America and Taiwan in the News

Only a  few months from my next Lanyu trip...

Another long analysis saying Donald Trump is No Friend of Taiwan of the Trump calls and "everything is negotiable" comments from Trump, this one from longtime Taiwan expert Shelly Rigger. She reviews the history of The Call, and then the Trump Administration's appointments, and discusses Trump's trolling...

In less than 200 words, Trump managed to shake the foundations of U.S.-China relations and cast Taiwan’s future into doubt. Even for a devotee of short-form writing like master-tweeter Donald Trump, this was an achievement.

The one China policy is a U.S. policy statement first articulated in the 1970s that has allowed the U.S. to pursue economic and political ties with Beijing while maintaining robust unofficial relations with Taipei. Every administration since Richard Nixon’s has affirmed the policy. Suggesting it might be open to revision cast the very basis – even the possibility – of economic and diplomatic interactions between the U.S. and China into serious doubt.

It might at some point pay analysts to consider that the "one China" policy from the 1970s and US Taiwan policy dating formally from Apr 28, 1952, are not the same thing, even though they refer to some of the same entities.

Note the words of Trump that Rigger gives in full:

I fully understand the One-China policy. But I don’t know why we have to be bound by a One-China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade. I mean, look, we’re being hurt very badly by China with devaluation, with taxing us heavy at the borders when we don’t tax them, with building a massive fortress in the middle of the South China Sea, which they shouldn’t be doing. And, frankly, they’re not helping us at all with North Korea. You have North Korea, you have nuclear weapons, and China could solve that problem. And they’re not helping us at all.

So, I don’t want China dictating to me. And this was a call put into me. I didn’t make the call. And it was a call, very short call, saying, “Congratulations, sir, on the victory.” It was a very nice call. Short. And why should some other nation be able to say, I can’t take a call? I think it would have been very disrespectful, to be honest with you, not taking it.

Trump is not threatening Taiwan's status in US policy. He is threatening China's status. Taiwan's status is never mentioned and is obviously not the focus of Trump's thoughts -- China is. Let's imagine what "not being bound" by the one China policy could mean. Because the US could switch to a two-China policy (ROC and PRC are both China), a no-China policy (neither PRC nor ROC is China, we don't recognize either), switch recognition to the ROC (wouldn't the KMT swoon over that) or something else. In fact at some point some of these policies existed in the past, and under all of them, the US worked to preserve Taiwan's status. Even when the US recognized the ROC as China it never recognized Taiwan as part of the ROC.

Under current understandings the US could delete the one China policy under which we recognize the PRC as China, without affecting Taiwan's status, which exists because of a different policy. But no major change was ever in play, as many of us wrote at the time.

In any case, as I argued before, it was all meaningless trolling related to Trump's trademarks and so on. Nobody actually ever formally proposed seriously revising US China policy.

As I noted in January, many people who derive wealth and status from the current US position on China were quite unsettled by The Call, since it signaled them that things might change, and threatened their wealth and status. It is amusing that at the moment it is ok to criticize Trump's team for not knowing anything about China, while remaining silent on the deep links so many China commentators have with Beijing's status and money flows. The limits of the discourse, ya know....

Nevertheless, Rigger is often insightful and this comment is dead on and has had me worried as well

Taiwan’s leaders should also worry about the Trump administration’s overall approach to foreign policy – an approach that seems to abandon America’s long-standing commitment to democracy around the world. Trump’s speeches rarely mention democracy or human rights, and his proposed budget slashes funding for all sorts of values-oriented programs. For Taiwan, this is a very bad sign. As China’s political, military, and economic power increase, making a utilitarian argument as to why the U.S. should support Taiwan gets harder, leaving democracy as Taiwan’s signal virtue. When Navarro used the phrase in his July 2016 article, describing Taiwan as a “beacon of democracy” was a tired cliché. Today, it feels like an important moral statement.

Further down she says abandoning the TPP was a bad idea, but I don't see abandoning the TPP as a "devastating blow" since the TPP was a corporate giveaway that would have put Taiwan permanently under the sway of US corporate power, immiserating its people and further harming its economy and environment. Trump did all us who live on Taiwan a favor, even if you don't like the geopolitics of that decision.

Rigger notes that there will be an arms sale in April (more on that in a moment) and that the Administration might well upgrade official visits. She then concludes:

In sum, after a promising start and with the eager participation of many strong supporters of Taiwan in the transition, the Trump White House has managed to comprehensively botch its Taiwan policy, leaving Taiwan more vulnerable than ever to Beijing’s increasing pressure.

