Bush Administration to Release $6.5B arms package

The Financial Times is among the many media sources reporting....

The Bush administration on Friday notified Congress of the proposed sale, which includes Patriot missiles, Apache helicopters, submarine-launched Harpoon missiles, Javelin anti-tank missiles and spare parts for F-16 fighter jets.

Taiwan will welcome the package following earlier signs that the US might not proceed with the sales. Admiral Timothy Keating, head of US Pacific Command, ignited controversy earlier this year by saying the US had frozen arms sales to Taiwan.

The move comes as relations between Taipei and Beijing continue to improve under since Ma Ying-jeou assumed office as the new Taiwanese president in May. But the package is significantly less than an earlier $12bn proposal, and does not include Blackhawk helicopters or money to study the possibility of acquiring diesel submarines.

This excellent news has been building for some time, with reports piling up during the last few days on the various Taiwan and China lists that at last something was going to go through. The FT story observes that the Bush Administration slimmed the package down to appease China, but left it large enough to please Taipei. Also, the submarines, which I have always considered a massive waste of money, are eliminated....

One former US official said the slimmer package adhered to the “Goldilocks theory” of being “not too hard, not too soft to try to preserve things with Beijing”. A senior US official said the White House believed it could proceed with the sales now because Washington had restored a “very solid, very productive and positive relationship” with Taipei.

“President Ma needs these sales to demonstrate that he is doing the right thing for his people. On the other hand, we did not want to put such a large package forward that it would disrupt the positive trends in cross-strait relations, so we made a calculation to reduce the size of the package.”

The official added that some of the weapons not included in the package could be considered at a later point. But he said the Bush administration had decided not to consider submarines, since none of the countries that build the diesel vessels were prepared to sell them to Taipei.

I would say that the relations between Taipei and Beijing are moving in a positive direction too -- the kind of forward motion that takes one right over the abyss before anyone realizes it....

There's been a lot of speculation in blogs and media that the US is pleasing China because it needs those dollars in China to bail out Wall Street. Recently, however, Chinese banks have received instructions not to lend to US banks. Suddenly, the Bush Administration decides to reverse course and sell weapons to Taiwan. 2 + 2 = ???

Both the Obama and the McCain campaigns had wanted the Bush Administration to do the right thing before the new administration takes office. However, the Bush Administration has still refused to sell Taiwan the F-16s we need....the article continues:

Michael Green, former senior Asia adviser to Mr Bush, welcomed the proposed sales, which he said would remove any doubt that the US was committed to the defence of Taiwan. But he said the decision to postpone consideration of submarines, and the unwillingness of the Bush administration to consider F-16 sales, would give the next administration a difficult starting hand in dealing with cross-strait relations.

The Bush administration has refused to accept a letter from Taiwan requesting permission to buy F-16s. Mr Green said accepting the letter “would have been a nice additional touch” to the package announced yesterday. Another former Bush administration official criticised the decision, however, saying US credibility had been reduced by refusing to sell some items that had been previously approved in principle.

Sources in Taiwan expressed relief that the overall decision had not been left to the next US administration.

The Bush Administration has left many problems for the next Administration to clean up, not the least of which is Taiwan policy.

MEDIA: In this article, The Formula describing China's claims on Taiwan is excellent, entirely free of historical error, and very clear...

Although the People’s Republic of China has never ruled Taiwan, it claims the island as part of its territory and threatens to attack it should Taipei officially declare its independence.

I'd send Kathrin Hille a box of chocolates, but that's an ambiguous gift these days....

[Taiwan]

Nelson Report: Why Bush Adm has Frozen Arms & Other Stuff

A recent Nelson Report discusses why the Bush Administration is screwing Taiwan:

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Taiwan arms...even though seven notifications are pending and had been expected to be submitted to Congress last week, sources say it may not happen, as White House officials take seriously a case against them made by a defense expert.

"Perspective" tonite comes from the conclusion of an influential study of Taiwan's defense needs by Naval War College analyst Bill Murray which helps explain what's happening...or, rather, not happening.

TAIWAN arms...a Loyal Reader asked last week what's up with notifications which faced a deadline for submission to Congress. Today, it's clear the deadlines have been missed, and pro-Taiwan folks are expressing outrage.

Heritages' John Tkacik tells Defense News he fears that Beijing will just "pocket" the Bush Administration non-decisions and that the next US Administration will be stuck with the ability to sell even less, regardless.

Maybe that's what will happen, say our defense experts...John is talking mainly politics, geopolitics here...but the internal debate on what Taiwan really needs, especially given China's current build-ups and power projection capability intentions...that may help explain the Bush decision to "decide" by not deciding.

Also remember, as Defense News notes, the Taiwan politicians are themselves to blame, in that they indulged in domestic gamesmanship for most of the Bush Administration, and "missed the window" which might...might have produced a favorable decision on some of the systems now stuck in limbo.

But the main reason? Our understanding is that a hard-nosed critique of the Taiwan arms situation by the Naval War College expert William Murray has been very closely read by senior Bush Administration players in various appropriate agencies.

So while it may be psychologically comforting for some pro-Taiwan folks to blame it on State (for example) that's not the real situation, they argue.

For "Perspective" tonite we're providing selections from the 32-page Murray paper which has clearly been so influential. You can ask yourself how YOU would react, were you a decision-maker, knowing that he is not speaking from out in left-field...rather, he is voicing concerns long expressed by experts in and out of the US military itself:

"It is difficult to escape the conclusion that China either already has or shortly will have the ability to ground or destroy Taiwan's air force and eliminate the navy at a time of its own choosing. This prospect fundamentally alters Taiwan's defense needs and makes the intended acquisition from the United States of diesel submarines, P-3 aircraft, and PAC-3 interceptors ill advised.

Diesel submarines are poor antisubmarine platforms, since with their low speed and limited underwater endurance they simply cannot search quickly large volumes of ocean for quiet submarines. These physical restrictions also limit their versatility as antisurface platforms. They are, for all practical purposes, four-knot minefields. At a cost of over U.S. $1.5 billion each and with indeterminate delivery dates, conventional submarines also carry significant opportunity costs, as some in Taipei clearly recognize. Finally, submarines are no more likely than other naval ships tied up at exposed piers to survive the opening salvo of a war with China.

Taiwan's apparent decision to purchase up to twelve submarine-hunting P-3C aircraft is similarly brought into question. Although these planes can collect valuable information during peacetime and in crisis, in wartime they would be sitting ducks while on the ground (though hardened shelters might protect P-3s) and aloft would require uncontested air superiority to have any chance of accomplishing their mission.100 In any case, Taipei cannot protect its runways. Patriot surface-to-air missiles have some utility against short-range ballistic missiles, but China already has the means to defeat this expensive air-defense system.

The implication is that Taiwan would be far better served by hardening, and building redundancy into, its civil and military infrastructure and systems. In that way the island could reasonably hope to survive an initial precision bombardment, deny the PRC the uncontested use of the air, repel an invasion, and defy the effects of a blockade for an extended period. Many of these actions, in fact, would be consistent with recent efforts by Taiwan to improve its defenses. Others, however, would entail substantial shifts that some in Taiwan's navy and air force would doubtless oppose. Air force leaders would be understandably loath to admit that their fighters cannot defend Taiwan's skies; their navy counterparts might similarly resist suggestions that their fleet is acutely vulnerable in port. Both services' political champions would certainly challenge the implications of this article's analysis. So too would the arms manufacturers who stand to benefit from the sale of aircraft, ships, and supporting systems to Taiwan.

Yet under present conditions it is doubtful that the people and government of Taiwan could withstand a determined PRC assault for long. A hasty American military intervention would be Taiwan's only hope, but only at the risk of strategic miscalculation and nuclear escalation. A "porcupine" strategy - a Taiwan that was patently useless to attack - would obviate the need; it would also make a determined Taipei conspicuously able to deny the objective of a bombardment or defeat an invasion, thus deterring either scenario. Ability to resist a full-scale campaign - long-range precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade - for a substantial amount of time would allow its potential allies to shape their responses carefully. Above all, demonstrable Taiwanese resilience would diminish Beijing's prior confidence in success, strengthen cross-strait deterrence, and reduce the risk of the United States being dragged into a conflict with China.

Meanwhile, a porcupine strategy would restore the United States to unequivocal adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, since Taiwan would be in the market only for defensive systems. Taiwan would find itself with a better defense for fewer dollars, and the United States would abide by the 17 August 1982 joint communique© declaring that it would "not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those [arms] supplied in recent years...and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution."102

Finally, and most important, a porcupine approach would shift the responsibility for Taiwan's defense to Taiwan, rendering U.S. intervention in a cross-strait battle a last resort instead of the first response. Many observers believe that Taiwan today relies unduly on a perceived American security guarantee and does not do enough to provide for its own defense. Yet since 2000 the Kuomintang and the Democratic People's Party have not framed a defense debate that could produce the open, honest appraisal that is desperately needed if domestic consensus on a viable defense is to be achieved. A Taiwan that China perceived could be attacked and damaged but not defeated, at least without unacceptably high costs and risks, would enjoy better relations with the United States and neutralize the threat posed by many of China's recently acquired military capabilities. Unfortunately, political gridlock in Taipei stands in the way of any such hopes. It is not that Taiwan does not do enough to construct a viable defense but that it is not doing the right things.

