Latest Nelson Reports

The Nelson Report from last week noted (highlights are mine):

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US/CHINA/TAIWAN...Asst. Sec. State Chris Hill, somewhere in Indonesia today, apparently told a journalist that the President has ruled "no" on a visa request by Taiwan President-elect Ma Ying-jeou to visit Washington prior to the Inauguration in May.

No one involved will be surprised when this is formally announced. So attention has already turned to how the White House plans to compensate for so obviously catering to Beijing's concerns.[MT: Ouch! Wouldn't it be nice when we can have our very own US foreign policy, instead of Doing Whatever Beijing Wants?]

Most likely by sending a much higher-level official US delegation to the Inauguration than has been seen before...a decision now being worked on at the White House, Administration sources privately confirm.

Taiwan journalist sources say they've been told that Chris Hill himself will lead the US delegation, but former Administration officials here say they think that unlikely, given the self-imposed US ban on such a high-ranking State Department official visiting Taiwan in any capacity.

Rather, it is suggested, look to a delegation of high, and perhaps higher-level former officials...which opens up all kinds of interesting possibilities, so stay tuned.

(Since Commerce Secretaries and other Cabinet-level officers have previously visited Taiwan while in office, the distinction allegedly militating against an A/S from State is just one of the many weird bits of political catechism which makes parsing the Cross-Straits situation so interesting, we should note.)

Further gossip: it is now accepted by all concerned that in defiance of what may seem logical to the entire world outside of China, Beijing will continue to block Taiwan being granted "official observer status" at the World Health Association, when the meeting takes place in May.

The unofficially stated reason? Because DPP President Chen will still be in office, and Beijing is simply not going to give him any satisfaction on the "international space" issue, even though Ma's inauguration is the very next day.

(Remember Jimmy Carter and the Iranian hostages? The plane took off as Ronald Reagan was being sworn in, and not one minute sooner...)

There is considerable support here for having the White House tell Beijing it IS granting Ma a pre-inaugural visit precisely to underscore US anger at China's continued bullying on the WHA and similar issues, but apparently that argument is losing.

Also on the Taiwan wish-list agenda is, or are, whether the US will sell F-16's, an obvious heart-burn issue in Cross-Strait relations, if only as an offset to China's continued missile build-up on the coast.

Our sources indicate that the White House does not intend to deal with the F-16 issue in any way UNLESS it is formally requested to by DOD Secretary Gates...and they add that Gates won't unless HE is officially informed by PACOM that the Pacific commander considers F'16's to Taiwan to be a "military necessity".

OK, so if China is known, or felt, to be still opposed to WHA and other international space issues, and, of course, to enhanced military sales, what's the buzz on what Beijing IS willing to consider, now that it (and the US) have their wish of a DPP defeat, and a KMT victory?

Senior Chinese sources tell us that an immediate sphere of confidence building suggestions seem likely in the economic sector, since a strong Taiwanese economy is in Beijing's interest as much as Taipei's.

Included under that rubric would be direct flights, etc...issues firmly opposed by the DPP government on Taiwan, sources note.

But perhaps the most interesting potential indicated by our Chinese sources is a willingness to back-off from the expensive, often demeaning "competition" with Taiwan for official recognition by mainly African and Latin American nations willing to sell to the highest bidder.[MT: China could easily buy all those nations if it wanted....]

Obviously, an "international space" concession of this nature will be 100% contingent on the new Ma/KMT government proving itself to Beijing...something of a chicken and egg process, given Beijing's blockage on the WHA, etc.

What about those 1200 missiles along the coast of the Strait? Well, actually, yes, Beijing understands the symbolic importance of making some kind of gesture in that area.[MT: Rumor printed in today's Taipei Times says China will reduce the missile force by half.]

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And this from a few days later, just three days ago:

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TIBET...TAIWAN...the two issues are not formally "paired" but for tonite's Report, we want to follow-up on a discussion at Brookings yesterday, and Heritage last Friday, and see if Beijing can make a virtue out of necessity.

That is, everyone agrees that with the return to power of the KMT, even if a KMT which now fully accepts the nationalist implications of "Taiwan identity", that the coming months will see an improvement in both atmosphere and substance between Taipei and Beijing.

Whether these same moves help push a split between the new KMT and the "old" Taiwan Lobby here, founded as it is on conservatism and anti-China views and defense policies, is something we've warned about in past Reports, and will be watching for future Reports.

Of interest to the "old" faction, and a possible challenge to the "new" KMT, will be the apparent view of the Bush Administration that it IS willing to sell F-16's to Taiwan, but that given the KMT/DPP domestic political games of recent years (and, of course, the implications for cross-Strait relations) Ma will have to make the request.

(From the above, we can deduce that the necessary preconditions for an F-16 decision have taken place. That is, PACOM has formally told DOD Secretary Gates the jets are a "military necessity", and Gates has so informed the White House.)

For tonite, let's take a quick survey of what is expected bilaterally across the Strait.

First move, we'd argue, has been made by President-elect Ma, who said this week that he's OK with the "Chinese Taipei" name if it allows Taiwan to join international organizations, such as the World Health Association...a decision due the day before Ma's inauguration, and thus in doubt.

(Note to friendly Loyal Readers...for ONCE we are right in a factoid. The WHA is a sub-group of the WHO, and consists of the Ministers of Health of the members.)

WTO is, of course, a different animal. There Taiwan is the "customs territory of Penghu, Kinmen and Taiwan", and the deal with Beijing back in 2000-2001 was that Taiwan could join as an "economic entities."

Semantics have been matters of potential life and death, in the Strait, since 1972.

Anyhow, after our trip to Taiwan for the election, we've had a chance to compare notes with informed experts on what a Ma Administration can be expected to try, and on what schedule.

Here's a summary of the most informed current thinking on Ma's intentions, which experts see as occuring in three stages:

(1) Weekly charter flights and Chinese tourists. The negotiations on these two linked issues (carried out under the "Macau formula" in which the two sides are represented by their industries, but with government figures present using non-government titles) are essentially complete. But Beijing has put completion on hold until CSB leaves office. Most people expect this can be wrapped up by July 1, as Ma has publicly called for. The result probably wouldn't have been much different under Hsieh.

(2) New economic/trade issues: Progressing to even more frequent flights, going from charter to regular flights. Direct shipping and cargo flights. Relaxing rules on investment/allowing banks to open branches on the other side (some of this can done by each side unilaterally). A more advanced part of this stage could be a trade and investment agreement between the two sides.

Early aspects of Stage 2 could be done under the "Macau" formula, but eventually the two sides would probably have to go to the Straits Exchange Foundation of Taiwan, and Association for Relations Across the Strait of the Mainland (SEF/ARATS) quasi-official format that has been virtually in suspension for ten years.

(3) The tough political issues: Taiwan's international space; the missiles and military pressure in general; and ultimately, a peace agreement.

Ma is reported by our expert sources to believe that these three stages will be mostly sequential, and that they may not get to stage three in Ma's first four-year term. But negotiations need not be completely sequential: quiet, non-publicized contacts on the Stage 3 sensitive issues could be going on while more public discussions on the trade and economic issues are making progress.

The new government understands that it has to move at a measured pace. The election results show that 40% of Taiwan's population is solidly "Green" and not enthusiastic about most of this agenda. If the new government moves too quickly, there is risk of large demonstrations in the streets once again. But Ma and his people seem to understand that.[MT: The demonstrations will occur when Ma finally sells out. The pro-Taiwan side is already talking about it. But such mass energy will be too little, too late, without the revival of the DPP.]

