Friday, October 05, 2007

Nankunshen Temple, Beimen, Tainan

The massive gate of the temple.

On Wednesday John from The Real Taiwan and his lovely wife and daughter, Fili from Filination, and myself went up to the gigantic Nankunshen Temple in Beimen township on the northernmost edge of Tainan county. (Fili's tale is on his top blog.)(John on the Real Taiwan)

Because we are bloggers, immediately upon arriving at the temple, we spread out and began photographing. Because it's not about the experience, it's about the blog. Here's John getting an angle on the temple.

A ghost money burner, one of many at the temple.

This area is modern and fronts a vast temple complex that extends back probably at least a kilometer. The old temple, which dates from 1662, is sandwiched between newer structures that arose after completion of a road out here a few years back, which the made the pilgrimage from Tainan much easier.

Here's a pan of the first hall visitors see when they enter the temple.

Being a wednesday, it wasn't crowded, but tour buses arrived pretty regularly disgorging their loads of tourists from all over Taiwan.

Fili hides in the hall of pillars.

A worshipper wants a Honda Civic at a low price, and also expresses hopes for his good health. Such practicality is an important feature of the relationship between Chinese folk religionists and their gods.

As you go back around the initial area, you come an older section of the temple. This is the oldest Royal Lords temple on the island, constructed in 1662 on an island but moved in 1817 to its current location. It was renovated during the Japanese period, and with the addition of new revenues with the completion of the road to it in 1996 after a smaller road was built a decade before, has become a large, popular temple.

At the moment the older areas are undergoing renovation.

Up to the 18th century the area could be used as a port, but the harbor finally silted up, and locals shifted to salt production in the numerous salt pans that dot the area.

This is a very ornate temple in the Southern Celestial style, studded with carvings and color.

Here a worshipper gets an answer to his question by throwing these blocks on the floor.

The incense seller's son was stunned by the presence of picture taking foreigners.

Donors named listed on the wall.

Old woodwork and beautiful wooden doors can still be found deep in the interior of the temple, currently undergoing renovation.

Behind the old temple is another huge temple being rebuilt and expanded.

A pair of visitors contemplate an amusement machine. You throw money in and it makes a gong sound if you hit the center.

The gods are feted with offerings of food and drink.

A man, apparently possessed by one of the deities, stands rigid facing the temple.

Performers take a break.

A pan of the parking lot full of performers.

Another pan, same place, different angle.

Let's hope the gods like pork and snacks.

Self portrait.

A large ghost money burner.

More performers.

A view of part of the group of temples.

The god is taken into his temple, accompanied by a fireworks and a retinue of worshippers.

The temple grounds also featured some enjoyable park space.

Another busload of worshippers.

After visiting the temple we drove through Beimen town, where the town has an old salt worker's house.

Vendors selling seafood along a street in Beimen.

John documents bottled oysters.

John and I both wanted to explore this abandoned factory, but it was just too hot.

We drove down to Mashagou Beach, stopping by the President Yacht factory. Taiwan is one of the world's leaders in yacht construction.

...and after you've memorized all these signs, there will be a test on Friday.

Construction workers stop for a chat.

Fili strides across the beach, which is $100 per person. John talked the guard into letting us in for nothing, since we were only staying for a moment. The Force has a strong influence over weak minds....

A fishing boat far out to sea.

A boat drawn up in the yard in front of President Yachts.

While we stood taking pictures, boats strolled in and out of the tiny harbor.

To ensure quality, this blog has implemented a strict No Cute Kittens policy since its early days. Cute toddlers, however, are always welcome.

John took us by the Spoonbill reserve on the way back to Tainan. Here an egret searches for goodies in a mud flat.

The parking lot for the nature reserve.

Pan of the Spoonbill reserve.

...and then back to Tainan.

Thursday, October 04, 2007

China Threat To Taiwan Grave

Reuters becomes the latest news service to treat Chinese propaganda on the Anti-Secession Law as something meaningful and important. First, the news story itself:

China cannot compromise on its claim to Taiwan and is ready for "grave" scenarios, a top adviser said, days after the island's ruling party resolved to recommend a new constitution, with implications of independence from China.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) approved the controversial "Normal Country Resolution" on Sunday, calling for a new constitution for Taiwan as an independent sovereign state to replace its current one, which still binds the two sides.

