In traditional Taiwanese society, irrigation systems, including canals and ponds, were created as private property and shared by different communities. Usually, individuals or groups of landlords provided the capital for building such irrigation facilities (Chang, 1983; Chen, 2009; Tsai, 1999). These landlords were titled as canal owners, who owned the irrigation facilities and water. By signing contracts, they transferred the rights of water accessibility to farmers, who became canal tenants. Based on such water tenancy, a hierarchical framework of water management was formed (Chen, 2009). At the top of the hierarchy, canal holders were responsible for financial support of irrigation repair; at the bottom of the hierarchy, canal tenants paid fixed amounts of grain crops annually, a so-called ‘water tax,’ in exchange for secure water use. In this hierarchical structure, a middle position was fulfilled by canal managers, who were in charge of canal maintenance and water allocation. Compensated by the water tax, the positions of canal managers were also regarded as part of the water property and could be transacted (Liao, 1985).
Due to this hierarchical tenancy framework, it is complicated to define geographic distribution of traditional irrigation property. For an irrigation system, its service area was associated with residence of its interested parties, including canal owners, managers and tenants as mentioned above. With different rights and duties, each interested party had a dynamic geographical relation with irrigation water. Generally, canal tenants and managers lived adjacent to irrigation areas, because they held major responsibilities of water maintenance. In contrast, canal owners might live in town areas and exert control over irrigation operations remotely, since they were mainly concerned with the annual water tax and might not really participated in irrigation field work (Li, Ku, & Chuang, 2009). In reality, each irrigation system had its unique geographic pattern of ownership distribution, depending on various scales and stakeholder partnerships.
However, when Taiwan was ruled by the Ching Empire (1683–1895), comprehensive irrigation surveys and mappings were never done by the government.2 As irrigation affairs were dominated by the private sector, details of irrigation water ownership and tenancy relations were primarily recorded by civil contracts, which were textually based (Chen, 2009). Only when water disputes occurred, maps were made by official surveyors, and such cases were very limited.3 Consequently, a geographic overview of the existing irrigation systems in Taiwan was lacking, leading to the challenge for the Japanese to establish a national database of local irrigation resources at the onset of colonization.
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In 18th century Taichung and Fengyuan, eight Hakka families negotiated the novel exchange of water for land with the area's indigenous people. The Hakka would lend their expertise to the building of canals for shared use in the shadow of declining deer herds, and the Pazeh would, in exchange, transfer ownership of tribal land to the Hakka families (actually single men of eight surname groups). In this case, many of the Pazeh landlords owned land that was further from their village or was less ideal for wet farming. This led to both the rise of fruit orchards (many still exist in the areas between Daya and Shigang) and also regional ethnic strife in central Taiwan as the imbalance led some groups to a. move to Puli and Milan, b. resort to violence, c. seek out foreign missionaries for political leverage. It was also an excellent example of grassroots interethnic diplomacy that really highlights the unique dynamism of ethnic relations in Qing era Taiwan._______________________
When the Japanese reconfigured the irrigation and water systems of Taiwan, they also played a role in redefining ethnic divisions by removing prior ethnic delineations along water boundaries.
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In 18th century Taichung and Fengyuan, eight Hakka families negotiated the novel exchange of water for land with the area's indigenous people. The Hakka would lend their expertise to the building of canals for shared use in the shadow of declining deer herds, and the Pazeh would, in exchange, transfer ownership of tribal land to the Hakka families (actually single men of eight surname groups). In this case, many of the Pazeh landlords owned land that was further from their village or was less ideal for wet farming. This led to both the rise of fruit orchards (many still exist in the areas between Daya and Shigang) and also regional ethnic strife in central Taiwan as the imbalance led some groups to a. move to Puli and Milan, b. resort to violence, c. seek out foreign missionaries for political leverage. It was also an excellent example of grassroots interethnic diplomacy that really highlights the unique dynamism of ethnic relations in Qing era Taiwan.
