It goes both ways.
[Taiwan] [Nazi Germany] [Hitler] [Mao] [China]
For almost 25 years the US-Taiwan Business Council was known by the name USA-ROC Economic Council. It was created in 1976 at a time when the name was deemed appropriate in representation of the US based business community. We had a sister organization named the ROC-USA Economic Council.
By the late 1990s it became clear that the acronym ROC was becoming an increasing barrier in the business community to recognizing the role of the Council – business executives and others would ask, what's ROC? This was particularly true in the booming technology sector, which represented a huge new opportunity for the Council to grow but new little of the subtleties of Taiwan politics. As with all things related to business - brand name matters indeed, it is central to the success of any endeavor.
After a period of consultation with our membership we agreed that our name needed to change. We recognized that the KMT, still in power in the late 1990s, was unlikely to feel comfortable with the decision to change immediately to Taiwan (it was ours to make but please be conscious of the fact that our relationship with Taiwan's government, Blue or Green, is essential to our success) so we took an incremental approach.
We changed our name to USA-ROC (Taiwan) Business Council. We kept that name for 2 years and then removed the ROC and parenthesis giving us our present name. It worked well and leaves us appropriately branded in today's globalized business environment.
According to conventional wisdom, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the development of the concept of “strategic flexibility” were chiefly responses to advances in technology (primarily computers and communications) and the application of market principles to military management. The end of the Cold War, the subsequent attacks of September 11, and an altered security environment further accelerated these shifts in doctrine and force structure. The latest war-fighting gurus view fixed military bases with lumbering tanks and static defenses as comparatively low-tech and incapable of addressing rapidly emerging conflicts and threats. U.S. forces, they argue, should be flexible enough to respond to North Korean missiles, Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, or a cross-straits confrontation in Taiwan.UPDATE: Go leave a comment on this sad article there that argues that Taiwan should be annexed to China so that it can be democratic....
But a case can be made that the RMA and strategic flexibility are also responses to NIMBY (not in my back yard) and democratic movements. Fixed bases were an easy target, not only for the enemy but also for popular discontent, starting in the Philippines and spreading to Okinawa, Tokyo, and Seoul (not to mention other parts of the world such as Vieques). The U.S. security umbrella was generally popular among allied leaders, but the actual U.S. security footprint was another matter.
Believing Taiwan can deter "through wielding unacceptable punishment" is not only a waste of resources; it is downright dangerous as it could lead to neglecting genuine defense requirements, as well as instilling a false sense of confidence in the political leadership that could lead to a serious miscalculation. And, it could lead down the conceptual slippery slope to a rationale for nuclear weapons.McDevitt seems to want to redeem himself for the godawful article on Taiwan-China relations he wrote last year. It should be noted that the vast majority of independent analysts favor Taiwan's acquisition of submarines. While I am favor of that too, I have more faith in the ability of attack jets, rather than attack subs, to stop an invasion. Taiwan needs to acquire another 200-300 modern fighters, a huge stockpile of ammo and spare parts, and harden and decentralize communications, command and control, and airfields.
The only way Taiwan can "deter" China militarily is to convince the PLA that it could never successfully seize the island. Taiwan's reality is that the PLA can "punish" it through missile attacks, something that Taiwan can mitigate through hardened defenses, but not prevent. But, the PLA cannot capture Taiwan unless it can cross the Taiwan Strait – 100 miles of open water – and seize the island.
The way to make certain that could never happen is to ensure that Taiwan never loses air superiority over the strait. Without air superiority, an amphibious operation of the magnitude necessary to seize Taiwan is not possible. Air superiority was the essential prerequisite for the invasion at Normandy in 1944, and that prerequisite remains today. So long as the Taiwan Strait remains a "moat," the island is secure from seizure.
Many American policymakers and academics view China as an unstoppable force of nature. During an intense grilling by the House International Relations Committee on May 10, 2006, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said:There's more great stuff. Go thou and read, especially their suggestions for the US:
But we have to be very careful, you see. And this is the balance, is that we want to be supportive of Taiwan, while we are not encouraging those that try to move toward independence. Because I am being very clear: Independence means war. And that means American soldiers.[20]
Zoellick's sentiments are valid and understandable, but the "independence means war" formulation is a purely Chinese invention, designed as a threat and not as a postulate of immutable fact.[21] Avoiding war is a reasonable concern, but modern war-avoidance theory centers on the proposition that democracies do not make war on each other, but rather are themselves the targets of aggression.[22] An international system that makes peace the highest priority is "at the mercy of the most ruthless, since there [is] a maximum incentive to mollify the most aggressive state and to accept its demands, even when they [are] unreasonable." The result inevitably is "massive instability and insecurity"[23]
[Taiwan] [US] [China]
Counter Beijing's relentless campaign to isolate Taiwan economically and politically by strengthening U.S.-Taiwan trade ties and strongly encouraging allies and other democracies to include Taiwan in international efforts on health, transportation, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and disaster relief. A U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) with Taiwan would be a good place to start.
