Showing posts with label State Department. Show all posts
Showing posts with label State Department. Show all posts

Friday, May 22, 2015

Remarks from State: Taiwan: A Vital Partner in Asia

Lunch at a Thai restaurant on the road.

Taiwan: A Vital Partner in East Asia
Remarks
Susan Thornton
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Remarks at the Brookings Institution
Washington, DC
May 21, 2015

As Prepared for Delivery

Thank you, Jeff, for having me here today and for that wonderful introduction. I really appreciate all your support, advice and insight and it's appropriate, of course, to have you here, since much of our good work with Taiwan is built on the foundation you laid.... (READ MORE)

Tuesday, May 05, 2015

Nelson Report: Taiwan Bid to join AIIB = TPP leverage?

Coast_April_8
An abandoned strongpoint keeps watch over the coast.

Two interesting items here. First, the Nelson Report, the Washington Insider report, observes that the KMT may be attempting to use AIIB entry as leverage to enter the TPP. At the bottom, a reporter tries to get the State Department to comment on the 1992 Consensus, claiming absurdly that the 1992 Consensus was the basis for the CCP-KMT lovefest. China loves that 1992 Consensus and insists Taiwanese politicians hew to it even though Beijing itself has never accepted it. The US State Department is generally considered pro-China by many observers on all sides of the debates (wow to Newsweek). Thus, it is interesting that the State Department didn't make a statement saying Taiwan should adhere to the 1992 Consensus, which was invented in the 2000s to form a cage for the DPP's future cross-strait policies. Kudos to them. Instead, the State Department said that was something for the participants to worry about...
TAIWAN PLAYING THE AIIB CARD? Taiwan clearly wants to join the next round of TPP negotiations, if/when they get going, and while that obviously would require Taipei finally undertaking ag policy and other reforms its long been aware of and unwilling politically to do...from today's State Dept. brief it would appear that the KMT may think it can dangle possible AIIB membership in front of US policy-makers as a form of "incentive":

QUESTION: The secretary general of the Chinese communist party, Xi Jinping, just had a meeting with Kuomintang's chairman, Chu Li-luan. I'm just curious about the reaction of the U.S. Government to this highest-levels talks between cross-strait political parties.

MR RATHKE: Well, we welcome steps on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to reduce tensions and improve cross-strait relations. We encourage authorities in Beijing and Taipei to continue their constructive dialogue which we believe has led to significant improvements in the cross-strait relationship. And of course, as to the content and the pace and the scope of those interactions, that should be - it should be acceptable to people on both sides of the strait, but we'll leave those details to the people participating in those talks...

...QUESTION: Yeah. Also Chu Li-luan said he hoped Taiwan can take part in the AIIB, and Xi Jinping welcomes that. So will the U.S. support Taiwan's bid to join AIIB?

MR RATHKE: Well, I don't have any comment about the decisions of anyone to participate in the AIIB. The U.S. view on the AIIB has been made quite clear. We consider it important that high standards of transparency be part of the AIIB's approach. I think the President also commented on this just last week, so I don't have anything to add to that...

...QUESTION: And Xi Jinping also mentioned that he has seen some new and important point in cross-strait, and which has impacted Chinese nation and the country's future. I just wonder: Does U.S. have the same point of view?

MR RATHKE: Well, again, we welcome improved cross-strait relations. I'm not going to get into kind of characterizing them further than that. We've seen progress and we welcome that and we encourage continued dialogue.
Yes.

QUESTION: Thank you, Jeff. The '92 Consensus seemed to be the basis for the two sides to actually make the meeting possible. Would the United States think that this may serve as a point of reference for Taiwan's opposition party, the DPP, so that it would be able to open its own dialogue with the mainland some way, particularly when the DPP chair is about to visit the United States? Thank you.

MR RATHKE: Well, I'm not going to comment about how internally these issues are approached. Again, I think our support for improved cross-strait relations is clear.
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Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Saturday, March 21, 2015

The Coming Pressure on the DPP

Nantou 54.

Some links for today...

Alan Romberg over at the Hoover Institution on the current political situation in Taiwan in the context of cross-strait relations. Some of the footnotes are quite interesting; the main text is a richly-sourced attack on the DPP for daring to resist China and emphasizing DPP disunity and failure to serve Beijing while downplaying or hiding KMT disunity. Note that Romberg manages to write a long piece without ever using the term faction, thus making a whole slew of KMT problems disappear (for example). If you want to understand what's going on with the KMT, you're better off following my KMTitanic series.

Favorite quote from the Romberg piece: Eric Chu saying "we cannot let one-party dominance undermine democracy in Taiwan.” Irony is not only dead, its corpse has been exhumed and mutilated.

It's easy to see, with "analysis" like Alan Romberg's above, why you have ex-AIT official Barbara Schrage today saying that the DPP should "clarify" its China policy -- what a hoot! -- and that it should work to find ways to narrow its "differences of opinion" with Beijing. Wouldn't it be awesome if Schrage advised Taiwan to narrow the missile gap instead, and advised Beijing to back off? With what's coming, can't AIT struggle to get us some weapons and allies instead? Imagine, it's 1930s. There's Schrage advising the Indian nationalist movement to find a way to narrow its differences of opinion with the Raj...

More seriously, what Schrage's ill-advised remarks straight out of 2004 signal is the new/old mantra from the anti-Taiwan crowd in the US government: the DPP's China policy is "unclear." Use of this line, and pressure is only going to grow. It's worth quoting myself on the strange position of Taiwan:
The claim that Taiwan “causes tension” has a striking uniqueness: In all other instances of tension along the Chinese frontier, U.S. officials and commentators routinely and assumptively treat China as the source of tension. It is only Taiwan that is different. For example, in the late 1960s Beijing suddenly manufactured a historically absurd and legally indefensible claim to the Senkaku Islands of Japan. The U.S. has asserted that it will defend the islands under the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty and criticized China’s illegal air-defense identification zone and other aggressive acts. Nor has the U.S. been shy in criticizing China’s claim to most of the South China Sea, recently offering a highly publicized legal document refuting the Chinese claims. The U.S. also conducts diplomacy with regional powers obviously aimed at countering China. Washington and the U.S. media seldom publicly criticize Japanese, Vietnamese, Malaysian, or Indonesian leaders for resisting Chinese expansion (“causing tension”). Only Taiwan receives that treatment.
"Clarify your policy!" is of course Diplo-code for "submit." I have this dream that US officials will stop fantasizing that if only they sit on the DPP hard enough, problems in the Strait will go away. The reality is simple: if Washington pleases Beijing by stepping on the DPP, Beijing will respond by threatening to increase tensions to push Washington to step on the DPP even harder. D'oh. Feeding the monster only makes it bigger. Because Beijing seeks to transfer tension from the Washington-Beijing relationship to the Washington-Taiwan relationship, each time an (ex-) US official like Schrage criticizes the DPP, it's a strategic victory for Beijing. Please guys, Beijing already has its own diplomatic corps to suppress Taiwan, they don't need ours.

And changing demographics in Taiwan have rendered this policy not only obsolete, but counterproductive...

Anyway, as we wait for war to break out somewhere in Asia, enjoy some links...
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Daily Links:
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Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Thursday, October 28, 2010

The People Hosed of Cairo

Cecilia: I just met a wonderful new man. He's fictional but you can't have everything.

President Ma Ying-jeou was at it again with the Cairo Declaration and Taiwan's status this week, another in the long line of examples of the constant KMT iteration of the falsehood that the Cairo Declaration and the Treaty of Taipei are the legal basis for the ROC claim to have "recovered" Taiwan for China. This week was especially egregious, for he added a claim about President Truman:
The 1943 Cairo Communique, worked out by the ROC president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), then-US president Franklin Roosevelt and then-British prime minister Winston Churchill, said Japan should return Taiwan, Penghu and other territories in northeast China that it had “stolen” from the Chinese, Ma said.

The Potsdam Declaration of 1945 reaffirmed the Cairo Communique and gave the ROC the right to take sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu, he said.