Finally, even without the complication of Tibet, there is the question of whether Beijing will play this right. Subtly and flexibility in cross-strait relations has rarely been Beijing's strong suite, especially when it feels beleaguered by "splittism" in other parts of the empire.

The Ma government presents Beijing with a great challenge. He is the best they are going to get. If they don't deal with him skillfully, he could easily be replaced by another DPP government. But he also has made clear that Taiwan's future will be decided by the 23 million people of Taiwan.[MT: Does anyone actually believe him? I guess in Washington, they do.]

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So in sum (1) we're going to see Ma pass many of the investment measures that will hollow out the economy. It will be interesting to see whether the legislature generates any resistance to Ma's program. Likely not; the big infrastructure programs will buy the hearts of many of a local. Perhaps the wisdom many assert, that the companies that wanted to move have already moved, will turn out to be true and our manufacturing base won't disappear; (2) The F-16s sold to Taiwan; (3) Ma will take office -- and the Olympics will open, soon after. The perfect stage for a Ma-Hu summit?

[Taiwan]

Alan Romberg on Ma, Pressures on Ma

Want bulk indian spices? My wife orders them off Yahoo -- the big silver bags range from $60 for a bag of turmeric to $120 for a bag of cloves. This week I am existing on cabbage and tomato curry. Yum.

The Council on Foreign Relations offers this interview with Taiwan expert Alan Romberg, on the new Ma regime. The skinny is simple: Romberg offers the Establishment view that Ma means better Taiwan-China relations. That's probably true too, in the way that the Warsaw Pact offered better USSR-Eastern Europe relations....on to the discussion:

Ma wants to take things back to a period about 13 years ago but he is not about to even talk about unification, much less to negotiate anything. Rather, he wants to take this issue, the principle of One China, in which he has his own definition, then set the issue aside and move ahead with the PRC on a variety of fronts. He wants an economic agreement, quite early on; to establish much more frequent charter flights than now exist, then scheduled flights. Then over the period of what he hopes would be his first term, a peace accord, and what he calls a “modus vivendi,” an agreement by which Taiwan could have greater international participation or what Taiwanese call international space. He looks forward to a much more robust relationship across the Taiwan Strait and a much reduced level of military confrontation.

This is pretty much the same language Ma has been using for the last two years, right down to the peace accord and the modus vivendi. The DPP also wanted peace but was unwilling to sell Taiwan to get it, so it is hard to see how Ma can avoid that and get what he wants: Taiwan will almost certainly be sold to China somehow. But Romberg was asked if the PRC will accept Ma's position, and answered:

I think they will go along with the way he has been handling the One China issue. Basically they say they won’t accept what he says but they will live with it and move on. During the campaign, Ma was quite insistent on sticking with this “One China, Respective Interpretations” approach. President Chen, and Frank Hsieh the nominee of the Democratic Progressive Party, the DPP, both said the PRC had never accepted this and was not going to accept it. Well, I spent a lot of time in conversations with officials and experts on the mainland and I think it’s very clear that they are going to accept it. The PRC was anxious to get out of this very confrontational mode that they were in with Taiwan and try to put this whole thing back in a box and try to establish relationships that would over time win hearts and minds, but also to focus on their high priority, which is economic development.

I think it is obvious that the PRC interlocutors were being disingenuous with Romberg -- the "confrontational mode that were in" was entirely the result of choices made by the PRC in how it would react to Chen Shui-bian. Nobody held a gun to their heads and forced them not to negotiate, brand Chen a radical, and repeatedly refuse or disengage from talks with Taiwan on a range of issues. The PRC could have gotten out of the confrontational mode anytime they wanted, merely by choosing to talk.

More interesting than any of the policy stuff, a pavane whose moves all performers are familiar with, is Romberg's take on Ma the person:

He is certainly very comfortable with Americans and other Westerners in English. He is fluent and has spent a lot of time, as you say, being educated in the West. He’s a very calm person who does not, at least as far as one can tell, easily get riled up. One of the charges against him from his opposition in the election is that, on issues where he was pressed hard, he was very uncertain of himself and kind of flip-flopped. The biggest example of that in the campaign was when Frank Hsieh said that Ma had a “green card”--a permanent residence card to the United States and Ma was asked, do you have a green card, and he said “no I don’t.” It turned out that he had had a green card but he believed it had expired and so there was a great debate on whether it had expired.

Ma gets so many points for speaking good English and knowing how to handle Westerners..... he strikes me as vindictive, easily flustered, spoiled, egotistical, and something of a mama's boy. But that's just my opinion based on watching him since the early 1990s. I've never actually spoken to the man....

Ma has been talking about the fifty year peace agreement, originally an idea put forward by Soong in 1999 for the 2000 Presidential campaign. Romberg observes:

Ma, when he originally talked about this, talked about it for a period of thirty to fifty years. In my conversations in Beijing, people have said “we’re perfectly happy to talk about a peace agreement but we’re not going to sign a piece of paper that essentially says we essentially recognize that Taiwan is not going to be unified with the mainland for such a long time, even if that turns out to be the case. We just can’t accept that long of a period of time as a formal position, codified in some sort of document.”

Romberg does I think misunderstand on one point:

One of the issues that have been under negotiation but never came to fruition under the Chen Shui-bian government but I think will under the Ma administration is PRC tourism.

PRC tourists have been coming for a while -- one sees them at all the tourist sites, but thankfully they travel in tour groups and thus never show up to crowd the really good spots -- but their number has been carefully limited. Hopefully Taiwan will preserve this policy of confining them to Sun Moon Lake and various department stores, parting them from their cash, and sending them on their way. Much money has been expended on preparing for the anticipated hordes to be let in under Ma, so expect these numbers to rise.

In addition to pressures from Beijing and from Washington, Ma also faces the impatient wrath of the foreign businessmen. The Taipei Times reported on the European Chamber of Commerce:

By August, the ECCT expects Ma to realize his campaign promises, including direct weekend charter flights to China, allowing 3,000 Chinese tourists per day to Taiwan and eliminating the 40 percent cap on China-bound investments while providing tax incentives for high-tech companies, as a way to boost the local economy and create a friendly environment for foreign businesses, ECCT chairman Philippe Pellegrin told reporters after a board meeting with the chamber’s 15 directors.

And of course:

In addition, the chamber expects that by the second phase in December, Ma would lift foreign investment limits such as the 0.4 percent ceiling on Chinese H-shares, remove the ban on Chinese imports and develop a global marketing campaign to highlight the nation’s advantages and development potential.

In a year, the chamber hopes Ma will fulfill his “roadmap to prosperity” by implementing regular direct passenger and cargo flights across the Strait, lowering corporate and personal income tax to levels that are competitive with Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, and extending the tax loss carry forward period to 15 to 20 years from the current 10 years, while revitalizing the coastal zones to develop the yachting and water sports industry.

So from the period May to December, or about six months, foreign capital expects that Ma will completely open Taiwan to China, after eight years of carefully managed contacts. The pressure on Ma to deliver is immense..... and lots of things can go wrong here.

[Taiwan]

Politicizing the Olympics in the Diaspora

The intense three-sided competition between Taiwanese and diaspora Chinese (PRC + KMT) in the US was on display in San Francisco in the Christian Science Monitor this week:

Betty Yuan left Taiwan for San Francisco in 1981, when mainland China was just beginning to open its economy.

Now, a booming China is hosting the 2008 Olympics and is sending the Olympic torch to San Francisco. To celebrate, Ms Yuan will be helping deploy costumed performers, tai chi practitioners, and children's artwork along Wednesday's torch route.

But she is upset about the demonstrations planned by thousands of Tibetans, Burmese, Falun Gong believers, and others to protest China's human rights record.

