Showing posts with label Establishment Scholars. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Establishment Scholars. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 15, 2010

US China Policy: Opposite Poles II

Defense News weighed in one the recent "outburst" of a Chinese general directed at the American delegation in their trip to Beijing. In the key section, Defense News quotes several analysts:
"There is no evidence that the Chinese military takes forward-leaning positions ahead of, much less counter to, the PRC civilian leadership," said Dean Cheng, a China specialist at the Heritage Foundation. "I believe that Gates is being ill-served if he is being advised that there is some kind of factionalism, or that the PLA is operating 'off the reservation.'"

Another China-watcher, Larry Wortzel of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, noted the PLA makes few foreign-policy decisions of its own, but rather, acts within the broader foreign policy guidance of the Central Military Commission and the Politburo Standing Committee.

"Generally, the approach seeks to take advantage of American eagerness to 'engage' and the naïveté of senior U.S. officers and civilians that drinking tea and looking at bases changes approaches fundamental to national interest. For the Chinese, it does not," Wortzel said.

To be certain, senior U.S. officials want to move on from basic functions to substantive discussions about, say, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

But to the Chinese, even launching discussions about such matters would constitute "yielding or compromising on strongly held general principles, so they don't engage," Wortzel said.

In their drive to kill Taiwan's request for new F-16s, China is ignoring direct dialogue with senior U.S. defense officials, preferring instead to influence Washington through retired U.S. generals, Wortzel said.

"The Chinese side understands that the United States participants are now senior retired officers with deep ties to major corporations and boards that do business with China," Wortzel said.

The ironic thing about noting that the Chinese, in attempting to influence US policy, connect with individuals with deep ties to the corporate universe, is that above the Defense News pieces cites Bonnie Glaser:
"There are certainly different points of view in China on how China should respond to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and other steps by the United States that challenge China's core interests," said Bonnie Glaser, a China specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, who attended both the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED) and the Shangri-La. "Those who are confident about China's power position relative to the United States and are deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions toward China are willing to stand up to the United States and demand concessions."
Note how Glaser describes it as if there a strong divisions and these divisions represent major factions. The reader might be tempted to conclude that Glaser is mainstream, because the piece then cites Larry Wortzel of the US-China Economic and Security Commission, and then Dean Cheng of Heritage, who are clearly "right-wing", and argue that actually the anti-US noises represent PRC policy (aside: consistent with the Chinese practice of letting underlings bitch truth at you while the great men stand benevolently above such needful vulgarities). If you dig around on Google for a moment you'll find that Wortzel has a Heritage background as well. Obviously it is a case of mainstreamers vs right-wingers, right?

Think again. Who does Glaser work for? CSIS. CSIS speaks for the pro-China corporate point of view, which favors "engagement" with China. Speakers for CSIS detest the pro-Taiwan side in Taiwan's politics and have frequently painted it as a troublemaker (example 1, example 2, example 3). CSIS' report on what the US should do in China policy is written by two businessmen in the China trade. In other words, if you want to claim that Heritage is anti-China, you'd have to admit that Glaser's team has a quietly powerful pro-Beijing stance. Excellent work by the Defense News writer in correctly setting these two sides in opposition to one another.

But never mind that. The article's key point is its focus on the use of the generals-turned-corporate officials to influence US discourse and US policy. Brrr....

One other thing. The Taipei Times ran an article on the Afghan mineral riches today. At the end, it said:
China and India have bid for contracts to develop Afghan mines, with the Chinese winning a huge copper contract. An iron-ore contract is due to be awarded later this year.

A new minerals rush could pit US and Chinese interests against each other. Some critics in Washington grumble that China is reaping rewards from the copper mine while US troops are heavily committed against the Taliban.
That's what I've been saying for ages now: US troops are dying to make Afghanistan safe for Chinese expansion. Only Beijing will win the Afghan War.
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Saturday, March 27, 2010

Thinking about a Future DPP government

CSIS with comments from a former AIT official on a DPP government -- a sign that everyone is getting the same idea all at once: Ma is vulnerable in 2012. To get a sample of CSIS anti-DPP line, see Ralph Cossa's awful piece I blogged on here; the CSIS report calling for closer relations between China and the US was written by a current China consultant and an insurance industry CEO with old links to China. So I'm sure you can guess the main them of Brown's piece for CSIS without even reading it....

PacNet #13 - March 23, 2010
Thinking about a Future DPP Government
By David G. Brown

David G. Brown [dgbrown@jhu.edu]is adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Brown begins by reviewing the DPP's reviving electoral hopes, and closes with the entirely predictable....
....Pragmatists hope to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Chen Shui-bian era that saw escalating tensions with China and severely strained relations with the US. On the other hand, some DPP activists appeal for support by sticking their fingers in the dragon’s eye or by mobilizing protests against visiting mainland representatives. However, future party policy remains unclear.
...yes, Mad Chen© lives! No establishment piece would be complete without him, he's unpragmatic! It goes without saying that China's role in creating and sustaining tensions is not mentioned. Indeed, in no Establishment piece is China's role anything but passive. Scary.

The key point of the paper is here, and all flows from it:
Since the key to maintaining good US-Taiwan relations is for Taipei to be seen as pursuing stable cross-Strait relations, there are signs the US would be looking for in DPP policy.
You can see that the DPP is already being set up for Mad Chen, v2.0. Since Beijing, not Taiwan, controls the level of tension, Brown is essentially calling for Taipei to subordinate its foreign and domestic policies to the approval of Beijing, or risk the wrath of the US when Beijing starts its familiar whine about the hurt feelings of the 1.3 billion: "Those DPP leaders are provoking China again!" Imagine if CSIS mandated this for everyone:
OBSERVER: India has rejected Chinese claims to Arunachal Pradesh.
CSIS ANALYST: I wish New Delhi would quit provoking Beijing.
OBSERVER: Further, Vietnam has protested China's claim to 16,000 islands in the South China Sea, as have the Philippines and Indonesia.
CSIS ANALYST: (snarling) Worst case of provocation I have ever seen.
OBSERVER: Japan's foreign ministry filed a complaint with Beijing over Chinese submarines operating in the Senkakus, which Beijing first claimed in 1969.
CSIS ANALYST: (shouting) Provocation! Provocation! Provocation!
Of course no mention of the Chinese military build up, threats against Taiwan, etc. It goes without saying that these have no effect on cross-strait tensions, and so there is no need to say that. Or something. Whatever. Wish I could make the missiles disappear as easily....