China has claimed sovereignty over self-ruled Taiwan since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949 and pledged to bring the democratic island's 23 million people under its rule, by force if necessary.

"The essence of the resolution is to pursue de jure Taiwan independence," wrote Yu Keli, a prominent Taiwan expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), in a signed commentary run by the official Xinhua news agency on Wednesday.

"The Taiwan issue concerns China's core interests and the mainland does not have any room for compromise," Yu wrote. CASS is the government's top think tank.


It's always worth pointing out: China can bluntly say (1) we're threatening war and (2) we're not going to negotiate even one little bit but you can read in actual analysis from thinking human beings that -- I'm not making this up -- President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan is a radical. I suppose, from the point of view of a human history that offers us about 100,000 years of conflict settled by force, that democracy and referendums are a rather radical approach....

The great thing about this report is its final paragraph, in which the reporter simply regurgitates one of China's most brilliant propaganda ploys, the Anti-Secession Law, in a completely thoughtless manner:
Analysts say China is obliged by the 2005 Anti-Secession Law to react if the referendum is passed, but any decision will be tricky because it does not want to ruin the Summer Olympics, which Beijing will host in August next year.

Now imagine if you had read in a foreign newspaper articles containing the following statements.

Analysts say China is obliged by its security laws to execute dissidents.

Analysts say China is obliged by its Constitution to permit freedom of religion.

Analysts say that China is obliged by its legal framework to give full faith and credence to all contracts signed in China.

Should any reader who knows anything about China stumble across such a sentence in an article about dissent, missionary work, or Chinese contract behavior, respectively, no doubt either laughter or distress would ensue. But our Reuters reporter can scribble the paragraph above without ever stopping to think that the Anti-Secession Law obligates Beijing no more than any other law on the books in China does -- that enforcement of that law, like all other law in China, is the result of a political calculus, rather than a response to the normative status of law, as it is typically treated in the West.

Please, foreign correspondents, stop pretending that piece of political propaganda actually means something as law.



Wednesday, October 03, 2007

Job at Community Services Center in Taipei

Jerome Keating sent this around:

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Job Opportunity at The Community Services Center

The Center seeks to fill the position of Editor of Centered on Taipei (COT).

The editor of COT leads the magazine team comprised of the co-editor, Richard Saunders, who contributes and proof reads, the graphic artist, Katia Chen, and the advertising manager, Paula Lee. The editor is responsible for developing ideas for articles, seeking contributing writers, and seeing each issue through to print. Many community groups turn to the editor to place ads about their events, so the position also requires some community liaison work.

Job Requirements:
Understanding of and commitment to the Center's mission
Excellent PR skills
Excellent interpersonal skills
Excellent organizational skills
Very good written English

If you are interested in this position, please send your resume electronically to the attention of Mary Chua, Director, at csc@community.com.tw together with a letter / statement of interest by October 19, 2007. Questions about this position or the selection process can be forwarded to Lyn Neal, Office Manager, at csc@community.com.tw

Nelson Report: Bush Administration Blocking F-16 Sale

The Nelson Report, the well-known Washington insider report from Chris Nelson, on the US, Taiwan, and arms purchases. I've highlighted certain sections, and left comments after others. This is a long piece, well-written, and insightful from someone with an involvement in Taiwan affairs that dates back some thirty years......

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TAIWAN ARMS...the debate over selling arms to Taiwan is an old one, and it's constantly under the surface of both US-Taiwan and US-China relations. We looked at this in some depth twice last week.

The immediate cause was Wednesday's House Foreign Affairs Committee debate, and a unanimous voice vote approving a Republican-sponsored resolution urging the Administration to approve F-16's for Taiwan.

And we noted, Friday, that it's The White House, under the direction of President Bush himself, holding up even the consideration of F-16's...and that charges that the delay comes from State, or even DOD, are simply mistaken.

(In fact, "simple" is the wrong word here. To not understand the power realities bearing on US-Taiwan relations at this late date in the Bush Presidency is to risk increasingly dangerous disconnects between policy-makers on both sides.)[MT: in other words, the grim harvest of Iraq is impaired strategic flexibility in Asia.]

We did not mention last week a critical document of the early Reagan 1980's, the so-called "Six Assurances" to Taiwan, which have since their negotiation provided endless internal debate in Washington, Taipei, and Beijing.