"We are disappointed that some politicians and interest groups are threatening to stage protests and ruin the Games, for the sake of bad-mouthing and insulting China," she said in a statement in Chinese she released as head of the Northern California Chinese Culture-Athletic Federation.

For decades, the Chinese community in San Francisco has been broadly divided between mainlanders and the numerically smaller but more prosperous and influential Taiwanese, who are traditionally critical of the Communist regime in Beijing. Yet, many Chinese-Americans including Taiwanese like Yuan support the Games and denounce the human rights protests reflects the power of ethnic pride over politics – but also a shift in the diaspora's attitude toward Beijing in recent years.

It is easy to see that the writers have confused pro-KMT organizations with Taiwanese organizations, a common error. What the article really shows is how the pro-China Return to Zion theology of the KMT entails an inevitable drift towards Beijing over time on the part of KMT organizations as Taiwan democratizes. As any perusal of the websites of overseas Taiwan organizations like FAPA would show, the Taiwanese organizations support the Tibetans. It's a shame the piece is so confused on this topic, and did not include any of those voices.

It's also hilarious -- but also ominous -- to see US-based organizations, whatever their ethnic bent, reproducing the bombastic, illogical, and anti-democratic rhetoric of Beijing. If they are treated as 'Bots for Beijing, they have only themselves to blame.

Finally, complaints from Chinese about foreigners "politicizing the Olympics" are laughable hypocrisy. China has heavily politicized the Torch and demanded that pro-democracy politics, public protests, and other political activities abate during the Olympics, and used the Olympics as a lever to gain political ground in overseas Chinese communities, as this article shows. Further, those of us who have followed Taiwan's participation in international sporting events over the years can recall numerous instances of Chinese demanding the removal or alteration of flags, physical attacks on spectators and athletes, obnoxious protests, insistence on downgrading or eliminating Taiwan's participation in events, denials of visas, and so on. When it comes to the depoliticization of international sports, China has no ethical leg to stand on. Perhaps there is some standpoint from which people can plead that the Olympics not be "politicized," but until such talk includes withering criticism of China's constant politicization of international sports in general, and the Olympics in particular, it will be little more than special pleading on Beijing's behalf.

UPDATE: As Thomas reminds me below, China boycotted the 1980 Olympics.

[Taiwan]

Meet Up April 12

Pigeons caged, tagged, and ready to be timed for racing.

Jerome sends around the good word on the April 12 meeting:

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The speaker will be Dr. Lily Wang who is CEO of the Australian Taiwanese 'WHO for Taiwan" Action Association. This is a brief background on the Australian Taiwanese 'WHO for
Taiwan' Action Association. (http://www.geocities.com/atwa_whofortaiwan/)

Lily had come back to vote in the past elections. She will speak on Taiwan and WHO, their efforts and what they have run into. Also if anyone wants any special or related questions for her to prepare to answer, just email me.

As an added treat, Felicia Lin is back in Taiwan and expects to be there; her book on Su Beng is now together and ready for the last push of editing. Linda Arrigo is finishing up a book on the White Terror period and can update us on it. Also, schedule permitting, Dr. Bruce Jacobs Professor of Monash University in Australia will also be there and able to say a word or two about his on-going research in Taiwan. Plus of course, all you interesting people out there.
It will be a full morning and a good catch up for all.

Date Saturday April 12, 9:30 am
Venue Location:
The meeting location will be where we had met once before, the restaurant 婷婷翠玉 at 174 AnHo Road, Section Two. (rough translation of name is Tender, Pretty Green Jade.) You will be able to tell the restaurant by the lace curtains on the window--it was used in a TV commercial a while back. (We will have the downstairs room--breakfast cost will range between NT$100 and NT$150. Phone if lost 2736-8510.

Restaurant is between Far Eastern Plaza Mall/Hotel and HoPing East Road--about a half a block north of the corner of HoPing East Road Sec. 3 and AnHo Road. or a half a block south of Far Eastern Plaza on the AnHo Road side.

Easiest ways to get there; Take the MRT Mucha Line to the Liuchangli Station exit there, and walk west on HoPing East Road 3/4 of a block till you reach where AnHo Road dead-ends into it.Then go north on AnHo Road; it is a half a block up on the west side of that street.

Or take any bus down HoPing East Road and get off at the first stop that is east of Tun Hua South Road. That will put you at the corner of HoPing and AnHo. You can also take a bus down Tun Hua South Road to the stop right across from Far Eastern Plaza and walk over to AnHo Road. Or if you take the 235 bus east, it turns off of HoPing onto AnHo Road and the first stop is right across from the restaurant. Should be easy to find.

[Taiwan]

Ma charter flight plan opens July 4 (UPDATED with nuke plants)

Ma speaking at the Dead Dictator's Tomb (Taipei Times). Looks like a Photoshop moment, but it's for real. Cries out for captioning.

China Economic Review says Ma's charter flight plan commences July 4:

The National Policy Foundation, a think tank of Ma’s Nationalist Party or Kuomintang, said in a recent report that it had completed the direct weekend charter plan.

The service would begin taking passengers from the mainland for the weekend and carrying them back on Monday noon.

Chen Shih-yi, a foundation spokesman, said Ma had instructed that the service be started from July 4, and be extended to Chinese tourists coming to Taiwan for vacation after Beijing and Taipei work out an agreement.

Chen said Taiwan will open its international airports in Taoyuan in the north, Taichung in central Taiwan and Kaohsiung in the south for charter services. Flight points from the mainland will include Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xiamen.

The development is an expansion of the current system of flying on holidays, which began five years ago.

UPDATE: Taipower announces it will add ten new nuclear plant units to replace existing units. Another consequence of KMT ascendancy.

[Taiwan]

Reports from places great and small

Out in Oklahoma, an opinion piece comments on the election in 'the Asian nation most like our own.'

In a recent interview, Joseph Wu, director of Taiwan's Washington office, told me popular support for the murkily defined status quo in PRC relations exceeds 80 percent.

Americans must be attentive to Taiwan's needs, and here's why. Taiwan is the world's leading per capita consumer of American agricultural products. As Wu said, Taiwan has "been a consistent supporter of the U.S. in security concerns. ... Taiwan is the number three supporter of construction, reconstruction and aid in Afghanistan. In container security we are the best U.S. ally."

AP reports that vice-president elect Vincent Siew will meet with Chinese leaders and perhaps Hu himself at an upcoming forum:

Vincent Siew will not discuss any sensitive political issues if he meets Chinese President Hu Jintao at the three-day Boao Forum, which opens Saturday in Hainan province, his spokesman Wang Yu-chi said.

"Mr. Siew will meet some officials there, but a meeting with Hu has yet to be confirmed," Wang said.

But Taiwan's United Daily News quoted unidentified Chinese officials as saying authorities had agreed to the meeting so Hu could use the occasion to discuss matters of common interest with Taiwan's incoming government.

Although this article still offers the "China and Taiwan split in 1949" nonsense, it does contain one statement that is absolutely wonderful:

Beijing refused to deal with outgoing President Chen Shui-bian for the past eight years because he rejected China's insistence on unification with Taiwan.

Not many statements on affairs here are so absolutely clear. Note also the use of the term "unification" and not the historically erroneous "RE-unification." Tom Plate, who has an opinion piece on the election in the Japan Times, totally misses this in an abusive and unconsidered set of comments:

With this stunning result, you could almost hear a collective sign of relief sweep across Asia. The triumphant KMT was led by the debonair Ma Ying-jeou. For months he had been expected to win the presidential race. But the resurgent troubles in Tibet had forecasters wondering whether the party that was so committed to negotiation with Beijing would be able to maintain plausibility with Taiwan voters when the world's TV cameras were suggesting that Beijing didn't seem to be in favor of negotiating with anyone right now.