According to Ma, in its Instrument of Surrender, Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and former US president Harry Truman also accepted the idea that sovereignty over Taiwan was settled as the US Department of State said that the US and other Allied powers accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over Formosa, which was surrendered to Chiang.
Ma's claims about Cairo are the more complex of the two sets of claims here, so we'll first look at what Truman said. Ma refers to Truman's "1950" statements in his remarks (see the Taiwan Today piece). In 1950 Truman made two major statements on the status of Formosa. Remarks about the status of Formosa are included in his famous June 27, 1950 announcement:
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The 7th Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.
However, on Jan 5 of that year Truman issued a statement on the status of Formosa in which he appears to accept Chinese sovereignty over Formosa (extract here).
"A specific application of the foregoing principles is seen in the present situation with respect to Formosa. In the Joint Declaration at Cairo on December 1, 1943, the President of the United States, the British Prime Minister, and the President of China stated that it was their purpose that territories Japan had stolen from China, such as Formosa, should be restored to the Republic of China. The United States was a signatory to the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which declared that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. The provisions of this declaration were accepted by Japan at the time of its surrender. In keeping with these declarations, Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and for the past 4 years the United States and other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the island.

"The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa, or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges, or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its Armed Forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

"Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the island. The United States Government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program of economic assistance."
It might be possible to read: "...or on any other Chinese territory." as Truman saying Formosa is Chinese territory. To put that in its proper context, the KMT had just retreated to Taiwan in Dec and suddenly, after saying Formosa was irrelevant, the US did an about face and began to prepare a policy that shifted between saying Formosa was irrelevant and that it was important, because it did not appear that the Communist Chinese would have any trouble taking Formosa when they got around to that task -- thus the declared policy of the US was to simply let the chips fall as they may. This Time article from 1951 gives a sense of that. Hence, Truman is not saying that Formosa belongs to China. He is merely announcing that the island was not a strategic interest of the US and that there the US had no dog in that fight and no designs on any Chinese territory, however such territory may be construed.

The clear indication of the June 27th statement, however, is that the US position was that the status of Taiwan is undetermined. That has been the US position for all of recent history down to the present day.

However, let us recall some salient facts: (1) Truman can't dispose of Formosa. In 1950 the US didn't own it; Japan did. (2) The Formosans themselves weren't consulted on the issue. Lest you think that is some idealistic modern interpretation that didn't apply in those hard-nosed days, Chen and Reisman's seminal review of the issues for the Yale Law Journal in 1971 (Who Owns Taiwan: the Search for an International Title) observed of the Cairo Declaration that in its own League of Nations context:
As to environing international norms, it is sufficient to note that the doctrines of self-determination and the prohibition of use of force for territorial changes, as embodied in many resolutions of organs of the League of Nations, had transformed the component of acquiescence of the indigenous people into a peremptory aspect, and a virtual requirement of lawful transfers of territorial title. Hence, even assuming that the Cairo Declaration, as reinforced by the Potsdam Declaration, had been intended by the parties to it to create new international rights, such an intention would have been limited by international law. Jure gentium, the Cairo Declaration could mean only that the participants agreed to recognize a Chinese acquisition of Formosa if the inhabitants of Formosa indicated that they desired to be part of or to be governed by China.
In other words, Cairo, Potsdam, Truman, Mao, whatever is said and done, in the end, no legal transfer of territory can take place without the consent of the population. Even by the norms prevailing in 1943.

Shifting to the Cairo Declaration, several things may be noted. First, here is the text:
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.
The Cairo Declaration is not a treaty and has no force. It is merely a declaration of common aims, subject to any changes the future might bring. The language of the CD was adopted as a sop to keep Chiang Kai-shek in the war. The US clarified its position on Cairo in a statement issued Dec 27, 1950:
The Cairo Declaration of 1943 stated the purpose to restore "Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China." That Declaration, like other wartime declarations such as those of Yalta and Potsdam, was in the opinion of the United States Government subject to any final peace settlement where all relevant factors should be considered. The United States cannot accept the view, apparently put forward by the Soviet government, that the views of other Allies not represented at Cairo must be wholly ignored. Also, the United States believes that declarations such as that issued at Cairo must necessarily be considered in the light of the United Nations Charter, the obligations of which prevail over any other international agreement.
That is also the UK position. George Kerr observed:
This [the Cairo Declaration] was not a carefully prepared State Paper but rather a promise to divide the spoils, dangled before the wavering Chinese. It was a declaration of intent, promising a redistribution of territories held by the Japanese. None of the territories mentioned in the document were at that moment in Allied hands.
Similarly George Kennen wrote:
No one seems to know from what deliberations this declaration [Cairo] issued; it was apparently drafted, at the moment, by Harry Hopkins, after consultation only with the President and the Chinese visitors.
I bet your head is nodding. Chen and Reisman point out two major issues, (1) the norms of the day (paragraph noted above) and (2) the capacity of the participants:
As to the capacity of the declarants, three states were simply not empowered under the principles and peremptory procedures of the Covenant of the League of Nations then in force, to decide that the territory held, and formerly recognized as validly so held by another, could now be forcibly removed from that state.
So much for Cairo. The real reason President Ma and other KMT fantasists keep referring to Cairo and to Truman and to Potsdam and the Treaty of Taipei is simple: under the postwar treaty arrangements codified in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan and no recipient is named. Thus, under international law, the status of Taiwan is undetermined. Note that Ma generally omits discussion of the SF Peace Treaty, since to mention it instantly invalidates his case.

The purpose of this heightened exposure for Cairo and the like is simple: I believe it is the KMT plan to establish a basis for Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan without ever setting the matter before the people and legislature of Taiwan. By pretending that Taiwan has already become part of China -- and always has been, hence it was "returned" -- a 'stealth annexation' of Taiwan can be accomplished, and a plausible fait accompli offered to the world.
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Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums! Delenda est, baby.

Tuesday, August 24, 2010

Oklahoma is had by the KMT

Check out this story: Oklahoma Strengthens Relations With Taiwan Province...

The state of Oklahoma and Taiwan Province reaffirm their sister-state relationship which has stood for the past 30 years.

During a ceremony in the Blue Room of the State Capitol Governor Henry and Taiwan Province Governor Jung-Tzer Lin reaffirmed their agreement which promotes trade and friendship.

Governor Henry says last year alone Oklahoma exports to Taiwan came to $16.3 million.

“But that agreement, again, is more than just about trade. That’s been beneficial to both of our peoples, but it has also enriched the lives of both of our peoples.”
I have to admit, this exchange has enriched my life with a bit of entertainment. "Taiwan Province Governor Jung-Tzer Lin" is actually the former mayor of Hsinchu, now currently a minister without portfolio. He is apparently head of the Provincial Council which runs the now-defunct government, streamlined out of existence back in the 1990s, all of which are appointees of the President (see Wiki for details -- don't they have that in Oklahoma?). Congrats to Oklahoma for re-affirming its relations with less than a dozen people! I think they should next sign sister-relations with Fujian Province, ROC.

I wonder if Lin gets a separate salary as head of the "provincial government."

The KMT program of confusing others about the actual status of Taiwan continues.

Meanwhile, where was the US State Department? Shouldn't it have taken the Oklahoma state government aside and told them that US policy is that the status of Taiwan is undetermined?
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Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Wednesday, April 07, 2010

Ma Calls for China to Remove Missiles

President Ma this week once again called on China to remove its missiles facing Taiwan. This occurred during a videoconference at Harvard, a repetition of the very common pattern in which Ma announces outside Taiwan that China should remove its missiles (or makes some other important policy statement to outsiders -- like telling a Mexican newspaper that Taiwan was a region). Remember when, in 2006, he announced in London that China should remove its missiles before any talks could be held, and then he was forced to backtrack? The China Post reports on the latest missilectomy call:
President Ma Ying-jeou renewed Tuesday his call for China "to remove or actually dismantle" its missiles targeting Taiwan as a prerequisite for talks on a cross-Taiwan Strait peace accord.

Ma also reaffirmed his policy of maintaining the status quo across the strait, saying the conditions are not yet ripe for unification.

He made the remarks in response to questions on cross-strait relations, during a video conference linking Taipei with Harvard University faculty and students.

According to Ma, Taiwan is well aware of China's ambition to annex Taiwan, but it has to face up to the reality, try to temper cross-strait tensions and prevent China from using force against Taiwan.