William S. Murray is associate research professor at the U.S. Naval War College, where his research focuses on China's navy. He conducted submarine deployments and qualified to command nuclear submarines prior to retiring from the U.S. Navy. He is the coeditor of and a contributing author to China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force and China's Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing' s Maritime Policies...

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It's not a bright idea to base your policy decision on the opinion of a single expert, however intelligent. Especially when he is saying what you want to hear. UPDATE: Original article is here. Murray's assessment, little birdies say, appears to have been made without visiting Taiwan. I'll be talking about it in a post tomorrow.

Defense News reports:

The Chinese will pocket the Bush administration’s Taiwan arms halt as the baseline for approaching the next administration,” said Tkacik, now with the Heritage Foundation. “Beijing will make it very painful for the next administration to restart arms supplies to Taiwan, insisting that doing so would renege on Bush commitments, imaginary or otherwise.”

The package has been held up since December. It includes items promised by the Bush administration in 2001, plus newer items such as attack and utility helicopters.?

"All in all, Taiwan policy is in complete tatters," said Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president, U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. “The administration is blatantly gaming the system in a manner that runs contrary to U.S.-Taiwan interests.

“There are simply no other examples of a non-NATO or other security relationship having its congressional notifications stacked at [the U.S. Department of] State in this manner. They are doing so over a zero­sum attitude toward U.S.-China-Taiwan relations and the equities Mr. Bush believes will be hurt by following through on his 2001 commitment.”

And the CNA report connects the reluctance to sell the weapons to the financial situation:

Taiwan's plans to procure weapons systems from the United States remain unchanged, as the nation is resolved to defend itself militarily and needs to beef up its self-defense capability, Chang Shuo-wen, a ruling Kuomintang (KMT) legislative caucus whip said Sunday.

Taiwan has submitted its military procurement plans to the United States and it is now up to the Bush administration to decide what to do about Taiwan's requests, President Ma Ying-jeou said recently.

Taiwan is seeking to buy a weapons package of anti-tank missiles, Apache helicopters, Patriot PAC-3 missile batteries, diesel-electric submarines, P3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, sea-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Black Eagle helicopters from the US.

The US Department of State told Taiwanese news media Friday that Taiwan's arms procurement package is still under inter-departmental screening by the George W. Bush administration.

Once a final decision is made on the arms procurement package, the executive branch would notify Congress immediately, the State Department said.

When asked whether the arms procurement proposal would be left up to the new US administration, a State Department official said that "there is no timetable for that matter."

Commenting on the uncertainties surrounding the arms deal, KMT Legislator Lin Yu-fang, who is the convener of the Legislative Yuan Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, said there is no need for Taiwan to worry too much, given that Taiwan remains part of the strategic interests of the United States.

Washington would not like to see the Taiwan Strait become a waterway of China, as this would open a big hole in the US defense frontline in the West Pacific, he added.

Noting that the supply of defense weapons to Taiwan is part of the stipulations in the United States' Taiwan Relations Act, Lin expressed confidence that whoever is elected the next president of the US will not renege on the commitment.

Lin attributed the "bumpy ride" of Taiwan's arms procurement package partly to Washington's reliance on China's cooperation in US anti-terrorism efforts and in its spiraling financial and economic storms. For example, China currently holds between US$500 billion and US$950 billion worth of US Treasury bonds, he said.

We're in deep, deep trouble.

[Taiwan]

Taiwan Arms Freeze Alters Status Quo

Heritage Foundation scholar John Tkacik has a piece at Heritage on the Bush Administration's continuing refusal to lift the arms freeze on Taiwan, attributing it to the Administration's anxiousness to obtain "cooperation" on China....

The President’s hesitation to move on Taiwan may be related to his conversation Monday, September 22, with Chinese President Hu Jintao in which the two leaders discussed how China could help with the current “financial turmoil” on Wall Street and “particularly” how the two leaders could “properly handle the Taiwan question.”

...further noting...

Why would the White House whip-saw a loyal ally and one of America’s three most important security partners in East Asia? Perhaps because of its increasingly sanguine view of China’s record and potential as a security partner. Chinese “help” with North Korea’s “dismantlement” of its nuclear weapons program—now being reassembled—has perhaps persuaded the Administration of the value of being China’s friend.

Tkacik also comments on speculation in Washington....

A complementary view in Washington is that Taiwan simply cannot defend itself, even with the submarines, missile defense systems, anti-submarine aircraft, and so forth included in the current package, so it should not even try. This line of reasoning suggests that Taiwan adopt a “porcupine strategy” of mining all 180 miles of beaches on its west coast with surf-zone sea mines and weapons designed for waters less than 10 feet deep, then engage whatever invaders manage to actually land on those beaches with truck-mounted Harpoon missiles and assorted other last-ditch weapons. These are weapons that will not offend China, so the U.S. could sell these weapons without harming its relations with China.

Like many commentators, Tkacik notes that freeze violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Another point he makes is that it grossly violates Reagan's six assurances, one of which assures that the US will not hold consultations with China prior to selling weapons to Taiwan, and the other which promises that the US will keep Taiwan in parity with China -- and that the determination of weapons sales to Taiwan will be based solely on the PRC threat to the island.

During the Chen years many US analysts said that Chen was violating the status quo. One or two outside the Administration observed that China's violations of the status quo were far more serious and dangerous to the US-allied democracies around China. Almost no one has pointed out that the Bush Administration has now thoroughly violated the status quo -- by tilting toward China and by refusing to sell weapons to Taiwan: the US is now the chief violator of the status quo. Tkacik points out the danger for Taiwan of Bush's policy: the next President will be asked to continue it:

Senior Bush Administration officials, current and former, say privately it is a safe bet that Chinese President Hu will pocket President Bush’s Taiwan arms freeze and confront the next U.S. President to maintain the Bush “baseline.” The Chinese will threaten the next Administration with “serious consequences” if the U.S. “backslides” on the issue.

Former US official Randall Shriver observed in his appearance here several months ago that bot the McCain and Obama campaigns have said that they will sell arms to Taiwan, but they would prefer that the Bush Administration do it. It's long past time for the Bush Administration to grow up on this issue, and to nurture the status quo, instead of making permanent concessions for temporary gains.

Tkacik points out that current President Ma Ying-jeou desperately needs the sales to shore up his sagging position vis-a-vis China -- it's funny now to read things like this just-released CSIS report on confidence building across the Taiwan Strait -- funny because China has so thoroughly refused to cooperate with Ma. China could hardly have a bigger fan than Ma Ying-jeou and his KMT, yet it has given nothing to Taiwan. As friend of Taiwan Nat Bellocchi comments today in the Taipei Times: "...there is nothing that suggests Beijing will soften its line on obstructing international participation for Taiwan, even in isolated cases." Let that be a lesson to those out there who think that China will be accomodating to its friends.

ALSO: This piece at Taiwan News that observes that Taiwan is not Georgia.

We hope that the next U.S. president continues dialogue with China not to help the PRC squash Taiwan's democracy but to persuade Beijing to cease to block the participation of a democratic and peaceful Taiwan in the global community and realize that maintaining Taiwan as a democratic "lighthouse" is critical to ensuring the fostering of both peace and democracy in Asia.

and the Presidential office is hopeful the sales will still happen. It's a bureaucratic possibility, but just barely....

[Taiwan]

Tancredo makes last minute push to end arms freeze

Republican Congressman Tom Tancredo, a good friend of Taiwan, has introduced a resolution to force the Administration to sell needed weapons to Taiwan, taking advantage of Congress' being in session for the financial market mess. Below are copies of the bill, and various press releases. Many thanks to the Congressman for his hard work on behalf of The Beautiful Island.

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ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN RESOLUTION INTRODUCED IN THE HOUSE

On September 24, 2008, a Resolution requiring the sales of defensive arms articles to Taiwan was introduced in the House by Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-CO). The Resolution refers to section 3(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act, and states:

…. the defense articles and defense services described in subsection (b) shall be transferred on a sales basis to Taiwan as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act.

In the subsequent section it refers to the following specific defense items:

… diesel electric submarines or relevant designs, Mark-48 ASW torpedoes, Harpoon submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, PAC–3 missile defense systems, Paladin self-propelled howitzers, Apache helicopters, mine-sweeping helicopters, and 66 F–16 C/D fighter planes that were requested by the Government of Taiwan in August 2007.