Taiwan answered the clubs of Tibet with votes for change — for dramatic movement away from confrontation. With the thundering certainty that only a decisive ballot box result can offer, the vote heard around Asia was a call for sanity, civility and stability.

..."the party that was so committed to negotiation with Beijing." The DPP was also committed to negotiation with Beijing -- it is just that as AP correctly notes, and Plate ignores, Beijing blew off the DPP completely. Oh yeah, history, wonderful stuff. It is one thing to note that the KMT and certain pro-KMT observers in the US cast the election as "a call for sanity, civility, and stability" but it is quite another to reproduce KMT talking points as analysis. Pathetic. Plate's commentary also shows how Ma himself benefits from a nifty little foreign media personality cult, whose latest manifestation is here: Ma is debonair. Supporting democracy is, well, you know, just so working class......

[Taiwan]

Ma Worships at the Tomb

Kudos to AP for correctly labeling Chiang a 'dictator' as President-elect Ma Ying-jeou went to the Tomb of the Dead Dictator to pay his respects...

Taiwan's president-elect bowed in front of Chiang Kai-shek's mausoleum Saturday to commemorate the anniversary of the dictator's death, a departure from the outgoing government's efforts to distance itself from the late leader.

Ma Ying-jeou said Chiang's faults and achievements should be decided by historians - but that there was no denying he was part of the island's rich past.

Since Chiang Kai-shek's son Chiang Ching-kuo passed, the KMT has been struggling to decide who has retained the Chiang charisma. Both James Soong, now in political eclipse, and Ma Ying-jeou have attempted at times to claim they are the real inheritor of the Chiang charisma. Religious movements frequently split over whether the leader's charisma is passed down to the True Family or the True Followers -- thus we have the conflict between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites, or between the main Mormon church, run by disciples who went with Brigham Young, and the tiny Reorganized Church of Latter Day Saints, run by Smith's son, and possibly, the struggles between James and Paul in early Christianity. The secession crisis is twofold, not merely a question of Who Owns the Church? but also a question how the charisma of the leader is to be institutionalized and used to legitimate the structures and individuals who carry on (see Weber).

One key component of the KMT's quasireligious structure is the Return to China theology, but another important part is the personality cult that the party fostered around Chiang Kai-shek. Jeremy Taylor¹, the Australian scholar who has written several pieces on the cult aspects of KMT rule, observes:

"In any case, while the nature of Nationalist rule under Chiang can be debated, there is little question that it shared with its Soviet and fascist contemporaries a tendency to promote the mass adoration of leaders. This included the manufacture and distribution of images of Chiang, the naming of streets in his honour, the celebration of his life through textbooks and public events; and in some cases, the attribution to Chiang of superhuman power and wisdom."

Ma, who navigates in these waters with a sure hand born of his many years as a believer himself, immediately goes to pay his respects to the cult, showing both his deference to the received religion to conservatives within the KMT, and also, representing an attempt to appropriate that cult to legitimate his own rule. Recall that Ma is widely detested, for different reasons, by KMT elites. While at the Tomb -- a shrine that institutionalizes the charisma of the Cult Leader Chiang -- Ma comments that Chiang's role will have be decided by historians -- a comment that looks balanced, but which everyone around understands is directed at Outsiders *wink wink*. We know what Ma thinks since he is there at the shrine....

UPDATE: Taiwan News has a blistering commentary on this. Here's an excerpt, but don't miss the whole thing:

Ma's action and his declaration that he will continue to visit Cixi annually on the anniversary of Chiang's death on April 5, 1975 are unmistakable signals that the president elect intends to resurrect the former virtual state religion of the Chiang personality cult that is enshrined in the Cixi facility and the even more imposing imperial temple, once known as the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, in the middle of Taipei City as well as streets and facilities all over Taiwan.

Ma stated that the judgment of history on Chiang and the autocratic rule of his son Ching-kuo, who is interred at Touliao in Taoyuan County, is "open to discussion" and maintained that his visits to the mausoleums were "individual actions" and should not be branded as an acts of "worship."

Ma thereby willfully ignores the fact that the very existence of these publicly-funded shrines marks nothing less than a campaign by the KMT to use state power to "coerce" all of the 23 million Taiwan people into "adhering" to its own Chiang cult.

Chiang's personality cult, which was launched by the KMT regime on the China mainland during its "New Life Movement" in the 1930s and imposed on Taiwan in the late 1940s, is thought by some to rival the cult of the German Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler as well as the quasi worship of the Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong in the People's Republic of China after 1949.

All citizens, especially members of the KMT party, government, military, secret police and intelligence and security forces, were required to first "forever support the Leader" and, after his death in April 1975, "forever cherish the Leader," while the educational system was used to propagate Chiang's feudal-dictatorial values of obedience to patriarchal authority and Chinese national chauvinism.

¹"The production of the Chiang Kai-shek personality cult, 1929-1975", The China Quarterly, 185, March 2006, 96-110.

[Taiwan]

Japanese Paper interviews Lee

The Daily Yomiuri hosts an interview with former President Lee Teng-hui.

Some observers of Japan-Taiwan affairs have been concerned that Ma, who swept to victory in last month's presidential election, could take the wind out of attempts to improve relations. Ma has previously taken a hard-line stance on the Senkaku Islands, which also are claimed by China and Taiwan.

But after a meeting with Lee last month, Ma seemed to be willing to take a more pragmatic tack with Tokyo.

"We discussed using his influence to help develop Japan-Taiwan ties. I'd like to continue receiving Mr. Lee's advice," said Ma, who will officially take office on May 20.

Observers suggested the meeting also indicated Lee was keen to act as a conduit between Ma and Japan.

Lee also spoke of his plan to make a sightseeing visit to Japan before the end of the year, which will include a trip following the path 17th-century haiku poet Matsuo Basho took during the early Edo period (1603-1867), as recounted in his work, "Oku no Hosomichi." Lee, a prominent Japanophile, said he plans to visit Niigata and Fukui prefectures, among other places.

March's presidential election, in which Ma, a former chairman of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), thumped ruling Democratic Progressive Party candidate Frank Hsieh to herald the second democratic change of government since the end of the war, epitomized the growing maturity of Taiwan's democracy, Lee said.

"The election showed the depth of our democracy. I expect the democracy that I built up over 12 years will grow stronger," he said.

However, he had some stinging words for the Democratic Progressive Party.

"The DPP's win in 2000 was a step forward for democracy, but what has happened in the eight years since? The people were fed up--they became disillusioned with the corruption-riddled DPP," Lee said.

The return to power of the KMT, which favors closer relations with China, has made some DPP members skittish over whether the new administration will lean more toward unification with the mainland. However, Lee believes the possibility of a union between Taipei and Beijing remains remote--at least in the near term.

"Taiwan is, to all intents and purposes, a single country. The China-Taiwan issue won't be resolved for quite some time," he said. "China has its hands full dealing with its own knotty internal problems, so the administration there doesn't have the wherewithal to focus on the Taiwan issue."

Lee praised Ma's plan to start direct flights between China and Taiwan and welcome Chinese tourists, saying these moves would improve Beijing-Taipei ties. But he was more skeptical of the incoming president's hopes for a peace accord with China.

"I doubt that will happen," Lee said.

And there was Lee not a month ago saying a Ma win might set democracy back twenty years.

