Showing posts with label Asia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Asia. Show all posts

Friday, October 19, 2007

What is the East Asian Growth Model?

A recent posting on the excellent China briefing blog on whether China's growth has/will hit a glass ceiling reminds me of another debate still in its opening stages: How will China's growth be refracted through the debates over East Asian growth?

China's growth trajectory might, on the surface, appear to be similar to that of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Yet there are some key differences.

Land: In the Taiwan case, land reform is often identified as one of the leading factors in Taiwan's growth. In China land ownership remains mired in uncertainty and corruption, yet growth continues apace.

Authoritarianism: A business researcher friend of mine pointed out to me that in China it is often only the Taiwanese companies that make money. Run by people who grew up in Taiwan under the KMT, they understand how to work around the issues of conducting business in an authoritarian state. Both the KMT and the CCP shot/shoot people get in their way, but the "soft authoritarianism" of the LDP took a different approach. Korean authoritarianism had its own twists and turns... Commonalities? After Communism bankrupted itself, China turned to an artificial nationalism as a legitimating factor for authoritarian rule, an approach is not effectively different from similar approaches in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. In the latter three one-party rule was also legitimated by rapid economic growth, a position that I expect the CCP will be taking soon enough.

Currency: here is a massive commonality -- the East Asian formula is really quite simple: trade with US, and keep currency artificially low.

Industrial development & Domestic consumption: OEM leads the way. Another commonality. Low domestic consumption relative to what is exported. In Taiwan consumption was artificially held down to promote development of a pool of savings to support export-oriented industries. People who point to the high savings rates of Asians often miss the fact that those savings rates are artificially inflated.

Fortress East Asia: Markets in Japan and Korea were heavily protected to serve as bases for expansion overseas, but Taiwan's domestic market was never large enough for this strategy to work. China seems to give foreign firms more latitude for production and marketing than Japan and Korea ever did. Some variation here.......

Rural-urban migration: Commonality.

wealth inequalities: In the miracle period Taiwan's economy was characterized by a remarkably equitable distribution of wealth. Korea, less so, and China today is a nightmare resembling Latin America or the US. Those glittering high-rises in Shanghai and elsewhere are not a sign of wealth, but of wealth inequality.

Rural impoverishment: The post over at ___ raised the interesting contrast between India and China, pointing out that India's democracy demands that legislators respond to rural development issues. In China the rural areas are experiencing negative growth, as even the CCP admits. Raping agriculture while feeding industry was an approach in the Taiwan case too -- through tax and price mechanisms (higher prices for industrial inputs to agriculture, lower prices for agricultural inputs to the industrial sector) the government moved something like 22% of the value of agricultural production into industry.

State Subsidies: commentators frequently kvetch about China's bloated state sector. Few now recall that when Taiwan began its ascent the State was the center of production, and that its share of the economy shrank only because the private sector's rose. As Robert Wade put it, writing in 1990, Taiwan's state ownership of business was probably the highest in the world outside the Communist bloc. This lead, at least in Taiwan, to heavy dependence of OEM firms on subsidized inputs from the State, including cheap electricity, cheap raw materials like plastic, and R&D work.

Worker rights: worker what? East Asia choruses.

mass education: I have no idea how Chinese production of workers and technologists compares to Taiwan's, Japan's or Korea's.

Access to US market: the fundamental factor, in so many ways. And the support and encouragement of the US. How different would the histories of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan be if the US had not desired to make them capitalist showcases to parade about during the Cold War? If the US did not trade with China, its economy would look a lot more like Cuba's.

Organized crime, gray markets, parallel economies: Across the East Asian cultural sphere, how much economic activity, productive and unproductive, is essentially illegal? Yet the necessity of illegality to the operations of OEM firms is generally only mentioned with respect to environmental policies, but it goes much deeper than that.

Construction-Industrial State: I don't know about Korea in this respect, but in Japan and Taiwan the local one-party state ran on flows of money to local politicians, who turned it into flows of concrete around the countryside. In Taiwan the KMT prevented local factions from operating at the national level, and prevented business from sending its tycoons into politics as independent political forces. In China, where the relationship between Beijing and its satrapies is not nearly so straightforward, how does the center-periphery political economy run, and where does it stand in relation to the economic development path?