Today there is rising pressure by many here that it's time for a "revised" 6 Assurances, given the DPP's UN membership campaign, and the continued arms sale questions...the topic of a very timely seminar this coming Wednesday morning at The Heritage Foundation.

The relevance to last week's debate..."assurance #3", that the US won't "consult" with the PRC about arms sales to Taiwan...an obviously not entirely fact-based promise, witness current concerns.

Our Reports of Sept. 26 and 28 went into some detail, but we were not able to give you the full text of Asia Subc. chair Eni Faleomavaega's official statement opposing any such sale.

We do so now, because in it, the chairman makes one remark which is both wrong, and goes to underscore the difficulties even deeply involved players have in sorting out US promises and obligations to Taiwan.

Faleomavaega states that it is US policy to agree to "one China", and he states it in ways which track the PRC position. In fact, the official US position does not accept China's definition, but, rather, straddles the issue with deliberate ambiguity.

(It's a Report for another day to note that you don't have to be a partisan of any particular argument to be concerned that "one China" is a concept increasingly out of alignment with reality. But that's not for tonite.)

Chairman Faleomavaega is not alone in offering an incorrect paraphrase of various US positions on Taiwan which may be critical, if they are accepted without nuance or challenge, but which are wrong, especially in terms of legal obligation.

For example, when Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte "sent a signal" on opposing the DPP's UN membership, by granting an interview to Hong Kong's Phoenix TV, he apparently tried to offer some balance by saying the US is obligated to sell arms to Taiwan.

The correct answer is...maybe, but under certain circumstances.

That goes to the heart of the debate last week, and in hopes of providing at least some of the fundamentals, in terms of what the Taiwan Relations Act really means as interpreted by US policy in the 6 Assurances, we present a selection tonite from Alan Romberg's indispensable book on the subject, "Rein-in At The Precipice".

A final example (for now) of knowledgeable commentators mis-stating the US-Taiwan situation came this Sunday, in the form of a Washington Post book review by former Beijing bureau chief John Pomfret of Clinton-NSC China expert Susan Shirk's just-published "China: Fragile Superpower".

This may be picking too much of a nit, but Pomfret states that Shirk's study is critically important for many reasons, including that the US "is obligated to defend Taiwan".

In fact, the US is not obligated to defend Taiwan by law, and in the post-9/11 world, senior Republican offcials and military brass have cast considerable doubt on the US moral obligation, if President Bush were to conclude that hostilities were the result of actions by Taiwan.[MT: Chris is pointing to a very common problem here. If I had a nickel for everyone who said the US was obligated to defend Taiwan....]

In fact, although the TRA includes language designed to discourage the use of force by the PRC against Taiwan, the TRA only obligates the US to consider arms sales under certain circumstances, period.

Take our word for it, as a junior staff-participant, even this language was extracted very reluctantly from the State Department at the cost of considerable blood on both sides.[MT: Nelson was a Dem staffer at the time the Taiwan Relations Act was put together.]

The strongest language Congressional friends of Taiwan were able to add talks about a "grave threat" to US interests in the event of an upset in the peaceful status quo. That's it...not exactly a mutual defense treaty.

So you add it all up, and not even at the beginning did the TRA mandate that the US defend Taiwan under any circumstance, nor that arms must be sold, simply because of requests by Taiwan.

Every aspect of this is subject to US political will, judgement and discretion...the everlasting frustration of both China and Taiwan, duly noted.
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REGARDING H. RES. 676, September 26, 2007

Mr. Chairman:

I want to commend the gentle lady from Florida, our senior Ranking Member of this Committee for her authorship of H. Res. 676, just as I commend you also and other Members of this Committee who are supporting this Resolution. My question is, is it necessary?

I have serious concerns about H. Res. 676 which declares that is should continue to be the policy of the United States, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1978 has always been the basis of how our country has defined its relationship with Taiwan, and there has been no change in the provisions of this Act. The Act allows for the sale of arms to assist Taiwan with its defense capabilities against its enemies which it considers to be the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Knowing this, I question the need for H. Res. 676. I also question H. Res. 676 being put forward at a time when all of us know that the situation between Taiwan and China has been extremely tense for weeks and months. While I respect my colleagues' view on H. Res. 676, I disagree with this course of action. We all know that H. Res. 676 is a non-binding resolution that does not oblige our government to act but only serves to add fuel to the fire, or exacerbate already tense relations between Taiwan and Beijing. Again, I ask, is this Resolution necessary?