[Taiwan]

CNA: Ma will not permit hot money speculators from China

The Central News Agency (CNA) offers parts of an exclusive interview with President-elect Ma on the China money issue:

President-elect Ma Ying-jeou said Friday that he will propose anti-speculation legislation that will prevent Chinese investors from trying to make quick profits in the local real estate market.

Ma said in an exclusive interview with the Central News Agency (CNA) that his government will seek to normalize economic relations between Taiwan and China while maintaining Taiwan's national security and dignity.

As an example, Ma said his government would allow Chinese investors to invest in Taiwan's real estate market but also pass supplementary measures to prevent speculators from manipulating the market to make quick gains.

Under the measure, Chinese investors will not be allowed to resell the properties they buy in Taiwan within five years after making the purchase, he said.

Ma also warned that speculative capital might come not just from China but also from Southeast Asian countries and said the new government will take action against any speculative moves.

A law that prevents investors from "the mainland area" as Ma refers to it, from engaging in speculation, shows a number of currents in Taiwan society -- the idea that China needs to be restrained is something that the KMT hacked on the DPP for. And something that nations around China routinely engage it. It also shows ghosts of an underlying agrarian, or perhaps Confucian, horror of mercantile speculation. Taiwan's land use laws are rigid and appear to be primarily aimed at enabling local development and concrete firms to make big bucks putting up hideous cookie cutter concrete pestholes. One wonders how the laws will need to be revised.... last month a group of tycoons lead by the owner of Hong Kong's Phoenix TV visited Taiwan to see what the pickings were real estate wise, and there was one in November of 2007 as well.

This China Post article also explains why so many in Taipei are praying for real estate investment from China:

Feng explained that following the previous Chinese New Year, local Taiwan banks announced that they would stop lending money to buyers of apartments smaller than 20 ping (66 square meters). With the subprime crisis expanding worldwide, Taiwan banks have also learned to be careful when lending money, she said, noting that buyers of small apartments usually face more financial constraints.

"Taiwan people still want to invest in the housing market," she went on, "but they are waiting for the right moment."

Last Tuesday, Yeh Kuo-hua, a manager in charge of the luxury housing department of Yungching Real Estate Co., said that not only had the number of transactions in Taipei City and Taipei County shown a substantial decrease, but the prices of the luxury housing units sold in October also dropped about 5 percent.

Taiwan is already open for Chinese real estate investment, beginning in 2002, all that is required is a permit application. In other words, the framework, including restrictions, already exists, and was required by the WTO. One wonders how the WTO would view a law that discriminated against Chinese investors -- and if Ma and Beijing will slide around by saying WTO doesn't apply because the two sides are "One Country." Finally, what investor would want to buy a property that he couldn't sell when he pleased -- and why would other potential buyers support a law that took properties off the market for years at a time? Probably the government will install a "case by case" fig leaf -- looking at "speculative" sales on a case by case basis -- which will, like all such Taiwan regulations, have no teeth and permit anything to happen in practice.

For those interested, China Information, put out by the China Center at Leiden University, hosts an article on Taiwan's opening to China under the WTO rules out just this year.

[Taiwan]

US Awakens, Finds Coffee Aromatic?

The Taipei Times headline says it all: US wary of warmer Taiwan-China ties. Charles Synder in Washington tells the tale:

Some US officials fear that under Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) presidency, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) might swing far enough toward China that it could affect US interests in Taiwan and damage US interests in the region, a new congressional report indicates.

This, despite the fact that Ma has said he will place a high priority on repairing strained Taiwan-US ties that accompanied President Chen Shui-bian’s ( 陳水扁) last few years in the presidency, the report, an internal memo to congressmen from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) says.

The report, dated Wednesday, analyzes last month’s presidential election and Ma’s landslide victory and its likely impact on Taiwan’s domestic situation and relations with Washington and Beijing.

Based on conversations with US officials while the author, Kerry Dumbaugh, was in Taiwan to observe the election and other sources, the report says: “Some observers in the past have expressed concern that the United States may have underestimated the importance of the sea change in KMT thinking that arose from the visits to the PRC by senior KMT officials beginning in 2005.”

I've been saying that Ma is going to hurt US security interests, as have conservatives who are China hawks -- but the report focuses less on this issue than the Taipei Times lead would have you believe. The summary:

In a large turnout on March 22, 2008, voters in Taiwan elected as president Mr. Ma Ying-jeou of the Nationalist (KMT) Party. Mr. Ma out-polled rival candidate Frank Hsieh, of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), by a 2.2 million vote margin of 58% to 42%. Coming on the heels of the KMT’s sweeping victory in January’s legislative elections, the result appears to be a further repudiation of DPP leader and Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s eight-year record of emphasizing a pro-independence political agenda at the expense of economic issues. President-elect Ma,who will begin his tenure on May 20, 2008, has promised to improve Taiwan’s economic performance, to improve Taiwan’s damaged relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and to address any annoyances in Taiwan-U.S. relations arising from the Chen Administration. This report will not be updated.

You can see that Dumbaugh's construction of the election simply echoes the KMT line: Chen "emphasized independence at the expense of economics" which is nothing more than a KMT talking point. Further down, in the key paragraphs at the end on the implications of the election for the US, Dumbaugh says:

For U.S. Relations. U.S. officials say they have had strong ties with Taiwan’s DPP government and had developed a considerable network of working economic and military ties with Taiwan under President Chen. But such problems of trust had developed between President Chen himself and U.S. officials that many believe the bilateral atmosphere can onlyimprove under the new KMT leadership. President-elect Ma has said he will place a high priority on repairing any residual difficulties in Taiwan’s relations with the United States. Still, some observers in the past have expressed concern that the United States may have underestimated the importance of the sea change in KMT thinking that arose from the visits to the PRC by senior KMT officials beginning in 2005.

Those visits, according to this view, may have given pro-China interests in the KMT a new, alternate vision for Taiwan’s future. If this concern is founded, one consequence could be the growing inurement of the KMT to U.S. pressure or interests. For instance, Taiwan could resist U.S. pressure that it increase military spending on the grounds that such expenditures are too high, too confrontational, and maybe unnecessary in light of potential improvements in cross-strait interactions. Some worry then that the KMT, driven in large part by economic imperatives and pressures from the Taiwan business community, could reach an accommodation with Beijing that ultimately may damage U.S. regional interests.

Note the lead sentence that says Ma may place a high priority on relations with the US -- with the implication that what follows contradicts that position. But if Ma and his handlers really intend to shift Taiwan into Beijing's orbit (no shit, sherlock! Goes without saying) then of course they must place a high priority on upgrading US relations -- Uncle Sam will need to be bamboozled and placated while having the rug pulled out from under him. Hence, ascendancy of a pro-Beijing policy entails warmer relations with the US, if things are run smartly. The report leaves out any mention of the Bush Administration's role in screwing up US-Taiwan relations.

However, it is important to note that this is just a couple of paragraphs in a report of a dozen pages. The majority of report discusses the challenges facing Ma (no mention of Ma's past ideological positions is made, and longtime Ma watchers here will richly enjoy Dumbaugh's assertion that Ma has "a reputation for thoughtful conciliation"), along with the implications of the election for the DPP and the KMT, implications for the PRC, and its possible reactions. Of the last, Dumbaugh notes:

Despite the challenges that Ma faces, many believe that the election results have placed the real burden for an improved Taiwan-PRC situation squarely on Beijing. According to some observers, the Taiwan electorate’s choice of Ma and rejection of the two referenda to which Beijing objected are seen as a first step toward cross-strait improvements. Having railed against President Chen for eight years while wooing the KMT, the PRC now will have to follow through with creative initiatives with the Ma regime if it is to capitalize on the election results. The opportunitywould appear to be too good to miss. Rebuffing a new and more conciliatory Taiwan government could damage the PRC’s credibility that it wishes to pursue a peaceful and constructive solution for cross-strait ties. Any perceived PRC reluctance also could serve to revitalize U.S. and congressional opposition to the PRC’s Taiwan policy — opposition which has remained muted in recent years in part because of mutual U.S.-PRC problems with Chen.