"We also demand that the mainland should remove or actually dismantle all the missiles that are targeted against Taiwan.

Otherwise we won't be interested in making further step to negotiate a peace agreement with them," the president said.
It's actually a good example of Ma/KMT cynicism: talks are underway to annex the island through financial and economic integration, as well as the arrival of Chinese workers (see Taiwan News today, and more in Taipei Times tomorrow). So a "peace agreement" is basically superfluous to the reality of creeping annexation; it is a mere diversion. As always, one must watch what elites here are doing, not what they say. This is merely words aimed at placating foreign audiences. If there are real negotiations on missiles, they don't have anything to do with Ma's words here.

Kudos to the CNA for putting "annex" into their article, which was picked up by the pro-annexation China Post for this article. Haha.

Reuters also reports, and they have a good precis of The Formula describing the cross-strait situation.
Taiwan officials say China has aimed from 1,000 to 1,500 short- and mid-range missiles at the self-ruled island, which Beijing has claimed as its own since the Chinese Civil war of the 1940s.
Nicely nuanced "...since the Chinese Civil War of the 1940s." Apparently it is possible to describe the situation pithily without the historically inaccurate "split in 1949" formulation so beloved of AP and AFP. Reuters says it is possible that trade might be harmed by Ma's call for missiles to be removed, although trade rose steadily under the DPP despite their much more pro-Taiwan cross-strait policy.

Ma's remarks on online complete at Isria. Search for them and then log-in for free seven day access.

This event also sheds light on Beijing's strategy to isolate Chen Shui-bian and paint him as a radical. Anybody recall in May of 2007 when Beijing whined and peed on the floor because a sitting Taiwan President, Chen Shui-bian, appeared at the National Press Club in teleconference? And the kerfluffle that accompanied his appearance? Now President Ma does the exact same thing at Harvard, and what comes out of Beijing but .... silence. The idea that Chen is some radical is a idea fostered by Beijing, to serve its interests. Nothing else.
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Tuesday, May 19, 2009

1979 State Department Memo on Terminology

Here is the text of the State Department memo, written by Charles Freeman, who was then heading up the China Desk, on what to do about the ROC after we recognized China in 1979. Note how point (2) simply follows the Beijing line that there are no Taiwanese and makes the aborigines disappear entirely. Pay attention to point (6) as well. Freeman would move on to doing business with China, eventually securing an appointment on the board of a Chinese state-owned oil firm, before becoming the victim of a mindless right-wing AIPAC assault following Obama's appointment of him for the NIC position, as readers may recall.

+++++++++++
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Guidelines on Proper Terminology for Referring to China, People's Republic of China, China Mainland, and Taiwan in Official Statements and Publications

With the recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China and with the severance of diplomatic relations with the authorities on Taiwan, guidelines are necessary to insure [sic] that all U.S. Government official statements and publications concerning Taiwan conform to our policy.

Accordingly, on and after January 1, 1979, U.S. Government departments and agencies should follow the guidelines listed below in referring to China, People's Republic of China, China mainland [sic] and Taiwan in official statements and publications:

1) the term "Republic of China" is not to be used in referring to Taiwan.

2) The adjectival form is "Taiwan," not "Taiwanese." People should be referred to as "from Taiwan," "on Taiwan," "of Taiwan," etc., rather than as Taiwanese. The adjective "Chinese" should not be applied to the government or institutions on Taiwan. (The ethnic groups on Taiwan are, however, Chinese; the language spoken there is Chinese, and one of its dialects is Taiwanese. These terms should continue to be used in appropriate instances.)

3) The People's Republic of China has adopted its own method for Romanizing Chinese names ("pinyin"), which is preferable for persons from the PRC and PRC placenames [sic].

4) The Wade-Giles system, long in general use for transliterating Chinese into English, should be used for personal and place names relating to Taiwan and for other Chinese names, except where local or personal variations have been customary in places like Singapore and Hong Kong/
[-2-]

5) Tables of economic statistics, indexes, and similar materials, should put "China" (not "People's Republic of China") in its appropriate alphabetical position, followed by "mainland," and then "Taiwan," each indented and printed in italics or other distinctive type-face. Where statistics or other tabulated material appear in such lists, separate totals should be provided for "mainland" and "Taiwan." No grand total for "China" should be given. Where information on China is provided on a province-by-province basis, Taiwan should not be listed alphabetically among the provinces, but set off separately after the alphabetical list of provincial names. Again, statistics should be totaled separately, for "mainland" and for "Taiwan."

6) Where non-statistical information is given on both the China mainland and Taiwan (e.g., in country directories and similar publications), information on the Chinese mainland should be placed under "China" (not "People's Republic of China"), and information on Taiwan should be placed under a "Taiwan" heading. "China" should be asterisked and the reader referred to "Taiwan," which should be listed separately at the close of the list of countries. Under no circumstances should be "Taiwan" be placed of footnoted under "China" or the "People's Republic of China."

7) There are cases, of course, where "People's Republic of China" may be appropriate usage. Special guidance has been and will continue to be provided for such cases (e.g. FBIS "Green Book"). If any agencies have publications with they believe should use the term "People's Republic of China," they should make a recommendation to the Department of State, as below.

8) Any questions should be addressed to the China Working Group, Room 1210-A, Department of State

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Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Saturday, January 24, 2009

The US Speaks on Taiwan

There's been much written on potential Obama policies here in East Asia, and the international media today focused on two small indicators. The first was Treasury nominee Tim Geither, who claimed that China was manipulating the yuan, and said that is what the President believed. Does that mean a new hard line on China? Probably not, since we are now 7 or 8 presidents into our engagement with China, and most have made similar noises, yet the sacrifice of long-term US strategic and economic interests to short-term business interests and the failure to push for democracy in China has continued unabated. This "hard line" is strictly for media consumption. It will have no effect on actual policy.

More interesting from Taiwan's point of view was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's announcement yesterday that the US will support observer status in the WHA for Taiwan.

The administration of US President Barack Obama will continue to support Taiwan’s efforts to gain more international space, including becoming an observer at the World Health Assembly (WHA), US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in a recent statement.

The statement was made in response to an inquiry from senators Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and Johnny Isakson of Georgia on Clinton’s stance on Taiwan’s WHA bid if she was confirmed as Washington’s top diplomat.
Wow! Taiwan can observe an assembly! A breakthrough!

Secretary of State Clinton said that it was important that China give a little, and observer status in the WHA, totally meaningless, will nevertheless be a tiny tiny step that all involved can celebrate as a gigantic diplomatic success. "China has given Taiwan a little space!" This will also be trumpeted by the Ma Administration as a demonstration of the wisdom of its policy of selling Taiwan out to China. A key question of WHA participation of course will be what Taiwan is called and whether it is treated as part of China, or given some quasi-independent status.

The real indicator of Obama policy is here: Clinton echoed the Bush foreign policy line that China ought to give Taiwan a little space, and that the US supports Taiwan's entry into the WHA. The foreign policy community loves the words stability and continuity, and that is what we are going to see from the Obama administration here in East Asia.

Also on the US front, William Lowther reports from Washington that two more US-based Taiwan experts, Randall Schriver and Michael Yahuda from my alma mater GWU, have added their names to the open letter to Ma Ying-jeou on the erosion of justice here in Taiwan:

Two important Taiwan experts based in Washington have added their names to the open letter published in the Taipei Times earlier this week expressing concern about what they see as an erosion of justice in Taiwan.

The new signatories are former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Randall Schriver and George Washington University academic Michael Yahuda.

In the original letter a group of international academics and writers urged President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) to order an independent inquiry into the way police squashed protests during the visit of Chinese envoy Chen Yunlin (陳雲林).
My thanks go out to both of them.

For those interested in the new Obama world, International Affairs Forum has their latest read on it. It's a collection of essays on major areas of the world, and major issues. The China essay is by Harvey Feldman, the former ambassador here and a longtime observer of East Asia. He notes:
Indeed, Mr. Bush can boast in foreign affairs that he has established a vastly improved relationship with China. But it will take major and continuing efforts in both Beijing and Washington to keep that relationship from deteriorating during 2009 as economic stress builds.
Yes, well, that "improved relationship" came at the expense of Taiwan. It's easy to sacrifice old friends to make new friends -- real success would have been improving relations with China while not sacrificing Taiwan.