Like all writing, as soon it moves away from abstractions and codewords like stability and pragmatic, it improves greatly. Brown then states that in Washington's view, it is important
....whether a future DPP government would maintain the newly institutionalized arrangements that have been negotiated between Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) – that is the SEF-ARATS agreements and the pattern of regular day-to-day contacts between the two sides that take place under those agreements. A DPP administration would undoubtedly want to change some details, but it would be reassuring to Washington if the existing arrangements were maintained.
The DPP should retain these arrangements, especially since the KMT will continue with its multi-track, party-to-party, back room agreements with the CCP. Note what Brown calls for then:
Another relatively easy decision would be for the DPP presidential candidate to provide reassurance to Washington and Beijing on the parameters within which cross-Strait policy will be pursued...
It is interesting to imagine how China can be "reassured" when it and the DPP hold diametrically opposed views on the fate of Taiwan.... read closely:
The more difficult challenge for the DPP would be to keep the SEF-ARATS negotiating channels open. To do this, Taipei and Beijing would need to work out a political basis for talks. Inevitably, this will require the DPP to face up to the “one China” issue. The Chen administration, which included current DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, rejected the “1992 consensus,” which has allowed Beijing and the Ma administration to conduct talks without reaching agreement on the meaning of “one China.” It will not be easy for a future DPP candidate to accept the “1992 consensus,” but finding a way to do so would be very significant for Beijing and Washington. Alternatively, some in the DPP have considered possible approaches to the “one China” issue. Frank Hsieh has talked of a “constitutional one China,” based on the party’s acceptance that the Republic of China constitution assumes “one China.” Coming to grips with this issue would be facilitated if the DPP were to update the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future to reflect the changed circumstances in cross-Strait relations and reformulating the old resolution’s explicit rejection of “one China.” Party leaders are understandably reluctant to reopen the issues in the 1999 resolution, but doing this would appear necessary to establish a basis for continuing cross-Strait talks.
The 1992 consensus does not exist; it is merely a fiction that the KMT invented long afterward as a fig leaf for talks. It can't be accepted because it doesn't mean anything, or if accepted, it won't mean anything anyway. Note that Brown calls on the DPP to "reformulate" the 1999 Resolution's explicit resolution of "One China" -- but a careful reading of the resolution shows that it rejects China's version of One China which includes Taiwan. Brown, in code, is essentially calling upon the DPP to repudiate Taiwan's democracy and sovereignty -- and adopt the very stand that is currently killing Ma in the polls. Thanks, but no thanks.

That humorous disjunction between the Establishment view and reality is also present in the complete lack of recognition in this paragraph that the reason the DPP won't able to keep the communications channels open is Chinese intrasigence. Here the avoidance of reality becomes positively heroic: Brown merely says "it will be difficult" for the DPP to keep the communications channels open. A master of understatement.

Any mention of the KMT's parallel negotiating tracks with China? Naw.

Having established that China is not a problem, Brown can then forthrightly move on to the next paragraph in which he (1) praises China for being "remarkably pragmatic" with Taipei and says that (2) it is possible that China's "China’s risk-averse leaders will look for a way to respond if the DPP moves away from the outright rejection of “one China” and away from its advocacy of de jure independence." Anyone remember when the Establishment sang with one voice that China would take all those missiles down in response to Taipei's becoming more flexible and pragmatic? Yea, verily, China would respond if the DPP kow-towed -- with another five hundred missiles. Because everyone in Beijing would realize that if they pile on the threat, the DPP comes around -- so why would they ever make any change in the situation? Brown's claims have no basic in the actual logic of cross-strait relations.
Regardless of Beijing’s response, if Taipei is seen in Washington as pursuing moderate cross-Strait policies, that would help ensure good US-Taiwan relations. However, if DPP cross-Strait policies cause a rise in tensions, a widening gap between US and Taiwan interests and relations would be inevitable.
DPP cross-strait polices will ALWAYS cause a rise in tensions, because

TENSIONS ARE CAUSED BY BEIJING NOT THE DPP.

Since Beijing can cause tensions any time it wants over any event it likes, the DPP will always cause tensions. The question is whether the US will take a more realistic view of things, not whether the DPP will "cause" tensions.

The rest of the paper looks to the future and worries that if the DPP continues to pursue de jure independence then Washington and Taipei will have divergent interests. Well, it can be hardly surprising that the class of analysts working for organizations with close links to firms doing business in China could come to any conclusion but that. But I expect that by 2020 when China is the Ultimate Super Power the Asian region will be looking at China in quite a different way.
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Saturday, March 13, 2010

Theology vs Reality: Rigger on Taiwan

Some days being a father offers rewards that no material compensation can match. We bought the kids a stand-alone basketball net that came in a box for them to assemble. This morning they called me over for some help. "Dad, look at this," said my DIY intern son in frustration. "When we put in these spacers, the bolt becomes too short to go all the way through the support pipes. We can't put this nut on. What do we do?"

Tears came to my eyes, as they always do when the opportunity to be Dad involves hand tools. "Son," I said, "let me teach you the proper use of a wrench." Firmly gripping the wrench in my strong yet gentle fatherly right hand, I gave the head of the offending bolt a strong bash. Suddenly the threads poked through the other side of the pipe. My children looked on, gaping, obviously drawing important life lessons. "Wow," exclaimed my daughter, "I am so bored."

I don't know what this story has to do with Shelly Rigger's latest piece over at Brookings out this week entitled Ma’s Puzzling Midterm Malaise, so I am counting on the creativity of my readers to make the connection. A longtime Taiwan watcher, Rigger interprets events in Taiwan for the Beltway Establishment, using well-worn Beltway Establishment frames. I had a bad Popperian Conjectures and Refutations moment perusing it, but took some Modernity leave to recover.

Sometimes not too bad, sometimes completely wrong, Rigger mostly sounds like a colonialist missionary trying to explain to the audience at home, in a fair and open-minded manner, the beliefs of the local heathens, which he understands in terms of his own Christianity. As many of the people who shot this piece off to me observed, Rigger does not appear anywhere to get the complexities of local politics. The whole piece is framed in the best Establishment style by the cross-strait relationship, as if Rigger were simply squinting through a telescope on the banks of the Potomac at Taiwan, and was not a trained scholar who has spent many years studying the island.

Rigger opens with a summary of Ma's "accomplishments":
It is two years this month since Ma Ying-jeou was elected president of Taiwan. As he approaches the mid-term milestone, President Ma’s record is puzzling. On the one hand, he has made significant progress toward his most important goals. First, he’s stabilized cross-Strait relations. The tension that gripped Taiwan and China during the Chen years has abated, high-level visits have become routine and the two sides are engaged in energetic negotiations on a wide range of issues.
There are multiple problems with this use of the word stabilized, which appears to be a code term for relations moving in the direction we want in the way that pragmatic in this type of discourse functions as a synonym for utterly lacking in principle. We're not in a period of stability here -- as I noted two years ago, before the current President was elected, Ma's refusal to stand fast on sovereignty means that there is literally no limit to what he can concede except -- as Rigger correctly notes further down in the piece -- what the public is willing to tolerate. The public here sees relations that are non-transparent, have no defined limits, and no clear goals. That is the very picture of uncertainty and instability. It seems the telescopes they use in Washington to peer across the Beltway at the Pacific simply lack the resolution to clearly discern the reality out here.

