Johnny Neihu: Was Heritage Pressured to Remove Tkacik?

Johnny Neihu announced in his column today that John Tkacik, the fiercely pro-Taiwan scholar at Heritage, has "left" his post as Senior Research Fellow there. To wit:

Not long after last week’s column, I received a series of e-mails from a respected source in the US with knowledge of the workings of The Heritage Foundation, probably the most influential think tank stateside.

Heritage is a very conservative bunch of people. It has a fascinating history that will appall or delight according to your political bent. But one thing is certain: For years it has been home to solid advocacy of freedom from communist thuggery, even when Republican presidents gave up the ghost.

In the past, Taiwan was a US interest mostly because it was anti-communist. Today, things aren’t so simple: the Chicoms and their despised Siamese twin, the KMT, are rejoining at the hip in a manner likely to injure the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese and cripple the integrity of a budding democracy.

Heritage’s most hardline, pro-Taiwan commentator — indeed, one of the most hardline in the US — is John Tkacik (also an occasional Taipei Times columnist), a former diplomat, who has written years of analysis on such matters.

But that has all come to a sinister end. My informant told me that Tkacik has been removed from his post at Heritage as Senior Research Fellow.

Unfortunately, with people too nervous or professionally vulnerable to go on the record, I can’t print most of what was said in the e-mails, including one particularly explicit and disturbing allegation. My legal budget extends about as far as challenging a ticket for double parking.

Anyone for a broad hint? Read on:

The obvious question is: Who would dance with joy to see Tkacik shorn of institutional respectability? Here are some possibilities, though they’re not the only ones:

1. The Chinese government;

2. Taiwan’s KMT government;

3. US individuals/groups/firms with Chinese interests;

4. A rival colleague(s).

Just out of curiosity, when I asked if Heritage could identify “the exact amount of money that the Taiwanese government donates to Heritage formally or informally,” an official kindly sent me a reply.

He said: “The Heritage Foundation receives no funding from the government of Taiwan. And the ASC is entirely a part of The Heritage Foundation. ASC does not have any independent source of income.”

Now that’s a denial. And just as well, too. Gracious, what would have been the ramifications of the top US conservative think tank taking conditional cash from a government that longs for China to be more powerful than the US one day?

So, for now, I’ll have to leave you in suspense on why Tkacik is no longer at Heritage. My humble message to him on behalf of Taiwan’s concussed democrats is: Thank you, John, and Godspeed.

Since my legal budget consists of borrowing money from Johnny Neihu to contest my parking tickets, that's all I am going to say on this subject. My readers are excellent mathematicians and will have no trouble combining 2 and 2 to attain 4.

This is a blow, especially with the so many in the US engaged in those periodic fantasies that strike each generation of Americans anew that if we only make China happy, it will make us rich. Unfortunately being right is not enough; institutions magnify voices, and Heritage was a powerful base for John T.

Thank you, John, and good luck.

[Taiwan]

Loch Ness and the Taiwan Strait

Loch Ness and the Taiwan Strait have something in common. They are both home to elusive, difficult to see or photograph creatures that excite all who come into contact with them, and exasperate the duly constituted authorities, even though they agree that their continued existence is good for the locals.....

John Tkacik published an excellent piece in the Taipei Times today outlining some of the issues regarding Taiwan's homegrown version of Nessie, the Status Quo. Tkacik, a longtime supporter of the island who grew up in Taiwan and went to international school in Taipei as a wee lad, has very interesting comments on Washington's policy drift (the piece is top-drawer and should be read in its entirety):

Beyond that third point, Kelly had to admit he was "not sure" he "very easily could define ... `our' one China policy." Nonetheless he continued, "I can tell you what it is not." It is not the "one China" principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some would have in Taiwan. Alas, that is as close as a State Department official has ever come to defining "our one China policy" in private or in public. Nor, as it happens, has any US official ever "defined" the "status quo as we define it."

Which raises two core questions for US policy: First, what are the "use of force" and the "threat of force" and what, exactly, is Taiwan's status, as far as the US is concerned? And second, what is the US going to do if either side does something the US "does not support?"

The fact is that Washington has no answers to these core questions -- either publicly or in confidential policy documents circulated among decisionmakers. Hence, Washington's political leaders should not be surprised when Washington's Delphic pronouncements are interpreted arbitrarily in both Beijing and Taipei.

As Tkacik notes, as a result of Washington's lack of a clear public or private policy, Beijing just does whatever it damn well pleases. The antidote to Beijing's growing awareness of Washington's weakness and vacillation is a clear statement of policy in response to Beijing's recent changes in the status quo, such as the missile buildup and the revolting Anti-Succession Law:

The US government must also understand that so long as Taiwan refuses to accept Beijing's sovereignty, Beijing's long-term strategy will be to isolate Taiwan in the international community to the most extreme extent possible.

