=UPDATEDX5= Kenya Deportations: Taiwan drinks the heady gaoliang of febrile nationalism

Our bikes in Fenchihu on Sunday. We stopped to snack, parked by the motorbikes by the roadside. "You can't park them there," a vendor warned us. "The cops will give tickets to people who park in the street because people walk there. Better park them on the sidewalk." 

'Sovereign, like love, means anything you want it to mean; 

it's a word in dictionary between sober and sozzled.' -- R. Heinlein

(Updates at bottom)

So much going on in this crazy case of deportation of alleged Taiwanese fraudsters from Kenya to China. Haven't seen such a display of dysfunctional, febrile nationalism like this since Philippines coast guard evil Philippines coast guard shot murdered tuna poachers totally innocent Taiwan fishermen in Philippines waters Taiwanese waters (old post). The collective IQ of Taiwan's chattering classes has just gone kerplunk! somewhere into the Indian Ocean east of Mombasa. *sigh*

Lost in the tumescent twaddlenoise over this case is an opportunity for Taiwan. It also shows once again how the international media functions as a soft power tool for Beijing. I hope to work up a fuller treatment of that for something like CPI or Ketagalan out at the end of the week, but we can shed some light on it using this case...

Let's grab a couple of news reports first: from Reuters in the Kenyan Star Newspaper (how that brings back memories for me!):

The Kenyan government said the people were in Kenya illegally and were being sent back to where they had come from.

Kenya does not have official relations with Taiwan and considers the island part of China, in line with Beijing's position.

Taiwan's Foreign ministry said one of the Taiwanese sent to China was also a US national. The US State Department said it was aware of that report but was not able to discuss it at the moment "due to privacy considerations."

....

The Taiwanese government was incensed that Kenyan authorities used force , including tear gas, to get deportees out of a police station and into a plane on Tuesday. It has accused China of kidnapping eight of its nationals.

"They came from China and we took them to China. Usually when you go to another country illegally, you are taken back to your last port of departure," said Kenyan Interior ministry spokesman Mwenda Njoka.

He could not say which city in China they were being returned to, but Kenya Airways and China Southern both fly to Guangzhou.

Kenyan Foreign Affairs CS Amina Mohamed said Taipei had not contacted Nairobi about the matter. The protests came via a media briefing in Taiwan.

"We don't have official relations with Taiwan. We believe in the 'One China' policy. We have diplomatic relations with China. We haven't seen the official protest, we are actually hearing it from the media," Mohamed told Reuters.

A group of eight left on Friday and a second group of 37 Taiwanese nationals were in the process of leaving on Tuesday, Taiwan's Foreign ministry said.

Chinese Foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said Beijing approved of Kenya's upholding the 'one China' principle. He declined to elaborate.

Now yesterday from the Taipei Times the Ministry of Justice said that the deportations were legal and China had every right...

However, they said that Beijing acted in conformity with the principles on legal jurisdiction in having them deported to China, where the targets of the fraud schemes reside.

Tai Tung-li (戴東麗), deputy director of the ministry’s Department of International and Cross-Strait Legal Affairs, told a news conference in Taipei that the government had asked Beijing to deal with the eight Taiwanese in accordance with the Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement (海峽兩岸共同打擊犯罪及司法互助協議), and that they be released and sent back to Taiwan.

“Chinese government officials said they are investigating the Taiwanese suspects for fraud involving phone scams. As these cases took place in China, they were asserting their legal jurisdiction in having the Taiwanese suspects forcibly taken to China,” she said.

Tai said that the Chinese Ministry of Public Security had informed Taiwan’s Criminal Investigation Bureau that the eight were held in custody in Beijing on Monday, and promised to handle the case in accordance with the cross-strait legal agreement.

The government will send a delegation to China to negotiate the case, Tai added.
According to information released by Chinese authorities, the victims of the phone scams originating in Kenya were all Chinese citizens — not Taiwanese — so the suspects were deported to China for investigation, Tai said.

“The telecommunication facilities used to make the telephone calls were based in Kenya, so the fraud schemes took place outside of our country, so Taiwan does not have jurisdiction [over the case],” Tai said. “Therefore, China’s handling of the case conforms to principles of international criminal jurisdiction.”

As for reports that the Kenyan court had acquitted the eight, Tai said: “They were found not guilty on three of the charges, which were operating a telecommunications enterprise without a license, operating radio communications without a license and organized crime. The ruling did not involve the fraud charges. From an objective point of view, China made the deportation request to investigate the fraud charges.”

Today, thanks to the sudden wave of insensate nationalism sweeping the nation, the Ministry attempted to appear to reverse its position. Read what they said closely: same as yesterday, just different words.

Ibtimes report here observes:

The repatriated group's lawyer Steve Isinta said that police had told the group held at the police station to get ready because they would be leaving soon. He later received a message from one of his Taiwanese clients saying: "It's not our people coming for us," referring to the fact that Chinese officials had arrived at the police station instead of Taiwan representatives. Isinta said he did not hear from them after that.

Isinta told Quartz: "It was illegal for them to be deported. To be deported you have to have broken the law. It's because of pressure from China."

Isinta said that most Kenyans do not understand the controversy behind the deportation, nor do they care. Isinta has filed a motion to take the country's attorney general and the police chief to court over the detention and deportation of his clients following their acquittal.

Indeed, that last claim about Kenyans not caring seems quite true. I looked at a couple of papers, and the Kenyan papers seem to be relying on outside media services for their reports, like this AFP story on it in the Daily Nation.

The Daily Nation also featured another piece from AFP, which observed:

Asked to comment on the row Monday, China's foreign ministry said it needed to check on the details but "the One China policy should be upheld".

Check this Xinhua report (link) on the Public Security Ministry's comments on the case in Chinese. It focuses entirely on the criminal aspects, which are extensive. China says these and similar frauds have been raping Chinese citizens and all the victims are Chinese in this case. According to Xinhua, the gang set up in "dens of fraud" in Nairobi, and made internet calls to Beijing, Jiangsu, Hunan, Sichuan and nine other provinces and municipalities posing as Chinese public security authorities to commit fraud with initial estimates of millions of dollars. Old people, students, savings, -- all gone. The piece also complains that Taiwan just lets people go once they've been sent back here. China is not exactly blameless (can we have back all the criminals from Taiwan who have taken refuge there?) but they do make some strong points. It even refers to cooperation with Taiwan over similar fraud cases in SE Asia.

What's not in the report? Not even a boilerplate reiteration of sovereignty.

The foreign ministry spokesman just thanked Kenya for upholding the 'One China' policy and the foreign ministry backed that, but to my knowledge no official word concretely connected this case with the cross-strait sovereignty. No one has said "We deported them to China because they are all Chinese." The 'One China' mentions were boilerplate, trotted out on all diplomatic occasions. The same automated, unconscious words would have been uttered if Kenyan officials had hosted a tea party for Chinese diplomats.

This did not prevent BBC, always ready to screw Taiwan, from cleverly interpolating this boilerplate into its report (4th sentence) to make it look like the extraditions were related to the One China policy. Nice work, whoever did that.

Taiwan and all of its commentators here and abroad were presented with a golden opportunity NOT to make this thing about sovereignty, but instead to treat the case as a normal event between normal countries. To normalize relations between China and Taiwan. To say offhandedly "We hope that Chinese authorities will adjudicate the case in accordance with established international procedures and China-Taiwan agreements, and we are closely monitoring it. Now, moving on to the issue of falling exports and tax revenues..." That common sense move is exactly what our Ministry of Justice tried to do two days ago. Kudos to them.

Of course, Taiwan also had a chance to decouple an issue from the simpleminded sovereignty discussions in the international media. Tired of the international media's ignorant, interminable focus on Cross-Strait sovereignty issues? Stop playing that game. Instead we got total mediafail by our commentariat. The NYTimes report by the refreshingly competent Austin Ramzy was quite restrained, basically focusing on the diplomat spat, indeed, it was way more restrained than our own media. That's what we on the pro-Taiwan side should have encouraged all across the media, domestic and abroad.

Great job, guys.

Taiwan spokesman extraordinaire J Michael Cole is in CNN today on the issue, clearly identified as part of a Tsai Ing-wen funded organization (if Cole had China links, they probably would not have been so clearly identified). Sadly, Cole decided to run with the sovereignty issue and argue for other, more dubious links to odious Chinese behavior, when it could have been downplayed...

Besides the fact that the individuals were cleared of all crimes by a Kenyan court, their extradition to China, ostensibly due to pressure from Chinese officials, raises essential questions about the future implications of the "one China" policy in a time of greater Chinese assertiveness.

It didn't have to raise any "essential questions". It could have been kept as a simple issue of crime under international law. Sometimes a cigar should be permitted to be only a cigar: Cole should have moved to dampen the flames, not pour oil on them. I also can't resist pointing out that the individuals were not "cleared of all crimes" by the Kenyan court. They were cleared off all the crimes the Kenyan authorities brought to the court -- the fraud charges were withheld as the Taiwan Ministry of Justice said, probably because China wanted to prosecute those (that may have been why the Kenya authorities cleared them, so there would be no tussle about where they serve their prison sentences). China appears to have wanted to send a message, not about sovereignty, but about international crime (read the Xinhua report again. Note emphasis on tawdry fraud crime). It's been doing that for years, btw.