Note that the passive voice is used to good effect: it is the "tension that grips" during the Chen years. You know, that turbulent, causeless tension that comes like a poltergeist in the night to upset everyone's dreams. The reality is that tension in the Straits is not caused by Chen or by Taiwan, but by China's desire to annex Taiwan. It's fascinating how in every other case of Chinese expansionism, "tension causing" is forthrightly assigned to Chinese expansion. But in the case of Taiwan......

Stabilized? But -- and in every discussion of what Washington puts out we always come back to this but -- there remains the Chinese military build up. Naturally, since China's enormous, destabilizing, and totally unnecessary military build up is a gigantic problem for anyone claiming that Ma has "stabilized" relations, it disappears. Yes, that's right. In this piece there is no concrete reference to China's missiles or military build up, just a vague nod to Taiwan's declining relative power vis-a-vis the PRC. Gee, it sure is hard to figure out why these pagans don't worship at our Establishment altars.

Rigger continues:
What is puzzling is that these successes have failed to endear President Ma to his constituents. On the contrary, his popularity has plummeted since the election, and today his personal approval ratings hover below 30 percent. [evidence skipped] .... Hence the conundrum: Why are Ma’s successes in areas believed to be important to voters – reducing cross-Strait tension and reviving the economy – not boosting his approval ratings or his party’s political fortunes?
Note that both these claims of "success" - reducing cross-strait tensions, and reviving the economy -- are not successes here in Taiwan. From Washington's perspective, perhaps "tensions" have been "reduced", but to make an argument about "tensions" is to confuse Washington's agenda with that of local voters (note how "believed to be important" is a passive construction). There are a million Taiwanese in China working daily. How much "tension" do they experience day to day? None, of course. For most Taiwanese, "tension" as Washington understands it is something that occurs far from their daily lives in the international media, and involves Washington and Beijing, especially now that Beijing is ruthlessly attempting to transfer its anger and anxiety over Taiwan to the Washington-Taipei and Washington-Beijing relationships.

Turning to the economy, voter unhappiness with Chen Shui-bian was driven largely by the relentless propaganda that Taiwan's economy had gone bad, and by the corruption cases. Taiwan's voters want good relations with China but not at the island's expense.

As for "reviving the economy" that is primarily the result of policies put in place under the DPP and under Lee Teng-hui, the results of China's current growth, and the marginal improvement in the US economy. The Ma Administration is not responsible for any of that. Indeed, it has simply seized upon the crash as an excuse to push the ECFA agreements as rapidly as possible while failing to take firm action on the domestic economic front. Rigger missed a golden opportunity to inform her readers that throughout the economic crisis the Ma Administration has appeared almost completely indifferent to the plight of ordinary Taiwanese, something that has profoundly harmed its standing among voters.

The Establishment presentation is not necessarily a factually inept one, but instead, it proposes a slant on events that sanitizes them. For example, Rigger follows the familiar pattern of sanitizing attacks on the headlong rush of the Ma Administration into China's arms as a criticism of the DPP that "might" be true:
A number of factors contributed to the public’s waning trust in Ma. The lack of transparency in decision-making has been a particular concern. DPP leaders suggest high-ranking KMT cross-Strait specialists might be willing to compromise Taiwan’s autonomy in order to reach an agreement with Beijing. They argue that the government’s closed cross-Strait decision-making – including on the proposed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) – is dangerous, because these specialists, whether out of perfidy or naïveté, might fail to protect Taiwan’s interests.
But as anyone who spends time talking to locals knows, the sudden swerve toward Beijing has caused widespread public anger across the Green and Blue political spectrum. The criticism that Ma is too close to Beijing is not limited just to the pan-Greens. To get elected, Ma promised that he would not impair Taiwan's sovereignty, but he has utterly reneged on that promise. The criticism that Ma is too close to China is not just a DPP criticism -- most KMTers also do not want to become politically closer to the PRC.

It might be nice if Rigger had mentioned that the KMT's own theology is based on annexing the island to China, thus providing a meaningful context for the DPP's analysis of KMT elite behavior. Oh well....

Sometimes Rigger goes badly wrong....
Several of the KMT’s recent electoral set-backs resulted from local politicians rebelling against Ma’s attempts to clean up local politics, a development that further reinforces this impression.
It's 2010 folks, not 1990. Sorry Dr. Rigger, but it is delusional to imagine Ma, a longtime opponent of democracy in Taiwan, is a reformist attempting to clean up local KMT politics. In fact Ma has taken huge hits even in the KMT papers for his inexplicable and often unnecessary support of candidates widely perceived as corrupt (Green version). Another strange moment occurs in paragraph 2:
In Taiwan’s domestic politics, “normal” is a highly-competitive democracy in which the executive is forced to accommodate an active and activist legislature while defending its positions from an energetic – and politically viable – opposition.
Perhaps in some alternate reality Taiwan has an activist legislature, but in this universe Taiwan's legislative performance is widely acknowledged to be awful. Taiwan News reported in the last year of the Chen Administration:
As the Citizen Congress Watch noted in its evaluation of the Legislative Yuan's performance last July, "there is nothing good to say."
In case you think things have changed under Ma, just google public opinion about the legislature in Taiwan; it usually has lower approval ratings than Ma himself (example). I have no idea how anyone who knew anything about Taiwan's politics could write that the legislature is active and activist. Rigger also takes seriously Legislative Speaker Wang's protestations that he would lead the legislature in oversight of ECFA; as far as I know, she is the only person who does.

Of course, no Establishment piece is complete without that Establishment shibboleth, the provocative Mad Chen© who is Anti-China:
Many Taiwanese found Chen’s Sino-phobic policies unnecessarily provocative, but that did not mean they were ready to support blindly whatever policy the next administration proposed. As the pace of elite-level interactions accelerated, the focus of the domestic political debated shifted from restraining Chen’s provocations to scrutinizing Ma’s performance.
Did the domestic political debate "focus" on "Chen's provocations?" I was here for all four years of that in the second term, and in Taiwan, we focused on the economy and on the corruption issue. "Chen's provocations" was a purely Washington concern; in the local arena, the "provocations" such as UN entry -- widely supported by locals -- appeared as part of the debate over Taiwan identity. Once again Rigger is confusing Washington's agenda with that of Taiwanese voters.

As for "Sino-phobic" there is no need to list the large number of accomplishments in cross-strait relations under the DPP. But -- and here is a crucial point -- by using this pejorative rhetorical frame, Rigger paints herself into a corner -- she cannot then explain that Ma has angered Taiwanese by moving too close to China without vindicating Chen's position. That is an inherent problem of using this Washington Establishment frame -- Chen the Mad Provoker juxtaposed with Ma the Tension Reducer -- to explain Taiwan's local politics. That is why there is no clear, concrete mention of a real issue with Ma for locals: too close to China. The best she can do is mention criticisms of the transparency of the process. To say that Ma is "too close to China" is to utter what is currently a heresy in the Establishment theology.