Thus, when China gets obstreperous on the Taiwan issue, White House and Cabinet spokespersons should publicly articulate the common-sense stance that "the United States does not recognize or accept that China has any right whatsoever under international law to use or threaten the use of force against democratic Taiwan." (This has the advantage of actually being US policy, but it has never been stated in public.)

In background to journalists and reporters, US "senior officials" could explain that even a Taiwanese declaration of independence would just be "words on paper" and would not change any country's behavior or affect China's security posture? This wording would make it clear that the US does not now recognize, and never has recognized, China's territorial claims to Taiwan.

I should add that one consequence of the policy drift in Washington is that without clear guidance from policymakers at the top, the US State Department is for practical purposes increasingly adopting a pro-Beijing position on the Taiwan question. After all, Beijing is the only one with a clearly defined position: Taiwan is mine Mine MINE! Almost by default, State has defined the status quo as "whatever is acceptable to Beijing." It goes without saying that this lack of will or leverage in our East Asian policy is yet another pernicious effect of our criminal, and criminally stupid, war in Iraq.

[Taiwan] [Tkacik] [US] [China] [US Foreign Policy] [State Department]

China and Taiwan Duke it out in the Carribean

Richard at the Peking Duck points to a great article on China's diplomatic moves in the Carribean that cites my man John Tkacik. Since the Duck has already discussed it.......

[Taiwan] [China]

More good stuff from Tkacik

Don't miss John Tkacik's backgrounder at AEI on US-Taiwan affairs, and why Taiwan is important to the US:

Many American policymakers and academics view China as an unstoppable force of nature. Dur­ing an intense grilling by the House International Relations Committee on May 10, 2006, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said:

But we have to be very careful, you see. And this is the balance, is that we want to be supportive of Taiwan, while we are not en­couraging those that try to move toward independence. Because I am being very clear: Independence means war. And that means American soldiers.[20]

Zoellick's sentiments are valid and understand­able, but the "independence means war" formula­tion is a purely Chinese invention, designed as a threat and not as a postulate of immutable fact.[21] Avoiding war is a reasonable concern, but modern war-avoidance theory centers on the proposition that democracies do not make war on each other, but rather are themselves the targets of aggression.[22] An international system that makes peace the high­est priority is "at the mercy of the most ruthless, since there [is] a maximum incentive to mollify the most aggressive state and to accept its demands, even when they [are] unreasonable." The result inevitably is "massive instability and insecurity"[23]

There's more great stuff. Go thou and read, especially their suggestions for the US:

Counter Beijing's relentless campaign to iso­late Taiwan economically and politically by strengthening U.S.-Taiwan trade ties and strongly encouraging allies and other democracies to include Taiwan in international efforts on health, transportation, nonproliferation, coun­terterrorism, and disaster relief. A U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) with Taiwan would be a good place to start.

Participation--even as an "observer"--in other formal and informal international organizations (e.g., the World Health Organization, Interna­tional Civil Aviation Organization, and Interna­tional Maritime Organization); the various informal nonproliferation groups (e.g., Austra­lia Group on chemical weapons and the Missile Technology Control Regime); and refugee and relief "core groups" would benefit the interna­tional community and give Taiwan enhanced international legitimacy. In turn, Taiwan's enhanced legitimacy would provide extra deterrence against China's constant threats of force against Taiwan.

However, the problem is far more complex and requires a more comprehensive solution than sim­ply opposing Beijing's attempts to isolate Taiwan. The first step in rethinking the Taiwan Strait must be to adjust existing policies. To this end, both the Administration and Congress should:

Confront Beijing's policy of "independence means war" with quiet suggestions from Wash­ington that war might just as easily mean inde­pendence. Some argue that such a stance would encourage some irresponsible Taiwanese lead­ers to advocate independence in order to start a war that would lead to diplomatic recognition. Nonetheless, Taiwanese politicians and the Tai­wanese people already are effectively restrained by their conviction that any war with China would devastate Taiwan, and no one wants to avoid war in the Taiwan Strait more than the Taiwanese people do.

Maintain the "island chain" hedge against a hostile continental Asian power as a broad stra­tegic goal of the United States. The island chain concept is especially relevant in the context of a new, continental Asian naval power seeking unrestricted access to America's sea lines of communication across the Pacific Ocean.

Enhance official exchanges. Defense coopera­tion is already at a high level, but the Adminis­tration should quietly enhance it by lifting the self-imposed ban on visits to the island by flag-rank U.S. military and naval officers. It should encourage visits by Cabinet-level officials, a practice that was common in the Clinton Administration. Senior U.S. State Department officials up to the rank of undersecretary should be able to visit Taiwan without placing undue stress on ties with Beijing.

Lend moral support to Taiwan's democracy. The Administration should cease justifying the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as merely an obli­gation under the Taiwan Relations Act and instead admit publicly that the United States has a stake in the survival and success of democracy on Taiwan, regardless of China's ter­ritorial claims on the island.

