Jamestown Brief on Taiwan Initiating Domestic Sub Production

Lots of rumors in the media lately about Taiwan beginning a program in domestic submarine construction. This would get around the high cost of the submarines the US is offering to Taiwan -- a cost some have claimed was inflated to prevent Taiwan from accepting the offer, since that would cause the US to develop an indigenous electric sub manufacturing capability, which the US navy does not want since it likes nuclear subs. Making subs at home would also enable Taiwan to develop an export sales capability. The global market for submarines is around $16 billion annually, but most of that is US. It is expected to grow. Note that with the pushback against Chinese expansion in Asia, Taiwan's natural market is right next door.

I've never been a fan of submarines for Taiwan. However, many defense experts advocate subs on the grounds that they are the best anti-sub platforms. To my mind effective use of submarines by Taiwan's navy in such a role presupposes the kind of long institutional experience with submarines that navies like Russia, the UK, or the US have. Taiwan does not. For the kind of money we'd be spending building subs, we can absolutely bristle with missiles, which is what we should be buying, and missile-equipped fast attack boats.

The Jamestown Brief has a great article on the current move to procure submarines domestically:

For example, a founding member of the quasi-governmental Straits Exchange Foundation and long time advisor to Ma, Chen Chang-wen (C.V. Chen), who was a strong vocal opponent of U.S. arms sale since 2002, shifted his position to support the indigenous submarine program in a widely-noted editorial in spring 2009. In the article, Chen explained that, in the past, nearly 60 percent of Taiwan’s defense budget was being spent on purchasing equipments from abroad, which did not improve Taiwan’s technological standards and military capabilities, nor did they help Taiwan’s economy or expand business opportunities. On the other hand, if the eight submarines are produced domestically, then about 30 percent of the human labor cost would create business opportunities in Taiwan, and Taiwanese businesses could supply approximately 40 percent of the items for 60 percent of the equipment material cost. Additionally, other associated maintenance costs and investments would be able to help the economy (China Times, March 23, 2009).

Good stuff. The debate in Taiwan's defense establishment, concludes the article, is now a debate over when, not whether, a domestic sub program will begin.

ADDED: Also on this subject: Does the US Navy have the resources for the Pacific Century? The answer is obvious: yes, if the nation doesn't senselessly waste them in endless and stupid wars in the Middle East.
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums! Delenda est, baby.

Nelson Report: Why Bush Adm has Frozen Arms & Other Stuff

A recent Nelson Report discusses why the Bush Administration is screwing Taiwan:

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Taiwan arms...even though seven notifications are pending and had been expected to be submitted to Congress last week, sources say it may not happen, as White House officials take seriously a case against them made by a defense expert.

"Perspective" tonite comes from the conclusion of an influential study of Taiwan's defense needs by Naval War College analyst Bill Murray which helps explain what's happening...or, rather, not happening.

TAIWAN arms...a Loyal Reader asked last week what's up with notifications which faced a deadline for submission to Congress. Today, it's clear the deadlines have been missed, and pro-Taiwan folks are expressing outrage.

Heritages' John Tkacik tells Defense News he fears that Beijing will just "pocket" the Bush Administration non-decisions and that the next US Administration will be stuck with the ability to sell even less, regardless.

Maybe that's what will happen, say our defense experts...John is talking mainly politics, geopolitics here...but the internal debate on what Taiwan really needs, especially given China's current build-ups and power projection capability intentions...that may help explain the Bush decision to "decide" by not deciding.

Also remember, as Defense News notes, the Taiwan politicians are themselves to blame, in that they indulged in domestic gamesmanship for most of the Bush Administration, and "missed the window" which might...might have produced a favorable decision on some of the systems now stuck in limbo.

But the main reason? Our understanding is that a hard-nosed critique of the Taiwan arms situation by the Naval War College expert William Murray has been very closely read by senior Bush Administration players in various appropriate agencies.

So while it may be psychologically comforting for some pro-Taiwan folks to blame it on State (for example) that's not the real situation, they argue.