It doesn't raise any essential questions also because it has happened before, as I noted yesterday when I observed that everyone was barking up the wrong tree. In 2011 Philippines sent a bunch of alleged fraudsters back to China. Please enumerate the repercussions of that... O yeah, there weren't any. Well, there were -- all that assiduous pursuit of fraudsters in SE Asia by China over the last few years was probably a factor that sent them off to Kenya in the first place, where things are congenial for financial criminals.

Cole (and many others) have placed the extradition of alleged gangsters accused of being engaged in fraud in the context of the kidnapping innocent booksellers in Hong Kong (see this Reuters piece, for example). Turning fraudsters into heroes of dissent is a leap into an abyss where nobody should be going. Once again, the opportunity to normalize this behavior and separate it from the vile kidnapping of the booksellers by emphasizing the differences in the case was thrown away -- instead the abnormality and evil of the kidnapping of booksellers is blurred, denigrated.

Not only that, but the Hong Kong booksellers aren't even the right context -- the 2011 Philippines deportees are, and China's campaign against fraud in SE Asia. This is not a political crime issue, but a gangster crime issue.

Even the use of the term "kidnapping" is ill-advised. I do not know what the correct legal term should be, either deportation or extradition, but these men weren't "kidnapped". They were acquitted and given a fixed time to leave the country, then bundled off to the place they came from (you can't fly directly to Nairobi from Taipei, and the cheapest flights go through China. Hence Kenya seems to be correct). That's how the system works. People get deported to countries they are not citizens of all the time. That could have been invoked in this case -- instead of focusing on "China as China" the commentary could have stressed "China as a foreign country". You know, normalizing its distance from Taiwan.

It's quite true that China rushed to get them -- because once they got back to Taiwan, they would be out of Beijing's reach.

Cole claims that the 2009 crime-fighting agreement is a "dead instrument." Two days ago the Ministry of Justice said that China had notified Taiwan that the case will be handled in accordance with that. Let's wait and see on that, shall we?

Taiwan really ought to be going to bat for international law and its cross-strait agreements on crime, as the Ministry of Justice initially attempted to do. International law is one of the things that helps keep Taiwan out of Beijing's clutches -- heck, we could even have leveraged Chinese victimhood to support international law, in this case. Maybe we could have used this to get some of our own criminals there sent back...

Another lesson here is how, if you don't suppress the media's urge to make everything about the sovereignty issue, it will go right ahead and keep pointing that out, thus helping Beijing enforce its claims and make them known to the world.

Not only that, but once you claim that this is Beijing making trouble for Tsai, you've made trouble for Tsai that you didn't have to make.

Great work all around, folks.

It will, of course, have a temporary impact on Taiwan's attitudes toward China, but since they were largely negative anyway...

Finally, just as in the Philippines case, all this noise about "kidnapping", sovereignty, and the China threat may be out there to obscure an important truth that no one in Taiwan wants to face: one of Taiwan's chief exports is organized crime.

UPDATE: Julian Ku, the international law professor who tried to claim it was perfectly legal for China to maim and murder Taiwanese and annex their island (his political allegiance should be obvious if you find some of his stuff, so filter whatever he says hard), is cited in this NYTimes piece. NYTimes observes:

Deporting suspects to third countries is not illegal under international law, said Julian Ku, a professor of international law at Hofstra University.

China also has the right under international law to prosecute people suspected of committing crimes directed at Chinese territory, Mr. Ku said. “China makes a lot of bad arguments, but this one is pretty good,” he said.

But, complicating matters, China and Taiwan have abided since 2009 by their Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement, which formalized criminal-justice cooperation and established a procedure for each side to return the other’s citizens in legal cases. In a 2011 fraud case, 14 Taiwanese suspects who had been deported from the Philippines to China were sent back to Taiwan under the agreement.

Some experts suspect that China’s change in strategy is a deliberate warning to Taiwan’s newly elected president, Tsai Ing-wen, who will take office in May and has advocated an approach to cross-strait relations that is more cautious than her predecessor’s.

“The Chinese are definitely trying to send a message,” Mr. Ku said. “Before this case, the Taiwanese were used to being consulted by China. The level of trust that made the agreement work seems to have broken down.”

Recall that in the 2011 case, it took months of negotiations to get back the Taiwanese Manila sent to China. They didn't just send them back right away as NYT could be read to imply. Same thing will happen here.

Again, there's a context missing: if all those Taiwanese criminals residing in China who haven't been sent back are not a message to Ma Ying-jeou (and Chen Shui-bian) how is it that this one case is a message to Tsai Ing-wen? The Kenyan investigation long predates Tsai Ing-wen's election. The timing is a coincidence, unless you want to argue that Beijing arranged it with Nairobi (feel free). Because the negotiations will drag out for months, it is way too early to say how and whether China is cooperating.

UPDATE 2: Taiwan Law Blog summarizes the three positions of Taiwan, China, and Kenya.

UPDATE 3: Here is the Kenya Star Jan 2015 report of the original arrest of the Kenya 8, originally in Dec of 2014. You want to claim this is about Tsai Ing-wen, go right ahead. I'll laugh at you. Note that the list of charges is consistent with that offered by the Ministry of Justice in its original statement.

The eight were arrested at Ngong Avenue, Ngong, in December.

Their arrest came after 77 Chinese were arrested following a fire outbreak at their Runda, Nairobi, residence.

The 77 have denied the charges of illegally running a telecommunication system, conspiring to commit a felony and engaging in organised criminal activity.

Police suspect the foreigners may have been involved in bank fraud, money laundering and other serious financial crimes in other countries using the telecommunication equipment seized.

Here is what the Ministry of Justice said:

As for reports that the Kenyan court had acquitted the eight, Tai said: “They were found not guilty on three of the charges, which were operating a telecommunications enterprise without a license, operating radio communications without a license and organized crime. The ruling did not involve the fraud charges. From an objective point of view, China made the deportation request to investigate the fraud charges.”

The Ministry of Justice's initial statement that fraud charges were not pursued appears to be correct.

Now here is the follow up Jan 27 report from The Star. Note that the timing of the case was fixed back in Jan, when the men began serving a one-year term.

Here is another report of Taiwanese operating an illegal radio station (?) but I don't know if these are the same guys sent to China this week. This appears to be a related report from Dec of 2014. Tentatively, the 8 and 37 Taiwanese all appear to have been discovered in the same fire, but were handled separately.

UPDATE 4: Commenter observes:

According to today's China Post here is what happened to the Taiwanese that were eventually sent back from the PI five years ago.

"Two were found not guilty, while the rest were handed sentences ranging from one year and four months to three years and eight months under combined violations.

However, no one was jailed as the case allowed them to convert imprisonment into fines, Sun stated."

It confirms what China has been complaining about, and why they went to prosecute these people themselves.

UPDATE 5: Ministry of Justice testifies about Kenya case:

However, Chen stated that the preliminary investigation showed that the international fraud ring only targeted Mainland Chinese, and that there were no Taiwanese victims. “In spite of this, we will still send people to the Mainland to learn more about the case. In the past, Taiwanese suspects in similar cases were repatriated to Taiwan, but were later released because we had no jurisdiction. Therefore, this time we should be more cautious in dealing with the case,” stressed Chen.

UPDATE 6: The Nation newspaper of Kenya reported in Jan 2015 that China was asking for the prisoners. Taiwan has had a whole year to act on this. Either the diplomatic corps didn't care, or it was incompetent. It didn't move until it became a nationalist issue in Taiwan, and the government had to stoke cross-strait emotions to cover up the fact that it had dilly-dallied for a year, done nothing, and then been blindsided. Taiwan had a whole year to secure "due process".  Posted on it several posts above this one.

REF: The 2011 Phils case and China power.
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TAO WOW: The most important thing you will read this month on Taiwan

Betel nut trees removed from a hillside in Taichung

For a long time I've been resistant to concluding that Beijing was inept and ignorant of Taiwan affairs as so many have asserted privately to me. It looks like I was wrong to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt....

Solidarity translated two reports from Storm Media about Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). Apparently the anti-corruption drive has now reached into the TAO and is going after Chen Yun-lin...

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has stationed itself inside the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), serving notice to China’s Taiwan network and Taiwanese business community. An ROC (Taiwan) cross-strait official divulges that according to the information the office has gotten hold of, after Taiwan’s nine-in-one elections Chairman Xi Jinping in an internal meeting criticized former ARATS and TAO chief Chen Yunlin for his “erroneous methods” which had caused Taiwan policy to produce poor results. Hence, the CCDI’s investigation of Chen Yunlin [S.tw: more on that in the next report] is not just “wind blowing through an opening.” Our government source believes that the PRC anti-corruption campaign aside, the true purpose of the CCDI investigation is to put the nation’s Taiwan network on notice that policy work on Taiwan affairs will no longer run on mutual exchanges of benefits.

You have to read the entire thing, with its rumors, allegations, and descriptions of Beijing's leadership circles being unable to understand a thing about Taiwan even though media and social networks make things abundantly clear. Apparently, Beijing's spy network in Taiwan can't even read the newspapers. It is incredible how stupid things are...