Participation--even as an "observer"--in other formal and informal international organizations (e.g., the World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, and International Maritime Organization); the various informal nonproliferation groups (e.g., Australia Group on chemical weapons and the Missile Technology Control Regime); and refugee and relief "core groups" would benefit the international community and give Taiwan enhanced international legitimacy. In turn, Taiwan's enhanced legitimacy would provide extra deterrence against China's constant threats of force against Taiwan.
However, the problem is far more complex and requires a more comprehensive solution than simply opposing Beijing's attempts to isolate Taiwan. The first step in rethinking the Taiwan Strait must be to adjust existing policies. To this end, both the Administration and Congress should:
Confront Beijing's policy of "independence means war" with quiet suggestions from Washington that war might just as easily mean independence. Some argue that such a stance would encourage some irresponsible Taiwanese leaders to advocate independence in order to start a war that would lead to diplomatic recognition. Nonetheless, Taiwanese politicians and the Taiwanese people already are effectively restrained by their conviction that any war with China would devastate Taiwan, and no one wants to avoid war in the Taiwan Strait more than the Taiwanese people do.
Maintain the "island chain" hedge against a hostile continental Asian power as a broad strategic goal of the United States. The island chain concept is especially relevant in the context of a new, continental Asian naval power seeking unrestricted access to America's sea lines of communication across the Pacific Ocean.
Enhance official exchanges. Defense cooperation is already at a high level, but the Administration should quietly enhance it by lifting the self-imposed ban on visits to the island by flag-rank U.S. military and naval officers. It should encourage visits by Cabinet-level officials, a practice that was common in the Clinton Administration. Senior U.S. State Department officials up to the rank of undersecretary should be able to visit Taiwan without placing undue stress on ties with Beijing.
Lend moral support to Taiwan's democracy. The Administration should cease justifying the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as merely an obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act and instead admit publicly that the United States has a stake in the survival and success of democracy on Taiwan, regardless of China's territorial claims on the island.
Encourage diplomatic ties. The State and Defense Departments and U.S. diplomatic missions abroad should quietly and discreetly encourage the preservation of third-country diplomatic ties with Taiwan, especially in the Pacific, but also with Central American and Caribbean countries where China seeks a more assertive presence, such as Panama, which owns and operates the Panama Canal. Apparently, the State Department does this now on a limited basis.[61]
Revisit Taiwan's offensive military capacities. The Pentagon should admit that Taiwan's strategic planning, which is based on purely defensive weapons systems, is horrifically expensive and lacks the deterrent efficiency of a robust second-strike, counterforce capability. The Pentagon should consult with Taiwan on supplementing its defensive strategy with weapons systems of a "limited offensive capacity" such as JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), cruise missiles, HARMs (High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles), and submarine-launched Harpoons. Quietly encouraging Taiwan to develop an offensive tactical missile force would also give Washington leverage over Beijing's penchant for supplying offensive missiles (and perhaps more) to rogue states from North Korea to Iran.
The language barrier not only affects job opportunities, but also the parental education a foreign spouse can provide. Foreign mothers are usually the main caregivers at home, but communication with their own children can be handicapped by language problems. Usually they do not speak their own languages with their children. "Their environment makes them feel ashamed of their mother tongues, and as a result they feel pressure not to communicate with their children in their own language," says Hsia. A recent survey by King Car Education Foundation indicates that only around 32 percent of children born to foreign mothers can communicate with them in their mothers' native language. Yet the children, surrounded by Taiwanese relations, can often become more fluent speakers of the local language than their mothers, and there are fears, according to Hsia, that this communication gap encourages children to look down on their mothers. Surveys by the MOI and by King Car Education Foundation have, however, shown to be false the popular canard, much disseminated in the media, that children of such mixed marriages lag in learning ability.
Following the switch, the ROC rejected the proposed name "Taiwan, China," arguing that it implied Taiwan was China's subordinate. Furthermore, the ruling Kuomintang government at the time insisted that the ROC was still the only legitimate China, another reason why it would not accept the name "Taiwan." In 1979, the ROC and PRC reached a compromise on the issue, with the help of the IOC. The Executive Committee of the IOC voted for the Nagoya resolution, which said that Taiwan would compete as the "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee," according to an article in the autumn 1985 issue of Pacific Affairs Journal.