For "Perspective" tonite we're providing selections from the 32-page Murray paper which has clearly been so influential. You can ask yourself how YOU would react, were you a decision-maker, knowing that he is not speaking from out in left-field...rather, he is voicing concerns long expressed by experts in and out of the US military itself:

"It is difficult to escape the conclusion that China either already has or shortly will have the ability to ground or destroy Taiwan's air force and eliminate the navy at a time of its own choosing. This prospect fundamentally alters Taiwan's defense needs and makes the intended acquisition from the United States of diesel submarines, P-3 aircraft, and PAC-3 interceptors ill advised.

Diesel submarines are poor antisubmarine platforms, since with their low speed and limited underwater endurance they simply cannot search quickly large volumes of ocean for quiet submarines. These physical restrictions also limit their versatility as antisurface platforms. They are, for all practical purposes, four-knot minefields. At a cost of over U.S. $1.5 billion each and with indeterminate delivery dates, conventional submarines also carry significant opportunity costs, as some in Taipei clearly recognize. Finally, submarines are no more likely than other naval ships tied up at exposed piers to survive the opening salvo of a war with China.

Taiwan's apparent decision to purchase up to twelve submarine-hunting P-3C aircraft is similarly brought into question. Although these planes can collect valuable information during peacetime and in crisis, in wartime they would be sitting ducks while on the ground (though hardened shelters might protect P-3s) and aloft would require uncontested air superiority to have any chance of accomplishing their mission.100 In any case, Taipei cannot protect its runways. Patriot surface-to-air missiles have some utility against short-range ballistic missiles, but China already has the means to defeat this expensive air-defense system.

The implication is that Taiwan would be far better served by hardening, and building redundancy into, its civil and military infrastructure and systems. In that way the island could reasonably hope to survive an initial precision bombardment, deny the PRC the uncontested use of the air, repel an invasion, and defy the effects of a blockade for an extended period. Many of these actions, in fact, would be consistent with recent efforts by Taiwan to improve its defenses. Others, however, would entail substantial shifts that some in Taiwan's navy and air force would doubtless oppose. Air force leaders would be understandably loath to admit that their fighters cannot defend Taiwan's skies; their navy counterparts might similarly resist suggestions that their fleet is acutely vulnerable in port. Both services' political champions would certainly challenge the implications of this article's analysis. So too would the arms manufacturers who stand to benefit from the sale of aircraft, ships, and supporting systems to Taiwan.

Yet under present conditions it is doubtful that the people and government of Taiwan could withstand a determined PRC assault for long. A hasty American military intervention would be Taiwan's only hope, but only at the risk of strategic miscalculation and nuclear escalation. A "porcupine" strategy - a Taiwan that was patently useless to attack - would obviate the need; it would also make a determined Taipei conspicuously able to deny the objective of a bombardment or defeat an invasion, thus deterring either scenario. Ability to resist a full-scale campaign - long-range precision bombardment, invasion, and blockade - for a substantial amount of time would allow its potential allies to shape their responses carefully. Above all, demonstrable Taiwanese resilience would diminish Beijing's prior confidence in success, strengthen cross-strait deterrence, and reduce the risk of the United States being dragged into a conflict with China.

Meanwhile, a porcupine strategy would restore the United States to unequivocal adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, since Taiwan would be in the market only for defensive systems. Taiwan would find itself with a better defense for fewer dollars, and the United States would abide by the 17 August 1982 joint communique© declaring that it would "not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those [arms] supplied in recent years...and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution."102

Finally, and most important, a porcupine approach would shift the responsibility for Taiwan's defense to Taiwan, rendering U.S. intervention in a cross-strait battle a last resort instead of the first response. Many observers believe that Taiwan today relies unduly on a perceived American security guarantee and does not do enough to provide for its own defense. Yet since 2000 the Kuomintang and the Democratic People's Party have not framed a defense debate that could produce the open, honest appraisal that is desperately needed if domestic consensus on a viable defense is to be achieved. A Taiwan that China perceived could be attacked and damaged but not defeated, at least without unacceptably high costs and risks, would enjoy better relations with the United States and neutralize the threat posed by many of China's recently acquired military capabilities. Unfortunately, political gridlock in Taipei stands in the way of any such hopes. It is not that Taiwan does not do enough to construct a viable defense but that it is not doing the right things.

William S. Murray is associate research professor at the U.S. Naval War College, where his research focuses on China's navy. He conducted submarine deployments and qualified to command nuclear submarines prior to retiring from the U.S. Navy. He is the coeditor of and a contributing author to China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force and China's Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing' s Maritime Policies...