Also missing in this piece purporting to explain Ma's puzzling drop in approval is any mention of the competence issue. Everyone in Taiwan knows that Ma is the Chairman of the KMT (no mention of that in Rigger's piece UPDATE: Yes, it is buried in there.). He's both President and head of the party. The electoral problems thus also stem from Ma's mishandling of local elections and the installation of an unpopular close associate as Sec-Gen of the KMT, King Pu-tsung, whose nickname, "little knife", alludes to his role as Ma's hatchetman. But since the whole piece is premised in the opening two paragraphs on the purely Washington belief that Ma is a competent leader, none of his numerous political failings -- appointing academics with little experience of politics to high office or mishandling the last couple of elections -- can appear here. Yet so widespread in Taiwan is the belief that Ma is utterly incompetent that if you type his name in Chinese in Google Taiwan the first prompt Google offers you is 無能 -- "incompetent." The reader will search in vain for this little nugget of reality in Rigger's piece, however, since Establishment Theology is premised on Ma Inerrancy.

The Beltway Establishment view is concerned -- and quite justly -- with What Beijing Will do, and Rigger spends the last three muscular and generally sound paragraphs reviewing this. While this is nice, it is simply three paragraphs of missed opportunities to more fully sketch the utter failure of the Ma Administration to make forward progress despite having a large public mandate, total control of the legislature, and the ardent support of Washington. This failure can only be explained in terms of the Ma Administration's own pervasive incompetence, and thus, cannot be explained within the framework Rigger has chosen.
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Daily Links:
  • State Department Human Rights Report out on Taiwan. Alas, until the US cleans up its own torture and detention apparatus and puts its architects and propagandizers behind bars, the impact of its human rights reports will be....impaired.
  • J Michael Cole says China is showing worrying signs of fascism. Let's see... concentration camps and prisons for political prisoners? check Suppression of dissent and control of communications networks? check A racially-driven belief in cultural supremacy inherited from discredited 19th century European racial theorists? check Apparent economic success amid global economic meltdown? check Territorial claims on most its neighbors? check Previous conquests providing rationale for current expansions? check A one-party state? check Deluded admirers in western democracies thinking its authoritarianism is more efficient than democracy? check An obsessive focus with the followers of a harmless religion, including controversial claims of state-run murder programs? check A historical mythology driven by an artificial sense of victimhood? check Rapid military build up? check A state-centered authoritarian ideology? check A long history of centralized monarchy with little democratic experience? check Whew! Aren't we lucky that China is nothing like the fascist states of the 1930s, especially Nazi Germany?
  • Michella with a really wonderful post on the reporter as stalker: "As a TV reporter and sometimes-anchor, I get a stalker here and there once in a while. But as a reporter, I also become the stalker sometimes too." My opinion of the outgoing Health Minister just rose again.
  • Taiwanese-American Org interviews child actress Crystal Chiu of the film Children of Invention.
  • Wings Taiwan finds that a bridge near my house sheds light on the construction-industrial state.
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Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Sunday, February 07, 2010

Trifecta of the Terrible

Let's start with the just plain silly: China continues to make noise about the US arms sales. Yesterday at the Munich Security Conference, Chinese FM Yang complains that US arms sales to Taiwan are against international law, and says that Chinese news is more reliable than western news. Yang clearly has a promising second career in comedy.... For bonus reliability of Chinese media hilarity, don't miss China Daily's propaganda piece on Taiwan's people protesting against the arms sales. What, you didn't see any demonstrations? That proves your mind has been controlled by the horribly biased western media.

Speaking of comedy emanating from Beijing, our first entry in the trifecta of terrible is The Berkshire Encyclopedia of China has an absolutely hilarious entry on Cross-Strait relations that was written in China, so you know it is hopelessly biased. Enjoy its false claims of economic suffering under Chen "the radical" and its apparent omission of Chinese threats, missile launches, military build up, etc. The problem with an entry this bad is that it makes one suspicious of the competence of the other entries. I'd give this highly political load of crap a wide berth. I've written them about it; you should too.

Bazillions of pixels have been slain in the furious commentating on the US decision to sell arms to Taiwan -- arms that are nearly a decade in coming and will have very little effect on the military situation. The cacophony of commentary is a tribute to Beijing's ability to play US commentators. For example:

Leslie Gelb, former official and longtime national security policy commentator, lobbed Obama's Dangerous Game with China into The Daily Beast. Gelb's major points are contained in this paragraph:
The cage rattling won't come close to blows, but it will unsettle and unnerve international affairs, and ignite a new and damaging testing of great power wills. Count on this tug of war to block mutual cooperation on stifling the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea and to further sour ongoing trade and investment disputes and charges of Chinese Internet censorship, and whatever else turns up. Most worrisome, it’s not at all clear that Chinese and American leaders have thought strategically about their next moves and how to keep the situation within bounds.
Dr. Gelb has catastrophically misunderstood the game. The point of China's "anger" -- a policy choice, not a visceral response -- is to strain relations between Taipei and Washington. Indeed, as I have noted, several commentators hastened to reassure that Beijing-Taipei relations would not be affected (example). As I have always noted, China could punish Taiwan, but never does, because that would not affect the one relationship it really wants to alter. Gelb falls for this completely. He also falls for the classic "now is not the time" fallacy: now is not the time to increase tension with Beijing because we are engaged in _____. Since we are always engaged in something sensitive with China, it follows that it is never the time to push back against Chinese bullying. I'd write more, but my friend Tom has an awesome response to Gelb there, that points out all this, and more, including Gelb's total misunderstanding of the US position on Taiwan.

The ominous thing about Gelb's piece is that it fits neatly into the flow of calls for abandoning Taiwan emanating from the Council on Foreign Relations and other US Establishment think tanks. This includes Gilley's awful piece in Foreign Affairs on Finlandizing Taiwan, which I looked at below, as well as this recent and very ugly piece by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace visiting scholar David Rothkopf: Can the US continue to afford supporting Taiwan?

I don't think there is any need to go into detail on the manifold problems of the Rothkopf piece, but the oddity of the strategic thinking expounded by the Dump Taiwan crowd is worth exploring. This crowd has on the whole evinced no great reluctance to waste billions on our criminally stupid wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the latter being where good American boys are dying to make Central Asia safe for Chinese expansion. The CFR has issued several pieces in support of continued involvement in Afghanistan, but its house organ, Foreign Affairs, hosted Gilley's piece on Finlandizing Taiwan. In fairness Rothkopf says the real goal of US policy in Central Asia should be Pakistan, not Afghanistan, but that boggles the imagination: essentially the Dump Taiwan team consists of Serious Thinkers who want to dump Taiwan -- a key producer of technology products in the most important region in the world for the foreseeable future -- in order to keep Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Right. How's that again?