Some 15 times now, Taiwan has sought and failed to be formally recognized by the United Nations, and this has caused a heated exchange of responses even among Members of this body. I just returned from Taiwan where I met with Taiwan's President, and the opposition party. I also recently visited China where I met with the Vice President, and other government officials. When I say that relations are tense, I mean it. From both sides, the situation between Taiwan and Beijing is quickly becoming a confrontation which may lead to an outcome none of us wants.

I am certain that all of us are committed to a course of action which will avert a crisis, and bring about a peaceful solution in the Taiwan Straits. But I do not believe H. Res. 676 gets us where we want to go. H. Res. 676 is just a reminder that an arms deal is still pending and it is pending because the Administration is having difficulties persuading Taiwan not to seek membership with the UN. Obviously, Taiwan is not listening and does not care what this may mean for the US and our important, strategic relationship with Beijing.[MT: US policymakers commonly complain of this. Whatever you may say, Taiwan really needs to step down on the UN referendum and repair its relations with the US. A little groveling and pleading would go a long way here.]

The fact is there is a difference of opinion among the people and leaders of Taiwan about what position Taiwan should take towards Beijing. One of the two major parties advocates peaceful coexistence with the PRC. The other major party and its leaders keep pushing the envelope to the point of forcing Beijing's hand which led to President Clinton having to send two naval battle groups to the Taiwan Straits and almost led to a nuclear confrontation with Beijing. I wonder if my colleagues want to go through this again. [MT: I guess Google isn't known in Washington offices. First, the KMT does not want "peaceful co-existence"; it wants to annex the island to China. I suppose that's "peaceful," in the way that rape is peaceful if the victim complies. Second, his facts are totally wrong. President Clinton sent two carrier battlegroups to the Straits under the KMT's President Lee Teng-hui because China was angry that Taiwan was having an election, not because of something the DPP did. Finally, it is the DPP that wants "peaceful co-existence" in the form of two nations on either side of the Strait. I think the good Congressman will be getting a gentle letter from me today.]

Last time, Beijing backed off. But will Beijing back off again? With implications as serious as this, I am hopeful that we will not move forward with this resolution until we have had time to consider a more thoughtful approach, and until Taiwan has time to hold its elections next March.

For now, H. Res. 626 can potentially influence the outcome of those elections, as could the sale of F-16s. I suspect this is probably one of the reasons the Administration has been reluctant to proceed with the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan because the Administration also recognizes we should give the people of Taiwan time to determine their future status before acting in ways that could set off a chain reaction in this volatile region of the world.

All of us, including Taiwan, know that our US foreign policy has always been to accept the One-China concept whereby Beijing and Taiwan are to work out their political differences through peaceful means. This said, Taiwan has made significant progress towards a pluralistic and democratic form of government. Taiwan enjoys a free market system and economy that ranks among the top fifteen economies in the world. Taiwan also enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world.

Currently, Taiwan conducts over $100 billion in unofficial trade with Beijing. Over the years, millions of Taiwanese have also been able to freely travel to Beijing to be reunited with their families and friends. [MT: "millions?"]

Beijing is also moving towards a more free market system. China has become one of the top five economies in the world, despite its Socialist Marxist ideology that puts a limitation on greater freedom for its citizens and transparency in government. Beijing is doing its best to feed more than 1 billion people, and we must also credit Beijing for bringing North Korea to the negotiating table, thwarting North Korea's efforts to produce nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Chairman, do we want to build on the positive? Do we want to avert a crisis? Or, do we want to add fuel to the fire? I submit that H. Res. 626 tilts favorably towards Taiwan, and I suggest to my colleagues that we ought not to pursue this course of action anymore than we should adopt legislation or resolutions that favor China over Taiwan.

Having said this, I will not oppose this resolution but I will again ask if it is necessary and, in closing, I will suggest that it is not. I will also suggest that it is in our interest to work collectively and bilaterally with both Taiwan and China to prevent another standoff in the Taiwan Straits.