Observers suggest there are a number of options now for Beijing to make a meaningful gesture toward Taiwan that would not impinge on PRC sovereignty claims. These could include a willingness to invite (or to be willing to discuss inviting) Taiwan to be a “meaningful participant” in the World Health Organization (WHO); an invitation to restart cross-strait talks on a mutually acceptable basis; a halt to petulant posturing against Taiwan in APEC and other multilateral organizations; or asuspension of Taiwan-focused military exercises and other military maneuvers in the strait, among other acts. In the wake of the election, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao has expressed hope that cross-strait talks can resume quickly on the basis of the “1992 consensus.”

Unfortunately, past experience demonstrates that the PRC often is unable to adopt creative and flexible policy initiatives at times of great tension — as is currently the case with the crackdown against demonstrations in Tibet — or when there is intense pressure to be seen to be successful — as there is now in the months leading up to the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. In addition, some have suggested that Beijing remains concerned about potential controversies that could arise during the remainder of President Chen’s term, before Ma takes office on May 20, 2008. For these reasons, many feel that, at least in the short term, Beijing may be unable to make an important overture to the incoming Taiwan regime.

The report looks at several possibilities, but it is good to see a significant departure from the Establishment position that Ma will somehow be safely constrained in his relationship with Beijing by Taiwan's divided society. He won't be. The main constraints on Ma are more likely to be the structural weaknesses of the President's position, and the greater power of legislature, as well as the differing views with the KMT itself -- and the attitude of the US and the other regional powers.

READ AT YOUR OWN RISK: Chat discussion between Taiwan, the US, and China on nuclear fuse issue.
[Taiwan]

Nelson Report on Election Results

An excerpt from the Nelson Report, a Washington insider report that gives a sort of precis of official views in Washington. As can be seen, in Washington, the problem in Taiwan-China relations is the DPP, showing once again that while democracy is destabilizing, hundreds of missiles are a force for stability *sigh*. It shows also how welcome a Ma victory is to Washington. On to the report:

++++++++++++++

TAIWAN...despite analogies in the press, and especially in the recently concluded presidential campaign on Taiwan, the differences between Taipei and Lhasa are too obvious to require much discussion.

(Most fundamentally...while Tibet was basically independent for most of the 20th Century, but has not been since China's military take-over in 1951, Taiwan has been functionally independent of Beijing for the better part of 200 years. And unlike Tibet, of course, Taiwan is now a vibrant liberal democracy, with capitalism in full flower.)

It should be noted, however, that the KMT's president-elect, Ma Ying-jeou, managed to miss the obvious when confronted by a last-minute DPP charge that "Tibet shows what Taiwan is in for under KMT rule".

A more apt argument would have been that continued DPP agitation of Beijing risked leading to tragic excess by the Mainland, so that's one more reason why the people of Taiwan should favor the KMT.

(Indeed, one can argue that the Bush Administration implicitly...and sometimes very directly...made that point for the past six years. To arguments that the US didn't actively interfere, we'd respond that's true only if one's definition of interference required a cruise missile on DPP headquarters...)

In any event...the fundamental Bush concern was two-fold: first, that maintaining a good working relationship with Beijing was, to be brutally frank, obviously more important to the US, and to the world, than maintaining a good working relationship with Taipei; but second, that protecting the newly emergent liberal democracy on Taiwan was simultaneously a genuine US interest.

The dilemma became that DPP policies and actions increasingly put each of these interests at risk, due to the nearly universal assessment that for Beijing, nationalism as state policy potentially trumps all other interests.

Which brings us to the new government on Taiwan, headed by the avowedly more Mainland-focused KMT.

We had the pleasure and privilege of being on Taiwan as the guest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the days leading up to the election, and we can personally testify to the vigor of democracy in action...and the seriousness of both the policy debate, and the alternatives presented by the contending parties.

Election of the KMT raises issues in management of US relations which we don't have time for tonite, but will definitely explore in a later Report.

To the basic theme of tonite's China/Tibet section, we'd argue that the task of Presidents Hu and Ma is to bridge the spiritual and policy disconnects between Beijing and Taipei.

Especially must the new KMT government work to meld consciousness of the now universal acceptance of "Taiwan identity" by the 32-million people on the island to the power realities represented by both Beijing and Washington.

That includes helping Washington and like-minded allies to persuade Beijing that WHO observer status (one very important example) is in everyone's interest.

Delegation colleague Denny Roy, of the East-West Center on Hawaii, has written a really thorough analysis of what our group saw and thought, so let's turn the discussion over to him for now, with a promise to pick-up later this week on things like F-16 sales, et al:

[the Denny Roy piece is linked in the post below]

++++++++++++

[Taiwan]

Daily Links, April 4, 2007

What's parked on the blogs today?

The Bushman visits Beautiful Wulai.

Ma Ying-jeou protests too much, according to the Foreigner

Fili visits The Holocaust Museum in Taiwan

That's Impossible! on the war on Taiwanese language. And another post on it. Many things Taiwanese are going bye-bye under the new regime.

Getting a leg up with videos + music.

David looks at God Man Dog, a new film.

KMT avoids criticizing Tibetan crackdown.

Spring Scream takes a visa blow.

The Tainan Bulletin is up, full of Tainan related info.

SPECIAL: The Onion News Service has a video of China celebrating its status as the number one polluter. And don't miss this chat discussion between Taiwan, the US, and China.

MEDIA: An investment piece, full of mistakes, that gives a good view of how foreign investment experts perceive the opportunities here. Funny to think that just last year people were complaining how much our stock market sucked....a piece by a Chinese scholar says that Taiwan is a good example of how democracy really can succeed in a Chinese society.... Denny Roy has a piece in the Japan Times on the election..... Students protest the recent decision to build the Suhua Highway.... The NYTimes mag has a piece on The Last Days of Taipei.... Holiday Inn express launches in Taiwan.... Taiwan probes kickback allegations in China Airlines-Airbus deal. Feels like one of those noisy allegations the KMT makes when something good happens, to distract attention... Jane's says Ma win eases tensions between China and Taiwan.....

JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION: I'm giving them their own section today, the conservative think tank offers three interesting pieces: Time for Conflict Prevention Across the Taiwan Strait, a short piece on Generation Y in China on Tibet and Taiwan, and Ma Ying-jeou and the Future of Cross-Strait Relations.

MILESTONES: Sometime yesterday I had my 500,000th visitor to this blog. Thanks so much, everyone, for making the View go.

[Taiwan]

Mormon Missionaries Assist City of Taichung

At last all those foreigners riding around on bicycles are actually going to be doing something useful....

Mayor Hu had often seen the Mormon missionaries riding throughout the city on their bicycles and developed an idea he shared with Hoer. “Many of your missionaries are from North America and other English-speaking countries. Why couldn’t they take note of incorrect signs and offer suggestions for better English,” Hu suggested. The mayor even offered to pay the Church for such a service.

Hoer quickly replied that the Church’s missionaries are encouraged to provide voluntary service to the communities in which they serve and that the sign correction project would be a service the missionaries could perform at no cost to the city.

Now dozens of missionaries serving in Taichung take note of any unusual English renderings on signs as they go about their routine mission work.