More on Arms Sales
Taipei Times: China Factor in Arms Sales
CNN cites Chinese scholar in Canada who has never visited Taiwan. Awful dreck.
AFP notes that the arms sale is aimed at reassuring countries around China.
AP echoes claims that arms sale will not hurt Beijing-Taipei relations.
VOA says effect of Chinese sanctions would be limited.
CSM on the effect on US-China military cooperation.
FT editorial says China overplays its hand.
China has also complained about EU chopper sales to Taiwan, but seems to be taking a softer line with the EU because Beijing hopes the arms embargo will be lifted. UPDATE: This is wrong, no protest from Beijing on this, says Eurocopter.
WSJ says arms sales help cross strait relations
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Daily Links:
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Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Wednesday, September 09, 2009

Our Predictable Establishment Commentators: Cossa in SCMP

Interesting week looking ahead -- new cabinet and premier to be announced tomorrow -- by presidential spokesman, and not by the president himself, a change in protocol -- and on Friday, the verdict in the Chen Shui-bian trial.

If anyone out there in the States can image and send to me the Mental Floss magazine article from this month that hilariously named Ma Ying-jeou as one of the world's five gutsiest leaders, I'd be eternally grateful forever for it.

A couple of weeks ago, when the DPP extended an invitation to their ally in the fight against Chinese colonialism, the Dalai Lama, I observed:
And how will the international media handle this conjuction of the freedom movement in Tibet, which it is sympathetic to, and Taiwan's pro-independence forces, who are (it goes without saying) "radicals" who "provoke" Beijing.
I think the answer was, predictably, Door Number Two on that one. Ralph Cossa of CSIS Pacific Forum, the all-Establishment-all-the-time think tank, had a long commentary in SCMP today about which it can only be said that if you want to consume tripe, Hakka style is definitely preferable to this. Onward and upward:
Taiwan opposition ploy effective but dangerous
Ralph Cossa

Updated on Sep 09, 2009
Right there in the title we have our Taiwan opposition, the DPP, out there being "dangerous." Gotta be careful of the pro-Taiwan, pro-democracy side. Next thing ya know, they'll have a referendum or something! Also, compare this to the Economist, which noted: "Chinese officials may be pleased that the DPP has apparently gained little." The DPP is "dangerous but effective", the DPP "gained little." You say tomato, I say fan chieh.

After a paragraph on how there were "serious concerns" about Taiwan's democracy a year ago thanks to the DPP, branded as incompetent and corrupt, and total KMT control of all aspects of the central government, Cossa goes on to say:
What a difference a year makes. Today, the DPP is resurgent and seems to have the Ma administration and KMT on the ropes. It may not have been very good at running the country, but it has proved itself to be a formidable force when it comes to its more traditional opposition role. One is tempted to tip one's hat to the DPP, except for one slight matter: its success is increasingly coming at the expense of Taiwan's economic recovery and potentially at a risk to its security,as well.
It's totally overblown to describe the DPP as "resurgent." The DPP is still pretty much where it was in May of last year when Ma became president. Rather, what's happened is that KMT control of the government has simply given the Party of the Dead Dictator every opportunity to display incompetence at whatever it turns its hand to, from economic recovery to typhoon relief. As a special bonus, Ma's signature projects as Taipei mayor, the Neihu subway line, and the trolley cars, are a mess. Despite controlling the legislature, stimulus bills have been passed tardily or not at all. One could go on. Suffice to say we are not looking at a rising DPP, but a flatpeter KMT.

But being Establishment to the core, Cossa makes his point: the DPP resurgence is affecting Taiwan's security and economy! Lions and Tigers and Bears, oh my! I love the next paragraph's opening sentence, so wonderful in its unstated implications:
Take its latest political manoeuvre, for example.
....for example!!! You know, because it is one of many examples of DPP threats to the security and economy of Taiwan. I wonder if Cossa has written as feelingly on the KMT's blocking of the special arms purchases over 60 times of the legislature. Couldn't find one when I looked today.

Cossa discusses the invitation, and says it was a "stroke of genius for an opposition party that seems to have the majority running scared." Yes, the KMT is so scared it has been deterred from indicting and locking up DPP politicians left and right. Oh wait, it has been doing that. If only the DPP really did have the KMT on the ropes....

Cossa discusses the reaction of Beijing, and observes:
Thus far, Beijing's response has been muted: ritualistic protests and the cancellation of a number of events aimed at highlighting improved cross-strait relations. But there is a real danger that Beijing will, at some point, reach the conclusion that the Ma administration is too weak and incompetent to deal with and revert to its old tactic: marginalising Taiwan and limiting its political and economic opportunities.

This could put at risk Taipei's attempts to negotiate an economic co-operation framework agreement - in effect, a cross-strait free-trade agreement (FTA) - with the mainland. Such an agreement is not only significant in its own right, as a boost to Taiwan's economic recovery, but is expected to open the door for similar FTAs between Taiwan and many of its Southeast Asian neighbours and, perhaps, even with the US.
There are at least two key points omitted -- and probably deliberately so -- in this discussion. The first is that Beijing very much wants ECFA because it is a huge step forward in its desire to annex the island and hollow out its industries on its way to do that. For the same reasons, Ma and other KMT heavyweights want it. The second key point is that the KMT and the CCP are in constant communication and obviously discussed the reaction to the Dalai Lama's visit. Hence, there was never any threat to ECFA -- if only there had been! -- and all this is really just Cossa's way of taking a completely egregious swipe at the DPP.

After accusing the DPP of unnecessarily antagonizing Beijing -- once again, since Beijing determines when it is antagonized, Cossa is essentially arguing that the DPP submit its foreign policy to Beijing's approval (all "antagonizing" is unnecessary in Beijing's eyes) -- Cossa moves on to take a by-now patented slam at the DPP, which everyone will now recognize as the current Establishment position (see Jerome Cohen's op-ed in AWSJ for entirely similar sentiments)
Perhaps the time has come for the DPP to understand that the role of a responsible opposition is not just to oppose everything for the sake of embarrassing the party in power but to craft policies that serve both its and the people's interests.
Yes, the current slam -- circulating in Taipei as the conventional wisdom and repeated to me as if it were gospel by my Blue friends and of course, by the Really Knowledgeable types up in Chinatown the capital, is that the DPP is objecting for the sake of objecting. He ends by claiming:
It also seems hard to believe that the KMT, for all its political clout, has been unable to take its case to the people of Taiwan and has instead allowed the DPP to seize the initiative.
Dr. Cossa, the KMT can't "take its case to the people" because there is no rational case for an ECFA whose real purpose is to integrate the island so tightly with China that it will be effectively annexed, which will whack 7-9% off the size of our IT sector and about which both pro-DPP and pro-KMT think tanks have tendered very equivocal analyses (what? You didn't put those facts in your op-ed? How did that happen?). The KMT instead is "isolating the case from the people", ensuring that there is no democratic oversight, and conducting negotiations on a party to party basis. The KMT doesn't want to take the case to the people.