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And now, from The Bible on these matters, Alan Romberg's "Rein-In At The Brink of the Precipice", pgs. 134-37, with Alan's original footnoting:

KEEPING FAITH WITH TAIWAN: THE "SIX ASSURANCES"

As negotiations with Beijing moved toward conclusion, Gaston Sigur, then Senior Director for Asia at the National Security Council, phoned Mark Mohr on the Taiwan desk at the State Department and asked him to draft something that would "ease the shock" of the communiqué on Taiwan, alleviating Taipei's feeling that it was being "sold out."55 This exercise yielded the so-called "six assurances," transmitted to Taipei in mid-July 1982, only weeks before the issuance of the August 17 Communiqué.

As the U.S.-PRC communiqué was being issued, the Reagan Administration informed Foreign Minister Frederick Chien that Taipei could make public the following version of the "six assurances." They were to say that it was "their understanding" that the U.S.:

1. Has not set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan.

2. Has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.

3. Will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing.

4. Has not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act.

5. Has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.56

6. Will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC. 57

Not agreeing to a "date certain" for ending arms sales was central to the U.S. position. Declining to play a mediating role seemed as much a matter of self-protection as anything else, as American officials had warned for years about the pitfalls of any such involvement. But it was also consistent with the point about not pressuring Taipei to negotiate with Beijing. Moreover, the U.S. took the occasion to reiterate: "The U.S. does not take a position on the issue of reunification."58 The assurance on the TRA reflected a rebuff of earlier PRC insistence that the Act be rescinded or at least amended in major ways.

Of the assurances, the two that have been most frequently the subject of later discussion are the ban on prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan and the statement of U.S. policy consistency on the question of sovereignty.

As to the "prior consultation" issue, while some have argued that this assurance strictly precluded any discussion with Beijing about arms sales to Taiwan, this appears to be an overreading. First of all, it was a statement that the United States had not agreed with Beijing to hold such consultations; it did not say there could never be such consultations. For years-before and after 1982-the United States made clear to Beijing that the nature of arms sales to Taiwan, including the quantity and the capabilities, was directly related to the "threat" the island faced. Logically, the point was not only that if the "threat" went up so, too, would arms sales, but, conversely, that if the threat were reduced, arms sales would follow suit. Reagan had, as we have seen, made that very point in his April letter to Zhao Ziyang.

What was more reasonably implied by the assurance was that the United States would not consult with Beijing on specific sales, nor would it allow Beijing to dictate which sales were "acceptable" and which were not. As the FX saga demonstrated, the United States was willing to take account of PRC views, but it would not negotiate with Beijing before taking decisions.

The assurance on sovereignty has been interpreted in a number of different ways. One interpretation is that the U.S. "would continue to regard Taiwan as part of China," but that the question of reunification was left to "the Chinese themselves" as long as it was peaceful.59

More likely, and a view supported by the drafter of the assurances, is that, as in the Shanghai Communiqué, it skirted the issue of whether or not Taiwan was "part of China" and simply meant the United States would not force Taipei to accept the PRC position on sovereignty -in a sense, a response to Taipei's criticism, noted earlier, that Reagan's "endorsement" of the PRC's nine-point proposal implied U.S. acceptance of ultimate unification on PRC terms. In the words of the message Lilley was asked to convey to Chiang Ching-kuo on the eve of its issuance, the communiqué...will not refer, either through language or by implication, to a U.S. position with regard to sovereignty over Taiwan. We take no position on that matter.61

Footnotes:

54 Haig, Caveat, pp. 213-215.

55 Mark Mohr, interview by author. The origin of the six assurances has been the subject of some controversy. John Holdridge, then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, wrote that he was given them by a Taiwan source (Crossing the Divide, pp. 231-232). Harvey J. Feldman, head of the ROC office at the time of normalization and a frequent writer on Taiwan issues, did some sleuthing on this question and concluded that Holdridge's memory misserved him, and that the six assurances indeed originated with the United States as Mohr states-not in Taiwan; see Feldman's "Taiwan, Arms Sales, and the Reagan Assurances, American Asian Review XIX, no. 3 (fall 2001), pp. 75-101.

56 There is some difference of recollections about the origins of the assurance regarding sovereignty. David Dean, Chairman of AIT in 1982, happened to be in Mohr's office while Mohr was drafting the assurances, and Dean made inputs to the points. Dean had the impression that a senior foreign ministry official in Taipei might have played a role in the addition of the sovereignty point to five original points. Mohr's recollection is that he drafted all six. In any event, they agree that there was nothing very complicated or mysterious about the process; the points, many of which, as we have noted, had already surfaced in one way or another, were simply logical statements addressing the problematic aspects of the communiqué from Taipei's point of view. (All drawn from interviews by
author.)