A knowledgeable source says that the TAO’s reports had originally led Xi Jinping to believe that the KMT would hold onto Taipei City. When the TAO’s prediction was proven wrong, Xi was infuriated. He demanded the Taiwan network write a review report of what had happened. In the first report it submitted Xi, the Taiwan network repeated its past rhetoric by blaming the Democratic Progressive Party for “fanning the flames of the Taiwanese citizens.” Xi believed this report was unable to explain the real problem and demanded it be rewritten.

But wait, there's more...

However, last year as the anti-services pact controversy got hotter and hotter, there was word across the strait that Lai Xiaohua had embezzled at least US$10 million through different channels of the TAO and the Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland. When it became clear later that the organizations’ books didn’t add up, the TAO was forced to ask Taiwanese businesspeople to use the accounts of Taiwan Associations and the Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises on the Mainland to cover the hole. The Taiwanese businessmen were so infuriated by this request that they were speechless, but for the sake of their businesses they gave in and covered the loss.

According to a Taiwanese businessperson, when Chen Yunlin ran the TAO during Taiwan’s Lee and Chen administrations, Taiwanese investment in China was still not systematic, and cross-strait relations were not good, so most things were done through private channels. The line between personal investment and government Taiwan work was hazy. Hence, there have been many unproven rumors of beneficial relationships between China’s Taiwan hands and certain Taiwanese politicians and businessmen.

Such things have long been rumored, but there have been few articles on it. Solidarity and Ben from Letters from Taiwan talked about it on Twitter...

It's pretty obvious that the combination of authoritarian institutional arrangements -- where you can't speak truth to power because it will get you killed -- ideological blindness, faction politics, corruption, and incompetence have created a vast ignorance in Beijing. Cole notes:

For all his faults, Mr. Chen is being unfairly accused by a regime that, despite multiple occasions to learn from Taiwan’s open society, stubbornly refuses to acknowledge the drivers of Taiwan’s distinct identity. Beijing seems to regard the trend lines that indicate a rising self-identification as Taiwanese and single-digit support for unification as a sign that it — the TAO, ARATS — has failed to properly communicate with the Taiwanese people and explain why its Taiwan policy, which is largely influenced by a belief in economic determinism, should be embraced by its 23 million people. The problem is that Beijing appears to have become a victim of its own propaganda, a phenomenon that may have been exacerbated by the authoritarian nature of its political system which discourages officials from providing their superiors with information that doesn’t fit the accepted model.

Not just Beijing has bought into the economic determinism model. How many times has it been said since 2000 that annexation is inevitable and economics will make Taiwan just fall into Beijing's lap, ripe plumlike and all? Quite the opposite: the closer the two sides become economically, the more the Taiwanese reject China. Moreover, the golden age is over. A lot of people have yet to wrap their heads around that. No doubt in 2035 I'll wheeze into a bar in Taipei with my walker and IV drip, and some paleface will inform me with a patronizing sneer that close economic relations between Taiwan and China mean annexation is just around the corner...

Just envision, for a moment, Xi's alleged cluelessness on Taiwan and then extend this kind of information collection regime and response across all areas of China's government. Brr....
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Our Real Future of Integration with China: China warns Kinmen not to compete with Macao

Another glorious day of cycling in the mountains near my home.

Fortunately I have the text of the article, which I quote from... the key point is this:

China’s top official on Taiwan affairs has warned that Beijing will sever valuable transport and other ties with Taiwan’s outlying island county of Kinmen if it moves to develop an integrated resort.

Taiwan Affairs Office director Zhang Zhijun issued the extraordinary threat on Sunday as he toured Kinmen after talks with his Taiwanese counterpart, Mainland Affairs Council minister Andrew Hsia.

Kinmen business leaders cited Zhang as saying that Kinmen’s development “must follow the correct path” and warned the island against establishing a casino industry, “otherwise the small three links will most definitely be shut down”.

The “small three links” refer to direct transport, trade and postal connections between Taiwan-controlled Kinmen and Lienchiang (Matsu) counties and nearby Chinese port cities.

Getting gambling established on Kinmen is often mentioned as the end goal of the referendum on Matsu enabling casino gambling, since Matsu is unsuitable for a variety of reasons. The article observed:

However, since Sunday a number of DPP legislators have attacked Zhang’s comments as a slur on Taiwan’s autonomy, pointing out that China tolerates gaming facilities not only in its own territory of Macau, but also just across its borders with other countries.

How do you think Beijing will behave when it has actual control of Taiwan?

Isn't it good that ECFA has enhanced Chinese goodwill and favorable attitude towards Taiwan?
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Taiwan Voice on Zhang's visit

Kitteh is unhappy with Zhang.

I've been busy putting together a presentation so enjoy Taiwan Voice's reporting on the visit of Zhang Zhi-jun's visit to Taiwan. Click on Read More to see full report.... (Facebook).

Taiwan Voice:

Fourth and last day of Zhang Zhijun’s visit—Zhang cancels scheduled visits; Taiwan’s MAC still treated as nothing more than Zhang’s personal secretary.

Today (28th) at 2 AM, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) announced on short notice that Zhang Zhijun’s travel schedule will change. His scheduled visit to Kaohsiung’s Chien-Cheng Fish Harbor and The Lin Family Garden in Taichung have both been canceled. Also, instead of taking the high speed railway (HSR), they will drive to Taichung, due to the uproar Zhang caused when he arrived yesterday at the HSR station in Kaohsiung....

A Zhang Visit

An east coast river gorge.

NYT's Austin Ramzy on the Zhang visit to Taiwan. He cites Titus Chen of Political U, the old KMT political warfare college...

“Zhang Zhijun’s Taiwan trip is more of a P.R. thing than a real, substantial policy tour,” said Titus C. Chen, an associate research fellow at National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations in Taipei. “His agenda in Taiwan is to give the people, the government and the politicians in Taiwan more of a positive image of China.”

It's certainly a PR thing. But it's not aimed at the people of Taiwan, few of whom want to be part of China or believe that the PRC has any of the important interests in mind. China knows that. Rather, it is aimed at the domestic audience in China, to let them see how kind and generous the PRC is to Taiwan, what care it takes to do the right thing. So that the PRC can say to its people when it attacks Taiwan "look, we tried everything, but they wouldn't listen to reason..."

The real deal was the astounding middle finger the Ma Administration gave both the people of Taiwan and the United States. Vincent Chao at Thinking Taiwan has a good piece on the way the Administration is handing Beijing a veto over ascension to the US-led TPP:

In large measure, the visit to Taiwan by Taiwan Affairs Office Minister Zhang Zhijun (張志軍) has already been a success — at least for the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration. Both sides have agreed, over renewed public opposition, to quicken the pace of economic integration. More measures for Chinese tourists have been planned. And the government has again signaled that Taiwan’s economic fate relies, in fact, on China’s goodwill.

The message was driven home by the request for China to agree to Taiwan’s eventual membership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In a statement on Wednesday, Mainland Affairs Council Minister Wang Yu-chi (王郁琦) told his Chinese counterpart that inclusion in the regional trading regimes was a matter of “survival” for Taiwan’s economy.

Chao goes on to note that the US has made it clear that China's approval is not an issue for Taiwan's participation in the TPP. So why is the Ma Administration courting it? Just another service of Ma to Beijing, and just another way to keep irritating Washington to give the impression that Taiwan is a poor partner and should be abandoned.

Washington backs Ma to its own detriment.
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Daily Links:

• Peter Lee on Hillary and China. Lee would probably be more perceptive if he didn't engage so relentlessly in reductio ad Cold War. 
• WantChinaTimes sometimes has good articles on Taiwan. This one on the island's entrepreneurs trying to get their children into the family business is one of several with this theme they have run. 
• CPI blog on the China map changes. Ben Goren too.
• The demotion of the judge in the Wang Jin-pyng case is discussed in detailed piece in Taipei Times. The pattern of administrative punishment of judges who rule the "wrong" way is all too familiar, and also extends to other members of the judicial system. 

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Polls and Propaganda

Tiny, but effective.

The latest TISR poll on Ma, cross-strait affairs, etc, is out. Taipei Times summed it up:

Asked whether the relationship between Taiwan and China is “state-to-state,” 59.7 percent gave a positive response, up from 56.2 percent in a similar survey conducted by TISR in April last year, with 25 percent saying “no” and 15.3 percent declining to answer.

The survey, conducted on Monday and Tuesday, also found that 61 percent of those polled did not agree that Taiwan and “mainland China” belong to “one China,” while 26.8 percent agreed and 12.2 percent did not respond.

....

The strongest “one China” supporters in Taiwan appeared to be those who identified themselves as Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) supporters, the survey found, as 52.3 percent of them agreed that both sides belong to “one China,” 52.7 percent supported an alliance or unification, and 53.6 percent said they would accept a country with a new name.

That means better than 40% of KMT supporters don't support the Party's core mission. The poll also found that satisfaction for Ma was at 15.7%. The poll did not ask about the services pact, probably deliberately. This poll is basically consistent with the others that find a low level of support for his Administration and for Taiwan becoming part of China, as well as "compromises" like "One Country, Two Systems." Beijing's heavy hand in Hong Kong is having an effect on Taiwan. It seems that Ma's rule has actually made the nation more pro-independence. Imagine that.