When the Japanese reconfigured the irrigation and water systems of Taiwan, they also played a role in redefining ethnic divisions by removing prior ethnic delineations along water boundaries.
And when the KMT came to Taiwan, they implemented the 375 rent reduction act (耕地三七五減租條例) and basically redefined (ie stole) swaths of land in Taiwan, and that really played a role in redefining ethnic divisions. There was no farmland owner in Taiwan that wasn't affected.
A large part of the KMT land reform project was to undermine the embedded strength of the local gentry by reducing their income through land rents. They were compensated in shares of state enterprises, where some won and became KMT stooges and others lost everything. The other thing it did was force Taiwanese land owning families to consolidate their resources onto smaller plots of land through the founding of SMEs supplied by free, family labor, which played a large role in Taiwan's economic miracle.
"where some won and became KMT stooges and others lost everything."
I wonder, who are some examples of people who "won" (and became KMT stooges)? Most people I know of were the ones that "lost everything." The social upheaval was tremendous. On an anecdotal basis, I do know that those who had advanced knowledge of the changes (basically had some tip off in the government) were quick to either sell their property before the 375 act was announced, or start building houses on them (to become not subject to the 375 act).
My in-laws are examples of those who won. They've told me that the only reason they own land is because of those land reforms, and the older generation are all loyal KMT voters. My in-laws are Hoklo Benshengren from Tainan County.
Families that were able to hold on to those government-company stocks did well. If you had to sell them to survive, you got screwed.
Tenants benefited as well (especially if their land became urban), and there were a lot more of them than there were landowners.
That's very interesting. Thank you for sharing. But what do you mean by "the only reason they own land is because of those land reforms." Does that mean they didn't own land before 375 and because of 375 they owned land afterwards?
The original quote: "They were compensated in shares of state enterprises, where some won and became KMT stooges and others lost everything." made it sound like those who "won" were those who were compensated in shares of state enterprises, and were successful because of those shares (as opposed to successful because they acquired land).
After the KMT killed the political/educated Taiwanese elite during 228, the big landowners were the greatest remaking local threat. So they took their land, gave it to the tenants who were renting that land, and gave the (now former-) landowners shares in state-owned enterprises, tying their success to the government's. Those shares eventually became very valuable - but if financial circumstances forced a family to sell their shares early, they ended up with pennies on the dollar. Meanwhile, the tenants got land for free and as cities spread out, that land became very valuable.
Land reform - taking land from its owners and giving it to its tenants - has often worked well for countries' economies; for example, Pakistan had very little of it compared to its neighbors and it now has more deeply entrenched poverty. But it's hard to implement because the landowners usually have a say in government. That wasn't the case in Taiwan.
I have no idea if my in-laws received shares of state enterprises. They've never told me that. They currently own farmland. My understanding is that during the Japanese era they did not own land, but were tenant farmers paying rent to a landlord. After land reform they were able to own some of the land that previous generations rented. Today, the family doesn't rely on the farmland for income, but they still farm it and eat or give away all the produce.
I guess from a macro-perspective, the 375 might have been good for the country. Although one can argue the "fairness" of redistributing the land (imagine the government coming today and saying that the land you own will be divided up so that you only own 37.5% and the remainder 62.5% is to be given to some one else). Heck, the KMT now sounds like a modern day Robin Hood (robbing the rich and giving it away to the poor). Although I also heard that during the 375 process, not only the tenant farmers benefited from the land acquisition, but the KMT acquired a lot of valuable land too. I don't think the 375 Act was purely for altruistic purposes to aid the tenant farmers.
But thank you to all for sharing your insight and comments! And thanks to Carlos: one of the few people with insight into Taiwanese, Spanish AND American history/cultures/languages.
Perhaps I wasn't clear - it was the former landlords that received shares of state enterprises, as partial compensation for having their land taken away and given to the tenants.
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