Moreover, note the glaring problem, as the observant person who flipped me this piece noted: Cossa says that the DPP should not make waves else Taiwan will be marginalized. As if it is not marginalized now? No, Cossa's argument is that Taiwan should marginalize itself now so we can partake of the glorious future later -- simply a US version of the KMT Cargo Cult view of China: if we just build that ECFA runway, Chinese planes will land and disgorge plenty of cargo for all!

Cossa, like many Establishment commentators, argues that Taiwan needs the ECFA with China so that it can then follow it up with free trade agreements with other nations, FTAs that China is currently preventing. But as Chao Wen-hung pointed out in the Taipei Times a couple of weeks ago, there is absolutely no reason for China to permit Taiwan to have FTAs after ECFA. By preventing FTAs, China will force Taiwan firms to relocate to China to take advantage of China's FTAs with other countries. Veterans will already be able to hear China's claims: "Taiwan, as part of China, has no need of FTAs of its own since it can already partake of China's FTAs."

I'd like to believe Establishment assurances that we'll get our FTAs, but I seem to recall that before and after the election, there was a slew of articles in which legions of US Establishment analysts hinted/predicted that China should reduce/eliminate the missile threat facing Taiwan, among them Cossa (in the Taipei Times, no less). In fact, Cossa himself said he thought there'd be some kind of missile draw down. And what happened? Well, a year later, Richard Bush, the longtime US government Taiwan specialist who is to inscrutable what Bergman was to beautiful, was forced to wonder aloud why China hasn't reduced its missiles facing Taiwan. Meanwhile the silence from the all those other analysts who said that China would reduce its missiles.... stretches.
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Friday, April 24, 2009

US-China-Taiwan Love Triangle and WHA

Ma appeared at the teleconference yesterday and unlike when Chen Shui-bian appeared at the National Press Club a couple of years ago, the State Department did not protest that this was a violation of the One China policy. Perhaps this is progress.... From both public and private reports it appears to have been a lovefest ("Ma wowed 'em" observed one major Washington report). The Taipei Times reported on it today:
Former US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage called it “outstanding” and former US deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz described it as “statesmanlike.”

Almost all of the high-profile panelists at the Center for Strategic and International Studies conference were later in agreement with Douglas Paal, director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, when he said that Americans should not be concerned about the direction that Taiwan is taking in its process of detente with China.

Paal, a former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, said: “The people who make policy in the US are right to be unconcerned by the pace and scope of political detente with the mainland. It’s time for the Taiwanese people to realize the benefits of reduced tensions in the very important economic and cultural relationship with China.”

He said that some people in Washington worried that Taiwan would rush into unification with China.

“I think this simply is not on the cards. The terms offered by China are not seen as generous by the Taiwanese. President Hu [Jintao, 胡錦濤] seems to recognize it is not going to happen any time soon,” Paal said. “Unification is not on the agenda. We can trust Taiwan’s vibrant democracy to make sure that does not happen. Even if a leader were to come to power tomorrow who wanted to unify with China, he couldn’t do it because of the Constitution. The people are the final arbiters. We should have confidence that it’s not going to happen.”

“The US defense relationship with Taiwan is of an enduring nature,” Paal said. “One hopes that China will come to live with it in ways that will allow the US and China to pursue their other interests.”
Interesting contrasts. At home, Ma is widely viewed as weak and ineffectual, and nurses approval ratings of under 30% even in pro-Blue polls, while in Washington, Ma is taken seriously as a statesman on US-China policy despite the fact that he is not even in control of his own party or its China policy! Of course the Big Cheeses at the conference are neither stupid nor uninformed, so the whole thing is basically an exercise in signal sending, a pavane of surreal doubletalk. Look at the signal in US China expert Alan Romberg's chilling comments in the final paragraph...
“One cautionary note. The success of Ma’s policies, and really of our own, will depend on Beijing’s continued and growing willingness to respond positively. We all know that the PRC [People’s Republic of China] has been cautious, unsure of where Ma’s heading and what the consequences of reasonable flexibility today might be for a future situation where the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] returns to power,” he concluded.
Romberg regurgitates PRC propaganda for it: the DPP causes trouble in relations between Taiwan and China. Yes, we have to be cautious in case Taiwanese voters make democratic choices! In 2012 it looks like we can expect massive US pressure on Taiwan to prevent the election of the DPP and suppress local democracy. Remarks like Taiwan-China unification is "not in the cards" should be taken with a large grain of salt. Every person in that room must know where things are headed..... perhaps Washington feels that Taiwan's complete rejection of annexation to China might keep it out of China's grasp, but looking at the tea leaves, it seems increasingly clear that official Washington is going to sell out the island in order to obtain a better deal with China -- the usual Washington practice of making permanent concessions for temporary and reversible gains. Fortunately everything should happen in slow motion...

Ma called strongly for the US to continue to sell arms to Taiwan, while Douglass Paal, the solidly pro-KMT, former JP Morgan Asia Vice President, former AIT head here, said in the final sentence of his remarks that China should learn to live with US arms sales. All nicely scripted. Looks like we will get our F-16s, and China will make a pro forma protest, and everything will go on as usual.

Ma also mentioned Chinese students coming here to study -- effectively meaning that Taiwan's MOE will be subsidizing the studies of Chinese students by way of subsidizing Taiwan's colleges. Taiwan has massive oversupply of college places, and warm bodies to fill them are just across the Strait. He reiterated KMT plans to recognize Chinese credentials. Ma also claimed that 70% of Taiwanese support ECFA, although as I noted a couple of posts below this one, that is likely a wildly (2X) inflated figure. Both Green and Blue polls indicate that the public rejects ECFA and wants Ma to explain it better.

The shift in US attitudes toward Taiwan's fall into China's orbit is important, because voices in Washington are calling for a review of Taiwan policy.
The Taipei Times has been told by senior congressional sources that a formal review is being considered by the Obama administration but that no decision has been made.

And Professor David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, wrote earlier this month that there was a “growing discussion” in Washington of the need to undertake a thorough Taiwan Policy Review “given the dramatic and positive changes in cross-strait relations.”

Significantly, such a review would come at a time when Shambaugh — one of the most-respected China scholars in Washington — said that the Sino-US relationship appeared to be the best it has been in the 20 years since the “traumatizing” Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989.

In a paper for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Shambaugh said that resuming military-to-military exchanges with Beijing was a high priority for the Obama administration and recent bilateral discussions suggested such exchanges were slowly resuming.