Gearing up for the election in November, the KMT was on an all-out propaganda offensive for its precarious position in Taichung, where there is likely to be a hard fought battle in November, at least according to everyone I have talked to so far. The "Taiwan Competitiveness Forum" picked our Taichung as the most competitive city in Taiwan, and endorsed KMT Mayor Hu, according to a Taipei Times report. One said Taichung could become a "countryside city" if Hu is not re-elected. LOL. No doubt our awesome competitiveness is the reason so many gangsters have chosen our fair city as their base. Note that that very issue of TT hosted another article rating the city/county leaders from a local political magazine. For some reason Hu's awesomeness was less visible to that crowd, which ranked him four stars out of five. Can't please everybody, I guess.....
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Daily Links:

• Ketagalan Media on HoChie Tsai, the Taiwanese-American activist.
• Japanese Taiwan settler recruitment film from the 1930s: Youtube. What a strange collection of images of Japanese power.
• 300 year old Spanish Church in Taiwan found on Hoping Island
• The stooopid, it buuurrrnnnns. AntiWar.com writing on China. Only there can you deplore the use of the international court to resolve a dispute.
• Behind paywall: Time.com on the China threat to Taiwan
• FPIF on Taiwan's Sunflower movement: what does it mean for the TPP? From longtime journalist in Taiwan. 

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

The political role of "There is no consensus"

Waiting for people to hang out.

Was reading up on some notes of the presentation of Taiwan Defense Minister Andrew Hsia at one of the conferences on the 35th anniversary of the TRA. Hsia said the government recognizes three security threats:

1. unconventional threats - climate change, natural disasters.
2. "problems with Japan over the Diaoyutai," issue with the Philippines
3. biggest threat still the other side with its increasing defense budget since 1985.

I thought it was cool that global warming was the number one threat, and thought it was really stupid that the second one was Japan and the Senkakus/Diaoyutai (and Manila. LOL). I doubt many ordinary people see Japan as a threat. It really shows the insanity of the ROC position on the Senkakus, and also their important function as an irritant in Japan-Taiwan relations, cooling and complicating Japanese support for Taiwan.

The notes observed that Hsia's next point was that the government wants a prosperous and stable Taiwan without being coerced by China, based on the 1992 consensus. But interestingly, Hsia then said that due to the lack of mutual trust and Taiwan being a democracy, there is no consensus on how to handle China. Hsia then went on to claim that the KMT move toward Beijing was apolitical and pragmatic (how they love that word!).

You can see the political function of the constant claim about how there is no consensus from the KMT side right in Hsia's comments. The reason they keep reiterating that is (1) to cover the fact that there is indeed a consensus and (2) it permits them to do whatever they want -- they're not defying the consensus, right? -- and claim that since there is no consensus, they aren't being "political."
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Services Struggle

With the new legislative session slated to begin, the KMT and DPP struggle over the services pact. The situation is the same as it usually is -- the DPP wants the bill to be reviewed piece by piece, the KMT wants it up for a vote as a single package. The pact was actually passed last June but no date of implementation was set, meaning that the legislature can still prevent it from coming into force. ECFA, despite all the promises from the neoliberal crowd, has been a colossal failure for all but the rich and for organized crime; ordinary people have seen little or nothing. This has only increased suspicion of the services pact. If it comes into force soon, and has the same effect that ECFA has had, then it will negatively impact the KMT's 2016 election prospects.....
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Daily Links:

• Phils Prez sounds alarm on Chinese expansionism
• In an election in which the KMT might be vulnerable, we don't need the pan-Greens to splinter.
• James Wang on the abuse of the Cairo Declaration by the ROC: "In the days of court diplomacy, it was said that the job of the diplomat was to tell fibs to foreigners in the interest of his country. Under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has turned this principle on its head, lying to its own people in the interest of a hostile nation."
• Fagan frees a kingfisher.
• Battle of Fisherman's Wharf on the unknown airports of Taipei and other cool stuff.
• 2014 Sony World Photography awards

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Clarifying the Cross Strait Situation, Redux: Etzioni in The Diplomat

A Yanshui Street corner.

Amitai Etzioni, longtime international affairs expert, writes on the strategic ambiguity of the US commitment to Taiwan in The Diplomat....

True, even if the restraint both sides imposed on themselves (and on their respective hawks) is made more explicit, either side could violate it. However, the more explicit the agreement the less likely is that it will be subject to misunderstandings and the more likely it is to survive. It may well be impossible at this stage to turn the implicit understanding, such as there is – if there is one – into an explicit one; however, the more than it can be clarified and solidified, the more this important simmering point of conflict can be assuaged.

I am quite aware of the theories of the merits of “creative ambiguities”; they can enable one to squeeze extra leverage out of the relatively small amounts of power. In East Asia, however, they are much more likely to produce miscalculations and conflicts than significant gains.

Finally, reducing the tension on this issue would help to narrow the differences between the U.S. and China, especially if integrated into a more general policy of mutually assured restraint. That would encourage both states to focus on the many issues in which they have shared or complementary interests.

This is a common argument, and if the reader feels like searching the internet, many iterations of the call for clarifying or removing the ambiguity in the US commitment may be found over the years. The reason that such a move has never been made, however, is obvious: it's a really bad idea. Ambiguity serves the needs of all three governments and defuses tension, whereas clarity would lead inevitably to confrontation and increased tension.

To understand what would really happen, one only needs to look at other (bogus) territorial claims of China, such as Arunachal Pradesh, the Senkakus, and the South China Sea. In each of those cases, the sovereignty of the current possessor and the demands of China's manufactured claim are both clear, meeting Etzioni's demand for clarity. The result is that each claim is a zero-sum game which China treats as non-negotiable, meaning that each of these claims is in a state of permanent tension which cannot be resolved. Indeed, in the South China Sea violence has already occurred, most notably in the 1970s when China annexed 24 Vietnamese islands. It seems sometimes that IR theorists like Etzioni are unable to see China for the belligerent, intransigent, expanionist power that it is, and are thus unable to see the consequences of its positions clearly. Instead their theoretical frameworks fog over the grim reality.

In the Senkakus the situation is crystal clear: we have an exact analogy for Taiwan, a foreign territory, Japan, backed by the US with strong and periodically renewed clarity. Everyone knows that the Senkakus are currently Japanese, that China wants to annex them, and that the US will defend them.

Note first that the Senkaku situation is one marked by massive and escalating tension, one which increasingly appears will lead to war within a few years. Clarity has not lead to relaxation of tension; quite the opposite. It has lead to an increase and a polarization of tension.

The Senkakus also make clear another issue with clarity of commitment. Etzioni argues...

So this might be seen as a basis for an implicit agreement. We oppose a declaration of independence; China forgoes the use of force.”

...except that Etzioni doesn't make clear the clearly scary corollary of clear commitment: if China does use force, the US has to respond with force. D'oh. Last year China promulgated an illegal ADIZ over Japanese territory. This compelled the US to take action, to fly B-52s into the airspace to show Beijing that the US commitment remained and that its claims were bogus. Once the US clarifies its position on Taiwan, it no longer has wiggle room. The President's hands are tied. And what President wants that?

Clarity on the Senkakus also raises another issue: once you have clear lines, they are subject to the relentless nibbling that characterizes China's long-term strategy. The ADIZ is a good example of China constantly pushing, little by little, at the edges of the policy, forcing Japan to respond, which in turn enables China to label Tokyo "provocative" (astonishingly, Tokyo's PR campaign is even more inept than Beijing's). In the Taiwan situation Beijing does not have the leverage of clear lines. It has no idea what might happen and nothing to grab onto. This is one factor among many that leads, ironically, to restraint.

Finally, Etzioni fails to see why Beijing would never agree to such a deal, because something is missing from his writing: the people of Taiwan. Like so many in Washington, Etzioni imagines that the Taiwan issue is a Washington-Beijing issue, and can be addressed by joint action among the High and Mighty without paying any attention to the people of Taiwan, who, in the kind of realpolitik calculus that drives Washington thinking, exist, at best, merely to be betrayed. But of course this is rank nonsense. The starting point to any discussion of Whither Taiwan? has to be how the locals will react. Beijing understands this very well, Washington, not at all, as Etzioni's omission shows.

To accept a clear situation in which Beijing agrees not to use force if Washington doesn't back independence is, in essence, to accept an independent Taiwan. Taiwan doesn't want to be part of China; the only thing keeping Beijing in the local discussion is its threat to murder and maim the people of Taiwan if they don't annex themselves to China. Without the threat of war, Taiwan will simply (continue to) go its own way and will never voluntarily annex itself to China. Even Ma's pro-China policies are made possible only by the understanding that Beijing is underpinning Ma's strategies with its own threat of force. Beijing understands this perfectly, and thus, would never accept such a commitment. This whole discussion is pointless.

Further, the US already doesn't support Taiwan independence. What exactly does Beijing gain from a promise for the US to do something it is already doing without any horse trading?