Encourage diplomatic ties. The State and Defense Departments and U.S. diplomatic mis­sions abroad should quietly and discreetly encourage the preservation of third-country diplomatic ties with Taiwan, especially in the Pacific, but also with Central American and Caribbean countries where China seeks a more assertive presence, such as Panama, which owns and operates the Panama Canal. Appar­ently, the State Department does this now on a limited basis.[61]

Revisit Taiwan's offensive military capacities. The Pentagon should admit that Taiwan's stra­tegic planning, which is based on purely defen­sive weapons systems, is horrifically expensive and lacks the deterrent efficiency of a robust second-strike, counterforce capability. The Pentagon should consult with Taiwan on sup­plementing its defensive strategy with weapons systems of a "limited offensive capacity" such as JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), cruise missiles, HARMs (High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles), and submarine-launched Harpoons. Quietly encouraging Taiwan to develop an offensive tactical missile force would also give Washington leverage over Beijing's penchant for supplying offensive missiles (and perhaps more) to rogue states from North Korea to Iran.

[Taiwan] [US] [China]

Excellent Article by Tkacik in Weekly Standard

John Tkacik and Gary Schmitt write a great article on the name rectification and Taiwan's sovereignty in the Weekly Standard (hat tip to Gerrit van der Wees of FAPA), as well as the numbing shortsightedness of the State Department:

Since 1979, when the United States cut formal diplomatic ties with the "Republic of China"--that is, the government of Taiwan--it has banned official U.S. government use of the term "Republic of China." Yet, in the Alice-in-Wonderland logic of Foggy Bottom, the State Department criticizes the Republic of China for using the word "Taiwan," even while addressing its statement to the "Taiwan authorities." Meanwhile, out at Langley, the CIA lists "Taiwan" in its World Fact Book not under "China," nor alphabetically, but at the end, after Zimbabwe. And under "Name: conventional long form" it says "none," when in fact the "conventional long form" of the name of Taiwan's government is "The Republic of China." So, while the State Department complains about the decision in Taipei to drop "China" in exchange for "Taiwan," the CIA is desperately trying to avoid using the term "China" in reference to Taiwan.

Next they point out the obvious: that the State Department is feeding Beijing's hunger for Taiwan:

China insists that Taiwan keep the name "Republic of China" in order to legitimize implicitly its claim that Taiwan is part of "one China" and, hence, part of its sovereign territory. By going along with this, the United States actually fuels China's sense of entitlement--or, more accurately, its resentment over the fact that it doesn't rule Taiwan.

Then comes a review of what everyone understood Taiwan's situation to be after WWII: its sovereignty was unresolved, the US position into the 1970s (much to the chagrin of the Chiang regime):

But the United States has not recognized Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan since at least April 11, 1947, when then-Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a letter to Senator Joseph Ball, stated that "the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China [had] not yet been formalized." Taiwan, then called Formosa, had been a colony of the Japanese Empire from 1895 until the end of the Second World War, when Japan "renounced all right, title, and claim" to the island as a condition of Japan's surrender. When, in 1951, a formal peace treaty with Japan was concluded in San Francisco, China was not represented, because of a disagreement among the signatory powers as to which government actually represented it. The delegate of the United Kingdom stated for the record that the "treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands," a position that all parties, except the Soviet Union, adopted. The Soviet delegate grumbled that "this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory: Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands."

After further review Schmitt and Tkacik note:

The State Department formally restated this position to the U.S. Senate in 1970: "As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution." And President Ronald Reagan, as part of his "six assurances" in 1982 to Taiwan president Chiang Ching-kuo, declared that "the United States has not changed its long-standing position on the matter of Taiwan's sovereignty." Every succeeding U.S. administration has reiterated its adherence to that assurance--though without spelling it out, which is probably why Foreign Service officers in the Department of State and staffers on the National Security Council have come to lose sight of this fundamental act.

It's important to understand this key fact: after WWII the sovereignty of Taiwan was generally understood to belong to no one, and this was the official US position for many years. That is why in the Shanghai Communique the US merely "acknowledges" the Chinese position.

They close with a sad anecdote:

At the press conference announcing the agreement, general manager Brian Cashman referred to Yankee pitcher Chien-Ming Wang, who last year tied for the most wins in the American league, as coming from "Chinese-Taipei." While doing so no doubt pleased his Chinese Communist hosts, it was undoubtedly an embarrassment for Wang, a national hero in Taiwan, to have his country tossed aside for the sake of the Yankees' commercial interests. Of course, the Yankees have not been the only ones to go down this road. And the real issue here is not whether the Yankees or Major League Baseball can sell a few more baseball caps and shirts in China. The real issue is that by playing this game we are not moderating Chinese ambitions toward Taiwan but fueling them.

Bingo. Every time the State Department kowtows to Beijing, it simply aggravates the situation. China has no right to own Taiwan, and it is high time the State Department internalized that fact.

[Taiwan] [US] [China] [Chinese Taipei] [Taiwan Independence] [Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)] Photos hosted at Flickr.