The Formosan Association for Public Affairs applauds introduction of this resolution and urges Congress to act on it before adjournment. FAPA President Bob Yang, Ph.D. stated: "The US Administration's stalling on the arms sales to Taiwan is both bad strategy and a direct violation of the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances: delaying the arms sales is playing into China's hands, which wants the sales stopped altogether, so Taiwan has increasingly less leverage in its negotiations with China."

Yang adds: "To those who have worked hard and sacrificed to help make Taiwan a free and democratic country, the American hesitations to move forward with these sales are undermining US credibility as a proponent of democracy in East Asia."

* * *

110TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION H. R.
To require the sale of certain defense articles and defense services to Taiwan.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. TANCREDO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on

A BILL

To require the sale of certain defense articles and defense
services to Taiwan.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT TO SELL CERTAIN DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES TO TAIWAN.

(a) REQUIREMENT.—In accordance with section 3(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act, the defense articles and defense services described in subsection (b) shall be transferred on a sales basis to Taiwan as soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act.

(b) DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES DESCRIBED.—The defense articles and defense services referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) The unfulfilled elements of the request made by Taiwan and approved by President George W. Bush in 2001 that includes diesel electric submarines or relevant designs, Mark-48 ASW torpedoes, Harpoon submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, PAC–3 missile defense systems, Paladin self-propelled howitzers, Apache helicopters, and mine-sweeping helicopters. (2) 66 F–16 C/D fighter planes that were requested by the Government of Taiwan in August 2007.

(c) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION AND APPROVAL.—The requirement to transfer defense articles and defense services under subsection (a) shall be carried out notwithstanding the provisions for congressional notification and approval of a proposed sale of defense articles or defense services in section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)).

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Tancredo Makes Last Minute Push to Complete Stalled Taiwan Arms Sale

Bill Would Sidestep Legally Dubious Bush Administration “Freeze” And Mandate Weapons Transfer

(WASHINGTON, DC) – U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo today introduced legislation that would mandate the completion the long-stalled arms transfer from the United States to Taiwan.

The bill would require the sale of diesel-electric submarine plans, F-16 fighter jets, cruise missiles, and Apache helicopters to Taiwan. The transfer of all of these weapons systems was approved by the U.S. government as far back as 2001 and, in some cases, earlier.

Despite long-standing U.S. policy, and in defiance of the legal requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act, however, the Bush Administration has blocked the completion of the sale in what many believe is yet another attempt by the White House to curry favor with the communist government of mainland China.

“We have a moral obligation to make good on our commitment to our democratic friends in Taiwan,” said Tancredo. “Congress and the Administration have a legal obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with these weapons systems, regardless of what the communists in Beijing or the ‘panda-huggers’ in the U.S. State Department might think.”

Tancredo pointed to the text of Taiwan Relations Act which stipulates that, “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,” and that “The President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan” (emphasis added).

The Bush Administration has flip-flopped on the issue of supporting democratic Taiwan since taking office eight years ago. In 2001, President Bush declared that the U.S. would “do whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan, and approved a robust transfer of defensive weapons to aid the island nation in beefing up its defenses against its rapidly militarizing and increasingly belligerent communist neighbor.

Since then, however, the Bush State Department has taken great pains to accommodate and appease China, refusing to accept Taiwan’s request for replacement aircraft in 2006, 2007 and 2008 and freezing portions of the 2001 arms transfer by withholding a routine “notification” to Congress that is necessary for the completion of the sale.

“The Taiwan Relations Act entrusts both the President and Congress with the task of helping Taiwan defend itself from a hostile China,” concluded Tancredo. “Unfortunately because the President has made it clear that he isn’t interested in living up to that responsibility – Congress is going to have to take the initiative.”

Tancredo’s bill would waive the requirement for a “Presidential notification,” and allow the unfulfilled elements of the 2001 sale, as well as the F-16 fighters the Taiwan government requested two years ago, to go forward.


[Taiwan]

More Pressure on the Arms Freeze

An op-ed in the reliably pro-Taiwan Washington Times by a retired US admiral points out some of the flaws in the arms freeze, and the threat Taiwan still faces despite peace in our time "reduced tensions."

Chinese military writings over the last decade have made it patently clear that Taiwan's value to China is as a new military base. They look at Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier; controlling Taiwan will allow Chinese military forces to break out of what has been called the "First Island Chain" and to then dominate East Asia. Even with President Ma's conciliatory moves to reduce tension with mainland China, there has been no reciprocity by the PRC. Since the Taiwan election in March, China has shown no inclination to reduce its order of battle facing Taiwan, or even to slow the rate of growth in these forces. The Chinese air force flies up to five sorties a day up to the "midline" of the Taiwan Strait, creating a strain on Taiwan's air defense posture, made more burdensome by the increasing number of nearly-impossible-to-evade, long-range Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles.

Since 2001, the number of Chinese ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan has increased from about 400 to over 1,250, and include 250 new land attack cruise missiles. The number of modern, fourth-generation fighters facing Taiwan has grown from about 150 to about 500. The number of modern submarines has grown from about eight to about 30. This does not include the new underground submarine pens on Hainan Island, which provide a base to interdict the critical sea lines of communication coming from the Straits of Malacca to Taiwan and our allies Japan and South Korea.

Had the Bush administration's original 2001 arms sales package to Taiwan of new destroyers, new Patriot anti-ballistic missile interceptors, P-3 anti-submarine aircraft and eight new, conventional submarines been transferred immediately, Taiwan might have been able to sustain a margin of technical superiority and deterrent capability. Further, as many as 66 new F-16 fighters that Taiwan has requested in the last two years would also have to be added to the equation.

Ma's strategy of selling out Taiwan to achieve "peace" is a total failure. Even allowing for the usual exaggeration of the threat, there is no question that China's arms build-up has continued apace.

[Taiwan]

Quickies on the market and on the arms freeze

China Times reports KMT Legislator Lin Yu-fang, long involved in defense issues, says that Taiwan asked three times for F-16s:

立法委員訪問團七月卅一日在華府指出，兩年來，中華民國政府三度向美國提交F-16C/D戰機的採購意向書，可是三度遭到美國政府退回具體日期，分別是二○○六年七月廿七日、○七年二月十三日以及○七年六月廿二日。美國還要求台灣不要再提。

The dates in the penultimate sentence are 2006 July, 2007 Feb, and again in 2007 June. The last sentence says that the US then asked that Taiwan not bring up the issue again. Note that Bush Administration has claimed (a) there is no arms freeze and (b) that it dates from after the election of Ma, because the KMT asked the Administration to freeze arms sales because they didn't want to disturb President Ma's delicate surrender negotiations talks with Beijing. Again note that (a) and (b) contradict each other, and both contradict known facts. If the Bush Administration were any more full of shit, the President would need sewage permits to hold a press conference.

Ma save us! The property market slowdown continues!

The local property market continued its slowdown last month with market watchers expressing mixed views about its future prospects, a statement released yesterday said.

Evertrust Rehouse’s (永慶房屋) survey found that residential property prices in the greater Taipei area saw a 10 percent month-on-month decline to average NT$267,000 (US$8,670) per ping (3.3m²) last month while trading volume dropped by 15 percent in the same period.

....

The real-estate index, co-compiled by Chang and Cathay Real Estate Development Co (國泰建設), the nation’s second largest developer, showed that the 30-day trading volume indicator saw a 23.49 percent year-on-year decline in the second quarter of this year to reach 412 points, although closing prices saw a 6.15 percent growth at the same time, to average NT$195,500 per ping nationwide in the second quarter.

On a quarterly basis, both closing prices and the 30-day trading volume indicator jumped by 2.53 percent and 28.05 percent respectively in the second quarter, Chang said.

In addition, Evertrust’s survey found that the property market in Taichung saw 30 percent month-on-month decline last month, although average prices remained steady.

The property market in Kaohsiung, however, appeared to benefit from investments made by Hon Hai Precision Industry Co (鴻海精密), and the launch of the city’s mass rapid transit system, seeing a 5 percent growth in sales last month, compared with June.

In other areas where Ma was going to save us, the Liberty Times said today we are getting 150 tourists a day from China. Hopefully this is just a temporary depression as everyone gears up for the Olympics.

[Taiwan]

Stevan Harrell Interviewed in Blogging Beijing, and other tales

Dr. Stevan Harrell, longtime Taiwan and China scholar who used to live in Taiwan and has produced some wonderful work on it, was interviewed on his work in China and on the Beijing Olympics, on Blogging Beijing. A sample:

How were you drawn into studying minority people in southwest China?

After the Mosher affair , it was impossible for foreigners to do field research in Han areas. My student Dru Gladney had done research with Hui in various areas, and encouraged me to give minorities a try.

For readers who know little about Chinese minorities, what are three essential kernels of information?