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It's not a bright idea to base your policy decision on the opinion of a single expert, however intelligent. Especially when he is saying what you want to hear. UPDATE: Original article is here. Murray's assessment, little birdies say, appears to have been made without visiting Taiwan. I'll be talking about it in a post tomorrow.

Defense News reports:

The Chinese will pocket the Bush administration’s Taiwan arms halt as the baseline for approaching the next administration,” said Tkacik, now with the Heritage Foundation. “Beijing will make it very painful for the next administration to restart arms supplies to Taiwan, insisting that doing so would renege on Bush commitments, imaginary or otherwise.”

The package has been held up since December. It includes items promised by the Bush administration in 2001, plus newer items such as attack and utility helicopters.?

"All in all, Taiwan policy is in complete tatters," said Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president, U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. “The administration is blatantly gaming the system in a manner that runs contrary to U.S.-Taiwan interests.

“There are simply no other examples of a non-NATO or other security relationship having its congressional notifications stacked at [the U.S. Department of] State in this manner. They are doing so over a zero­sum attitude toward U.S.-China-Taiwan relations and the equities Mr. Bush believes will be hurt by following through on his 2001 commitment.”

And the CNA report connects the reluctance to sell the weapons to the financial situation:

Taiwan's plans to procure weapons systems from the United States remain unchanged, as the nation is resolved to defend itself militarily and needs to beef up its self-defense capability, Chang Shuo-wen, a ruling Kuomintang (KMT) legislative caucus whip said Sunday.

Taiwan has submitted its military procurement plans to the United States and it is now up to the Bush administration to decide what to do about Taiwan's requests, President Ma Ying-jeou said recently.

Taiwan is seeking to buy a weapons package of anti-tank missiles, Apache helicopters, Patriot PAC-3 missile batteries, diesel-electric submarines, P3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft, sea-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Black Eagle helicopters from the US.

The US Department of State told Taiwanese news media Friday that Taiwan's arms procurement package is still under inter-departmental screening by the George W. Bush administration.

Once a final decision is made on the arms procurement package, the executive branch would notify Congress immediately, the State Department said.

When asked whether the arms procurement proposal would be left up to the new US administration, a State Department official said that "there is no timetable for that matter."

Commenting on the uncertainties surrounding the arms deal, KMT Legislator Lin Yu-fang, who is the convener of the Legislative Yuan Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee, said there is no need for Taiwan to worry too much, given that Taiwan remains part of the strategic interests of the United States.

Washington would not like to see the Taiwan Strait become a waterway of China, as this would open a big hole in the US defense frontline in the West Pacific, he added.

Noting that the supply of defense weapons to Taiwan is part of the stipulations in the United States' Taiwan Relations Act, Lin expressed confidence that whoever is elected the next president of the US will not renege on the commitment.

Lin attributed the "bumpy ride" of Taiwan's arms procurement package partly to Washington's reliance on China's cooperation in US anti-terrorism efforts and in its spiraling financial and economic storms. For example, China currently holds between US$500 billion and US$950 billion worth of US Treasury bonds, he said.

We're in deep, deep trouble.

[Taiwan]

EU Parliamentarian Says Taiwan should beef up its defense

Taiwan's parliament was informed again that it should purchase weapons.....

A European parliamentarian urged Taiwan yesterday to bolster its defense capabilities while acknowledging that the EU would not intervene militarily should China attempt to take Taiwan by force because it would be outside Europe's regional security responsibility.

Dr. Georg Jarzembowski, the head of the Taiwan Friendship Group of the European Parliament, said Taiwan needed to act in procuring weapons to defend itself to be taken seriously on security issues in the rest of the world.

"If the people of Taiwan feel threatened by 900 missiles across the Straits, people from the outside would say what are the Taiwanese doing to defend themselves," Jarzembowski said. "Then you would wonder how long it takes until the (Taiwan's) parliament takes a decision on these questions."

Jarzembowski has long been a Taiwan advocate and more power to him. We need people to advocate for Taiwan in Europe. But it would behoove the good Dr. Jarzembowski to put some study into the issues. Taiwan is quite serious about procuring arms from abroad, being generally among the top five arms importers among the world's developed nations. I wish Taiwan's friends would instead focus on the real issue: the perfidious behavior of the pro-China side, with perhaps a nod to the problems the US has created as well. If you're going to hack on Taiwan, at least direct your hacks at something useful.