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Although it was the ROC that initially insisted on using "Chinese Taipei," ironically now it is the PRC that enforces this rule. In the past, China might have accepted the name "Taiwan" since it would signify "Taipei's acknowledgement of Beijing's legitimacy as the government of all China," a Jan. 10, 2002 article by the Taiwan-based National Policy Foundation stated.
Since 1979, when the United States cut formal diplomatic ties with the "Republic of China"--that is, the government of Taiwan--it has banned official U.S. government use of the term "Republic of China." Yet, in the Alice-in-Wonderland logic of Foggy Bottom, the State Department criticizes the Republic of China for using the word "Taiwan," even while addressing its statement to the "Taiwan authorities." Meanwhile, out at Langley, the CIA lists "Taiwan" in its World Fact Book not under "China," nor alphabetically, but at the end, after Zimbabwe. And under "Name: conventional long form" it says "none," when in fact the "conventional long form" of the name of Taiwan's government is "The Republic of China." So, while the State Department complains about the decision in Taipei to drop "China" in exchange for "Taiwan," the CIA is desperately trying to avoid using the term "China" in reference to Taiwan.
China insists that Taiwan keep the name "Republic of China" in order to legitimize implicitly its claim that Taiwan is part of "one China" and, hence, part of its sovereign territory. By going along with this, the United States actually fuels China's sense of entitlement--or, more accurately, its resentment over the fact that it doesn't rule Taiwan.
But the United States has not recognized Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan since at least April 11, 1947, when then-Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a letter to Senator Joseph Ball, stated that "the transfer of sovereignty over Formosa to China [had] not yet been formalized." Taiwan, then called Formosa, had been a colony of the Japanese Empire from 1895 until the end of the Second World War, when Japan "renounced all right, title, and claim" to the island as a condition of Japan's surrender. When, in 1951, a formal peace treaty with Japan was concluded in San Francisco, China was not represented, because of a disagreement among the signatory powers as to which government actually represented it. The delegate of the United Kingdom stated for the record that the "treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands," a position that all parties, except the Soviet Union, adopted. The Soviet delegate grumbled that "this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory: Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands."
The State Department formally restated this position to the U.S. Senate in 1970: "As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question subject to future international resolution." And President Ronald Reagan, as part of his "six assurances" in 1982 to Taiwan president Chiang Ching-kuo, declared that "the United States has not changed its long-standing position on the matter of Taiwan's sovereignty." Every succeeding U.S. administration has reiterated its adherence to that assurance--though without spelling it out, which is probably why Foreign Service officers in the Department of State and staffers on the National Security Council have come to lose sight of this fundamental act.
At the press conference announcing the agreement, general manager Brian Cashman referred to Yankee pitcher Chien-Ming Wang, who last year tied for the most wins in the American league, as coming from "Chinese-Taipei." While doing so no doubt pleased his Chinese Communist hosts, it was undoubtedly an embarrassment for Wang, a national hero in Taiwan, to have his country tossed aside for the sake of the Yankees' commercial interests. Of course, the Yankees have not been the only ones to go down this road. And the real issue here is not whether the Yankees or Major League Baseball can sell a few more baseball caps and shirts in China. The real issue is that by playing this game we are not moderating Chinese ambitions toward Taiwan but fueling them.
A local shipping company will build Taiwan's first luxury cruise ship by the year 2012, officials with the company said yesterday.
Yangming Marine Transport Corp. (Yangming), a Keelung-based shipping company with over 90 years of history, said this endeavor is part of their effort to promote oceanic culture and marine ecology in the country.
Sea tours for the company's "Formosa Blue Highway" luxury cruise package are expected to start at the time of the Yangming cruise ship's completion.
In the past few years, Yangming has made a great effort to make the public aware of oceanic life and culture, said Huang Wan-hsiu, the company's chairman.
In 2003, Yangming started construction of the Oceanic Culture & Art Museum which opened to the public on Dec. 28, 2004. The museum has since displayed numerous international oceanic culture exhibits, and enhanced Taiwan's image on the global arena in this area, according to the company.
A reminder that from now until March 25, Yangmingshan is going to play host to some stunning floral displays...
The Taipei City Mayor Hau Lung-bin yesterday inaugurated this year's blossom season on Yangmingshan, a once-a-year event in the country's northernmost national park that is a popular among local and international tourists alike.
This year's blossom season will run through March 25. The city government is providing special bus services to the park, with stops at seven scenic spots along Yangteh Avenue, in a tour route especially mapped out for this year's blossom season.
People who visit the park from 6 p.m to 9 p.m. during the blossom season can also enjoy dinner and coffee with family and friends among the blossoming cherry trees.