1. There are as many minority people in China as there are people in Japan, and way more than there are in any one European country.
2. Not all Chinese minorities have active independence movements. In fact, only two of them do: Tibetans and Uighurs.
3. Minority people participate actively in incorporating themselves into the Chinese state, even when they have resentments against the state and against the Han.

What do the 2008 Games mean for China - Chinese people, Chinese government, Chinese minorities, and Chinese academics?

More than anything else, the Games are a chance to show the world that China is a grownup country. That's really about all.

I've long followed the issue of casinos here in Taiwan, partly because I suspect they will be involved in my PhD thesis. Taiwan Journal has a piece out on the Penghu's desire to get gambling:

Penghu has good reason to look for a financial boost from casinos as the gambling industry is expanding rapidly in Asia. According to a survey released by the American Gaming Association in June, gambling revenues in the region could surpass those generated in the United States by 2012.

Booming gambling meccas in Macau as well as new casinos in Singapore were expected to drive this growth, the AGA predicted. The association reported that U.S. casinos raked in US$34.1 billion in 2007, while Asia's casino gambling market was estimated to have made between US$15 billion and US$20 billion during the same period.

The industry's potential has reignited the debate on whether casinos should be legalized in Taiwan. With neighboring countries such as Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore either preparing to or having already lifted gambling bans, there is a growing sense that Taiwan should jump on the bandwagon before it is too late.

In order for that to happen, the Legislature would have to pass the so-called "casino article" in the Offshore Islands Development Act. Legislators have already rejected the article twice: in January 2002 by a 51-vote margin and in December last year, by 27 votes.

An aide to Lin Pin-kuan, a fourth-term independent legislator from Penghu County, suggested it might be a case of third time lucky. While the previous Democratic Progressive Party government was firmly opposed to gambling, the aide said the ruling Kuomintang's position on this issue had softened in recent years.

"Lawmakers have long blocked the article because many Taiwanese people consider gambling immoral, but the enormous successes of the casino industry in other Asian countries made for a powerful argument," said Lin's aide. "Taiwan has legalized lotteries. People should be able to discuss casinos more reasonably now," he added.

The water issue is a severe one, but a friend pointed out that casinos might actually be a benefit on that front, since the government might at last put in pipes to bring H2O over from Taiwan instead of straining the delicate local ecosystem.

++++++++

Lastly, the arms freeze. To complement the Senators who wrote to King George on the arms freeze, 25 members of the House Taiwan caucus have also sent a letter to the President asking about it. Below:

The Honorable George W. Bush July 31, 2008
President
The White House Washington , DC 20500

Dear President Bush:

For decades, the United States and Taiwan have maintained a mutually beneficial economic and political relationship. Taiwan is one of our strongest allies in the Asia Pacific region and we believe it is essential that there be a peaceful environment in the Taiwan Strait . The U.S. has a long history of making available to Taiwan defense articles and services that are essential in the goal of enabling Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

In 2006, Taiwan ranked 5th among worldwide recipients of U.S. foreign military sales, receiving $970 million in defense articles and services. In December 2007, Taiwan approved their 2008 Defense budget which included a significant package of weapons to further its military modernization efforts. Among those requests were 12 P3-C planes and 3 PAC-II missile upgrades which you approved in April, 2001. Other requests that are still pending include 8 diesel submarines, 30 Apache helicopters, E-2 aircraft upgrades, sea-launched Harpoon 20 missiles, precision attack missiles and 66 F-16 fighter aircraft.

We welcome Taiwan 's request of support for its security and growth of its defense capabilities. Upon reception of Congressional Notifications, we look forward to the opportunity to work with the Administration in completing these sales as soon as possible. Recently, we have been aware of a possible freeze on all foreign military sales to Taiwan . We believe that a freeze on foreign military sales to Taiwan violates the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act. We request a briefing on the status of these sales from all appropriate agencies, and urge the Administration to expeditiously execute consideration of these requests.

In March 2007, China announced that their 2007 defense budget would total $46 billion, although Secretary of Defense Gates estimated that China 's total defense spending for 2007 could be as high as $139 billion. The military and strategic imperatives for Taiwan are real and urgent, and if we fail to show the necessary resolve it would mean missing a significant opportunity to improve cross-strait peace and security - a vital U.S. interest.

We would like to echo your statement on March 22 regarding Taiwan 's recent election, stating that you are "confident that the election and the democratic process it represents will advance Taiwan as a prosperous, secure and well-governed society." We understand our administration' s "One China" policy and all agree that a strong, defendable Taiwan is in our nation's best interests.

In our view, a secure and prosperous Taiwan requires the means to provide for its own self defense and the ability to engage its neighbors without fear of military intimidation. Taiwan 's ability to maintain its defense rests heavily upon its ability to acquire defense articles that are capable of deterring aggressive neighbors. As your statement also points out, Taiwan has a right to be "secure," and that can only be guaranteed by an unambiguous and non-negotiable commitment from the United States to provide Taiwan with weapons systems consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.

Sincerely,

SHELLEY BERKLEY D-NV STEVE CHABOT R-OH GENE GREEN D-TX VIRGINIA FOXX R-NC ELLIOT ENGEL D-NY 05 THADDEUS MCCOTTER R-MI MICHAEL MCNULTY D-NY TOM TANCREDO R-CO MAURICE HINCHEY D-NY DAN BURTON R-IN ROBERT ANDREWS D-NJ MARK SOUDER R-IN SHEILA JACKSON-LEE D-TX ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN R-FL BARNEY FRANK D-MA 15 DOUG LAMBORN R-CO STEVE ROTHMAN D-NJ JOHN CULBERSON R-TX G.K. BUTTERFIELD D-NC JOE BARTON R-TX 20 DONNA CHRISTENSEN D-VI SCOTT GARRETT R-NJ DAVID WU D-OR
GUS BILIRAKIS R-FL DENNIS CARDOZA D-CA 25

The Taipei Times had several pieces on the arms issue today. Dennis Wilder of the US NSC says there's no arms freeze. Legislators say there is no realistic possibility of arms sales this year. J Michael Cole says that US arms freeze is example of US hegemony at work.

[Taiwan]

Nelson Report -- Still More on the Arms Freeze

The Washington insider Nelson Report doesn't often have remark on Taiwan, and yet here are two in a row that have stuff on Taiwan. This one comments on Wolfowitz's remarks the other day. Pay attention to that first sentence -- does it herald change?:

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TAIWAN ARMS...we can confirm that the Administration is in deep consultation over whether to approve an $11-billion arms package for Taiwan, and if so, when.

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, now president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, predicted in Taipei yesterday that President Bush is "close" to deciding to release what PACOM Adm. Tim Keating perhaps inadvertently last week seemed to indicate was a freeze, due to larger US-China relations and issues.

You can suspect that Wolfowitz was doing his job, and special pleading, and/or you can suspect that given his connections, he may know something the rest of us don't.

Our guess is he was promoting, not reporting, and that while there are those who argue Bush will announce the deal, then hope to "make up for it" with his Beijing Olympics' visit with China's Hu Jintao...that strikes us as are being a little too clever, as per the observations of a directly concerned Loyal Reader who supports the package:

"I think Hu is so concerned about domestic unrest and possible demos that any sign from Bush of bending Taipei's way would be more than Hu could handle.

Many, including me, think Hu is under pressure to show that his policy of 'no unification now' toward Taipei is a good policy. Ma's mantra 'no unification, no independence, no arms race' doesn't sit very well in Beijing. Even more so was Ma's statement that he didn't foresee unification 'in his lifetime.

This has Beijing nervous about giving any leeway to Taiwan for fear that the DPP might return, and that the DPP would pocket all concessions from China, and ask for more.

I worry, by the way, in all this arms 'delay' and optimism over the dialogue that is underway between Taipei and Beijing, that any signs of a DPP resurrection would make Beijing very belligerent.

That would risk the US being caught in a trap somewhat of its own making, ' troublemaker DPP/peacemaker KMT' - so you can't have that DPP be re-elected to power.'

But, as noted at the top, anyone who says they know the outcome of the Administration debate is exaggerating, we suspect. As we await a decision (and not making any announcement may BE the decision) here are some useful considerations we hear from other concerned observers, about points raised in recent Nelson Reports:

"I agree that the Bush Administration is not breaching the TRA. We are in a set of circumstances that the authors of the TRA did not contemplate. If the authors had been in this situation, they probably would be doing the same thing that the Administration is doing now. It's a bit more complicated than that, of course, but not as dire as some people are painting it."[MT: this Loyal Reader is wrong. The situation that the "authors of the TRA did not contemplate" -- the KMT-CCP lovefest -- is not the cause of the arms freeze. The arms freeze predates the current situation. The Bush Administration is full of it on this one. Whether the Bush administration is breaching the Taiwan Relations Act is a matter of one's values, but I don't think it is. It may be in violation of the spirit of the TRA, but the letter of the TRA clearly gives the President the right to do what he wants. Stupid to hand the executive so much power.]