Gender roles in business: Ever take a look at the masculinity rating for Hofstede on Taiwan and China compared to Japan and Korea?

Confucianism: Confuciuns say work hard, save money, explains East Asian growth, with the addition of China to as massive exclamation point for this "theory."

Another Gosling: Japanese scholars have pointed to the coincidence that all the growth areas of East Asia were Japanese colonies or occupied territories. So it is with China's growth areas. It's only matter of time before some brave right-winger in Japan advances the idea that because Japan raped and plundered its way across south China, the south Chinese are now rich....

Own branding: Japan, and to a lesser extent, Korea, have seen their OEM firms make the successful transition to own-brand operations. Many Taiwanese OEM firms are still trying to figure that trick out. Debate rages over the current status of Chinese firms in this respect.

Lots to think about. Reading political economy debates over the next three decades is really going to be fun....

Tuesday, September 04, 2007

Armitage Blasts Bush Administration Asia Policy

Right-winger Richard Armitage, a longtime US Asia expert, lambasted the Bush Administration for its floundering Asia policies in an interview in The Australian yesterday. Some highlights:

"It's not that we're ignoring Asia a little bit; we're ignoring it totally. We're playing foreign policy at the moment like five-year-olds play soccer, everyone is going after the ball at once rather than covering the whole field.

"Right now, we're just so preoccupied with Iraq that we're ignoring Asia totally."

Mr Armitage's withering assessment of the administration - in which he served for four years in one of its most senior positions - is a severe blow to the Bush administration on the eve of APEC. Mr Armitage, with his close friend and former boss Colin Powell, who was secretary of state when Mr Armitage was deputy, were the two chief sceptics within the Bush administration concerning the Iraq invasion.

They repeatedly warned the US President of the consequences of invading Iraq in terms of the post-invasion period and the responsibility the US would assume for the political future of Iraq.

Armitage was one of the signatories of the infamous PNAC letter to President Clinton that demanded the removal of Saddam Hussein (an interview with him just prior to the 2003 invasion).

Mr Armitage was the senior official with the greatest experience of Asia within the Bush administration and his departure has left the administration short of Asian expertise. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is a Soviet expert who has become completely embroiled in the Middle East.

Mr Armitage, in an exclusive interview with The Australian, lambasted what he described as her "disastrous decision to miss two out of three ASEAN regional forums". Dr Rice missed the ASEAN meeting in Laos in 2005 and again earlier this year in Manila. She has also declined to stay for the second day of this year's APEC leaders' summit in Sydney on Sunday, which Mr Bush is skipping. Mr Bush will be represented at Sunday's meeting by US trade representative Susan Schwab. Dr Rice will fly home with the President rather than spend the day with 20 other Asia-Pacific leaders.

.......

Mr Armitage believes the Bush administration has radically underestimated the importance of Asia. "In almost every measure - military budgets, population growths, the need for raw materials - our interests will force us back to Asia," he said.

However, he does not expect the performance of the Bush administration to lift markedly in its last 16 months in office. His assessment of the administration is scathing: "In the seventh year of an eight-year administration, you've got a lot of third and fourth teamers occupying these positions. I don't think you can expect much from this bunch."

That is the most damning assessment of the current Bush administration from any former senior official and will gravely undercut the administration's credibility in Asia.

Mr Armitage said he was "entirely disappointed but not surprised" by the administration's performance. He said it was a result in part of its overall style in foreign policy. "You reap what you sow. You can't be so dismissive of others' views without it having consequences. I believe the United States can exercise leadership while fully taking account of the views of its friends and allies."

Mr Armitage said there was a danger, but not yet a great danger, of Chinese leadership in Asia surpassing that of the US. He said he was aware of the Chinese military build-up and wanted the Chinese to exhibit more transparency in their military actions, but he did not yet think it was destabilising the region.

However, he said that China's rationale for its military build-up had changed. "At first the Chinese explained it as needed to deal with the Taiwan scenario. But they've passed that point and now they talk about the need to protect their oil sources, they won't sub-contract out protection of the high seas to the (US) Seventh Fleet."