Tuesday, October 21, 2008

State Department Replies to Congressional Inquiry on New Taiwan Guidelines


A few weeks ago there was a kerfuffle about the new State Department guidelines for its relations with Taiwan (blogged on here). I discussed the guidelines and the text is there for readers to peruse themselves. Above is the State Department's reply to an inquiry from a member of Congress on the issue (click to go its Flickr page and see it bigger). There was much new language added to the cable, which simply appears to codify what was already US policy, for the most part.

Wednesday, September 10, 2008

Bush Administration issues new State Department Guidelines --UPDATED--

The Bush Administration issued the annual State Department guidelines for official interaction with The Beautiful Island, reported the Taipei Times today....

Contacts between US diplomatic personnel and Taiwanese officials and representatives abroad would be strictly limited under new guidelines the State Department has issued that appear to tighten the curbs on bilateral interaction that the department set down in government-wide prohibitions last issued in 2001, a copy of the new guidelines obtained by the Taipei Times on Monday showed.

The guidelines, which are believed to have been issued last week, go as far as barring any US official from writing a note or letter to any Taiwanese official, and banning US officials from attending Taiwanese events or entering official Taiwanese premises.

It appears that the timing of the new guidelines is related to the upcoming celebration of the Double Ten anniversary, and to remind US overseas personnel what they can and cannot do or say.

The guidelines do not break new ground, the article says....

For instance, the guidelines commit the US to a so-called “one-China” policy, a phrase absent in the 2001 guidelines, which were issued shortly after Bush entered the White House as an ardent supporter of Taiwan. Even personal thank-you notes must be written on plain paper and put in plain envelopes to disguise the sender’s official identity.

The guidelines also ban the display of the ROC flag on US premises, which is a no-no absent from the 2001 guidelines, and bar Taiwanese military personnel from showing up in their uniforms.

The new document also contains a new section on US non-support of Taiwan’s membership in international organizations, such as the UN, which require internationally recognized statehood for membership.

The article points out that the document retains previous limits on US official interaction with Taiwan. The codification of the "one China" policy would seem a big change, but little birdies say it is no great change. The article does not mention that while the guidelines specify US non-support of membership in organizations requiring statehood, they do call for support for other forms of international participation. Consistent with that, the guidelines have an exception to the "plain paper note" rule -- US officials can write to Taiwanese reps when they are writing to them as representatives of Taiwan's participation in international organizations. Then the proper organizational referent must be used ("Chinese Taipei").

In other words, the guidelines simply state what we all know US policy to be. Pro-Taiwan organizations in the US protested, nevertheless. As they should....

It is important to note that these guidelines DO NOT apply to AIT. They have their own separate guidance. These guidelines are for US officials in other countries who may be invited to Double 10 celebrations, etc. They are sent around annually at this time to State Department posts around the world, probably because ROC national day celebrations are coming up soon.

UPDATE: Word has it that the 2008 cable is twice as long as the 2006 cable, which had no mention of:

- the US believing that Taiwan is not a sovereign country
- the US not supporting Taiwan's membership in international organizations that require statehood
- guidelines on flying the ROC flag
- "One China Policy."


The clarification of the US position is clearly a lot clearer.....

UPDATE II: Text of the cable (it is unclassified). I have removed links and telephone numbers.

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT, PREL, TW
SUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON CONTACTS20WITH TAIWAN

REF: 2007 STATE 123344

1. SUMMARY: EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN
REPRESENTATIVES ABROAD SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE GUIDELINES LAID OUT IN PARA 3 BELOW. THE
GUIDELINES APPLY TO ALL OCCASIONS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR AND
ESPECIALLY IN THE WEEKS PRIOR TO THE OCTOBER 10 ("DOUBLE
TEN") ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE "REPUBLIC OF
CHINA." PLEASE ENSURE THAT THESE GUIDELINES ARE BROADLY
CIRCULATED WITHIN YOUR MISSION. THIS CABLE DOES NOT
PROVIDE GUIDELINES FOR AIT EMPLOYEES.
END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND ON UNOFFICIAL NATURE OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH
TAIWAN

2. FOR THE PAST THREE DECADES, THE UNITED STATES HAS
ADHERED TO A ONE CHINA POLICY, CONSISTENT WITH THE THREE
U.S.-PRC JOINT COMMUNIQUES AND THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT
(ALL AVAILABLE ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S WEBSITE). IN
KEEPING WITH THIS ONE CHINA POLICY, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE PRC IN 1979 AND
0A RECOGNIZED THE PRC AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA.
FOLLOWING THE TERMINATION OF FORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNING AUTHORITIES ON TAIWAN, THE
UNITED STATES BEGAN MAINTAINING UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH
THE ISLAND, PER THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. SIMILARLY, THE
U.S.-PRC JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF 1979 STATES THAT "THE PEOPLE
OF THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN CULTURAL, COMMERCIAL,
AND OTHER UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN."

GUIDELINES FOR CONTACTS WITH TAIWAN REPRESENTATIVES

3. THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT ESTABLISHED THE AMERICAN
INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN (AIT) AS A NONPROFIT CORPORATION
RESPONSIBLE FOR CARRYING OUT PROGRAMS, TRANSACTIONS, AND
OTHER RELATIONS THAT WOULD, HAD WE MAINTAINED DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS, HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT OR ANY
AGENCY OF THE USG WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN. TAIWAN'S
COUNTERPART TO AIT IS THE TAIPEI ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE IN THE UNITED STATES (TECRO).
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS SHOULD ADHERE TO THE FOLLOWING
GUIDELINES FOR INTERACTION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF TAIWAN:

-- TAIWAN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD BE TREATED WITH
APPROPRIATE COURTESY AND RESPECT, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
OUR UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAND.

--USG OFFICIALS SHOULD CONDUCT THE SAME SUBSTANTIVE RANGE
OF BUSINESS WITH THEIR TAIWAN COUNTERPARTS THAT THEY WOULD
CONDUCT WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE
UNITED STATES HAS20DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

--MEETINGS BETWEEN USG OFFICIALS AND TAIWAN AUTHORITIES
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES MUST BE HELD OUTSIDE USG AND
TAIWAN OFFICES (E.G., AT PRIVATE MEETING ROOMS OR
RESTAURANTS).

--EMBASSY PERSONNEL MAY ACCEPT INVITATIONS TO PRIVATE
FUNCTIONS HOSTED BY TAIWAN REPRESENTATIVES EITHER IN
RESTAURANTS OR IN THEIR HOMES, BUT NOT IN RESIDENCES OF
TAIWAN'S PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVES OR AMBASSADORS.
INVITATIONS TO OFFICIAL TAIWAN-HOSTED FUNCTIONS OR ANY
FUNCTIONS HELD ON TAIWAN'S OFFICIAL PREMISES MAY NOT BE
ACCEPTED.

--U.S. EMBASSY AND CONSULATE PERSONNEL MAY HOST TAIWAN
REPRESENTATIVES AT PRIVATE FUNCTIONS IN RESTAURANTS OR IN
THEIR HOMES, BUT NOT IN U.S. CHIEF OF MISSION RESIDENCES.
TAIWAN REPRESENTATIVES MAY NOT BE INVITED TO U.S.
FUNCTIONS OF AN OFFICIAL NATURE OR TO FUNCTIONS HELD ON
OFFICIAL U.S. PREMISES.

--IN COUNTRIES WHERE THE TAIWAN AMBASSADOR SERVES AS THE
DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, U.S. PERSONNEL MAY ONLY
ATTEND FUNCTIONS THAT THE TAIWAN AMBASSADOR HOSTS FOR THE
ENTIRE CORPS IN HIS ROLE AS DEAN.

--ANY FUNCTION HELD ON OR AROUND OCTOBER 10, CELEBRATED
BY TAIWAN AUTHORITIES AS THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING
OF THE "REPUBLIC OF CHINA," SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AN
OFFICIAL FUNCTION REGARDLESS OF ITS VENUE OR DECLARED
NATURE. (NOTE: WASHINGTON-BASED EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS
ARE PERMITTED TO ATTEND THE SEPARATE TECRO-SPONSORED
=0 ARECEPTION SPECIFICALL Y FOR USG EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS
THAT NORMALLY TAKES PLACE IN MID-OCTOBER, BECAUSE IT IS
DISTINCT FROM THE FORMAL DOUBLE-TEN FUNCTION.)