Finally, a security concern you almost never hear "in public", from a directly involved Loyal Reader:

"It is curious that all the comments about accommodating China, Taiwanese politics, obligations under the TRA, etc. hardly mention one of the most important constraints on any arms transfers to Taiwan -- compromise of advanced systems/technologies. Leakage to China from Taiwan of US defense data is already evident.

The KMT's return brings us back to a long-standing assumption about Taiwan's eventual fate -- accommodation with China involving some trade-off of sovereignty for autonomy. If you acknowledge that (whether or not you like it), you must also recognize that US military systems transferred to Taiwan will in effect become transfers to China...something that would surely give pause to any US administrations considering arms sales to Taiwan.

This should not mean the end of US arms support for Taiwan, but it will certainly impact what gets transferred. Mature equipment like the F-16s and utility helicopters could and should be released. Speculation on Aegis systems should stop.

The submarine project -- misconceived from the beginning and all but unimplementable in reality -- should be shelved. Some systems, like PAC-3, will be challenging re. legitimate Taiwan defense needs vs. tech security.

These are the sort of issues on which policy makers and responsible Congressional attention must focus -- an approach to Taiwan's security that finds a sensible middle ground between the extreme swings that have characterized current administration actions."[MT: Actually, we hear this security concern all the time, most recently in the Manthorpe piece a few posts below.]

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[Taiwan]

Nelson Report : More on arms freeze

Once again, the Washington insider report The Nelson Report has another round of inside-the-Beltway analysis on the Arms Freeze.

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TAIWAN ARMS..."fallout" continues from PACOM Adm. Tim Keating's speech to the Heritage Foundation last week, covered in recent Nelson Reports, in which Keating informally confessed that the White House has put a "freeze" (press language, not his) on a big arms package for Taiwan.

The consequence, observers report..."letters, resolutions, all kinds of things flying all over the place", given what appears to finally be a formal request from Taipei, for the bulk of the arms first offered by President Bush back in 2001. [MT: The presentation here isn't clear that there are seven-eight systems in the pipeline, some already funded by Taiwan. I am still working on getting a list of what has been funded. The Nelson Report also takes the view that the freeze is recent but clearly it goes back a couple of years.]

Indications were clear, even before the controversial Keating speech, that Bush was reluctant to move on his offer at this time...given the current state of US-China relations, and the apparent thaw in China-Taiwan relations under a new KMT government.

As we have been reporting, while it is obvious common sense that the US take into account both the bilateral and Cross Strait situation at the time of any arms sales, the letter of the law, the Taiwan Relations Act, requires that the only consideration is supposed to be an objective analysis of Taiwan's defense needs.

That, of course, can be and usually IS loosely defined to include a strategic and political assessment of all kinds of things, current major examples including US-China relations, such as cooperation at the UN on Iran, and the 6 Party talks with N. Korea...the problem being that while you DO it, you aren't really supposed to SAY it.

Enter Adm. Keating...

Before reprinting the full text of a Republican staff letter seeking support for a Congressional Resolution by HFAC Ranking Member Ilena Ross-Lehtinen, it's important to consider that for most of the Bush Administration, the normally very vocal, mainly Republican Taiwan lobby on Capitol Hill has been forced to keep as calm as possible, so as to not upset China, and the China-Taiwan policies of the Republican White House incumbent.

Not that support for Taiwan or arms sales ever disappeared, but events between China and Taiwan, and statements or actions by the White House, and senior State Department officials which, during the Clinton Administration, might have caused a furor on the Hill...didn't.

You may remember, back in early 2002, then-House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, at the peak of his powers, told an American Enterprise Institute audience that he planned to lead an attack on the "one China" policy which has underwritten US-China relations since the Nixon Administration.

We don't know who made the call, but with Vice President Cheney's office clearly on record as supporting a professional cooperative relationship with China, nothing further was heard from Mr. DeLay about "one China".

Increasingly, mainly Republican, pro-Taiwan inclinations, especially on the House side, were forced by their own rising, if grudging anger at the then-KMT government of President Chen, to join with the White House, State and DOD officials in warning Chen that he was failing to take vital US interests into account, perhaps even at risk of undermining the fundamental US defense commitment to Taiwan.[MT: the "KMT government of Chen"? LOL. Here is the Beltway mentality hard at work -- Chen wanted the weapons, the KMT-controlled legislature blocked them. Naturally, the US blamed Chen, instead of the actual culprits. So much of the US anger at Chen was totally unnecessary and Washington's own fault. The Bush Administration blew an eight-year long opportunity.]

Republicans Warner, then-Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick, and then-Asia Subcommittee chair Jim Leach all, at various times, made statements which, even a few years before, would have been politically unthinkable.

Administration and Congressional frustration also was fed by domestic Taiwan political squabbles which made it impossible for Taipei to respond until this year, to the big arms sale package which WAS offered during the summer of 2001, following, not coincidentally, the Hainan Island PC-3 crisis with China. [MT: this is apparently all wrong. A number of weapons systems were approved in the regular budget and supplied to Taiwan during this period, $4.1 billion worth in 2002-5 alone. The big package was not a creation of the US but of Taiwan policymakers who put some of the offered weapons in the regular budget, and other systems in a special budget, creating an inevitable mess. Far from "impossible to respond until this year" Taiwan requested F-16s back in 2006. The italicized letter Nelson includes has a better understanding of the issue.]

We have argued for some time that the next president, whether McCain or Obama, is likely to encounter an increasingly active pro-Taiwan effort from Congress...for a variety of reasons.

First, McCain himself is clearly more skeptical of the embrace of China which Bush has fostered; second, Obama, as a Democrat, is going to naturally face a more combative Republican minority, and it's not hard to predict that a revived effort on behalf of Taiwan will be an early and perhaps constant battleground.

For the sake of further discussion, please note we sincerely stipulate China's escalation of "missile diplomacy" along the coast, and the openly stated plans and objectives of the PLA...armament and power projection which WILL take place, likely regardless of anything the US does or does not do.

Of course these events and policies will affect McCain or Obama decisions on Taiwan arms, as was intended by the TRA back in 1979. The question, as in life, marriage, and all important things, is balance.

Here's the text of a "staff dear colleague" which lays out the issue as seen by Republican staff, following last week's Heritage Foundation speech by Adm. Keating:

"A long rumored freeze on United States weapons sales to Taiwan, a policy which has apparently been in force for all of 2008, was confirmed on July 16 by Admiral Timothy Keating, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific. According to press accounts of his remarks at the Heritage Foundation, Keating observed that there have "been no significant arms sales from the United States to Taiwan in relatively recent times," and that the absence of arms transfers reflected "administration policy." Keating went on to suggest that he had in fact discussed the issue of Taiwan arms sales with leaders in Beijing, noting that "The Chinese have made clear to me their concern over any arms sales to Taiwan."

According to press reports, the list of military hardware being held up includes eight diesel submarines, 66 F-16 Block 50/52 fighter aircraft, four Patriot PAC3 fire units (384 missiles), 30 Boeing-made AH-64D Apache attack helicopters and 60 UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopters. These are all items that the Bush administration has approved in principle for export to Taiwan - and for which Taiwan's legislature has appropriated the funds or put down payments. Indeed, on July 12, 2008, new Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou made a public appeal for renewed arms transfers, saying that the island still needs to secure defensive weapons from the United States, despite a warming of relations with mainland China.

As stated an editorial this week in Defense News, the freeze marks a complete reversal in the administration's policy toward Taiwan, which started in 2001 with a promise to furnish Taipei with new submarines, patrol planes and Patriot missiles. It is also in apparent contradiction with longstanding U.S. law and policy, including section 3(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 ("the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability") and the Six Assurances of July 14, 1982 (including assurances that Washington had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan nor to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan).

The TRA also specifies a congressional role in decision-making on security assistance for Taiwan. Section 3(b) stipulates that both the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services "based solely" upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. Section 3(b) also says that "such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress." To date, however, the Administration has declined to brief the Congress on the legal justification and rationale for this stunning departure from a bipartisan, consensus approach toward Taiwan that has well-served every U.S. Administration for the last thirty years.

The judicious sale of defensive weapons system to Taiwan has been an essential element in United States support for a secure, stable and democratic Taiwan, as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In that context, please consider cosponsoring the attached legislation which, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, would require the Administration to consult with Congress in the development and execution of its arms transfer policy toward Taiwan. The Ranking Member hopes to introduce the resolution this week. If you would like to be an original cosponsor, please contact [her office...]."

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Everyone in Washington is saying the same thing: that no matter who wins, Taiwan is likely to rise in importance. And the next president, whether McCain or Obama, will have a much-improved Taiwan policy over the current disastrous presidency.