One long-term goal of the pro-China side is to drive a wedge between the West and Taiwan, and especially, between the West and the pro-Taiwan parties. Each time someone outside of Taiwan blames "Taiwan" for the arms purchase impasse, this strategy is rewarded. Time to pinpoint our attacks on the source of the problem, instead of on some abstraction called "Taiwan."

[Taiwan] [China] [US] [submarines] [arms purchase] [European Union]

Ted Galen Carpenter on US and Taiwan Defense Policy

Last year Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute published a book discussing why we shouldn't defend Taiwan. This year he's back to work on the issue of defending Taiwan, this time complaining in the Asian Wall Street Journal that Taiwan is free riding on the US defense network:

The Taiwan legislature's reluctance to pass a "special defense budget" to pay for U.S. weapons systems looks set to continue as the island's presidential campaign heats up. That leaves America in the unenviable position of having an implicit commitment to defend a fellow democracy that doesn't seem especially interested in defending itself.

First, the good thing: Carpenter understands the difference between Blue and Green and their respective positions on the defense purchase:

Though Mr. Chen's administration has repeatedly scaled back the deal, reducing it in stages to a mere $10.3 billion, from $18.5 billion, prospects for its passage have barely budged. So far, the Pan Blue coalition has blocked a vote on the measure more than 60 times. It took until December of last year for the majority to agree even to send the proposal for consideration in the budgetary committee. U.S. President George Bush grew so disgusted with Taipei's behavior last month that he personally overruled a Pentagon arms proposal for the island unless and until the special defense budget is approved.

Then Carpenter veers into the mad mad media world, going to blame President Chen for being, you know, "provocative." Mad Chen, the Crazed Independence Radical, strikes again!

A very disturbing dynamic is developing in Taiwan. On the one hand, Mr. Chen's government seems determined to consolidate Taiwan's separate political status -- even if that means taking measures Beijing regards as highly provocative. The latest incidents include, for instance, Taipei's decision to rename various state corporations to substitute "Taiwan" for "China." Yet even as Taipei adopts ever more assertive policies toward the mainland, it underinvests in defense. Its spending on essential matters like procurement, operations, training, and personnel has shrunk, in real terms, by more than 50% since 1993, and continues to contract at an alarming rate. Taiwan's regular defense budget has plunged to an anemic 2.2% of its annual GDP.

Chen cannot help but be provocative, because being provoked is a choice China makes. Writing like this makes China the helpless victim of Chen's actions, rather than a calculated actor making use of all its agency in international arenas to lead, and to mislead.

Further, as I and others have stated (see Mark Harrison's commentary below this one), name rectification is a normal and inevitable step in the democratic evolution of the island. Taiwan is simply restoring the name "Taiwan" to items that were originally named "Taiwan" in many cases, like the shipbuilding and posts.

Thus, in the rhetorical world Carpenter builds, Taiwan is being "provocative" on one hand while cutting defense spending on the other:

From America's standpoint, Taiwan's political leaders are creating the worst possible combination: the DPP's provocative cross-straits policy with the KMT's irresponsible policy on defense spending. That is a blueprint for trouble. China has already deployed nearly 1,000 ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait, and Beijing's military modernization program appears heavily oriented toward credibly threatening military action against Taiwan. A bold cross-straits policy, coupled with inadequate defense spending, virtually invites a Chinese challenge.

At least this time around he mentioned the missiles China points at Taiwan. Carpenter does not face the strong role of the US in creating this mess by jacking up the price of the submarines and refusing to give Taiwan any co-production role (getting all historical and suchlike, I must remind that the KMT is on Taiwan because of our intervention). In Carpenter's rhetorical world, it is all Taiwan's fault, a sad trait shared by many observers in the US, and a position China wants observers to take. Too bad Carpenter buys right into it.

Chen's actions are not "a blueprint for trouble." China makes noise whenever Taiwan takes any action in the international sphere. Readers may recall that the National Unification Council (NUC), which Chen froze last year to international farce dismay, was opposed by China when it was erected. There is no way Taiwan can exercise its democracy -- indeed, make almost any autonomous international decision -- without peeving China...and it should be noted, China gets "provoked" because "being provoked" is how China achieves leverage over Taiwan -- bullying the international community into complicity in suppressing Taiwan's democratic development and international space. Hence it pays China to get "provoked."