No, the current lack of clarity suits everyone. It gives all three sides space to present to their domestic populations that everything is ok: Beijing can promise its rabid nationalists that annexation of Taiwan is, like fusion power, inevitable and always just around the corner, Taipei can promise its people that big brother in DC is going to watch over them, and the US can promise its people that confrontation is minimized and we haven’t promised to send good US boys to die in Asia again. It also permits both Beijing and Washington to pretend they are not in confrontation over Taiwan, relaxing tensions.

A little.
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Big By-election in Taichung Area...not really

A K-town street.

UPDATE: Low turnout leads to close victory for KMT by a mere 1200 votes after Yen Sr. won by 39,000 the last time. Much better than I expected the DPP to do. But it also goes to show how Taiwanese bitch about political corruption, and then, when given the clear choice....

By-election in Taichung District 2 looks to be an easy KMT win though the DPP is pushing hard for votes..... the Taipei Times reports:

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) appears to be hoping that a conflict between Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Yen Kuan-hen (顏寬恆) and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) could help it win tomorrow’s legislative by-election in Greater Taichung’s second electoral district.

Wait...what is the conflict the DPP hopes to exploit?

“Ma, who is the KMT’s chairman, has not campaigned for Yen, and Yen has not used the KMT’s logo during his campaign, nor has he emphasized that he represents the KMT,” DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) said at a campaign stop in Greater Taichung.

...and the situation?

The DPP has promoted the by-election as a vote of no confidence in Ma’s governance in an apparent effort to neutralize the Yen family’s strong political presence in the electoral district, a traditional KMT stronghold which includes the districts of Shalu (沙鹿), Longjing (龍井), Wurih (烏日), Dadu (大肚), Wufeng (霧峰) and part of Dali (大里).

The Yen family is the family that runs the big Matsu procession that terminates at the Dajia temple (Check out this informative post from two years ago). Its patriarch Yen Ching-piao himself is a former KMTer who parted ways with the KMT because he was... umm.... too colorful. In reality he's independent of the KMT in the sense that the Byelorussian SSR was independent of the USSR, as I noted before. Yen Sr. is reliably pro-KMT and pan-Blue and Yen Jr. is running as a KMT politician. Yen is probably the most representative local politician in Taiwan, making a fortune from gravel operations, running a powerful political patronage empire, with tight links to the ruling party, and also cultivating links to China through religious and business links. I've noted on several occasions that one of the most important beneficiaries of the burgeoning cross-strait relationship is cross-strait organized crime. Actually I don't even know why I wrote that last sentence. It has nothing to do with the rest of the paragraph. Did I mention that Ma hilariously appointed Yen Sr. the Administration's ECFA spokesman?

But anyway, the Yen family comprises one of the most powerful political patronage networks on the island. They are solidly behind the son. The dearth of Ma and other senior figures is probably not indicative of any split, but rather is more likely a wish to avoid calling undue attention to the KMT's deep and abiding involvement with...colorful local figures (like Ma's secretary planning major gangster funerals here or the massive wedding of Yen Ching-piao's son attended by KMT bigshots here/here), or even more likely, the Yen family's lock on Taichung 2 is so strong that bringing out the big guns isn't necessary. As Frozen Garlic noted a while back:

There are two interesting stories.  Most of the attention will be on the contest to fill the empty Taichung 2 seat, so let’s start with that one.  The Taichung 2 district boundaries were drawn specifically for Yen Ching-piao.  His best town, Shalu, was put into Taichung 2 with the rest of his base instead of Taichung 1.  This created a bit of a population imbalance as well as a political imbalance, since the blue camp is quite a bit stronger in Taichung 2 than Taichung 1 and Shalu, where the KMT is particularly strong, exacerbates the difference.[1]  In fact, Taichung 2 is easily the blue camp’s strongest district in the old Taichung County.

I don't give the DPP much of a shot here to win. I think they can best hope to play the better-than-expected card when it's all over.
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Daily Links:

• Movies of life in Taiwan from the 1950s
• China Post commentary argues that KMT is headed for dismal showing in next local elections and so no one wants to challenge Ma for Chairmanship.
• Genetic studies show powerful evidence that Polynesian explorers brought the sweet potato from South America back to Polynesia. Thor Heyerdahl lives!
• Taiwan and China National Palace Museums to do exchange?
• Chinese tourist quotas to be raised. "On the evening of January 22, the Tourism Bureau announced that the quota on Mainland tour groups would be increased from 4,000 to 5,000 per day, while the quota on Mainland individual tourists would be increased from 1,000 to 2,000 per day."

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums! Delenda est, baby.

Ma's New Year Speech 2013

Backyard daisy, up close.

Today's New Year's Day Speech from the President offered some real head-scratchers, like this statement:

In the future, the government's industrial policy must concentrate on boosting local employment and increasing people's incomes. For our policy to attract more foreign investment, we need to break free from traditional approaches, which are over-reliant on tax breaks and low labor costs.

Right, we have to break free from traditional approaches... what's the Ma Administration policy for bringing back Taiwanese firms to Taiwan? I blogged on it a while back: it's tax breaks and low labor costs -- the formation of "free economic zones" (read: traditional industrial and science parks) where labor laws don't apply and more foreign workers can be imported. Not surprisingly, the proposals have been excoriated for their obvious tendency to promote traditional resource- and labor-intensive industries.

But the really fun part was President Ma once again displaying his ideological roots in the bygone security state era with reference to the Chineseness of Taiwan, in context of cross-strait relations:

The people of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are all ethnic Chinese. We are all descended from the legendary Emperors Yan and Huang.

Ma's powerful ideological commitments to this conception of Taiwan as "Chinese" which dominate his thinking, Han Chauvinist to the core. Note that the speech contains no references to Taiwanese culture or Taiwaneseness. Ma wrote on his Facebook page before the election, which I blogged on:

“I am a descendant of the Yellow Emperor in blood and I identify with Taiwan in terms of my identity. I fight for Taiwan and I am Taiwanese,” Ma wrote on his Facebook page on Tuesday. “In nationality, I am a Republic of China [ROC] citizen and I am the president of the ROC.”

Ma is Taiwanese only for the sake of elections, and only to the minimal extent necessary. That post contains several examples of the way Ma downplays Taiwaneseness into a subclass of Chineseness. Here in today's speech he simply eliminates the idea that there is any significant difference between Taiwanese and Chinese, and the aborigines, immigrants, and others who are Taiwanese simply vanish. Ma's thinking on this, like the KMT, is based on the archaic idea of "blood".

When Ma asserts that the people on the two sides of the Strait are Chinese he is also implicitly asserting that they are all part of China. It is an article of faith among right-wing Chinese ideologues like Ma that everyone who is Chinese should be incorporated into a single super-state. Thus, to assert that group X is Chinese is to assert that they should be annexed, as we have seen with both Taiwan and with the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which PRC officials have said is Chinese since its ethnic Tibetan inhabitants are "Chinese."

Ma returns to the theme of Chineseness at the end of the speech:

My fellow citizens, please rest assured that no matter how difficult and hazardous the world may be, as long as we remain confident, work as one, seek reform, and skillfully marshal the forces of progress, we can surely achieve positive things and create a new future for the Chinese society.

...not a new future for "Taiwan."
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Daily Links:

• A PR strategy for Taiwan's military
• Taiwan transitions to all-volunteer military
• Taiwan needs a new approach to emerging markets

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums! Delenda est, baby.

Yuan Clearing MOU signed....

Dollar elbowed aside, reports the CNA:

The MOU, signed between the central banks of Taiwan and China, will pay the way to allow direct exchanges between the Taiwan dollar and the Chinese yuan, so that businessmen will no longer have to use the U.S. dollar as a medium for currency exchanges between the two sides, said Yeh Hui-te, deputy chairman of the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots.

The banks "can help us save time and losses incurred from currency exchanges, so this is definitely a good thing," said Yeh.

However, some of the businessmen voiced concerns such as whether a daily currency exchange limit will be in place. In Hong Kong, the daily currency exchange ceiling is 20,000 Chinese yuan (US$3,139.80).

Taiwan's central bank governor, Perng Fai-nan, told reporters earlier in the day that the MOU is just a starting point for cross-strait currency settlement and that further negotiations will be required to iron out the details of the mechanism.

As for when Taiwan will begin to introduce yuan-denominated financial products, Perng said this will depend on how large the yuan market in Taiwan becomes and also on the types of products released by the banking industry.

One fork of China's Yuan strategy is clearly to reduce the role of the dollar. In simple terms, Bloomberg notes:

After the deal becomes effective in about two months, Taiwanese banks will be able to take yuan deposits and convert yuan into the New Taiwan dollar. The conversion will allow Taiwanese investors on the mainland to cut foreign exchange costs by skipping the current process of first converting their yuan earnings into U.S. dollars.

Another Bloomberg piece says....

China has been expanding its currency relations with trade partners to promote greater use of the yuan in global trade and investment. Nations including Singapore, Japan, and Thailand have signed similar deals with the world’s second-biggest economy as part of their efforts to reduce reliance on the dollar. Exports account for more than two-thirds of Taiwan’s economy and some 30 percent of shipments are bound for China.