[Taiwan]

Nelson Report on Freeze:

The Nelson Report, the widely-circulated Washington insider report, recently wrote:

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Taiwan arms...last week's Heritage speech by PACOM's Adm. Tim Keating continues to generate attention in Asia, given his admission of a US "arms sale freeze" in order not to risk disruption of the currently improved China-Taiwan situation.

But we were wrong in reporting that Keating explicitly said he "consults" with China on the arms sale question. We misheard something and did not double-check the transcript until a couple of Loyal Readers said they couldn't find any mention of consultation, per se.

TAIWAN ARMS...as noted in the Summary, we owe PACOM Adm. Tim Keating an apology for taking what he did say about Taiwan arms, and mistakenly thinking he was also explicitly saying he consults with China about Taiwan arms.

We were listening to his remarks at Heritage last Wednesday at about 400 miles an hour, and a private email seemed to confirm what we thought we heard, which, HAD he explicitly said it, would seem to be in violation of the spirit, if not also the letter, of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Careful reading of the transcript by faithful Loyal Readers has confirmed that we were wrong...he didn't say it. He didn't even use the word "freeze" still being attributed to him, as per today's Wall Street Journal story, which is a useful summary of the current situation [MT: this piece is by the excellent Ting-yi Tsai, now the Wall Street Journal correspondent here]:

TAIPEI -- The White House appears increasingly unlikely to proceed with a planned $11 billion weapons sale to Taiwan, a decision that critics say could alter the strategic balance between the island and China and that could leave a thorny issue for the next U.S. president.

The weapons package -- which includes antimissile systems sold by Raytheon Co. and helicopters from United Technologies Corp. and Boeing Co. -- originated with an offer by U.S. President George W. Bush just months after he took office in 2001. The arms offer was the biggest for Taiwan in at least a decade, but political infighting on the island blocked allocation of funds until last December, when its legislature finally approved funding.

Since then, however, the Bush administration has yet to send formal requests to Congress that are needed for such sales, raising questions about the deal's prospects.

Then, in remarks Wednesday, the top U.S. military official in the Pacific effectively acknowledged that the Bush administration has frozen arms sales to Taiwan, at least temporarily. Adm. Timothy Keating said U.S. analysis "indicates there is no pressing, compelling need for, at this moment, arms sales to Taiwan of the systems that we're talking about."

Some proponents of the sale are now worried it won't happen before Mr. Bush finishes his term in January. "It seems reasonably clear that the [Bush] administration has decided not to sell arms to Taiwan," says Harvey Feldman, a distinguished fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in Washington.

The U.S. is obligated to provide Taiwan with "arms of a defensive character" under the Taiwan Relations Act, passed in 1979 to govern relations with the island after the U.S. severed formal ties with it and recognized Beijing. China's government, which claims Taiwan as part of its rightful territory, has long demanded that the U.S. cease all weapons sales to the island.

The delay comes as relations are improving between Taiwan and China under new Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, after years of tension. Officials from the Ma administration and his Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang, say the president remains determined to acquire the weapons that Taiwan needs.

Critics say Mr. Ma isn't doing enough to push for the arms package. They point out that the Kuomintang fought budgetary allocation for the weapons for years when it was the opposition party.

Observers suggest there may be less urgency in Taiwan to push for such a sale as relations with China evolve and that a deal would strain any tentative overtures. Two weeks ago the two countries began the first regularly scheduled nonstop flights between them in nearly 60 years. The two sides also agreed to a sharp rise in the number of Chinese tourists allowed to go to Taiwan.

Lawrence Walker, a spokesman for the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto U.S. embassy in Taipei, said the U.S.'s position on arms sales to Taiwan remains unchanged.

Some analysts say Mr. Bush may only be delaying the sale until after he travels to China next month for the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. "The best chance [for the sales] is right after the Olympics," said Randall Schriver, a former senior Asia official at the State Department under Mr. Bush.

The $11 billion package includes Boeing Apache Longbow attack helicopters, Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters, Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 air-defense batteries, and designs for diesel electric submarines. For those sales to go through, the State Department must first issue formal "notifications" to Congress, but it hasn't done so.

Unless the U.S. completes legislative approval of the sales by the end of September, the package might have to be reviewed again next summer by the next administration. In addition, Taiwan's allocation for the weapons expires at the end of this year, meaning the legislature would have to approve it again.

-0-

Now, on the point of a "freeze", whether or not "consulted" about...the then-necessary amendment to the TRA (inserted back in 1970 over the figurative dead-bodies of the State Department and White House) was a major part of the "price" paid to Congress by the Carter Administration for "normalization" with the PRC.

Since then, as relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, in all of their combinations, have become more complex, a normal human being can be forgiven for thinking that it's plain common sense that the US and China would "consult", in some fashion, before the US decided to introduce sophisticated new armaments into the Cross-Strait equation.

Similarly, the US has complained, for years, to Beijing about its policy of a massive conventional missile build-up along the Strait, although pro-Taiwan critics of the Clinton and Bush administrations would not agree the "complaints" have had teeth.[MT: the issue was two-fold. Not only were the complaints not as loud as they could have been and were not backed by action, the US also complained even more loudly about Chen Shui-bian's essentially harmless political moves. For example, it made a much greater fuss about the harmless NUC shutdown than any noise it made about China's military.]

In any event, as Adm. Keating made abundantly clear, the US policy for now is not for us to introduce potentially de-stabilizing arms into the region...so long as current trends continue.[MT: that is not quite correct. The US policy is to prevent all arms from entering Taiwan, des-stabilizing or not. Previously it had only been to prevent offensive weapons from reaching Taiwan. Nelson's formulation argues essentially that any weapons are destabilizing.]

The really difficult part of this policy is measuring the sometimes very fine line between building Taiwan's confidence that it can peacefully negotiate its future with China, vs undermining Taiwan's ability to do so by holding back sales, despite improvements by the PLA.

The equation is further complicated by the US military role, sometimes implied, sometimes directly stated, in providing a security umbrella under which both Beijing and Taipei can more productively interact.

These are interlocking equations, and during the Bush Administrations' unhappy experience with the DPP government of President Chen, domestic political contradictions on Taiwan often made calculating the right balance increasingly difficult.

Hopes are high that the Ma KMT government will make the various computations easier for all involved...but that's a calculation which still rests very much on decisions in Beijing, and deployments of and by the PLA.

At a certain point, the question of purely the military balance, if one can separate that from strategic intent and geo politics, may "un-freeze" the US arms sale package on the table since 2001.

Next time Adm. Keating talks about it, we promise to listen better.

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[Taiwan]

Rainy Days and Freezes

Rivers cresting near Taichung. Ordinarily these bridges are many meters above the water. The steady rain has pounded the island into submission.

Yesterday the flooding was so bad that I did the whole trains, planes, and buses gig, spending more than 6 hours on a two hour trip. I got on the 7:00 express to Taichung in the morning -- had tickets for the 7:30 but thought, what the heck, I'll get home faster. The express got to Jhunan where we were informed nothing was moving south of Fengyuan, track was flooded all the way down to Kaohsiung, intermittently. We sat for an hour while they decided whether to take the Coast line. Finally they sent us whizzing down the Coast line, where the flooding had not yet breached the tracks, and we swung around Taichung, without stopping -- much to my frustration -- and then landed in Changhua. Nothing was going into Taichung -- as the major news outlets and even international media were reporting, major streets in our fair city were flooded. I waited around in Changhua for another hour or so before TRA started running trains into Taichung.

But I was lucky. The storm killed 11 in Taiwan, and there are six missing.

Meanwhile it is raining commentary out there today on the alleged freeze. FAPA passed around a condemnation of it.

FAPA STATEMENT
July 18, 2008
Contact: Iris Ho

FAPA PROTESTS ADMIRAL KEATING's TAIWAN ARMS FREEZE STATEMENT, URGING BUSH ADMINISTRATION TO REAFFIRM U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE TRA AND THE SIX ASSURANCES

In a speech given at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, DC on July 16, Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of the US forces in the Pacific, acknowledged the Bush Administration’s halt on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and stated that the U.S. Navy has regularly consulted with Beijing on weapons sales to Taiwan.

FAPA strongly protests Admiral Keating's statement and urges the Bush Administration to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the Six Assurances.

”We are outraged by Admiral Keating’s statement,” FAPA President Bob Yang, Ph.D. states. “A decision to halt the arms sales to Taiwan would clearly violate the letter of the Taiwan Relations Act, which is after all U.S. law mandating the U.S. to provide defensive weapons and weapon systems to Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The TRA requires that the United States provides such weapons and systems ‘solely' based on Taiwan's defense needs. Nothing more, nothing less,” Yang adds.

In the Contentions blog, veteran commentator Gordon Chang observes that the freeze is "creeping craveness".....

In the wake of Keating’s remarks, the State Department is expected to issue a press statement today on the matter. We don’t have to wait for the statement to know what’s going on. As the Heritage Foundation’s John Tkacik said, “The Bush administration has abandoned all commitments to defend Taiwan’s democracy.”