The full extent of the Bush disaster can be seen in many different ways -- the neglect of traditional ally Taiwan, the nuclear pact with India, the failure to construct a vibrant multi-national alliance to deal with China's expansionist dreams, and the driving together of Russia and China to form a NATO of the East, the SCO, over Central Asia. Not only is the SCO forging links with other regional associations -- associations that should be integrated into security arrangements led by the US and its allies, not China -- but it has gained observer status at the UN (that's right -- associations can have observer status, but not islands of 23 million people). That will not last, since each nation has plans to evict the other from the region, but for the moment Asian policy has been one long strategic defeat for Bush as China extends and deepens its links in Asia. Future historians will shake their heads in wonder at our eight year long train wreck. Unfortunately the Bush Administration views its relationship to the outside world as an emperor sitting on its throne, rather than as a sort of senior partner in an establishment law firm, the way the US used to.

Another thing this shows is that the whithering, informed, intelligent critiques of Bush Asian policy are coming largely from the Right. The Dems, as always, seem to be totally out of touch with events out here.

Full disclosure: Armitage owns a consulting company that angles for contracts from Asian governments, including Taiwan's, and was a paid consultant for Taiwan's UN campaign in the past.

Saturday, March 10, 2007

Asian Studies Toolbar

This was posted to H-Asia:

++++++++++++

H-ASIA
March 8, 2007

Asian Studies Toolbar
*
From: John Noyce

As a librarian turned writer/historian, I have a continuing interest in internet tools that efficiently process incoming information, and have tried a variety of data aggregators like Google Reader and KlipFolio.

Recently I have been experimenting with the Conduit customised toolbar which works on a single line inside web browsers such as IE and Firefox. My first effort, intended just for private use, has now been installed by 800+ friends and their friends (mostly those interested in meditation and yoga).

This has encouraged me to produce another toolbar, specifically designed for those in Asian Studies. It can be downloaded from: http://asianstudies.ourtoolbar.com/

In summary, the Asian Studies Toolbar contains

- a links directory of hopefully useful web pages (additions welcome)
- a stack of rss feeds for Asian newspapers
- a second rss stack for blogs, etc, in the Asian Studies field
- a radio player with internet radio and podcasts

together with the usual Conduit toolbar features, including multi-email notifier (very useful), local weather, and multiple search options. All Conduit toolbars can be further customised by users, using a drop down menu.

Installation is quick (268K in Firefox). I hope H-Asia members find it useful. (and if you dont like it, uninstall is straightforward). Oh, and its only for Windows.

Regards

John Noyce
Independent writer/historian/publisher
Melbourne, Australia
http://historye.blogspot.com

Saturday, February 24, 2007

East Asian, Popular Democracy, and Military Strategy Changes

Posted to H-Asia, an article on the way popular democracy affects US military strategy. It's mostly about South Korea. Of course, if the US wanted to establish a massive base on Taiwan, I suspect most people would be absolutely delighted, except for the pro-China crowd:

According to conventional wisdom, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the development of the concept of “strategic flexibility” were chiefly responses to advances in technology (primarily computers and communications) and the application of market principles to military management. The end of the Cold War, the subsequent attacks of September 11, and an altered security environment further accelerated these shifts in doctrine and force structure. The latest war-fighting gurus view fixed military bases with lumbering tanks and static defenses as comparatively low-tech and incapable of addressing rapidly emerging conflicts and threats. U.S. forces, they argue, should be flexible enough to respond to North Korean missiles, Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, or a cross-straits confrontation in Taiwan.

But a case can be made that the RMA and strategic flexibility are also responses to NIMBY (not in my back yard) and democratic movements. Fixed bases were an easy target, not only for the enemy but also for popular discontent, starting in the Philippines and spreading to Okinawa, Tokyo, and Seoul (not to mention other parts of the world such as Vieques). The U.S. security umbrella was generally popular among allied leaders, but the actual U.S. security footprint was another matter.
UPDATE: Go leave a comment on this sad article there that argues that Taiwan should be annexed to China so that it can be democratic....