“Concerning Taiwan, Washington is pleased with the trajectory of the issue since [President] Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) election. Cross-strait relations have substantially stabilized in all spheres. Of course, the real issue for the US in this area is the continuing buildup of ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan [now 1,000-plus], the large conventional force deployments in this theater and the continuing PLA exercises that simulate attack scenarios against the island,” he said.
The last review was under Clinton in 1994. Any revision of US Taiwan policy would not be in Taiwan's favor, I fear, as the population of US China experts is composed of many people who do business with China, and voices arguing for more realistic policies are not going to be listened to.

Brrrrr...... glad I am going biking this weekend, and won't be thinking about this.

Finally, on the WHA, Ma keeps talking about "meaningful participation." Taiwan recently thanked Japan for backing its participation as observer in WHA, but several people with Washington and Taipei foreign policy experience have said privately that it looks like "meaningful participation" isn't going to mean even observer status, but instead, some kind of participation under the "Chinese Taipei" formula. People sometimes ask me "What did the DPP ever do?" and the answer, is that many of its accomplishments were "negative" -- preventing things from happening, like the surrender of our cross strait shipping markets to Chinese firms, the surrender of our banking system to Chinese banks, or preventing expanded use of the odious "Chinese Taipei" formula. Once the KMT administration removed those brakes.....

...hope the weather's good this weekend...

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Sunday, February 15, 2009

Black Boxes

I was just reading an interesting blurb on Echo Taiwan's blog about Taiwan's own IDF fighter, which local wags formerly termed the I Don't Fly but now refer to as the I Do Fall. Apparently the military discovered that the black box from a 2004 IDF crash never recorded any data. Rather than check all the black boxes at that time, the Air Force waited to learn from a crash in 2008 that none of the black boxes on their IDF aircraft were recording any flight data.

Lots of other black boxes were opened this week. President Ma, for example, was interviewed in the NYTimes by the normally excellent Keith Bradsher, but this interview is an almost total waste of time, as no difficult questions were asked of Ma (though it does not seem likely he would have permitted them). Instead, he laid out some goals, and admitted that the tourists weren't coming:

Mr. Ma also said he planned to push further this year for close economic relations with mainland China, even while acknowledging disappointment with the number of mainland tourists who have been allowed by Beijing to visit Taiwan. The Taiwanese government has set a limit of 3,000 a day, but actual arrivals have been closer to 500 or 600 a day.

Recent moves to let mainland tourists stay up to 15 days instead of 10, and come in groups of as few as 5 people instead of 10, could help increase their numbers, Mr. Ma said. His administration has also opened up charter flights, shipping and investment, and he said Thursday that he wanted regularly scheduled flights to the mainland by the middle of this year as well.

It is high time the US media quit referring to China as "the mainland" or "mainland China." That is an adoption of the terminology of the KMT and Beijing. "China" is quite clear enough, thank you.

According to the article, one of the goals is the incredibly laudable idea of setting up an extradition treaty between Taiwan and the US. This could easily be done under the framework of the TRA, and then the US could start handing over some of the local criminals who have fled there. This is one goal I wholeheartedly support.

A US black box was opened this week as well as Obama intelligence chief Adm. Blair spoke on Taiwan security. The jury's still out on Obama's Taiwan policy, but every little clue helps.

I was contemplating, with vast amusement, and not a little sadness, US-based China expert Bonnie Glaser's comment in today's Taipei Times that she "view[s] Ma’s policies as pro-Taiwan." Oy ve. Glaser is a reliable guide to what the US Establishment thinks, and the US Establishment clearly loves Ma -- probably because they don't live here. To see what the locals think of our new pro-China president (not pro-Taiwan, Dr. Glaser), Commonwealth Magazine, which no one would ever describe as pro-Green, this week last month opened the black box of Taiwanese opinion with a survey....
The survey found that those dissatisfied with President Ma's overall performance since taking power May 20 outnumbered those who were satisfied by 55.3 percent to 33.4 percent, a 22 percentage point margin.

Looking more closely at the numbers based on respondents' political leanings, 85.7 percent of opposition Democratic Progressive Party supporters voiced their dissatisfaction with Ma, while only 2.4 percent approved of his performance to date. KMT supporters were more forgiving, with 46.3 percent voicing satisfaction with his performance and 27.1 percent saying they were dissatisfied. (Table 6)

Respondents also were generally unhappy with the performance of Premier Liu Chao-shiuan by a 53.7 percent to 27.9 percent margin. Even KMT supporters backed his performance by a lackluster margin of 53.8 to 36 percent. (Table 7)

Commonwealth goes on to observe:

The most important publicly articulated policy of the Ma administration has been its advocacy of 12 major infrastructure projects to boost domestic demand. But one member of a Taiwanese business association in the United States told friends after listening to a presentation on the program in Taiwan that he found it "difficult to understand" and "full of empty rhetoric without a central focus."

"All the 12 infrastructure projects and the NT$500 billion stimulus package have are numbers. They have no sense of direction, no sense of showing people where the government wants to take Taiwan," says Mon-Chi Lio, an associate professor at National Sun Yat-sen University's Department of Political Economy. Lio stresses the he does not want to hear bureaucratic rhetoric, but a vision of what the result of Taiwan's future development might look like.

...and....
The survey also asked who should be held responsible for not articulating the country's future course. Some 34.6 percent identified President Ma as the guilty party, while the Cabinet (21.5 percent), the ruling KMT (13.8 percent) and Premier Liu (4.4 percent) were also fingered. In all, 74.3 percent of respondents put the blame for the lack of a clear direction on those in power – the president, the Cabinet, and the ruling party. (Table 12)(emphasis mine)
The country may lack direction as Ma repeats the same policy drift we saw during his eight years as mayor of Taipei (as the Survey notes), but 76% of the people are proud to be Taiwanese, it found, and it adds:

The State of the Nation survey first began analyzing the inclinations of Taiwan's people toward independence from and unification with China in 1994. The latest numbers reveal that 23.5 percent of respondents want formal independence for Taiwan (whether as quickly as possible or as a long-term goal), the highest percentage in the history of the poll and far higher than during the pro-independence Chen Shui-bian's eight years in power.

In contrast, only 6.5 percent of respondents hoped for unification with China (either quickly or eventually under certain conditions) – the lowest percentage ever. Some 7.6 percent of those surveyed favored unification in last year's poll, down dramatically from the 13 to 18 percent who backed unification in the poll's earlier years.

Reuters reported today on another failure of Ma's, his policy of appeasing China militarily, which has produced no positive results. Instead, the number of missiles facing Taiwan is still increasing. To wit:
China expanded its arsenal last year even as tensions eased after the election of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛) said.

“In this period of warmth, a war won’t break out, but don’t forget China still has 1,500 missiles aimed at Taiwan — more than 1,500 — and that’s not right,” Lai said. “They’re always adding [missiles].”