Dictatorial Beijing has always complained of America selling arms to democratic Taiwan, but finally the Chinese have found a compliant American president. The man who once said he would do whatever it took to defend Taiwan now says “yes” to whatever Chinese autocrats demand. On Tuesday, Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of “creeping militarization” of American foreign policy. That’s not the problem, Mr. Secretary. If there’s anything you should be worried about, especially after Keating’s admissions yesterday, is your administration’s creeping cravenness.

Charles Synder, the redoubtable Taipei Times reporter in Washington, reported that the US refuses to concede it has implemented a freeze:

John Tkacik, a senior fellow and Taiwan expert at the Heritage Foundation, which hosted Keating when he made his remarks, called the freeze a “tragedy.”

“It is a demonstration of China’s growing power in Asia, and it will serve as a signal to many in the region that America’s influence is destined to wane,” he said.

“The Bush administration is, in effect, telling democratic Taiwan that it can expect no material, or even moral support from the United States as Taiwan attempts to negotiate a new relationship with communist China,” he said.

Tkacik, a long-time supporter of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in their drive for Taiwanese independence, supported President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in the current US-Taiwan arms standoff.

Ma, he said, “has pledged to improve Taiwan’s relations with China, but even he understands that to deal with Beijing, he must be in a position to negotiate from strength. That strength means that Taiwan must have a credible military force and must have a solid security relationship with the United States,” Tkacik said.

Defending the State Department’s position, a department spokesman would say only that “there is an internal interagency process for the US government to consider all military exports, including sales to Taiwan. When the interagency process achieves the final decision for any specific arms sales, we do notify Congress.”

“We don’t comment on specific weapons systems under consideration, but we faithfully carry out the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act,” the department official said.

In related news, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) yesterday called on the US government to resume arms sales to Taiwan as the nation needs the weapons to enhance its national security and to build a sound defensive capability to use as leverage in negotiations with Beijing.

Remember, the Freeze encompasses a number of weapons systems accumulating over several years. This isn't something that occurred when the F-16s were requested. Note also from the Snyder piece that Wang Jyn-ping, Speaker of the Legislature, also wants the weapons. Both public and private statements from KMT bigwigs are in harmony on this issue.

The sad part, as one commentator pointed out privately, is that the US need only have approved the flow of weapons, and it would have become the normal pattern in Taiwan-US relations, complained about in a pro forma way by China, but accepted. Instead, Bush Administration officials have called attention to arms sales to Taiwan in a very dramatic way.

Other commentators are saying that Japan is extremely anxious about this issue. Remember that any attack on Taiwan is likely to travel through Japanese territorial waters. Some influential Japanese believe that the recent Taiwanese forays into the Senkaku (Diayutai) islands are part of a joint KMT-Beijing effort. As Shriver noted in his talk (post below), there's quite a bit of skepticism about Ma Ying-jeou in Tokyo, and Ma's recent moves to wrench the island into China's arms have not helped his image there. Ma is widely perceived to be anti-Japanese. On a wider scale, China's military buildup is making waves in Tokyo, as this commentary shows.

During the 1990s, China set its offshore defense line along sea areas running from Japan through the Philippines. Gradually, however, a new line was drawn to encompass sea areas extending to the Mariana and Palau Islands. China is building the capabilities to counter enemy naval forces in the new sea areas and, to this end, is said to possess more than 30 increasingly stealthy submarines. Since 1996 China has also purchased from Russia 12 Kilo-class submarines, which are quiet and hard to detect, and in 2006 it put into service a domestically produced Yuan-class submarine modeled after the Kilo-class submarine.

The wide ranging water depths, the complexity of water temperatures and the strong tidal currents in the East and South China Seas make it difficult for Japanese and American surface vessels to detect Chinese submarines with increased stealth capability.

Japan's Maritime SDF had trouble detecting a Chinese nuclear submarine when it intruded into Japan's territorial waters near Okinawa's Sakishima Islands in November 2004. The approach of a Chinese submarine undetected within torpedo striking distance of the USS Kitty Hawk during exercises in the waters near Okinawa in October 2006 delivered a serious shock to the US Navy.

Finally, the US government continues -- hilariously -- to deny that there is an arms freeze on. Remarks on Taiwan from the State Department briefing for 7/18:

QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you very much. It’s (inaudible) of Phoenix TV of Hong Kong.

MR. MCCORMACK: Yes.

QUESTION: My question is regarding Taiwan. What is the current position of U.S., you know, regarding on arms sales to Taiwan? Has it changed, the position?

MR. MCCORMACK: The short answer is no. But let me reiterate for you what our policy is. The Administration faithfully implements the Taiwan Relations Act, under which the United States makes available items necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient defense. There is an internal interagency process for the United States Government to consider all military exports, including sales to Taiwan. When the interagency process achieves a final decision for specific arms sales, we will notify Congress. We do not comment on specific weapons systems under consideration. And you should all know that we faithfully carry out the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

QUESTION: So can I follow up? Is it true that it is frozen for the arms sale for a while, you know?

MR. MCCORMACK: I have stated the U.S. Government policy on this matter.

QUESTION: Sean, a follow-up? Admiral Keating of the PACOM – I mean the U.S. Commander of the Pacific Command – he said the other day that – you know, he actually – he confirmed that there is actually a freeze on the arms sales to Taiwan. So do you have any comment about his, you know, comment?

MR. MCCORMACK: I saw those remarks. And what I would do is I would point you to what I have just given you as the official United States Government policy that is applicable for all U.S. Government agencies, whether it’s the Department of Defense, Department of State or any other part of the U.S. Government. So I would look to this statement that I’ve just given you as the official U.S. Government policy position.

QUESTION: So what is the process of the, you know, interagency negotiations?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, it’s not interagency negotiations. There’s an interagency review process, as I’ve just outlined for you.

QUESTION: A quick follow-up, sir?

MR. MCCORMACK: Yes.

QUESTION: Admiral Keating also said that decision made by the U.S. leaders indicates that there is no pressing and compelling need for, at this moment, arms sales to Taiwan. Does the State Department agree with that?

MR. MCCORMACK: Again, what – I’ll repeat. What I have just given you is the official United States Government position that applies across the United States Government, all department – all cabinet agencies. This is the U.S. Government position.

QUESTION: So, Sean, there’s no freeze on the arms sales issue?

MR. MCCORMACK: Can repeat for you – here is the United States Government position.

In its way, denial is a sort of positive sign that someday the freeze will lift. When they start up the flow of arms again, as the US must, they can deny that there was ever a freeze.

UPDATE: Ed Ross asks that the freeze be lifted in the WSJ.

UPDATE: Also on tap is this piece in WSJ by Shriver and others calling on the President to lift the freeze.

UPDATE: John Tkacik on the Heritage Foundation blog with a few words on the arms freeze.

[Taiwan]

Talk Given by Randall Shriver, July 17, 2008, on Taiwan-US relations

Author and blogger J Michael Cole, a frequent commentator in the Taipei Times, and an attendee at Thursday's presentation.

On Thursday the 17th I had the great good fortune to attend a talk given by Randall Shriver, a longtime Taiwan booster who has held a number of US government posts concerned with Taiwan and Asia policy. With Shriver was Mark Stokes, a longtime Taiwanophile who has worked in DoD and private industry posts concerned with Taiwan, and as an attache in China. The two of them founded Project 2049, a thinktank concerned with Asian security issues (the name refers to the midpoint of the century, and the centennial of several key historical events). Shriver is currently a policy advisor to the McCain campaign. The talk was arranged by the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents Club (TFCC), and was held at the Caesar Park Hotel in Taipei.

Key points:

China's growing clout in Washington means that pro-Taiwan moves by the US now come at a high and increasing cost. Hence the Bush Administration needs to drop the freeze now, since it will be very costly for the next Administration to do so. Both campaigns are trying to persuade the Bush Administration to end it before they come in.

the lack of clarity in the Ma Administration's foreign policy. What end state does Ma want to achieve in cross-strait relations? What is Ma's future policy or strategic vision for Taipei's relations with Washington and Tokyo?

The freeze is unprecedented in Taipei-Washington relations, not only in its duration, but also in its size. 7 8 systems are blocked now, including spare parts for Taiwan's current F-16s (!), and not including the requested 66 F-16s.

++++++++++++++

Shriver opened with a discussion of US-China relations. "There's a very common narrative that I am sure all of you have heard about US-China relations, and that narrative focuses on their consistency, and the unchanging US policy toward China." He went on to list how all administrations since we recognized China has followed the One China policy, worked for engagement with China, and all have gravited toward a more Sino-centric view of the Asia-Pacific region whatever their starting point was. He pointed out that this narrative could be decieving, because during the Bush Administration "significant" changes have occurred in the implementation and practices and habits of interaction between the two powers.