LOL. We're barely 90 days in, and she's claiming that Taiwan policy is botched. Umm.... no. It's way too early. Note that Rigger provides no concrete examples of botched policy and its consequences (quick, point some out). In fact Taiwan's status got a tiny upgrade, with US marines to be posted to the new AIT office.

Chinese pressure on Taiwan existed prior to Trump's call, and will go on in the future, as the recent decision to block cosmetic imports from Taiwan over the 1992C shows. A trial balloon? A local official's overreach? New policy? Only time will tell.

Contrast Rigger's claims with the reality of the Obama team's Taiwan policy, which got high marks from the Establishment commentariat. Yes -- those same people who are worried that Trump might sell out Taiwan said nothing when Obama actually did so. The Obama Administration blocked an arms deal for Taiwan out of fear of China (Rigger does not mention the arms sale she lauds as a "bright spot" was blocked by Obama, one wonders what the commentariat would have said if Obama had dumped $1 billion in arms on Taiwan -- would have excused it if Obama did it, will hate it when Trump does). On Twitter Rupert Hammond-Chambers said it was probably because the US needed China's cooperation on the climate deal (as if either Beijing or the Trump Administration was going to adhere to that). Indeed, recall that the Bush Administration also downgraded its support for Taipei for China's cooperation in some transient political thing or other. Bonnie Glaser remarked:

But it is also possible that the Obama administration did not want to approve an arms sale in its final days because it didn't want to offend China and undermine the President's legacy with Beijing. 

For Obama's legacy Taiwan can't get arms it desperately needs (Trump at least got trademarks!). But of course the really worrisome thing is that Trump might sell out Taiwan.

Finally, KMT legislator Jason Hsu wrote up his trip to the US to visit the Trump Administration. It is interesting reading, his takeaways...

Despite all this, I came away with clear and crucial promises regarding stability in the Taiwan Strait: the United States will continue to uphold her moral and legal responsibility toward Taiwan. She will continue to assist in our self-defense. In terms of upholding the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, American good faith will endure.

President Trump, despite immense pressure from China, will still adhere to the One China Policy, the bedrock of strait relations. But China will also continue to demand adherence to the One China Principle. The danger then, lies in how the still-adapting Trump and an uncompromising China interpret these two differing frameworks, it has the potential to throw off the delicate balance of power in the Straits.

.....

Taiwan and the United States share more than thirty years of stalwart friendship. The Congressional Taiwan Caucus remains the second largest caucus in the United States Congress with more than 120 members. Despite the fragility of international relations, we remain unwavering in this partnership; we still believe in America’s good intent. Now is a time of uncertainty but it is also the time for opportunity and recognition. For years Taiwan has been America’s most loyal ally in the region, we are a young but flourishing democracy, an open and robust society with liberal values that mirror the U.S. We share the same resolve in promoting democratic ideals while ensuring peace, in fostering security while defending freedom, and in furthering trade and prosperity for all.

Kudos to Hsu for not only understanding the difference between the one China policy and the one China principle, but also for not conflating them in an attempt to mislead the reader as KMTers so often do.
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Clarifying the Cross Strait Situation, Redux: Etzioni in The Diplomat

A Yanshui Street corner.

Amitai Etzioni, longtime international affairs expert, writes on the strategic ambiguity of the US commitment to Taiwan in The Diplomat....

True, even if the restraint both sides imposed on themselves (and on their respective hawks) is made more explicit, either side could violate it. However, the more explicit the agreement the less likely is that it will be subject to misunderstandings and the more likely it is to survive. It may well be impossible at this stage to turn the implicit understanding, such as there is – if there is one – into an explicit one; however, the more than it can be clarified and solidified, the more this important simmering point of conflict can be assuaged.

I am quite aware of the theories of the merits of “creative ambiguities”; they can enable one to squeeze extra leverage out of the relatively small amounts of power. In East Asia, however, they are much more likely to produce miscalculations and conflicts than significant gains.

Finally, reducing the tension on this issue would help to narrow the differences between the U.S. and China, especially if integrated into a more general policy of mutually assured restraint. That would encourage both states to focus on the many issues in which they have shared or complementary interests.