STATE 00095091 002 OF 003


--USG OFFICIALS MAY NOT ATTEND OFFICIAL OVERSEAS
FUNCTIONS THAT HONOR OR ARE HOSTED BY VISITING TAIWAN
AUTHORITIES. THE ONLY EXCEPTION MIGHT BE A FUNCTION, NOT
ON TAIWAN'S OFFICIAL PREMISES, HOSTED BY TAIWAN
REPRESENTATIVES FOR A MEETING OF AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION IN WHICH TAIWAN IS A FULL MEMBER. REQUESTS
TO ATTEND SUCH EVENTS MUST BE REFERRED TO THE DEPARTMENT
(EAP/TC) FOR CONSIDERATION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS (SEE
PARA 6 BELOW).

--U.S. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD NOT CORRESPOND
DIRECTLY WITH AUTHORITIES FROM TAIWAN, BUT RATHER SHOULD
SEND LETTERS THROUGH AIT-TECRO CHANNELS. INDIVIDUALS FROM
TAIWAN WHOM U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS CONTACT ARE
GENERALLY REFERRED TO BY NAME, TITLE, AND CITY WITHOUT USE
OF INTERNATIONAL NOMENCLATURE (E.G., DIRECTOR GENERAL
CHANG, CIVIL AVIATION BUREAU, TAIPEI). CORRESPONDENCE TO
THESE INDIVIDUALS IS PREPARED ON PLAIN WHITE STATIONERY
AND SIGNED WITH A PERSONAL NAME WITHOUT A USG TITLE. (THE
EXCEPTION MIGHT BE WHEN CORRESPONDING WITH A TAIWAN
REPRESENTATIVE TO AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WHICH
TAIWAN IS A FULL MEMBER. THE REPRESENTATIVE'S TITLE,
AFFILIATION, AND STATUS IN THE ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE AS
SPECIFIED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNAT IONAL
ORGANIZATION, E.G., "CHINESE TAIPEI" IN A PEC). AIT WILL
PACKAGE CORRESPONDENCE UNDER AN APPROPRIATE COVER LETTER
TO TECRO, FROM WHICH IT WILL BE RELAYED TO RECIPIENT
AUTHORITIES ON TAIWAN.

GUIDELINES FOR TRAVEL TO TAIWAN

4. ALL EXECUTIVE BRANCH PERSONNEL WHO PLAN TO TRAVEL TO
TAIWAN FOR WORK-RELATED REASONS MUST HAVE PRIOR
CONCURRENCE FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF TAIWAN
COORDINATION BEFORE REQUESTING TRAVEL CLEARANCE FROM AIT
TAIPEI. USG PERSONNEL TRAVEL TO TAIWAN IN THE CAPACITY OF
CONSULTANTS TO AIT. OFFICIAL TRAVEL IS NOT PERMITTED FOR
STATE OR DEFENSE OFFICIALS ABOVE THE RANK OF OFFICE
DIRECTOR OR FOR UNIFORMED MILITARY PERSONNEL ABOVE THE
LEVEL OF 06 (COLONEL, NAVY CAPTAIN) WITHOUT THE WRITTEN
PERMISSION OF EAP/TC. FOR PERSONAL TRAVEL, SENIOR
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVEL OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OR THREE-STAR FLAG OFFICERS MUST
OBTAIN CLEARANCE FROM EAP/TC. ALL TRAVEL BY EXECUTIVE
BRANCH PERSONNEL TO TAIWAN OR TRANSITING THROUGH TAIWAN
MUST BE ON A REGULAR (TOURIST) PASSPORT. DIPLOMATIC AND
OFFICIAL PASSPORTS SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL TO
TAIWAN.

U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN'S STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

5. CONSISTENT WITH OUR ONE CHINA POLICY, THE UNITED STATES
DOES NOT SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS FOR WHICH STATEHOOD IS REQUIRED (E.G. THE
UNITED NATIONS OR ANY OF ITS20AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS).
THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS, AS APPROPRIATE, TAIWAN'S
INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PRO CESSES,
AGREEMENTS, AND GATHERINGS WHERE STATEHOOD IS NOT A
PREREQUISITE. WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF OUR ONE CHINA
POLICY, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT TAKE A POSITION ON WHAT
TAIWAN'S TITLE SHOULD BE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS FLEXIBLE ARRANGEMENTS AND
NOMENCLATURE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH THE PRC AND TAIWAN AND
OPPOSES ATTEMPTS BY EITHER SIDE TO USE NOMENCLATURE FOR
POLITICAL PURPOSES INCONSISTENT WITH U.S. POLICY. THE
USG'S OVERALL GOAL IS TO ENABLE THE PEOPLE ON TAIWAN TO
COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES AND
RECEIVE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE,
DESPITE TAIPEI'S GENERAL LACK OF RECOGNITION AS AN
INDE PENDENT STATE.

GUIDELINES ON TAIWAN MILITARY UNIFORMS AND ROC FLAGS

6. IN KEEPING WITH THE UNOFFICIAL NATURE OF OUR RELATIONS
WITH TAIWAN AND THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT
RECOGNIZE TAIWAN AS AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN STATE,
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AUTHORITIES ON TAIWAN
SHOULD NOT WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS WHILE IN THE UNITED STATES
OR ON U.S. PREMISES OVERSEAS, AND THE "ROC" FLAG SHOULD
NOT BE DISPLAYED ON USG PREMISES.

COORDINATION WITH WASHINGTON ON TAIWAN MATTERS

7. POSTS THAT HAVE ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING CONTACT WITH
TAIWAN OR ITS REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD SEEK EARLY GUID ANCE
FROM EAP'S OFFICE OF TAIWAN COORDINATION

STATE 00095091 003 OF 003


TERMINOLOGY

8. THE DEPARTMENT REMINDS POSTS THAT, CONSISTENT WITH THE
UNOFFICIAL NATURE OF U.S.TAIWAN TIES, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
DOES NOT REFER TO TAIWAN AS THE "REPUBLIC OF CHINA," THE
"REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN," OR A COUNTRY. THE USG
REFERS TO TAIWAN SIMPLY AS "TAIWAN."



+++++++++++++

Speaking of the US, DPP Chairman Tsai Ing-wen's talk at Heritage is online. Enjoy!

Tuesday, December 25, 2007

Globe and Mail: Taiwan Flashpoint 2008 -UPDATED-

The Globe and Mail is doing a set of pieces on the major world flashpoints. Among them is of course the Taiwan Straits, portrayed here as made dangerous by the recklessness of the dastardly Chen Shui-bian. It's a good thing those forces for stability, restrained and prudent, are there to keep Mad Chen© in check! On to the fun....

It's a highly volatile mixture of ingredients: a fast-rising superpower, a rebellious island, an arms race, duelling missiles, claims of independence, and a spate of high-profile political events that could trigger a reckless reaction.

You've seen all this before -- breathless prose, dripping with It's gonna blow! The writer weaves his construction largely out of familiar media claims, and omits several key facts, as we'll see. Note the opening frame -- Taiwan is "rebellious." No pretense of balance on China's desire to annex the island is made. Taiwan is not, of course, "a rebellious island." The whole issue is exactly what relationship Taiwan has to China, and to use "rebellious" is to take a side in the debate. Sad.

China and Taiwan have been preparing for war for years, building up their arsenals of missiles, fighter jets, naval ships and other weapons. China has close to 1,000 ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwanese targets and the number is constantly rising. Taiwan has its own missiles ready to hit China, including its recently developed Brave Wind cruise missile, capable of striking Shanghai and other Chinese targets.

For the sake of enhancing the fear-value, the author makes it seem as if there is some equivalence between a nation attempting to annex another nation, and that nation fighting for its survival. The author also writes as if the 1000 missiles pointed at Taiwan are somehow balanced by handful of missiles Taiwan points at China. The fact is that Taiwan is preparing to defend itself -- it does not threaten China. The war threat is entirely from the Beijing side, and the writer should have made that clear.