“It’s a good development as there’s huge demand for yuan in Taiwan,” said Penny Chen, who helps oversee $160 million in yuan assets as a fund manager at Manulife Asset Management Co. in Taipei. “Taiwan’s exporters and small-to-medium enterprises will be able to reduce transaction costs.”

Taiwan meanwhile wants into the lucrative Yuan clearing business, a business also being pursued by London and other financial centers, and currently a big business in Hong Kong, business Taiwan wants to poach. Bloomberg also identified another factor in the deal:

Taiwan also hopes to attract wealthy Chinese to park their yuan funds on the island, said Norman Yin, professor of finance at Taiwan's National Chengchi University, noting that China has seen an increasing amount of capital outflow despite its foreign exchange control.

"Compared with Hong Kong, Taiwan has more advantage in the wealth management business because its transactions do not come under China's watchful eyes," Yin said.

Yes! We can take those corrupt Yuan gains and hold them as deposits outside China's control here in Taiwan. Wheee! And of course, a key beneficiary will be cross-strait organized crime, one of the major beneficiaries of cross-strait rapproachment, which will be able to repatriate its gains as Yuan holdings to Taiwan banks, as "foreign" cash holdings whose interest will be capital gains and thus, tax-free. Am I ever in the wrong business....

As the several articles note, this is only an MOU and the details need to be worked out. So all this celebration may come to nothing once everyone sits down with their own agenda....
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Daily Links:

• Wendell Minnick at DefenseNews reports on a report that Taiwan is resisting Chinese assimilation. Note the details about Taiwan's ammunition status.
• Great guide to Kaohsiung
• A Hungry Girl eats Singapore/French

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums! Delenda est, baby.

DPP's Establishment of Dept of China Affairs Media Q&A

Keelung evening.

Media Q and A with DPP Chair Su Tseng-chang on the Department of China Affairs
July 25, 2012

Q: You mention that creating the Department of China Affairs is a first step, but creating the department with the name of "China" instead of "cross Strait", is that a sort of discount to its credibility?

A: The DPP highly values China by creating the Department of China Affairs, and this is showing, as well as a first step, towards goodwill intentions. Using "China" is a neutral term, China calls itself China, and the whole world knows it as China. The DPP already made a resolution to call it by this name.

Q: Has the name of "China Committee"(the future higher ranking one) been finalized?

A: The name is not the most important issue here. We can call it China Affairs Committee or by another name, and this is a decision that I will fully respect. This is something that we can all discuss. The main objective of a Committee is to be able to invite important members of our party as well as civic organizations and members of the academia to give their opinions, gathering different perspectives on the term for China.

The Committee will serve as a platform for everyone's perspectives and to strengthen communications in order to integrate the different views and form a large consensus for the party. Then we must go through the party mechanisms to make a lasting resolution.

The most important issues here is to be consistent for Taiwan's benefit, meeting the people's interests and expectations - all in line with the fundamental values of the DPP. We wish for this Committee to remain wide open instead of boxed in from the beginning. In addition to the current resolutions already in place for the DPP, and facing with the different circumstances in China, there is certainly room for discussion.

The role of the chair is to integrate the Committee into a platform and to formulate at the end, the best policy solution. In my view, the DPP has its own stand, viewpoints and values, but towards China's transformation, the DPP's attitude, method and strategic solutions do not have limitations. The DPP has chosen to express goodwill, showing an active and confident position towards engagement with China. In regards to how China will respond, the DPP will not make any forecasts, but we hope for a mutual relationship, not just unilateral. The DPP makes this type of goodwill hoping that both sides can achieve better developments.

Q: Will he DPP go to the other side(China) to establish a fortified point?

At this stage, the DPP does not have any plans to do that, and I am afraid that the current conditions are not so simple. After all, this is a matter for both sides to discuss. The DPP is a responsible political party, and the DPP must conduct its affairs step by step once it senses there is a mature atmosphere for these kinds of planning.

Q: If any DPP public official wishes to visit China, do they need the approval of the DPP Headquarters? For China, the DPP must abandon its independent stance in order to carry out exchanges. Do you wish, after showing goodwill, that China makes any concessions?

A: There are already regulations in place for DPP public officials making visits to China. In regards to the DPP persistence in its basic standpoints, China has in the past made such demands, but China has also changed its position. The DPP has its own stands and viewpoints, which are namely to build stability for national interests and for sovereignty. However, what is different now is that the DPP in the past did not carry out any exchanges with China, but now we have gradually made more interactions, and this is a good start.
(Chinese translation below, click READ MORE)
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Daily Links:

• Five Flashpoints in the South China Sea
• Yup, China forced removal of the ROC flag from the Olympic site. As J Michael points out, the rule on national flags refers to Olympic venues, not Regent Street. Sad.
• We landlubbers are delighted to learn that James Holmes, the naval strategy specialist with an interest in Taiwan, is writing regularly now at The Diplomat.
• Condolences to James Soong, whose wife died today.

TVBS: Public Kinda of One Mind on One Country Two Areas

Love locks on a pedestrian bridge across the tracks at the Fengyuan Train Station in Fengyuan. Wiki: "local legend holds that the magnetic field generated by trains passing underneath will cause energy to accumulate in the locks and fulfill the wishes".

A new poll from the rabidly pro-KMT TV station TVBS shows that Ma's China policies remain unpopular, perhaps more so than they have ever been. 55% of those polled oppose former KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung's idea of "One Country, Two Areas", with only 19% agreeing and 27% undecided. This outcome is interesting in light of the poll's other findings....

....Since Ma took the throne in 2008, support for independence and Taiwanese identity have both been growing. The latest poll says:  69% favor independence but only 16% support unification if only these two choices are given. Consider that independence is at ~70% but objection to "One Country, Two Areas" is 15% lower. Someone needs to do some very detailed polling on what "independence" means because there are obviously some minds which find One nation, two areas compatible with independence. Perhaps a large segment of the population simply believes that all the talk is just so much sound and fury, signifying not much. After all, an announcement by an Honorary Chairman for Life who has no formal government position really means diddly -- it gives the government the chance to float the trial balloon, gauge the reaction, and deny that anything happened, if necessary.

Among the young support for independence reaches 80% -- only 12% want to be annexed to Beijing.

The numbers are similar but a little higher for Taiwanese identity. More interestingly, with three possible choices -- clever of TVBS to offer these choices -- hardly anyone sees themselves as solely Chinese (3%). 54% are Taiwanese and 40% are both.

Some 55% support Ma's handling of the cross-strait relationship, with 29% satisfied. Just 41% believe that the cross-strait agreements are beneficial to Taiwan, 25% say not beneficial, 19% have no position. 59% say Ma leans too close to China.

What it really means is that Ma has done a good job of positioning himself as a safely centrist politician -- at least 70% of the public is pro-independence, which means that 30% are not, yet Ma got 51% of the vote.   Lots of pro-KMTers are pro-independence. There was a steady stream of complaints from the public about Ma being to close to China even before the election, but Ma still won.

As I've noted before, the "Taiwanese identity" includes the KMT and thus, when people identify themselves as "Taiwanese" they are not identifying themselves as potential pan-Green voters or potential pro-independence types (more people are "Taiwanese" than support independence) or Taiwan nationalists or anything else reflecting the fantasies of certain types on the pro-Taiwan side (note how the score for the solely Taiwanese identity falls when three choices are offered). As I said before, I suspect that being "Taiwanese" is a kind of not- identity -- in this case, a large part of the "Taiwanese" identity is not-China in the way that Canada is a not-America. The "positive" identity: what being Taiwanese/Taiwan/ROC means is still being worked out.

Thus when Wu Po-hsiung goes to Beijing and says "One Country, Two Areas" that is rhetoric locals have been listening to their whole lives from people like Wu, whose behavior, after all, is part of their 'Taiwanese' identity -- indeed, if TVBS' numbers are right, about 40% of the population has a Taiwanese-Chinese identity that is congenial to if not compatible with, just that position. How can it threaten them? The constant flow of such propaganda has normalized the presence of such statements in everyday discourse and thus they can't threaten the "negative consensus" on what Taiwan is not because Wu didn't bluntly and directly say that Taiwan = China ("overlapping territories" under the One China rubric) and in any case has no power to make a formal change in the relationship. Plus ca change...

Moreover, consider an even simpler interpretation -- at any given time 50-55% disapprove of the President and 25-30% approve. This seems like something close to the "natural level" of satisfaction with the President in Taiwan irrespective of what is asked.
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums! Delenda est, baby.

Arthur Waldron on Taiwan, China, the US, and the future

Waldron wrote the following for:

2011 TNSI International Symposium on the Regional Security of Asia Pacific and Peace in the Taiwan Strait.  Wednesday, September 7, 2011. 9:00 a.m. - 4:30 p.m. Ambassador Hotel Taipei in Taiwan 

It was picked up by a local blogger who apparently typed it up; Waldron sent around this corrected version. I post it here with his permission and my pleasure. To make the font larger just hit CTRL+.

The product of forty years of observation, this letter has some useful and important insights.

++++++++++++++++++

Esteemed colleagues and friends,

I trust this finds you well.  You did me a very great honour by inviting me to your meeting in early September.  Sadly that fell exactly in the first week of classes at Penn so I could not possibly attend, which was a great disappointment.  Then I thought of writing a paper, but I am busy with a book so I finally decided that a more informal letter could nevertheless convey what I feel needs to be said.