“We just keep an eye out for wrong English,” says Elder Ryan Weese of River Heights, Utah. Adds his missionary companion, Elder Royce De le Cruz Jr. of Manila, Philippines: “When I see a sign that doesn’t make sense I slam on my brakes. It’s a service we can offer and it’s kind of fun too.”

Once a less-than-accurate English sign is noted, the missionaries report its location to President Hoer. He then forwards the information to the mayor’s office, along with a suggestion for a more understandable translation.

One recent example: English warning signs at a baseball field declared “Game that attention to flying out-of-bounds.” The missionaries translated the English to read “Pay attention to foul balls.”

Taichung is the headquarters of the Mormon missionary effort on the island.

[Taiwan]

Journal of a Blockaded Resident in North Formosa

A Qing strongpoint overlooks Keelung harbor today.

Extract from the UK The Navy and Army Illustrated Apr, 1898.
The French had, indeed, a Chinese history. After the outrages at the Taku forts, they threw in their lot with us, and were parties to the Treaty of Tientsin. They fought with China later on in relation to Tonquin, and, but for the timidity of their statesmen, might in 1885, have held on to Formosa, or to the splendid anchorage and harbour which had been occupied in the Pescadores. The Treaty of Tientsin respected the integrity of China, and the French honourably held to its engagements. The signatories would certainly have stood aghast if they could have foreseen the day when the talons of the German eagle should lay hold a part of the Celestial Empire.

In 1884-5 China and France fought a war, with a critical campaign fought in and around the port of Keelung in northern Taiwan. Relics of that war still litter the area.

Keelung at the time was a major port servicing northern Taiwan, and the French had seized it in the hope of grabbing the city and the coal mines around it, in the vain hope of saving the city from its future of Starbucks and discount cruises. No dice. The Qing responded by investing the city on all sides and bottling the French up in the port. The city, which sits in a volcanic caldera open on one side to the sea, proved ideal for such a strategy.

A panorama of modern Keelung and its harbor.

The area hosted many foreigners engaged in the tea, rice, and camphor trade. In those primitive, bygone days, people kept diaries privately rather than posting them on the internet in the form of blogs, and one UK resident, John Dodd, kept a journal of the fighting which he published in 1888 as Journal of a Blockaded Resident in North Formosa During the Franco-Chinese War, 1884-5. From the first and second pages:

"....For some time past the papers have hinted that, in the event of French demands on China not being acceded to, Kelung or some part of Formosa would be held by them as a material guarantee against the payment of an indeminity to be named by them."

Indeed, the New York Times reported that very fact on Aug 28, 1884:


Dodd described the situation....

"It is not two months since the French cruiser Volta, Captain Fournier, arrived in the bay of Kelung, and as there appeared to be some delay in obtaining supplies of coal, &c., the gallant Captain gave the officials notice that unless supplies were forthcoming promptly, he would open fire on the forts. This threat had the desired effect, and as coals were sent off the trouble ended, and the Volta flitted northward, Captain Fornier appearing later on as a diplomat and Treaty maker. This little episode was very instructive, and seemed to open the eyes of the military mandarins to the fact that there was a possibility, not very remote, of Leung becoming the seat of war in the island, and that a French invasion might take place at no distant date. At Kelung there is a new fort, which has cost the Government an enormous sum of money; it has taken years to build and is, I believe, armed with Krupp guns. This fort commands the entrance of the harbour, and looks northeast; the position is exposed and undesirable in may ways, but not in the opinion of the Chinese. However, this was the fort, the stronghold, the terror to the outer barbarians; it was supposed that any man-of-war appearing in front thereof would be sunk, and that Kelung was safe from foreign attack....."

Dodd goes on to write that on the 4th of August three French men-of-war appeared in the harbor and the Admiral demanded that the city be surrendered to the French. That demand being rejected, the ships opened fire on the fort, and "in a very short time it was a mass of ruins." The French ships proved more or less immune to the guns in the fort, and after taking out some of the smaller fortifications in the area, sent in troops.

My friend Jeff Miller, Keelung history buff, tugs on a screw pine. Sharp and easily broken, it was planted around the Qing works surrounding Keelung so that French attackers would not be able to use it to pull themselves uphill when assaulting the Qing trenches.

The diary goes on to record the tribulations of Dodd, located at Tamshui, securing his positions, trying to sort out fact from rumor -- "It is reported that five men-of-war are now in port, but the Chinese who bring reports here daily from Kelung often see double" -- and attempting to engage in trade. In the meantime there was a war on....

8th October, 1884.
"....At about 8 a.m. the 'early birds' with binoculars adjusted, had observed various signs of extra activity amongst the shipping, and before and hour had slipped away, and just as we were sitting down to a 9 o'clock breakfast, the booming of cannon, from every ship, carried our recollections back at once to the 2nd instant, and one and all decided that the French, after a long five days' comparative rest, had determined to succeed in not only forcing a landing but in carrying the place by storm."

By the 20th of October, Dodd writes, foreigners had deserted Keelung and Tamshui was blockaded. Nothing was getting in or out. Another attack, he feared, would lead to a breakdown of control over the Qing forces and looting and attacks on foreigners. Though he did not surmise it at the time, Dodd would spend the remainder of the war trapped in Tamshui.

This cleared area is all that remains of a Qing observation post and strongpoint.

Day after day passes, and Dodd records the weather, trade, the movements of ships, the diplomatic moves, and the confident proclamations of the Chinese, for whom victory is always right around the corner. December brought a dusting of snow one day on the "north mountain", Dodd notes. Bored, the British gunboat and local foreigners stage a cricket match and later, a regatta. The progress of the French -- stifled in attempts to push out of the city and into what is now Nuan Nuan and Badu -- is the subject of much rumor and analysis....on the 31st of December, 1884, he observes:

"The French are no doubt finding it difficult to advance into the county. The nature of the country is very favourable to the invaded, the country around Kelung being hilly and full of cover, and the only roads being narrow pathways. Chines soldiers are said to be scattered all over the hills, on the tops and sides of hills. They either dig rifle pits or take up their position in thick jungly cover, and up trees even."

In February he complains that there is nothing to drink but tea, the foreign drinks all having been finished, nor is there anything to smoke but the "Blocus Mixture" made of local tobacco leaf, "blocus" being a term for the blockade. March in its turn brought glum pondering of their fate:

"18 March
At about high water, 11 to 12 p.m., the electric light from the Duguay-Trouin [a blockading French ship] outside played on the bar for some time, the idea being possibly that the Cockchafer [a British gunboat on the Tamshui River] would steam out at night. Every one more disconsolate than ever. We are in a veritable prison, and may remain here till the war is over. Rained nearly all day."

Anyone who has ever suffered through a wet winter in northern Taiwan can sympathize...

The Duguay-Trouin (from here)

But in due time the armistice came and by mid-May it was back to complaining about the trade:

15 May
"In the short space of about three weeks (since foreigners returned to Twatutia) the arrivals of tea have amounted to some 60,000 half-chests, a portion of which is old last year's leaf, which had to be stored until the blockade was raised. With all this tea pouring in daily what is to be done without lead? We can fire tea, and can make chests to contain the same, but unless the packages are lead-lined, the tea cannot be shipped to a foreign market."

Lead had been declared war material by the French and so none had been permitted to enter the island. Dodd was indignant that the French had so harmed British mercantile interests, but were still permitted to coal their ships in Hong Kong.

The Tamshui River today, looking east toward Yangmingshan.