The rhetoric on both sides has been ferocious. China's military often threatens to use force to prevent Taiwanese independence. Beijing has passed legislation to authorize violence against Taiwan if necessary. Taiwan's pro-independence President, Chen Shui-bian, has infuriated Beijing with his frequent talk of sovereignty.

As I've noted many times, "being infuriated" is a policy response, not a visceral reaction. Beijing uses them against pro-democracy actors in Taiwan, such as Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui, to gain leverage over international media presentations, as it has successfully done here.

Tensions have been high for years, but 2008 could be the most dangerous year of all. It is filled with potential trigger points, including two Taiwanese elections, a controversial referendum, the final days of Mr. Chen's presidency and the Summer Olympics.

Now after that slanted opening with its juicy OMIGAWD background, we come to the meat of the presentation. The writer says that tensions have been high for years, which is no doubt why a million Taiwanese have moved to China, completely unmolested by the Beijing government. Since tensions have been high for years, perhaps the writer might have discussed their location and development in the previous administration of Lee Teng-hui, and thus illustrated the context and continuity of Taiwan-China relations. Fact is, the same articles, with the same claims, were published throughout the Lee Teng-hui era, whenever Lee "provoked" China.

The piece discusses the "explosive" situation with the elections, and then observes:

Beijing is enraged by the referendum because it implies another step toward Taiwan's formal independence. China has recruited Washington to urge Taipei to cancel the referendum, yet Mr. Chen has vowed to push ahead with it, partly because it would help to galvanize his supporters and draw them to the ballot box.

It goes without saying: Beijing is enraged because it chooses to be enraged. Yes, the referendum's purpose is solely to drive election outcome: everyone knows it cannot possibly succeed. Since Beijing has a veto in the UN, nothing can ever come of the referendum in real world terms. It is simply a statement by the electorate. Note that this key fact is entirely omitted in the presentation, because if the writer had included it, readers would have wondered what all the tension was about and seen right through the writer's positions.

The anti-referendum rhetoric that Beijing asks for on the part of other nations is an attempt to manipulate the local election outcome. Washington is doing the same thing. Beijing has learned its lesson and is keeping the bombast down, and getting the Bush Administration to run interference for it.

For Beijing, the nightmare scenario is a victory by Mr. Chen's candidate in the presidential election and a victory for Mr. Chen in the referendum. "Beijing's reaction will be the million-dollar question," said Chao Chien-min, an expert on cross-strait relations at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. "The Taiwanese government has been warned over and over of the dangers, yet it chooses not to respond," he said. "They will do anything to win the election. Beijing is worried that the situation will get out of hand."

Here the writer cites pro-KMT analyst Chao Chien-min (we've run across him before) who simply regurgitates standard pro-China propaganda claims. Frank Hsieh is not "Mr. Chen's candidate" but the candidate in his own right -- it is purely a bit of Beijing propaganda to regard Chen Shui-bian as the evil genius and nemesis of Beijing. In fact, Chen's preferred candidate is generally acknowledged to be Hsieh's running mate, Su. Note that Chao presents Taiwan as reckless and China as restrained ("worried"). Fact is, Beijing is not "worried" but is simply using the situation to advance the interests of the KMT in Taiwan.

Further, the acutely intelligent Hsieh is widely considered conciliatory and moderate on China issues, and can hardly be described as a "nightmare." It is also curious that the writer reproduces Chao's quote "they will do almost anything!" without putting it in the context of China's military threats. People who threaten to plunge the region into war to annex a neighboring territory are the ones who will "do almost anything."

So you know what's coming next: the familiar Beijing rhetorical prop of Mad Chen©:

Beijing's nemesis, Mr. Chen, must step down when his term expires in 2008. But he will remain in office for two months after the presidential election. And if he is energized by victories by his pro-independence party in the presidential vote and the referendum, he could seize the opportunity to take a bigger leap toward independence, perhaps on the assumption that China will not dare to launch a war in the final months before the Beijing Olympics. (China, meanwhile, has warned that it is willing to take military action against Taiwan in 2008 even if it means sacrificing the Olympics.)

The idea that President Chen will take "a bigger leap" toward independence if the DPP is successful is entirely a bit of Beijing propaganda. A lame duck president, with no control of the legislature, in a population that prefers the short-term status quo, with a military whose officer class is largely pro-China? You'd have to be mad to imagine that. Or have a memory like the movie Memento -- when Chen came to power the military told him, as they did with Lee before him, that they would not defend the country in the event of a declaration of independence. This pattern of the President of Taiwan being depicted as a provocative troublemaker did not start with Chen. Again, it is a shame that all this context is entirely missing.

"I think there is a real danger of miscalculation on both sides," Mr. Chao said. "Both sides don't really understand the true feelings of the other. There's a huge gap of misunderstanding. The people of Taiwan don't really sense the danger of the referendum because we're so accustomed to the name Taiwan. And China, for its part, doesn't realize that the referendum is only domestic politics with little to do with sovereignty."

Except for the last nine words, this is misleading. China has an excellent grip on local domestic politics here -- note that China is using proxies and foregoing the urge to launch missiles and make threats -- and is assiduously interfering in them through pressure on the referendum, as is the US, which favors the KMT because of the Bush Administration's obsessive focus on the Middle East, and in various other ways. All of this information is publicly available -- I've discussed it incessantly on my blog -- and it is a shame that Chao's words are reproduced here without this context.

The writer then supplies a sturdy little fantasy about how a war could result.

Susan Shirk, a former official in the U.S. State Department, has recorded in detail how a small incident in Taiwan could quickly escalate into a global crisis. In a book published this year, Ms. Shirk outlines one of the most likely scenarios that could lead to disaster.

The crisis would begin with an accidental collision between a Taiwanese jet and a Chinese jet in the Taiwan Strait. The news is quickly flashed around the Chinese Internet, and the pressure of public opinion compels China's leaders to respond aggressively. China's army is mobilized and Chinese students march in the streets, demanding military action against Taiwan.

You probably already guessed that Shirk apparently has no serious Taiwan experience (the thesis is taken from her new book China: Fragile Superpower). Her expertise is China-oriented, a major problem of US observers of this relationship. It is highly unlikely that such a scenario could result in war unless China felt it was ready -- as I've frequently noted, China will make war when it feels the time is right, and not before.

With so much space devoted to the piece, so much more could have been said. Japan, for example, is not even mentioned, yet the emerging security relationship between Japan and Taiwan could be a major deterrant/determinant of war. As Steve Yates pointed out in his presentation, some Japanese observers consider Taiwan to be a testing ground for the kinds of tactics used against Japan later. Sadly, the author chose to forego any complex, nuanced discussion of the issues, to produce a shallow scare piece. Aargh...!

(hat tip to Marc A. in Taipei for the pointer to the article)

++++++++++++++++

The writer of the article, Geoffrey York, has asked me to post his response to a similar email. Here it is. I've snipped my comments to save space:

["rebellious"]

Response: nothing in my article said that Taiwan is a part of China. I referred to it as an "island", not a "province of China." It is accurate to call it "rebellious" because it is rebelling against the majority of the world community, including China and the United Nations and most of its members, who refuse to recognize Taiwan's claim to sovereignty. The Globe and Mail does not take a stance on the question of whether Taiwan is sovereign or not. Nothing in the article stated that Taiwan is a part of China. Can you actually deny that Taiwan is fighting against the majority of the countries in the world, which officially regard Taiwan as a province of China? Any island that fights against the official views of a majority of the members of the United Nations can surely be accurately described as rebellious.

[preparing for war]

Response: I never said that Taiwan is not preparing to defend itself. I never said that Taiwan is preparing to attack China. I merely noted that both sides have armed themselves with the ability to launch attacks on the other. You somehow imagined that I was accusing Taiwan of planning to launch a war -- a statement that I never made.

[infuriated is policy]

Response: Are you actually saying that China is not angry by some of Taiwan's actions, and that there are no tensions between the two countries? If so, perhaps you have some ability to read the minds of China's leaders?