Rhetorical blindness finally overtakes Carpenter at the end:

It is even worse to incur such risks on behalf of a client state that is not willing to make a meaningful defense effort.

As Mark Stokes, who used to run the Pentagon's Taiwan policy, said last year, in Taiwan there are pilots prepared to board aircraft for suicide missions against China should war arise (and all honor to them, for they are men). There are people on Taiwan who spend their whole professional life preparing to die for this island. But Carpenter surely does not mean to denigrate them, so what can he be talking about? Because Carpenter cannot be talking about the Taiwan I live on. As the Congressional Research Service observes:

As for U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, they have been significant despite the absence of diplomatic relations or a treaty alliance. The value of deliveries of U.S. defense articles and services to Taiwan totaled $7.7 billion in the 1997-2000 period and $4 billion in 2001-2004. Among worldwide customers, Taiwan ranked 2nd (behind Saudi Arabia) in 1997-2000 and 4th (behind Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Japan) in 2001-2004. In 2004 alone, Taiwan ranked 5th among worldwide recipients, receiving $1.1 billion in U.S. defense articles and services. Values for U.S. agreements with and deliveries to Taiwan are summarized below.

1997-2000 period 2001-2004 period 2004
U.S. Agreements $1,900 million $1,200 million $590 million
U.S. Deliveries $7,700 million $4,000 million $1,100 million

From worldwide sources, including the United States, Taiwan received $13.9 billion in arms deliveries in the eight-year period from 1998 to 2005. Taiwan ranked 3rd (behind Saudi Arabia and China) among leading recipients that are developing countries. Of that total, Taiwan received $9.8 billion in arms in 1998-2001 and $4.1 billion in 2002-2005. In 2005 alone, Taiwan ranked 6th and received $1.3 billion in arms deliveries, while the PRC ranked 5th and received arms valued at $1.4 billion. As an indication of future arms acquisitions, Taiwan’s arms agreements in 2002- 2005 totaled $4.9 billion. The value of Taiwan’s arms agreements in 2005 alone did not place it among the top ten recipients that are developing countries.

What does Taiwan have to do to get Carpenter's approval? Here are the budget numbers from the CRS report:



Note that the budget is pretty much the same every year. This means that in real terms expenditure is falling. One might argue that viewing in dollar terms is unfair -- in 1994 $250 billion NT$ got you almost $10 billion greenbacks, now it gets you just under $8 -- but recall that Taiwan's overseas weapons purchases are dollar-denominated and so the exchange rate gives a meaningful indication of the island's falling purchasing power. Except --wait -- weapons procurements are typically funded out of Special Budgets which amount to another US$22.6 billion over 1994-2003, spending that went for purchases of fighters and military housing.

There is no question that the island's defense budget must rise. There is also no question that forcing Taiwan to purchase submarines at three times the world rate while not giving the island any co-production is short-sighted and counterproductive -- and a poor use of limited and precious defense dollars. It is not for nothing that many observers are recommending that Taiwan build its own submarines -- weapons, it should be noted, that the US refused Taiwan for two decades, because they have no obvious defensive function! In other words, Carpenter excoriates the island for not wanting to purchase weapons the US said it didn't need for better part of two decades. The gods of history love irony....

And more irony: since Taiwan won't buy subs, the President has indicated that he doesn't want to sell it fighters. Surely a more reasonable US position to take is to sell the island fighters, the one weapon it really needs, while pressuring it to purchase the other weapons using less dangerous leverage. It is one thing to say: you're not doing enough to defend yourself. It is quite another to say: you have to defend yourself in exactly the way we tell you to....

Thus, Taiwan is too making a "meaningful defense effort." It is one of the largest arms importers in the world. It is revamping its military organization, procuring radar, command and control, and land warfare systems. It may not be up to the levels that Carpenter would like to see, but no one can deny that Taiwan puts quite a bit of emphasis on defense.

Carpenter finishes:

America is in an unrewarding and potentially dangerous position. Washington must make it clear to all political players in Taiwan, especially the Pan Blue leaders, that free riding on America's military might cannot continue.