Immediate Concerns:

Autocratic China’s ever-increasing entanglement with the free world is my chief source of worry.  We have now reached the point where freedom is being restricted in various places (e.g. in Indonesia, over the Falungong radio station) out of deference to China.  In the West we have “Confucius Institutes” and “Confucius Classrooms” where the tendentious P.R.C. version of Chinese civilization and history is taught.  These in turn endanger real scholars and their independence, as is increasingly clear on campuses where administrations, eager for money, tend to assume that anyone with a Chinese face knows more about that country than any Westerner, no matter how learned.  The leading Chinese-language newspapers in the United States are effectively controlled by China.  We have substantial inserts in English-language newspapers such as the New York Times and Washington Post paid for by Beijing.  Taiwan no longer speaks up robustly for freedom.  With people like Ambassador Chas Freeman and Admiral Owens now tied into the Chinese monetary rewards system, the Chinese government is increasingly influential in internal American decision-making processes.

Now the talk is whether or not to go on supporting Taiwan.  China threatens unspecified “fiscal measures” to punish the United States for Taiwan arms sales, though these are already substantially held up by officials in Washington who are worried lest the façade of normal relations between China and the United States should begin to crack.  For the first time in thirty years, foreign policy commentators have begun to discuss whether friendship with Taiwan is an asset or a liability.

The thirty two years since the U.S. and China established relations have taken their toll on relations with Taiwan.  China may not be in any way genuinely wealthy, but the government has enough money to wield influence.  Furthermore, even as Taiwan studies have emerged as a distinct academic area (good news) the rising generation of Asian specialists is less likely to have visited or studied in Taiwan.  Many know only simplified characters.  The tendency is to assume that one way or another Taiwan will join China rather as Hong Kong did.

Finally we have the lesson of the Ma administration’s attempts to reconcile with China, and in so doing also follow pretty much the path that many in Washington have long wished a Taiwan government to follow.  Remarkable to me is how little concrete Taiwan has gotten out of this.  China is unwilling to make substantive concessions, but seeks rather to manage Taiwan more and more, while continuing her military build up and her attempts to cut Taiwan off from the world community and trade, unless mediated through Beijing.  China has not really reciprocated Ma’s efforts.  Perhaps more significantly, neither has the United States.  I do not suspect his efforts will be crowned with success over arms sales.  Both take him as a useful transitional figure, who will bring the two countries that much closer to merger.  Little sense exists that Taiwan has value in herself, as a democracy and as a strategic ally and that Taiwan’s president should be supported in the interests not least of better cross straits relations.

Nor is there much understanding of how intertwined are Japanese and Taiwanese interests.  Almost any attack on Taiwan would involve violating Japanese territory (in the north and east) while the loss of Taiwan would strip [[Japan] of a crucial buffer and constrict her strategic space.

For now Washington is focused on somehow salvaging a relationship with China, rather than on improving her relations with her proven and democratic friends in Asia.  This is most unwise, but not surprising.  “China” has a deep hold on the American subconscious.

If present trends are simply extrapolated, then, we all have much reason for concern.  That said, the situation is in endless flux and my own belief is that if Taiwan can focus on her own interests, avoid damaging political division, and keep on having elections, then she will survive.  I have often said that I expect in twenty years that an elected president and legislature will still exist in Taiwan, while what shape China will have no one can say.

Changing Medium and Long Term Trends:

Many people today are profoundly impressed by China: not only by her rebuilt cities with their forests of skyscrapers, luxury shops and fashionable restaurants, but also by her developmental model.  I find it astonishing how we are able to carry on routine relations with China even as that country is torturing dissidents and groups such as the Turks and the Tibetans, constraining the press ever more tightly, and still relying on a manipulated exchange rate to underpin her export advantages.  No question exists in my mind that the leadership in Beijing has been surprised by “their” success (more a product of getting out of the way and letting ordinary people get ahead).  This is reflected in their more confident and monitory tone in addressing the world; in the sense that it is time to make some waves, change some rules, acquire some more territory—and to discipline e.g.  the United States and Japan.

The seemingly impressive success is nowhere near so complete as it seems.  Growth and employment even in prosperous areas are increasingly sustained by the use of borrowed money to pay for “investment” that is counted as an increment of GDP.  More than fifty percent of China’s growth rate now has such a source.  Furthermore, much of this investment involves wasted capital.  Economic decisions are not made rationally but rather by fiat influenced by political needs and as I have argued elsewhere (in my lectures at Tokyo University last year) China’s actual production remains wasteful of resources and inefficient.  The artificially cheap currency is what sustains exports.

We know that substantial dissatisfaction exists with the system.  We have now reached the stage where named dissidents and regime critics are known in the outside world.  We know also that hundreds of millions of Chinese continue to live in abject poverty.  We know that demonstrations and riots against the authorities number something like 200,000 per year.  I believe that the present system cannot be sustained indefinitely and will have to change—either through planned reform, or through breakdown and disorder.  Both of these inescapable choices are highly unwelcome to the current ruling class, which is why I continue to maintain that China’s greatest challenges lie in the future.

The Chinese authorities have no plan for dealing e.g. with freeing of speech and establishment of responsible government.  As a Chinese writer put it so aptly after the horrible Wenzhou train crash, we Chinese are all passengers on a high-speed train that is going very fast, on unproven track, toward a destination that has never been specified.  No official in China has ever said where “reform” is intended to take the country.

Furthermore, elite opinion in China is clearly divided.  We saw that in the incident of the Confucius statue in Tiananmen Square.  First it appeared.  That meant that a long planning process had been followed, the statue designed, its placement determined (if it had been originally intended for the Museum, it could have been sent directly), a planning process that almost certainly involved the highest officials in the land.  That means there was a pro-statue faction.  But then the statue was removed.  That means that an anti-statue faction existed or emerged strong enough to reverse an original, carefully deliberated, and long term decision.

We may expect, then, a period of uncertainty and transition in China, with possible social unrest, political factionalism, and so forth, even including violence.  My fear is that Japan, Taiwan, and other countries will become so closely tied to China that they will be destabilized too when China is, rather than being buffered.

This period of transition will have effects around the world and across Asia.  These will be major but at present imponderable.  Few governments—certainly not that of the United States—have considered how they will react when the present shaky equilibrium gives way.  We still treat China as a monolith and put all too much credence in what the current leadership says, while ignoring obvious trends.  One of these days Washington will receive conflicting messages from different factions in Beijing.  No one, I think, has any idea what we will do.  Taiwan’s government, too, tends in my opinion to expect China to continue more or less as she is now, indefinitely.  What will Taipei do when like Washington they face conflicting demands and suggestions from China? All of this will lead to substantial disorder in Asia and the world.

In Tokyo and Taipei skyscrapers are designed to survive major earthquakes.  The policies of Taiwan and Japan should similarly be designed to survive whatever ripples of instability propagate out from China in the years ahead.

Recent Developments:

Last year I spoke of the “new conditions” existing in Asia as the result of a fundamental shift in Chinese policy to external activity, policing, enforcing claims, and so forth.  This year, I think, the existence of those “new conditions” will begin to be accepted by Washington—and I hope by the Taiwan government—no doubt unwillingly.  How the recognition that China has qualitatively changed her approach will affect Taipei and Washington is the single most important question to be followed in the years ahead.

For forty years American policy has been based on a conviction that when all was said and done China and the United States would be friends.  The only problem separating them, as China repeatedly insisted, was Taiwan—and a belief that this was the case led many policy-makers to marginalize Taiwan in the interests, as they imagined, of the China relationship.

Since the arrival of the Ma administration, Taipei has cooperated more closely with both Beijing and Washington than any previous Taiwan government.  The Ma assumptions have been effectively those of the United States: That China was fundamentally a status quo power destined for a “responsible stakeholder”[1] role in Asia, which meant that cross strait relations could be opened up and the military downgraded without any actual threat to Taiwan’s security and democracy.

Now in a little over twelve months all of that has changed and the so-called “Washington Consensus” is shambles.  From our point of view, the question is how long it will take Washington and Taipei to recognize this fact, for the roots of this policy are deep and go back very far.  Some quite literally can imagine no other.

No longer is Taiwan the only issue.  Instead the entire 648,000 square miles of the South China Sea have been claimed by China as a sovereign “core interest.” China has once again begun to interfere with American operations in international water and air space.  Already relentless pressure against Japan has been increased.  Vietnam is alarmed.  Even the Philippines, who without thinking broke their alliance with the United States decades ago, are now scrambling to defend themselves as China claims their offshore islands.  India is concerned about many things including the clear pattern of Chinese base building around her and the permission China has obtained for seabed exploration in the Indian Ocean.  Whether the United States, and China’s neighbours, and Taiwan like it or not, these actions represent a clear long term shift in China’s policies.

This change is already having effects.  Joseph Nye (b.  1937) published an article earlier this year in which, while acknowledging that China’s new policy was beginning to create a countervailing coalition against her, he nevertheless counseled continuing openness, trade, and engagement.[2] As a friend noted to me, the article effectively asserts that enmity between the United States and China is impossible: that she will be our friend whether she likes it or not.  This is not a tenable position.  If China wants to make trouble, she will and we cannot stop her.