57 State 3160, "Assurances for Taiwan," August 17, 1982, FOIA. Holdridge
testified about the communiqué before Congress and, while not identifying them as "six assurances," made public their substance ("Opening Statement Made Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, August 18, 1982," carried in full in State 243116, "Briefings and Press Guidance on US-PRC Communiqué," August 28, 1982, FOIA).

58 State 230951, "Press Materials: US-China Joint Communiqué," August 18, 1982, conveying guidance prepared for John Holdridge's "background briefing" of the press the previous day.

59 Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p. 232.

60 Mark Mohr, interview by author.

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Key point, as the Taipei Times noted yesterday, is simple: the Bush Administration itself is blocking the sale of F-16s to Taiwan. Not State as the newspapers claim. Not DoD. The Great Decider himself.

This raises the issue of what exactly Bush Administration goals are. As I've repeatedly noted, structural features of Taiwan's electoral politics drive DPP behavior -- since both sides need to get out their base, and swing voters are not common, there are no "middle ground" voters to appeal to. Hence, if it were not the referendum, it would be some other move. The current policy, which appeases China, also encourages it to think that the US approves of its annexation of Taiwan. Certain commentators have complained that the Taiwan governments "provocations" of China, coupled with Taipei's failure to purchase more weapons, is an invitation to war. Back at ya, guys: a US policy that appeases China and suppresses Taiwan while weakening Taiwan's defense is a recipe for war. Simple as that. Sell us the F-16s!



Tuesday, October 02, 2007

Tkacik on the UN and the Status of Taiwan

John Tkacik has a wonderful piece that gives a behind-the-scenes look at the recent US response to Taiwan's UN drive, as well as some historical information on the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

"In accordance with that resolution, the United Nations considers Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the People's Republic of China," he said.

"For all purposes?" Could the UN secretary-general unilaterally and without consultation make a major pronouncement in international law on the status of 23 million people?

This caused such diplomatic concern in Washington and Taipei that both sides tried to keep it secret.

The US State Department, in its own methodical way, convened internal meetings and disseminated several confidential memorandums on how it might neutralize the secretary-general's stance without angering China.

This, of course, was impossible. Indeed, many officials in the department believe that Taiwan had brought all this on itself.

Others, however, argued (successfully) that unless Ban's pronouncement were reversed, Taiwan may find itself bound by a number of international protocols under China's signature.

The Department of Agriculture was particularly concerned that China, which bans US beef, would ensure via the World Organization for Animal Health (known by the French acronym "OIE") that Taiwan cease imports of the meat.

So, after considerable internal consultation, a delegation of US diplomats quietly approached one of their only friends in the UN Secretariat, Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe.

Pascoe, a retired US ambassador, once served as the director of the American Institute in Taiwan. Pascoe was sympathetic, but demurred that the issue was a "legal" one, not a political one. He directed the Americans to UN Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Larry Johnson.

In late July, the Americans confronted Johnson on Ban's letter. The assertion that Taiwan was "for all purposes an integral part of the PRC [People's Republic of China]" was very disturbing, the US diplomats said, because "while this assertion is consistent with the Chinese position, it is not universally held by UN member states, including the United States."

Significantly, China's position is held neither by Japan, nor the UK, Canada, Australia nor New Zealand, all of which signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 under which "Japan renounce[d] all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores [Penghu]," but the treaty did not add to whom "right, title and claim" to Formosa might ultimately devolve.

At the time, Britain set down for the record that, while the treaty provided for Japan to renounce sovereignty over Taiwan, "the treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands." As such, Britain was happy to sign it, as did Australia and New Zealand.
The position of the United States, up until Henry Kissinger, the Dementor of US foreign policy, decided to sell the island out, was that the status of Taiwan was undecided, a position also held by the other major Powers. As late as the Nixon Administration State Department officials regularly testified that Taiwan's status was yet to be determined. But then Nixon decided it would be a great idea to get Chinese cooperation on Vietnam........