Yes, perhaps America is in an unrewarding and potentially dangerous position. If so, it has only itself to blame for this mess -- rational pricing, a friendly co-production strategy, some patient commitment to the democracy side in the island's politics, constant pressure on the pro-China parties -- and all of this might have been avoided. (I am delighted that Carpenter calls for some sharp policy directed at the pan-Blue leaders -- here the US has not yet realized that effort on the pan-Blues must be direct and sustained, not fitful and clumsily aimed at "Taiwan.")

Withal, it must be said: it is high time US opinion leaders focused on a major cause of the problem: the United States. Sort out our own behavior, and Taipei will perforce follow.

[Taiwan] [China] [US] [submarines] [arms purchase] [name rectification]

John Tkacik: Defense = Offense

John Tkacik, a Heritage scholar and longtime supporter of the Beautiful Isle, had a Valentine's Day commentary in the Taipei Times that argued for provision of more "offensive" weapons to Taiwan:

The State Department fought hard against selling Taiwan the production technology for the IDF fighters in the mid-1980s, and battled against the Pentagon's push to sell F-16s in 1992.

In 1992, France sold Taiwan 60 Mirage 2000-5 jets, long-range fighters with a heavy bomb load -- clearly an "offensive weapon."

But as a French official told me in 1992, "the government of France believes that any weapon system sold to a country of 17 million to confront a country of 1.2 billion is a `defensive' system."

Although US President George W. Bush made an exception to this policy in 2001 by approving the sale of conventional submarines to Taiwan, a defensive-arms-only mindset still seizes US and Taiwanese policy-makers.

At the moment US State Department policy is to serve China's demands rather than US and Taiwan interests on the Taiwan issue. In fact, the Taiwan office in the State Department is under the China Desk, a clear indication of State's misguided priorities. Sad.

Meanwhile, Tkacik notes:

China's civilian and military chiefs need not fear that Taiwan will be able to inflict similar damage on China because Taiwan does not have offensive weapons.

Even now, China's leaders can launch offensive missiles at Taiwan for intimidation purposes and the only cost to Beijing is the cost of the missile.

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This is all to say that Taiwan has no deterrence against China. As things now stand, China can attack Taiwan without having to calculate possible losses to a Taiwan counterstrike.

Hence China's military calculus of attack is based solely on the cost of the equipment.

The diplomatic cost-benefit is also minimal as more and more countries accept that China has a right under international law to use military force in its own sovereign territory.

Obviously Taiwan needs a capability to strike back at China. In strategic parlance in both business and the military, if I can strike at your homeland and you can't strike at mine, then in the long run I will always win, since each of your losses occurs in a core area whereas mine are merely peripheral losses of systems that I can always purchase more of.

Note this tidbit:

Former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰) made exactly this point in 1999.

Lien said that Taiwan must establish a credible deterrent by developing a long-range ballistic missile force to convince China "that it should not dare to attack Taiwan."

At the time, Lien said China's missile threat made it imperative that Taiwan strengthen its anti-missile early warning, target acquisition and interception capabilities.

Lien said a Taiwan "second strike" capability was the only way to guarantee security.

Seven years later, Lien's words have proven prescient.

But now, Taiwan's legislature -- particularly the pan-blue camp -- cannot even pass a defense budget, much less agree on what weaponry to include in it.

I've long argued that Taiwan should bristle with missiles, especially cruise missiles. Although I admit to being disconcerted at finding myself in agreement with Lien Chan.....

Regrettably Tkacik, like all US public commentators on the weapons purchase, fails to forthrightly confront the key role of the US in prolonging the agony. Until the cost of the submarines falls to world price levels, instead of its current level of three times world prices, the legislature will have a strong point in its favor. Too, the US has refused to permit Taiwan to co-manufacture, and refused to give Taiwan the license for the designs of the submarines it is paying for. Politicians from both sides in Taiwan have been angered by the unreasonable and irrational US stance on the issue. Further, US officials in Taiwan have done a poor job of communicating the need for the weapons to the public (I hope somebody translates Tkacik and publishes it in the Liberty Times and China Times). Consequently, one hears all the time about the overpriced, outdated weapons we want to sell Taiwan, an erroneous position I have even run into in foreigners who should know better.

[Taiwan] [US] [China] [DPP] [KMT] [submarines] [Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)] [Arms Purchase]