At about the same time Henry Kissinger (b. 1923) published, On China, a book that, as I pointed out in a review in the Weekly Standard,[3] is permeated by a deep pessimism about the possibility of Chinese-American friendship absent the common enemy of the Soviet Union, indeed apprehensive about conflict.  This is remarkable coming from the pen of a man whose greatest achievement was the Chinese-American rapprochement of the 1970s, and who is personally very sympathetic to the P.R.C., which, among other things, has made him rich.

Kissinger’s pessimism, however, is supported by China’s rush to develop access denial strategies against United States forces and “assassin's mace” weapons to cripple U.S.  capabilities.  These developments, feeding into the consciousness of the United States governing establishment, will inescapably lead to changes in American policy.

Nor has any diminution been discernible in the ongoing Chinese build up against Taiwan.  I often reflect what a boost Ma would have received if China had pulled back her missiles upon his election (militarily not a very meaningful gesture, though it would increase warning time).  But China is incapable of making any gesture that actually reduces her coercive power; only symbolism and talk are acceptable.  Now, as Ma’s election chances look increasingly uncertain, rumours are that China is seeking to persuade the United States to offer visa-free access to Taiwan nationals, in order to help Taiwan’s president.  The big gestures she could make are never carried out, because her long-term policy is to make small gestures to keep Taiwanese happy, while undermining the country’s security position, by cutting off arms supplies from America and excluding her from trade.

Many in Taiwan see this as a “pro-blue” policy by China but it is not.  Their goal is to have their Chinese run Taiwan, as they do Hong Kong.  The blues are simply seen as the more useful interlocuters for now, to be discarded in favour of fully pro-China personnel when the situation makes it possible.  China has little use for a Ma, or a Lien Chan, or a James Soong, except as transitional figures, to be used and then discarded when the time comes.

As I see it, the greatest geopolitical danger right now to Taiwan is that she will be drawn into some sort of “cooperative” policy on behalf of the abstract “China” to claim the South China Sea and other disputed territories for the People’s Republic.  In her interests Taiwan is in fact no different from Japan or Korea or the ASEAN countries—she should not wish Chinese influence over her to increase.  But Chinese nationalism, and a self-deceiving belief that the P.R.C. will somehow recognize Taiwanese—especially those born in China or having Chinese parents—as somehow equal—are an intoxicating brew.  In fact China does not share any sort of power or recognition of status and rights with her own people, so how could one reasonably expect her to extend such recognition to people who are in some sense their adversaries?

My sense is that the tide of Chinese assertion and confrontational policy is now running faster than the attempts at self-deception in Taipei and Washington. What this means is that, perhaps in the course of the coming year, both capitals will begin to recognize the change in China’s policy and the need to react to it.  This has still not happened in the United States, where we pursue, like ardent suitors, meaningless military to military contacts with China, giving up real interests to get them.  Washington theorists are still full of ideas about U.S. Chinese cooperation.  Indeed, this is the first year in decades that serious talk has begun about Taiwan as an obstacle, an unwanted friend that should be discarded.  Worrying as I find such talk, I believe it will be overwhelmed fairly soon by the reality of e.g.  ever more tense Japanese-Chinese, Indian-Chinese, Vietnamese-Chinese, Philippine-Chinese, including American-Chinese relations.

To sum up, the international context of China-Taiwan relations is rapidly changing.  The question that follows is, what should Taiwan do?

How Should Taiwan Navigate?

Realistically I see no chance that Taiwan will be able to win, in the short run, over the increasing tendency to state that she is part of China—after all, a version of that view is espoused by her own government.  Nor do I think that the current flag of convenience, the Republic of China, can or should be changed abruptly.  My reasoning is as follows.  Every day that Taiwan remains in fact independent of China—and the elapsed time is now approaching seventy years—seems to me to increase the possibility that Taiwan will eventually emerge free.  The challenge is not to increase that international freedom now—the world situation will permit only small, symbolic moves—but rather to ensure that it is not compromised by unwise statements or actions by the current government.

I would urge strong action in two areas.  The first is in the redirection of international focus to the fact that Taiwan is a democracy and the only one in the world of huaren.  This is an enormous achievement, and although it is threatened every day by arbitrary government actions, such as the selective prosecution of some figures while the deeply corrupt Kuomintang escapes scrutiny, I believe it will be maintained.  Too many people see Taiwan only in a geopolitical way.  They have to see what has happened in Taiwan as part and parcel of the century old transformation that has made so much of the world democratic—and left China an outlier.  Taiwan must not be afraid to condemn human rights abuses in China, to provide support to democrats and dissidents, to speak out confidently in favour of a free system.  No delicacy must be entertained about “not hurting China’s feelings.”

Second, Taiwan must continue to prepare to defend its sovereignty without American help.  I believe that the U.S.  will not abandon its Asian alliance system, with Japan as the keystone, and of which Taiwan is in effect a part.  But support for that system in the United States is being undermined by rivers of Chinese money and the emergence of a generation of China specialists who do not know Taiwan, as my generation did, having been trained entirely in China.  This means that Taiwan must push ahead with her indigenous systems, her development of a non-nuclear decisive weapon and delivery system, and so forth.  The military budget must increase if this is to be achieved.

To these two major concerns I would add the need constantly to diversify trading partners, particularly in the Asia of which Taiwan is a part, and to eliminate needless obstacles to good relations with the United States (beef, for example).

I would stress in particular the paramount importance of relations with Japan.  On these the Ma administration has spoken in contradictory ways.  We must recognize that the Okinawa area and the islands to the south, with Yonaguni only sixty miles from Taiwan, are critical to the security of both countries, even as they are increasingly challenged by China.  Every level of cooperation with Japan, including joint security consultations and intelligence sharing, must be widened and deepened.  The more closely Taiwan is involved in Japan’s security, the closer she is to the United States, for I do not expect any change in the words of the Tokyo-Washington alliance.

With the United States, as I suggested last year, intelligence cooperation is Taiwan’s strongest card. It must be played carefully, but in fact what the U.S.  learns through working with Taiwan is essential to both countries and cannot be replaced, easily or at all.

The Immediate Political Future:

How to explain all of this in the coming electoral campaigns is a great challenge.  The current opposition must appear to be reasonable and capable and competent.  One can stress the desirability of good relations with China without accepting a “one China framework”—whatever that means—but self-possession, sweet reason, and openness are the traits to stress.

Many Americans still view the Kuomintang as the “natural party of rule” in Taiwan.  The opposition must so position itself that it will be seen, both by Taiwanese voters and by the U.S.  as a plausible and entirely trustworthy alternate party of government.  Satisfying theatrical gestures, if they are to prove unsuccessful or counterproductive, must be avoided.  Confidence in the judgment and competence of the opposition is the chief requirement.  This requires, at least for the U.S., what my late grandmother called the “ice cream treatment”—sweet and cool.

Taiwan is no more divided politically than is the United States.  But because Taiwan is not an acknowledged legitimate member of the international community, division is far more dangerous.  That is because rather than occurring within an agreed national constitutional framework, debate is rather about what that constitutional structure and international status should be.  Such an argument is like a game played on a field without foul lines and goals.  It is a game about what those lines and goals should be.  As such it can be extremely volatile.

I would urge the opposition to stress the need for prudence in dealing with China, as well as focusing on the bread and butter domestic issues that are likely to be the key to the election.  I know a certain amount about China and Taiwan internationally, but would not presume to say much about Taiwan’s domestic affairs.  The goal should be to build stronger and stronger democratic political and fair legal institutions.

Remember that by late winter and early spring of next year the regional situation may well be in flux.  China is over-extending herself and provoking hostility from states that long sough to be her friends.  I am not sure that everyone in China supports this policy—it comes in waves (such as the ramming of the Japanese coast guard vessels) followed by troughs during which little happens and diplomatic mending is attempted.  This dangerous foreign policy is furthermore matched by a policy of repression at home that threatens to make China herself increasingly unmanageable.

In other words, medium and long term trends favour Taiwan, even if short term setbacks are regular.  No one can upend Taiwan’s democracy except internal players in Taiwan.  In this election I hope that stress will be laid on what a substantial and solid achievement this democracy is, and on the need to defend it.  It can be defended, and Taiwan can prosper into the future, provided her government keeps a steady course and focuses on national interests.  No arrangement with China will be worth the paper it is written on, as China herself is headed for change, and effort should not be wasted seeking one.

In closing may I express my deep admiration for the responsible and patriotic work that all of you do.  I wish very much that I could be with you—nothing energizes me more than a visit to Taiwan, which has changed so much and so positively since my student days forty years ago.  I wish you the very best of luck.  If I can be of any use in any way, do not hesitate to be in contact.

With my deep and sincere good wishes to all.

Sincerely yours,
Arthur Waldron
Lauder Professor of International Relations
University of Pennsylvania

[1] http://transpacifica.net/2007/05/29/zoellick-on-china-the-washington-consensus/
[2] http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye96/English
[3] http://www.weeklystandard.com/author/arthur-waldron
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