The diary of John Dodd is both a good read and a useful historical source. Recommended for anyone interested in this period on Taiwan, Dodd not only wrote on the war, but also on trade, local customs and geography, and on the manufacture of such items as camphor and tea. Even the daily temperature was recorded (what else was there to do in Tamshui under blockade?). Dodd's journal is also a reminder of what life is like in wartime, with its deprivations, boredom, rumor without the comfort of confirmation, arbitrary life and death, and pointless, peevish destructiveness -- Keelung was first rendered unfit for habitation by the French, who trashed the buildings they occupied, and then looted by the Chinese when they reoccupied it. Returning locals found a city in ruins. Truly, Dodd reminds us, war is a madness and a waste....

[Taiwan]

Media views of Ma and Taiwan

Imagine this: Ma Ying-jeou criticized in the international English-language media.

I'm not kidding you.

Stephen Nelson in Asia Times has a nifty piece pointing out that Ma Ying-jeou is a man who has reimagined himself in the last two years:

Shortly after becoming KMT chairman in mid-2005, Ma told the Associated Press that - if he became president - he would do "everything in his power" to "re-unify" Taiwan with China.

He was strongly critical of efforts by President Chen Shui-bian to "suspend" the already dormant National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines - drawn up by the KMT - that laid out exactly how the Taiwan should go about "re-unifying" with China.

But even as outgoing KMT chairman Lien Chan was cozying up to Beijing, and promising "One China", Ma sensed that the ground in Taiwan was shifting.

It's so rare to read criticism of Ma in English that this piece should be treasured (UPDATE: does anyone actually know which AP piece he is referring to? The only ones I can find from that time all have Ma saying he won't unify until China is democratic).

Those of you with weak hearts should not read this interview with Ma in Newsweek, posted to Thirsty Ghosts. It's basically a farrago of nonsense from the Ma side. In it, Adams asks Ma two very good questions on the economy. In the first one, Ma starts backpedaling immediately:

NW: Is it realistic to think Taiwan can go back to old days of high-growth, or should people be more modest in their expectations?

Ma: Well, even the DPP government once reached six percent growth. I think we will be able at least to create a favorable situation, by changing the policy on direct flights, on tourism, and get people generally optimistic for the future. And that will help. So this year, the general forecast for our economic growth is 4% or something like this

Those of you with longer memories might recall that two weeks ago Ma was promising us 6% growth every year, along with a 30K per capita income and 3% unemployment. Suddenly he's "cautiously optimistic." The second good question Adams asked is about the truly severe problem Taiwan faces, rising income inequality. Ma detailed a couple of policies, and concluded:

And I think that can be done. Because the KMT, although it looks like a right-wing political party, has a lot of strength on the equitable distribution of wealth. So that will also be a very important part of our policy.

Sadly, the post-industrial economy driven by tourism, finance, and real estate that the KMT envisions is one in which income inequality is only going to worsen, as it has in the US since the Reagan Administration. We'll get a boost from the infrastructure expenditures, though it will be interesting to see if the Central Bank can hold down inflation, especially as the US dollar continues to fall over time.

This leads naturally to the next article of Adams', also in Newsweek, which points out that structural changes throughout Asia are driving political earthquakes. The first paragraph observes:

Voters in Asia are kicking out incumbents like never before. As maturing economies combine with the global slowdown to put a brake on the pace of development, Asians are electing pragmatic managers-in-chief who promise a return to the good old days of fast growth, job security and social mobility. The first came in South Korea last December, when former Hyundai chairman Lee Myung-bak won election as president vowing to serve as the pro-business CEO of a "Global Korea" and ending the reign of a string of populist liberals. On March 8 in Malaysia, an opposition coalition dealt the ruling party its worse loss in four decades by running on bread-and-butter issues and promising to end a stifling Malay affirmative-action system. Then on March 22, voters in Taiwan tossed out a quixotic nationalist who had undermined Taiwan's key economic advantage—access to mainland China—in favor of Ma Ying-jeou, who promises to improve economic ties with the mainland. In an exclusive interview with NEWSWEEK last week, Ma said he won because voters were tired of "pugnacious nationalism" and because the economic performance of outgoing President Chen Shui-bian had been "so poor, people just felt that enough is enough."

Let's remember: it was the DPP that legalized investment in China, not the KMT, and permitted over $150 billion of Taiwanese capital to move there. All countries around China place formal and informal limits on economic activities with China, though only the DPP gets abused for doing that. Further, the DPP vs KMT split on Taiwan's relationship to China was not a simple "open or not" dichotomy, though that is the line the international media and the KMT adhered to. The DPP was always open to direct flights and investment in China. It was a more complex debate over "what kind of relationship we will have with China."

Nevertheless, the article raises an important issue: changes in Taiwan's income and industrial base reflect changes happening throughout the region. All over Asia rising prices, stagnant real income, and slowing growth are a recipe for long-term instability. As they note in their last paragaph:

What the new leaders aren't asking is whether the old rates are still realistic. The richest economies typically can't grow faster than 3 percent for sustained periods without overheating. With average incomes now exceeding $15,000—not matching Japan but not poor either—South Korea and Taiwan may find that 5 percent is their new speed limit. With average incomes of only $6,150 and $3,400, respectively, Malaysia and Thailand will likely find it easier to hit 7 percent or more. But as Deans points out, the growing power of global markets means "new state leaders have fewer levers they can pull, [and] it's much harder to manage economies than it used to be." Particularly when voters expect past performance to predict future results.

A kind reader flipped me a link to this piece by a former Xinhua reporter, now a doctoral student in Singapore. Most of it is fairly typical establishment views of the situation. These see Ma's ability to move closer to China as constrained by Taiwan's divided society (note the underlying reading of Ma -- if it weren't for these constraints, Ma would indeed move closer to China). It also discusses some of the splits in the KMT. Sometimes it veers into the clinically insane:

With the KMT taking full control of both the legislative and administrative bodies, many observers have predicted a stronger civil society in Taiwanese politics.

Sorry, but when Ma attempts to put Taiwan into China's orbit permanently, the DPP will have to resort to street demonstrations again, putting us all the way back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. That is not an advance of civil society. I can't recall anyone saying we'd get a stronger civil society here as a result of putting the KMT in power.

Most of the time, though, the piece is quite balanced:

Whether or not Ma will succeed in his mainland policy equally depends on how Beijing responds and how the two sides interact in the short term. Now that the DPP is pushed to the political sideline, the ball is in China’s court. Beijing will have to take the initiative since there is no Chen Shui-bian to blame and no need to put pressure on the United States.

In the months ahead, it will be important to see how Beijing interprets the reality that the KMT, especially Ma's own position regarding Taiwan's identity, has moved significantly to the center. Also, it is important to see how Beijing views Ma's campaign rhetoric on the Olympics and Tibet and whether Ma continues such rhetoric after he takes office.

Most importantly, it will be crucial whether China changes its strategic priority regarding Taiwan from exclusively focusing on countering independence to some inclination of promoting unification. In the past few years, Beijing's dual strategy of forceful deterrence and charm offensive aimed at preventing Taiwan from moving further towards de jure independence.

Now that the imminent danger of Taiwan independence is gone, will China change its priority towards pushing for political conditions conducive for eventual unification? If so, it will be in direct contradiction to one of Ma's three-no policies: no unification, no independence, and no war. Any Chinese intention to use the economic bait to push for closer political ties is likely to be detected by the always-on-alert green camp in Taiwan, thus constantly putting Ma on the defensive.

We can only hope the Greens are so pro-active.

Finally, enjoy this very funny piece from the BBC on how the reporter went to observe a traditional aboriginal wedding ceremony that turned out to be a promotional event.

[Taiwan]