[2008 is year of tension]

Response: I never said that tensions (and the risk of war) have never existed before. Just because war did not happen eight years ago is certainly no guarantee that it cannot happen in the future.

[explosive combination of events]

Response: But the referendum is new, of course.

[nightmare scenario, Chao comments]

Response: I never wrote that Hsieh is a "nightmare" -- again you are twisting my article to fit your own views. I actually wrote that the nightmare scenario for Beijing is a whole series of events happening together: a victory by Hsieh, a victory by Chen on the referendum, and Chen using those two victories to push the envelope further on independence. As for Hsieh, he is certainly the candidate of Chen's party, which is the point of my article. Moreover, you are contradicting yourself by claiming that Chen and Hsieh have totally different views, and then suggesting that Chen's views are similar to "the vast majority" of Taiwanese. Which is it? First you say that Chen's views are those of the majority, and then you portray him as an ally of Su. Finally, you twisted the quote about "they will do almost anything" and deliberately took it out of context. The quote refers to Chen doing "almost anything" to win an election, not to start a war. Then you talk about China doing "almost anything" when China had nothing to do with the quote.

[chen will make leap toward independence]

Response: Your comment is a partisan defence of Chen. That's fine, but admit you are partisan. You're also attempting to guarantee his future behaviour, as if you can guarantee that he will never do anything reckless. But many people -- including the United States government -- are not nearly as confident as you. It's entirely fair for my article to report those fears. Finally, my article does not attempt to say that Chen is more of a troublemaker than China. You imagined that my article said that, but there's nothing in my article to justify this view of yours.


[china and taiwan don't understand each other]

Response: you claim that China and Taiwan have perfect information about each other, that there is no danger of conflict, and that there is nothing dangerous in the referendum. This is clearly your personal viewpoint, but you don't provide any evidence to support it. You're entitled to express your personal views, but don't expect everyone else in the world to repeat it blindly in their articles.

[susan shirk's scenario]

Response: Susan Shirk is a serious and well-respected scholar. If you look at her book, it is a careful and serious analysis. If you want to reject her argument, you have to provide some evidence -- you can't simply accuse her of "trying to sell books." Certainly you don't defeat her argument by mentioning other flashpoints in the region -- that's beside the point.

[summary criticisms]

Response: As I've explained above, nothing in the article was "breathless" or "wrong-headed." Clearly you have very strong personal opinions on these issues, but you don't seem tolerant of anyone who doesn't share your personal views.

UPDATE: York is the Globe and Mail's Beijing Bureau Chief.

Sunday, December 23, 2007

Sec Rice's Comments

Jerome Keating reminds that Sec Rice's comments that the referendum is a "provocation" may be responded to at the following email addresses:


Be nice when you talk to the Administration, I'm sure it will be a new experience for them..... Alton Thompson over at Conductor's Notebook has a good response:

Dear Secretary Rice:

Like many Americans living in Taiwan I think your recent statement is a provocative action. It unnecessarily raises tensions between the democratic ideals Americans cherish and the policies of your administration. The statement promises no real benefits on the international stage for the people of either America or Taiwan. Or even China.

The moment was not worthy of you, Ms Rice. History has recorded your name already as a crucial player in the advancement of democracy. You were your country's Russia expert during the fall of the Soviet empire. The people of central and eastern Europe did not achieve peaceful liberation from their nightmare because you or your boss sent mixed messages from your side. The motto then was peace through strength, not status quo.

I think the US has reached the point of self-defeating overkill -- which may in fact be the goal. This bombast-by-proxy policy may be intended to have the opposite effect than it conveys on the surface. Perhaps they are just subtle...

...but I sorta doubt it. It should also be noted that the Chinese wanted Bush himself to make a statement, and instead they got Rice. Since westerners often get rice when they want something else in Chinese settings, it's only natural that we return the favor. (badda bing!). Sec. Rice's comments were certainly uncalled for, but it could have been worse....

I wish Chen would stop misrepresenting the referendum:

Responding to Rice, Chen said the referendum was an engagement the government had made in response to the request of the people.

"The referendum comes from the bottom up, from the 23 million people of Taiwan. The people took the initiative to make the proposal and enthusiastically put their signatures on the petition to sustain the referendum," Chen said.


The referendum was initiated by the DPP and approved by the people. It was not initiated by "the people." This is a game that is beneath our dignity. It might also be wonderful if Chen would shut up until the election and step down as Chairman of the DPP, but I haven't seen any pigs flying outside my window lately.... one thing everyone is saying is that they are tired of Chen, who says things that everyone is thinking, but probably should not be said by any major politician ('there's no cap on the Pacific ocean'). Is the DPP's strategy to make everyone sick of Chen, then trundle out Hsieh to hit the big time for the last six weeks of the campaign?

Saturday, December 22, 2007

Stray Media on Taiwan's Int'l Relations

The always insightful Ting-i Tsai has a commentary in the Asia Times on the recent decision by the US to take a step back on the referendum. He argues that the US has reluctantly decided to live with it:

Burghardt's approach, which deviated from that of other US officials in recent months, may have signaled that Washington has reluctantly decided to change course after concluding that its efforts to compel Taiwan's ruling party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to drop the referendum were futile.

Washington now appears willing to "tolerate" the referendum but is hoping to encourage its failure so that it will not be over-interpreted with expansive and elaborate statements on what the referendum means.

Some US-based analysts believe that Burghardt's comments reflected a shift in attitude, prompted by Washington's realization that it could not have high expectations that Chen would drop the referendum.

Bonnie Glaser, senior associate at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, said she sensed that Washington had shifted to acceptance of the referendum after a meeting with a senior US official a few weeks ago.

The view is echoed by Richard Bush, former chairman of the AIT and director of the Washington-based Brookings Institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Study. "The attitude [of Washington] has been shifting for some time," Bush said, as the US government has known for a while that the chances were pretty low that the DPP would abandon the referendum.
++++++++

The train of US officials speaking out against the referendum reached another high with Sec. Rice herself labeling it "provocative" in remarks yesterday, the day after she received a letter from two Congressmen asking the Administration to stop this unseemingly behavior. The BBC reports:

At an end-of-year news conference at the state department, Ms Rice said: "We think that Taiwan's referendum to apply to the United Nations under the name 'Taiwan' is a provocative policy.

"It unnecessarily raises tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and it promises no real benefits for the people of Taiwan on the international stage."

Beijing has attacked the referendum, calling it a precursor to attempts to declare independence.

It has consistently threatened to use force if that happens.

Driving this wave of Bush Administration self-expression, I suspect, is the belief that Taiwan's voters actually correctly receive, interpret, and act on, warnings from the US. Tom Christensen, who has been particularly active in elaborating this policy of attacking the referendum on China's behalf, seems to hold this belief. Do people really care what the US says? How can they see what it is saying when everything that is reported here goes through the pro-Blue media's distortion machine?

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Max Hirsch of Kyodo News, consistently one of the best reporters on the island's affairs, has another insightful piece on the emerging importance of Japan in the domestic political battle here. I've been observing over the last couple of years how Japan's Taiwan policy has undergone a shift in response to China's challenge to Japan, a very favorable shift for Taiwan. Hirsch's piece elaborates on how this has affected Taiwan's internal struggles. Interesting bits highlighted (now in the Japan Times):

Such is the significance of Japan to Taiwan's Mar. 22 presidential election, in which tacit support from the vital trading and strategic partner could make or break the diplomacy platforms of Ma and Hsieh. Hence, Japan has emerged as a key battleground in the political fight for Taiwan's top job, as both frontrunners scramble to curry favor with Tokyo.

''Obviously...both candidates put Taiwan-Japan relations front and center in this race,'' says Andrew Yang of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, a Taipei-based think tank.

Concern in Tokyo over whether Taiwan's next president will ''exercise an independent voice'' for the island ''while avoiding miscalculations with Beijing'' is behind Tokyo's keen interest in the race, Yang says.

Taiwan's growing interest in Japan, meanwhile, is obvious.

Amid booming trade and tourism links, Japan's importance to Taiwan on security hit a zenith in 2005, when Tokyo joined Washington in referring to Taiwan as a ''common strategic objective'' -- a veiled reference to likely intervention by the United States and Japan in a Taiwan Strait conflict.