This is a common argument, and if the reader feels like searching the internet, many iterations of the call for clarifying or removing the ambiguity in the US commitment may be found over the years. The reason that such a move has never been made, however, is obvious: it's a really bad idea. Ambiguity serves the needs of all three governments and defuses tension, whereas clarity would lead inevitably to confrontation and increased tension.

To understand what would really happen, one only needs to look at other (bogus) territorial claims of China, such as Arunachal Pradesh, the Senkakus, and the South China Sea. In each of those cases, the sovereignty of the current possessor and the demands of China's manufactured claim are both clear, meeting Etzioni's demand for clarity. The result is that each claim is a zero-sum game which China treats as non-negotiable, meaning that each of these claims is in a state of permanent tension which cannot be resolved. Indeed, in the South China Sea violence has already occurred, most notably in the 1970s when China annexed 24 Vietnamese islands. It seems sometimes that IR theorists like Etzioni are unable to see China for the belligerent, intransigent, expanionist power that it is, and are thus unable to see the consequences of its positions clearly. Instead their theoretical frameworks fog over the grim reality.

In the Senkakus the situation is crystal clear: we have an exact analogy for Taiwan, a foreign territory, Japan, backed by the US with strong and periodically renewed clarity. Everyone knows that the Senkakus are currently Japanese, that China wants to annex them, and that the US will defend them.

Note first that the Senkaku situation is one marked by massive and escalating tension, one which increasingly appears will lead to war within a few years. Clarity has not lead to relaxation of tension; quite the opposite. It has lead to an increase and a polarization of tension.

The Senkakus also make clear another issue with clarity of commitment. Etzioni argues...

So this might be seen as a basis for an implicit agreement. We oppose a declaration of independence; China forgoes the use of force.”

...except that Etzioni doesn't make clear the clearly scary corollary of clear commitment: if China does use force, the US has to respond with force. D'oh. Last year China promulgated an illegal ADIZ over Japanese territory. This compelled the US to take action, to fly B-52s into the airspace to show Beijing that the US commitment remained and that its claims were bogus. Once the US clarifies its position on Taiwan, it no longer has wiggle room. The President's hands are tied. And what President wants that?

Clarity on the Senkakus also raises another issue: once you have clear lines, they are subject to the relentless nibbling that characterizes China's long-term strategy. The ADIZ is a good example of China constantly pushing, little by little, at the edges of the policy, forcing Japan to respond, which in turn enables China to label Tokyo "provocative" (astonishingly, Tokyo's PR campaign is even more inept than Beijing's). In the Taiwan situation Beijing does not have the leverage of clear lines. It has no idea what might happen and nothing to grab onto. This is one factor among many that leads, ironically, to restraint.

Finally, Etzioni fails to see why Beijing would never agree to such a deal, because something is missing from his writing: the people of Taiwan. Like so many in Washington, Etzioni imagines that the Taiwan issue is a Washington-Beijing issue, and can be addressed by joint action among the High and Mighty without paying any attention to the people of Taiwan, who, in the kind of realpolitik calculus that drives Washington thinking, exist, at best, merely to be betrayed. But of course this is rank nonsense. The starting point to any discussion of Whither Taiwan? has to be how the locals will react. Beijing understands this very well, Washington, not at all, as Etzioni's omission shows.

To accept a clear situation in which Beijing agrees not to use force if Washington doesn't back independence is, in essence, to accept an independent Taiwan. Taiwan doesn't want to be part of China; the only thing keeping Beijing in the local discussion is its threat to murder and maim the people of Taiwan if they don't annex themselves to China. Without the threat of war, Taiwan will simply (continue to) go its own way and will never voluntarily annex itself to China. Even Ma's pro-China policies are made possible only by the understanding that Beijing is underpinning Ma's strategies with its own threat of force. Beijing understands this perfectly, and thus, would never accept such a commitment. This whole discussion is pointless.

Further, the US already doesn't support Taiwan independence. What exactly does Beijing gain from a promise for the US to do something it is already doing without any horse trading?

No, the current lack of clarity suits everyone. It gives all three sides space to present to their domestic populations that everything is ok: Beijing can promise its rabid nationalists that annexation of Taiwan is, like fusion power, inevitable and always just around the corner, Taipei can promise its people that big brother in DC is going to watch over them, and the US can promise its people that confrontation is minimized and we haven’t promised to send good US boys to die in Asia again. It also permits both Beijing and Washington to pretend they are not in confrontation over Taiwan, relaxing tensions.

A little.
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