America's Coming War with China: Ted Galen Carpenter

Some of you will recognize the name of Ted Galen Carpenter, whose commentaries appear in the Taipei Times. Carpenter has a new book out, America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan:

There is one issue that could lead to a disastrous war between the United States and China. That issue is the fate of Taiwan. A growing number of Taiwanese want independence for their island and regard mainland China as an alien nation. Mainland Chinese consider Taiwan a province that was stolen from China more than a century ago, and their patience about getting it back is wearing thin. Washington officially endorses a "one China" policy but also sells arms to Taiwan and maintains an implicit pledge to defend it from attack. That vague, muddled policy invites miscalculation by Taiwan or China—or both. The three parties are on a collision course, and unless something dramatic changes, an armed conflict is virtually inevitable within a decade. Carpenter explains what the United States must do quickly to avoid being dragged into war. Please join the author and our distinguished commentators for a discussion of this timely and important book.

I cannot comment on the book as I have not read it. But Taiwan is only one of several places that can flash into a US-China war. As China's moves to push the US and its allies from their pedestal as regional hegemons, the prospects are for war, period, and any one issue can be the flashpoint. One of Carpenter's previous articles is online here. If it is any indication, the book probably isn't very good. He writes:

Two factors have historically deterred the People's Republic of China from attempting to retake Taiwan by force: technologically superior Taiwanese weaponry and concern that the United States might intervene with its own military forces.

Actually, only one factor, and that is the US military. The Taiwanese military has always been poor, and the Chinese have always known that. Here Carpenter appeals to an underlying myth of the capitalism/communism rivalry -- that we're technologically advanced and they are not. The reality is actually neither is Taiwan. Carpenter goes on:

Until recently, Taiwan took seriously its responsibility to purchase arms to defend itself. Unfortunately, the Taiwanese people seem increasingly unconcerned about providing for their own defense, and instead want to rely on an implied U.S. security commitment.

Carpenter does not provide any evidence or argument that would enable him to blame "the Taiwanese people." Nor does he mention that the pro-China parties, not the pro-democracy parties, are blocking the arms purchase. Carpenter also acts as though the US is not at fault here, whereas the weapons offered to Taipei are nigh-on useless. This type of presentation shows little knowledge of the true situation, and less willingness grapple with its complexities or to present them to the reader. Many of us who love Taiwan and want to see it invest more in defense nevertheless oppose this wasteful and stupid arms package, most particularly the hopeless submarines. Can we have aircraft, please?

If the United States does not force Taiwan to get serious about its own security, the result could be an emboldened China and the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait.

It is the Bush Administration's weakening of our military, our alliances, and our strategic situation that has gravely harmed Taiwan's status and emboldened China.

Since the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, the United States has been legally obligated to sell Taiwan "arms of a defensive character" in order to help deter the PRC from attempting to retake the island by force.

This is wrong, as the TRA does not obligate the US to do anything. Here's section 3302, the key one:

# (a) Defense articles and services
In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 3301 of this title, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
# (b) Determination of Taiwan's defense needs
The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.
# (c) United States response to threats to Taiwan or dangers to United States interests
The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

Note that the (1) the weapons sold must be "sufficient" (a vague amount) for Taiwan's needs; and (2) the President and Congress solely determine what Taiwan needs. In other words, Taiwan has no say in the US decision. Hence, the US can do whatever it pleases. It is political calculus, not legal language, the determines whether the US sells arms to Taiwan. Carpenter does essentially concede this further down.

In 2001, the Bush administration offered Taiwan an arms sale of roughly $20 billion to counter a campaign of Chinese military modernization aimed directly at retaking Taiwan. Recently, a version of that package, scaled back to $18.2 billion, was approved by Taiwan's cabinet, but remains held up in the legislature. Opponents of the arms sales package lament that the weapons are too expensive, and that the island has other priorities. In an absurd display of denial, Tseng Yung-chuan, the executive director of the opposition Kuomintang's Central Policy Committee, remarked in November 2004 that Taiwan's existing defense budget should be cut in half in order to fund social welfare projects.

Carpenter again does not note that the package is a dog. In fact, he withholds from the reader any hint that the contents of the package might be opposed even by those who support weapons purchases in general. No details of the package are ever supplied in this article. Finally, he ends with an absurd citation from one of the pro-China parties, the KMT, intended to slant the presentation. He continues:

Taiwan's lack of seriousness is unacceptable because it has the effect of pushing the United States to the forefront of the cross-Strait conflict. China's purchases of advanced KILO class submarines and Sukhoi fighter planes from Russia are eroding Taiwan's qualitative advantage. Taiwan's anti-submarine warfare capabilities are insufficient and dwindling, and its air supremacy is waning in the face of China's acquisitions. All of these trends are getting worse, and creating a sense in China that it may soon be able to take Taiwan by force or intimidate the Taiwanese into surrender.

Carpenter again fails to mention that the US package does not address any of these problems. For example, there are no weapons intended to augment air supremacy, the key to Taiwan's defense. The submarines offered by the US at three times world prices are useless for any defensive purpose (the US has turned down requests for them for many years precisely because they have no defensive function). The anti-submarine aircraft are useful, but without air supremacy cannot be used. Furthermore, they do not exist, and production of them has ceased.

One apparent factor in Taiwan's irresponsibility is that it is banking on a U.S. security guarantee. However, Taiwanese legislators (and more than a few U.S. officials) would do well to take another look at the TRA, which some allege commits the United States to defend Taiwan's autonomy.

Incorrect, as the pro-democracy types want to purchase the weapons and are not banking on the US security guarantee. The pro-China Blues do not want the US involved as they want Taiwan to be annexed to China. Hence the feeling that the US will protect Taiwan is not a major factor. It is good to see someone finally understand that the TRA does not guarantee protection for Taiwan, though, as his subsequent analysis shows.

To be sure, it is possible that the United States could decide to involve itself in a conflict between Taiwan and China. That decision would be ill-advised in its own right, given the potential dangers, but it certainly should not be left to Taiwan's government to force such a momentous decision. However, given Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian's penchant for provocations, combined with Taiwan's dwindling defense capability, Taiwan is increasingly controlling the politics of the conflict without taking responsibility for the military consequences of its actions.

This is sheer nonsense, as Chen has no "penchant" for provocations (apparently democracy is provoking, but 700 missiles pointed at Taiwan are not). Again, Carpenter withholds from the reader the fact that it is Chen's party that wants the arms purchases passed. The last sentence of the paragraph above is not merely 100% wrong, it is asinine nonsense. Carpenter's piece is horribly slanted. I sure hope the book is better. Carpenter ends by recommending that the US abandon Taiwan.

The United States should continue, under the obligation of the TRA, to sell Taiwan defensive arms with which it can deter a Chinese attack. However, at the same time, Washington should indicate to Taiwan that it does not intend to involve itself in a war in the Taiwan Strait. As things stand now, the Taiwanese increasingly expect that the United States will defend them, and the Chinese increasingly suspect that it will not. That is the worst of both worlds, and portends a perilous situation for all parties involved.

This was written last year, and much has changed. Perhaps the book is more rational, balanced, and better-informed, but I don't hold out much hope of that.

Cato is having a book forum on the topic.

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