China views Taiwan as a breakaway province that must be united with the mainland, by force if necessary.

Beijing's threats to attack the island have spurred Hsieh to capitalize on Japan's 2005 statement -- issued by then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi -- by seeking U.S.-style security guarantees from Tokyo during his trip.

However, fears abound in Taipei that the current prime minister, Yasuo Fukuda -- known for his ''China-friendly'' stance -- will back off of commitments to the island to soothe Beijing.

''We have a poster of Junichiro Koizumi tacked up in our office, but not of Prime Minister Fukuda,'' says DPP Legislator Hsiao Bi-khim, who serves in Hsieh's campaign and runs foreign affairs for the DPP.

''It's not that we don't like [Fukuda]; it's just that we connect more with leaders like...Koizumi,'' she adds.

All the more reason, then, for Ma and Hsieh to court Fukuda's administration. Bullish economic ties further explain why wooing Japan is more important in this race than in past races.

Taiwan's trade with Japan, for example, totaled nearly US$63 billion last year, a record high allowing Japan to overtake the United States as Taiwan's second largest trading partner, after China. Taiwan for its part ranks fourth among Japan’s trading partners, while the two exchanged some 2.3 million tourists last year -- another record high.

That both frontrunners sent their running-mates to the United States on goodwill visits before visiting Japan themselves, undermines another piece of conventional wisdom -- that Washington mainly arbitrates the island's geopolitical fate.

Ma's trip to Japan was apparently very successful. The DPP places such importance on its relationship with Japan that its website is available in both Anglais and Japanese....

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Finally, from a blogger where the south polar star is found comes this tale of growing Chinese influence in the Cook Islands....

Given the paucity of news in New Zealand media about events in our South Pacific neighbours, unless it is about coups, riots or cyclones, I’m not surprised there has been virtually no news here about the wonderful benevolence of China in the Cook Islands. But I am surprised there has been no coverage whatsoever here of the farewell speech given in Rarotonga a few days ago by the departing New Zealand high commissioner John Bryan, which received considerable publicity in the Cooks because of his candid thoughts on the China connection. It’s not as if our media did not know he was leaving – they have been speculating he will be replaced by NZ First MP Brian Donnelly.

As the daily newspaper, the Cook Islands News, put it, career diplomats seldom express their views on important issues in public, so Bryan’s comments were all the more remarkable and worthy of reporting by the New Zealand media.

“People are saying there is no such thing as a free lunch so what do the Chinese want in return for the assistance they are providing?” Bryan said. “There are lots of ideas floating around, including them wanting access to Cook Islands fishing grounds, the establishment of a fishing fleet in the northern group and the facilitation of migrants. May be there is an ounce of truth in that.”

But what John Bryan believes to be China’s main interest is the Taiwan issue. There is great rivalry between China and Taiwan, the province that broke away after Mao’s communists took over the mainland in 1949 and which was recognised by most Western countries as the “official” China until the early 1970s. Some countries still recognise Taiwan rather than China, including Nauru, Palau, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands in the Pacific. Almost unnoticed by the New Zealand media, China and Taiwan have been quietly competing for influence in the region, in much the same way, though not as nakedly, as Japan has been trying to buy the votes of Pacific nations at the International Whaling Commission. This makes it all the more disappointing that the New Zealand media missed John Bryan’s speech.

Let me report what he said: “I think it comes down to the bitter rivalry that exists between China and Taiwan in securing diplomatic recognition across the Pacific. China advocates, and most members of the United Nations agree, that Taiwan is still a legitimate province of the mainland. Taiwan likes to think they are ‘autonomous’ and can operate accordingly. Several Pacific nations agree with them and they all have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. China would, of course, prefer these countries to respect the one China policy and they continue to try and persuade them to change allegiance. Some argue that this situation is the cause of what is commonly referred to as ‘chequebook diplomacy’ in the Pacific, where the one with the highest financial offering tends to win the battle for diplomatic recognition. Naturally China is concerned that the Pacific island countries that currently support China, including the Cook Islands, might also be courted by Taiwan and be persuaded to change diplomatic recognition. That is why I think they are enhancing their relationship with the Cook Islands and offering tangible assistance. Also, China sees the Cook Islands as having a very good reputation in the region and that they might have the ability to influence those Pacific countries who currently acknowledge Taiwan to change their diplomatic position towards China.”

This is important stuff indeed. An almost unnoticed battle between Taiwan and China for diplomatic influence in our own backyard. These views are presumably what John Bryan was reporting back to Wellington, and what would have been reported from our other diplomatic missions in the region. The Cold War is long over, thank goodness, and China is our friend. But so is Taiwan. We have excellent relationships with both, and we are seeking a free trade deal with China, the first it is likely to sign with a Western country. This makes activities such as China’s and Taiwan’s in our region of more than passing interest, as we could easily be caught up in them. As reported last Sunday by The Hive, Niue has established diplomatic relations with China despite New Zealand being responsible for Niue’s foreign affairs. The Taiwan issue is apparent there, too.

John Bryan’s opinions are of somewhat greater importance than what Lucy Lawless, Hollie Smith and Marcus Lush emote about whales, which the capital’s morning paper saw fit to make its page one lead yesterday. It would be nice to see his cogent, relevant views also get an airing in the mainstream media.

Wow! I would have thought the NZ media would be more interested in South Seas nations, especially since the foreign relations of so many of them are entangled with New Zealand's.

Friday, December 21, 2007

Tancredo to Rice: Stop Interfering in Taiwan's Elections

Tom Tancredo's (R-COL) office just forwarded me a copy of his latest effort on Taiwan's behalf: a joint letter of Tancredo and Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) to Sec of State Rice asking the Administration to stop its interference in Taiwan's elections. Go Tancredo! Here's the letter in its entirety:

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The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Secretary
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Rice,

We are writing to ask that the State Department cease its repeated efforts to affect the outcome of the upcoming elections in Taiwan, and specifically, the outcome of the planned referendum on membership in the United Nations. Your department has already made its objections to the referendum quite clear, and we are concerned that continued public criticism of the measure by U.S. officials will only contribute to the perception that the U.S. is playing political favorites in Taiwan.

Administration condemnations of the referendum have been numerous and public. In June, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack publicly urged people to reject the proposed U.N referendum. In August, John Negroponte arranged to appear on a Chinese television station to express U.S. opposition to the plebiscite, dangerously mischaracterizing it as “a step toward a declaration of independence.” A few days later, a National Security Council spokesman also blasted the referendum. Our AIT director in Taipei, Stephen Young has repeatedly criticized the proposal. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian affairs suggested that the “DPP referendum” is “inconsistent with President Chen’s inaugural pledges” (disregarding the fact that President Chen’s pledges were contingent on China not threatening to use force against the island). And just a few days ago, Raymond Burghardt publicly panned the upcoming vote as an obstacle to “develop[ing] relations across the Taiwan Strait.”

One or two public statements would be quite sufficient to convey the Administrations position to Taiwan’s elected officials on this matter. It is not necessary to continue dispatching an endless parade of U.S. officials to denounce and attack the proposal over a six month stretch while parroting the terminology used by the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Doing so is not just unseemly, it is totally unnecessary. Given the vibrant debate on the issue inside Taiwan and the widely varying opinions on the wisdom and efficacy of the referendum among Taiwan’s numerous political parties, the Department’s sustained interference will do little more than contribute to what has already become a troubling – and unfortunately quite understandable – perception in Taiwan that the U.S. government is choosing sides in their elections.

We hope the Administration will refrain from orchestrating any further interference in the referendum question and will instead allow Taiwan’s political leaders, political parties and people to make this decision on their own. The people of Taiwan have earned the right to conduct their elections without coercion from our government, the government of the People’s Republic of China, or anyone else – and we should respect their right to do so.

Sincerely,

Tom Tancredo, M.C.
Dana Rohrabacher, M.C.

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"One or two public statements would be quite sufficient to convey the Administrations position to Taiwan’s elected officials on this matter. It is not necessary to continue dispatching an endless parade of U.S. officials to denounce and attack the proposal over a six month stretch while parroting the terminology used by the Chinese Foreign Ministry."

Yup. Good stuff, gentlemen.