First, the breadth of the interaction has changed, he pointed out. A decade ago the dialogue was limited to Taiwan, trade, and human rights. It was very predictable and scripted. The quality of the cooperation was restricted. But now, when we sit down with the Chinese, he observed, the talks "touch every part of the globe." Discussions with the Chinese range across peacekeeping in Haiti, the Sudan situation, Iraq and the Middle East, climate change, energy security, North Korea and other Asian issues. "This is a dramatic change from ten years ago," he said.

The second change he identified was that the frequency and scope of the interactions has changed. Every one of the major bureaucracies in the government has its own dialogue with the Chinese. For example, Treasury has its Strategic Economic Dialogue. This is mirrored at every level of the bureaucracy, Shriver noted, and is now routinized. This is something that is very different from previous administrations.

The third thing that has changed on the Bush Administration's watch is "the tremendous influence that China has in Washington now," Shriver said. Now some of the most skilled diplomats in the world serve in China's embassy in DC. Corporate America is very energized and willing to work for Beijing on sticky bilateral issues, and the Chinese also employ lobbyists. Finally, Shriver added, there are the old friends of China. When there is an issue that the Chinese want to move on in Washington, he said, the amount of attention can be extremely intense and extremely effective.

"What I'm really describing is an inheritance that doesn't get rolled back easily," he continued, referring to the problems the next Administration in Washington will face. What does that mean for Taiwan?

The next Administration is going to inherit a diminished, weakened US-Taiwan relationship, one that is "fairly dysfunctional." Shriver then moved on to one of the key points of his presentation, the idea of the "cost" of repairing relations and of carrying out actions on Taiwan's behalf in the next Administration. Pursuing a more robust Taiwan agenda, as Shriver says he and others in Washington are in favor of, will come at a higher cost, due to the pressure Beijing will assert on Washington to temper that.

Shriver next outlined some of the reasons for the impaired relationship between Washington and Taipei. Shriver argued that both sides, not just any particular individual, were responsible for the decline in relations. He observed that while there was a core of individuals in the Administration in 2001 who knew something about Taiwan, what they knew was the old KMT Taiwan -- they had no experience working with the DPP. The US also sent mixed messages to Taiwan. He added that the US had also contributed to the arms purchase problems as well.

The feeling in Washington was that the 2008 Taiwan Presidential election offered the opportunity for a fresh start no matter who won, Shriver described. He pointed out that in Washington there was/is a period of caution in dealing with the new Ma Administration, and Shriver said that this was a mistake. "We are losing some valuable time," he said, in strengthening the relationship immediately so that the next Administration can "do the right thing" and restore the US-Taiwan relationship.

Shriver and Stokes both agree that the US-Taiwan relationship can be more robust, with a range of areas full of "untapped potential." However, Shriver is concerned that the Bush Administration is not doing its part to repair things. Some in Washington believe that the recent Taiwan-China reapproachment is a true watershed in the region and a historic opportunity, while others see things as going too much, too fast.

"Seems to me that too much, too fast is not the right set of questions," he said. The Ma Administration has a mandate to pursue changes in cross-strait relations, but they've really pursued "the low-hanging fruit." Many of Ma's successes were set up by the DPP, as was the increase in the number of tourists. These were relatively easy initiatives for Ma to pursue. What are the right questions to ask of these developments?

Shriver answered this by pointing out that the real question is what the leadership in Taipei is thinking in terms of end goals and end state. We need to think about end points and what is sacrificed or compromised in the process, he pointed out, or else we will end up in an unwanted or unanticipated place.

What is Taiwan's policy toward the US? What efforts is Taipei making to strengthen the relationship? Shriver said it isn't clear to him what Taipei's policies toward strengthening relations with Washington and Tokyo are, and toward increasing its international space -- "other than requesting more and more from Beijing."

What about the more difficult issues, the non-low hanging fruit? The WHO next year will be a test of China's real sincerity. What happens to cross-strait relations if that fails?

Shriver concluded by saying that his greatest interest at present is looking at what the Bush Administration can do in its waning days, and what the next Administration can do. At the moment the Bush Administration is focused on the high profile Olympic visit and the North Korean issue. It is unlikely that new initiatives on Taiwan will be undertaken.

What about the arms sales? Is there a freeze? Things are muddled, he said. From the outside there is every appearance that the Bush Administration has decided, unilaterally, to suspend arms sales to Taiwan.

Shriver said the record on Taiwan's position is clear. The Ma Administration has stated publicly and privately that it wants the weapons. The Legislative Yuan has already authorized the funds -- and thus, the obstacle is clearly in Washington. Shriver attributed the de facto freeze to the Bush Administration's perception that it needs China's cooperation on global and regional issues, and on the view of some in the Administration that this is best for Taiwan.

The next US administration will have a difficult position, he observed. If it inherits a freeze, it will be costly to undo it -- there will be a price. Shriver expressed the hope that they would undo the freeze, and that they would pursue a more robust policy with Taiwan.

The first question was on the freeze. Shriver responded by saying that both the Obama and McCain campaigns have said they don't want to inherit a freeze, and both are trying to persuade the Bush Administration to do the right thing. Shriver argued that both US law and US interests decree that the US should make weapons available to Taiwan. "The threat is clear," he noted.

Shriver was then asked about the reports that the KMT asked the US for the freeze. "We've asked the question directly, and been told it is not true."

What if the F-16s don't go through? Shriver answered that the consequences would be serious. "You don't fall behind linearly, but exponentially." Recovery befores more difficult as time goes by, he said. For Ma to fulfill his ambitious agenda, he needs to be negotiating from a position of strength, Shriver averred. There are also credibility issues for the US, Shriver pointed out.

Mark Stokes picked up the thread of Shriver's reply. There are three issues, he stated. First is the budget. Taiwan already has passed the funding, and if the money is returned to the treasury, then resurrecting it in the next budgeting round will be "a bureaucratic nightmare." Second, there is the simple problem that every day Taiwan does not have the systems, it falls one day behind. Finally, the current weapons systems in Taiwan are aging, Stokes observed. The credibility issue is also a problem. Stokes pointed out that the US Administration has criticized Taiwan for many years for not defending itself. When Taiwan finally gets a consensus on what it needs, suddenly the Bush Administration reverses its stance and refuses to sell the island weapons, he said. There's a credibility issue there.

Shriver was then asked about the views of DoD on the arms freeze. He said that the Defense Department is more focused on China, and giving a lot of interest and attention to the direction that China is taking. He then gave a short plug for Project 2049 latest project, envisioning alternate futures for the island. Shriver pointed out that because the US has refrained from specifying what outcome it wants in the Taiwan Strait, requiring only that it be peacefully arrived at, essentially the US position asks US soldiers to "die for a process."

He was also asked about Japan's views, and said that in Tokyo, Ma comes to power "with a little bit of baggage" and the verdict is still out in Tokyo. The cross-strait changes are even more on the radar in Tokyo than in Washington, he said, and they are not comfortable with the current state of affairs. According to Shriver, Tokyo wants a more concrete strategic vision from Taipei, and a better feel for what Washington it doing. Washington's policy was simply to give a big sigh of relief after the election, "and we haven't finished exhaling," he added. Washington needs to give more thought to what comes next, he said.

The next question returned to the freeze, and Shriver reiterated his previous point: lifting the freeze will come at a cost. China will still be important no matter who the next president is. The easiest way to avoid the problems with China is to have the Bush Administration do the right thing, rather than push it onto the next Administration. Will there be legal action on the basis of the Taiwan Relations Act if the freeze is not lifted? You'd see noise about legal action, replied Shriver. Stokes pointed out that Congress has the power under the Arms Export Control Act to take action, if it likes.

Stokes and Shriver both agreed that such a freeze is unprecedented in the history of US-Taiwan relations. Shriver's said that from his outsider's perspective it is a consensus opinion at the cabinet level in multiple agencies. But several times he cautioned that his was an outsider's perspective.

Stokes then added that the other unprecedented thing about the arms freeze is that it involves seven or eight systems that were originally approved back in 2001-2, including the submarine designs, Apache helicopters, Javelin missiles, Patriot ground units, utility helicopters, and spare parts for Taiwan's current F-16s. More are coming down the pipeline too, he observed. What they should have done, he said, was approved them as each came in. Instead, they've been allowed to pile up -- $11 billion in weapons systems, not including the current request for 66 F-16 fighters. The amount that is built up is unprecedented.

The discussion then ranged over a number of issues, including Taiwan's indigenous defense industry, and what weapons systems the island needs. Asked about the possibility of Obama or McCain Administration to push for more international space for the island. Shriver pointed out, as many US commentators have, that movement on international space is important for the Ma Administration. Shriver said that he expects that the next Administration will followed the stated policy of the Bush Administration, but that much would depend on how Beijing and Taipei handled the issues.

[Taiwan]