The Ministry of National Defense estimated early last year that there were 1,300 missiles pointing at Taiwan.
The article notes that we've cut our live-fire drills to once every two years. Thus, our "pro-Taiwan" President has enabled China's military build up while slashing our own, failed to reach any of his tourism goals, handed over our cross-strait markets to China (as his party condemns the locals for protesting this betrayal), handed off China policy to unelected KMT heavyweights, destabilized the status quo by moving closer to China, shrunk our sovereignty to a "region" and let the pandas in as a "domestic transfer", puttered around while the economy burns, refused to push the legislature on needed legislation, reintegrated the Party with the military and the government, and stood by as his ruling party adjusted the courts to suit itself, pressured local TV stations to reduce their pro-Green coverage, and took control of the government media in a manner that provoked international protest. If this is a "pro-Taiwan" president, then I'd sure hate to see what a pro-China President looks like.

Oh wait -- that's what we're seeing.

Monday, April 14, 2008

Bringer of Peace

See my eyes, I can hardly see.
See me stand, I can hardly walk.
I believe you can make me whole.

Longtime Asian scholar Ezra Vogel has a very mixed piece in the Boston Globe that combines a couple of quite truthful observations on the US attitude toward Taiwan with some disgusting deification of Ma....first the good part:
The United States has a "one China policy" and recognizes the government of Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China but does not recognize Taiwan as part of China, for it considers that the status of Taiwan has not been determined. The United States does not recognize Taiwan as an independent nation, but it maintains unofficial relations with the "people of Taiwan" and supplies Taiwan with weapons to defend itself.

As unbelievable as it may be, although the United States has opposed the use of force to resolve the Taiwan problem, it has never explicitly declared that it would support an agreement reached peacefully by the two sides. Some mainland Chinese leaders still believe the United States wants to block reunification to slow down China's rise.

Note the two key facts of US foreign policy: (1) Taiwan's status is unresolved and (2) the US has not declared as a matter of policy that it will support a "peace agreement." Vogel, like everyone in the Establishment, believes that Ma will "bring peace" which has become the latest euphemism for "sell out Taiwan." Vogel then gives his advice:

The United States should declare categorically support for any agreement that Taiwan and Beijing reach peacefully and actively encourage both sides to reach agreements.

Perhaps that is OK as far as it goes, but what does Vogel write about the architect of peace?

The election of Ma Ying-jeou provides the best opportunity to defuse the Taiwan situation since Beijing and Taipei representatives met in 1992. It is not clear when another such opportunity will arise. Mainland officials have said that if Taiwan agrees to preconditions they are ready to carry on dialogue with Ma Ying-jeou.

Ma Ying-jeou is extraordinarily well-prepared for the job. A strategic-thinking Harvard Law School graduate and former secretary to President Chiang Ching-ku (son of Chiang Kai-shek), formerly a leader of national unification work, charismatic politician, he has been thinking about this opportunity for three decades. He has made it clear that he will not discuss unification, which the local Taiwanese public is not ready to discuss, but he will discuss closer cooperation. He will also strengthen military cooperation with the United States to be able to negotiate with the mainland from a position of strength.

Just today in the Taipei Times an editorial commentator complained about the intoxicating deification of Ma Ying-jeou....

The presidential election was just three weeks ago, and certain media outlets have already begun Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) deification. The editorials in some newspapers have complimented Ma for having a good physique and for working out daily.

They have also called him wise and said that he has learned a great deal from his wisely chosen companions.

Not only has this kind of sycophantic praise become an Internet joke, embellishments made by television stations are even more jaw-dropping: Ma is frugal, squeaky clean, full of filial piety, sincere, loyal to his party and patriotic to his country, adept at negotiations, as charming as former US president John F. Kennedy, and radiates gentleness from his double-lidded eyes.

With such a fine husband, even Chow Mei-ching’s (周美青) way of tying her shoelaces is extraordinarily sleek. Needless to say, the beauty of their daughter, Lesley Ma (馬唯中), and her many talents, are also praised.

The presidential cult of personality isn’t new. Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) was known for having deduced great wisdom from observing swimming fish in his childhood: no wonder he became the saviour of his people, as well as a military strategist, politician, philosopher, educator, thinker, calligrapher, and artist all rolled into one.

It would have been difficult for his son and heir, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) to have been anything less than magnificent.

The economic miracles, political liberalization and his Ten Major Construction Projects, are all credits to his name; whereas the Taipei Tenth Credit Cooperative corruption scandal and the murders of Chen Wen-chen (陳文成) as well as Lin I-hsiung (林義雄) and his family, are swept under the carpet to prevent harm to his achievements.

The internet joke, a friend told me, is that Ma is now "God Ma" (神馬). The Leader Cult is latent in the theology of the KMT, and in its Leninist political structure; it is overt in the claims that Ma is a savior and only he could "save" Taiwan. It is also profoundly anti-democratic. Just wait until Ma makes 12 holes in one in his very first round of golf....

Still, one expects it of the local pro-KMT media, but of a US Establishment scholar? Ma is not merely smart, he is "extraordinarily well-prepared." This is....a bit of an overstatement. I especially like the "he has been thinking about this for three decades" line. Hard to argue with a qualification like "thinking about it for three decades"...

INTERVIEWER: So, do you have any experience operating heavy lifting equipment?
APPLICANT: No, but I've been thinking about it for three decades.

Maybe I'll try that line on Farah Fawcett-Majors, heartthrob of my adolescence...

FARAH: Why should I hop in bed with you?
MICHAEL: Well, I've been thinking about it for three decades....

Just another example of the ugly trend of deifying Ma that is becoming commonplace in the international media -- not to mention Chiang Ching-kuo, who ran his father's security state and oversaw the deaths of thousands of people. But why speak of the ugly past, when it is so much easier to idealize it?

Two other things caught my attention. First, we are also told -- very slickly -- that China will negotiate with Ma if he fulfills "preconditions." This throwaway sentence contains all the key issues: the precondition is Taiwan's acceptance that it is part of China. This directly contradicts Vogels statement that he will not negotiate on unification. How can that be? It is the only coin he has to offer. Ma cannot "ease tension" without giving on that issue, because the tension is caused by China's desire to annex the island.

Second is Vogel's assertion that Ma will strengthen military relations with the US. As I have noted, the long-term plan to move Taiwan into Beijing's orbit almost certainly calls for better relations with the US, for the same reason that an adulterous husband acts especially sweet toward his wife. Another implication is that the previous President screwed up military relations. The reality is the opposite: the KMT blocked the arms purchases in the legislature, as everyone knows, and roiled defense relations with the US -- and the US also strangled military contacts on its end. None of that was Chen Shui-bian's fault. But Vogel gives credit to Ma the Savior: there is nothing His Healing Touch will not improve.