However, accounts of President Nixon's secret talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai in China in 1972 reported that Nixon made promises on the question of Taiwan in return for diplomatic normalization that went beyond the communique issued at the end. The Carter Administration later called the promises: "Nixon's Five Points." Also, according to Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth's March 1999 testimony, Nixon pledged no U.S. support for Taiwan independence (second time after Kissinger's 1971 promise): "We have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement." With the release on December 11, 2003, of declassified memoranda of conversation of the secret talks between Nixon and Zhou, there was confirmation that Nixon stated as first of Five Principles that "there is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more statements made -- if I can control our bureaucracy — to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undetermined." (source)

Tkacik is trying to argue that this is the policy we've defaulted back to, but while his heart is in the right place, there is no support for that interpretation in the Bush Administration. Instead, the Taipei Times quoted the Nelson Report on the F-16 sale:

The Nelson Report, which caters to politicians in the US capital, quoted sources close to the Bush administration as saying that the purchase would not happen soon, if at all.

The sources said that the White House, not the State Department or the Department of Defense, was blocking the deal.

The report also said that Bush was holding on to control over US-Taiwan policy and was concerned that sending positive signals to President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) could destabilize the "status quo."

Although the Taiwan Relations Act allows the US to sell arms to Taiwan based solely on Taiwan's defense needs, the report said that the Bush administration felt separating the issue from US-China relations was difficult.

The report quoted the sources as saying that the Taiwan Relations Act did not necessarily justify the sale of F-16s to Taiwan's military and that the administration was debating Taiwan's defense needs.

This can't be emphasized enough: Taiwan policy is being run at the highest levels of the US government.

Let's hope that the Administration's apparent refusal to help Taiwan defend itself ends the prospect of any more misguided articles about Taiwan's unwillingness to defend itself. Taiwan clearly recognizes its need for these weapons, and wants the US to sell them. It is the US, not Taiwan, that is causing the problem here.

It is often said -- and usually attributed to Marx -- that history repeats itself, the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. Once again we have a corrupt, deeply unpopular Republican President embroiled in a losing war against an insurgency, trampling over the Constitution, and seemingly willing to sell out Taiwan permanently for transient political gains. Only the second time round, it's a tragedy too.

Taiwan Sues ISO over "Province" designation

Radio Taiwan International announced that Taiwan is suing the ISO:

Taiwan is suing the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) over its reference to the country as "Taiwan Province, China" instead of "Republic of China (Taiwan)." This is the first time that Taiwan has taken legal action against an important international organization.

The foreign ministry said Tuesday that Taiwan filed the suit with a Geneva court in July after the ISO failed to rectify Taiwan's designation in the ISO 3166 country codes list.

The ministry said that this misleading situation not only causes misunderstanding about Taiwan but also undermines Taiwan's national status.

The Geneva-based ISO is an international standard-setting body composed of representatives from various national standards organizations.

It may seem weird to sue the ISO, but in reality it is deadly serious. As Anthony Van Dyck, AKA Maoman of Forumosa fame pointed out to me, ISO standards lie behind innumerable everyday products. When software programs want a valid list of who's what in the world for those universal drop-down menus, they go to the ISO. By hitting the ISO directly, Taiwan is saving an infinity of fights with individual organizations over their Taiwan standards, and making change where it can affect a large number of institutions and products.

Edward Curtis American Indian Photograph Exhibition in Taiwan

The China Post reports on a traveling exhibition of photos of American native peoples:

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the National Taiwan Museum are co-sponsoring the exhibit, which runs from Sept. 19 to Oct. 21 at the National Taiwan Museum. It will be shown around Taiwan, then in Hong Kong.

"The exhibition's staying here four months, the longest of any country on the tour," said Nick Papp, director of the AIT's American Cultural Culture. "This is because we've had a very strong response, a high level of interest in Native American culture here in Taiwan."

One reason for the heightened interest, he says, is "Curtis had an amazing ability to capture the soul and sensitivities of life in the early 1900s for American Indians," Papp said.

The other reason, he says is that "Taiwan is facing many of the same challenges as it struggles to preserve its own indigenous cultures and legacy," and "Maybe similar photographic projects can be undertaken here to help preserve the indigenous people's way of life."

"Curtis was one of the first Americans who devoted his life to cultural preservation -- basically he created an encyclopedia. In one sense, he was a pioneer in American cultural preservation," Papp said.

In 1907, Edward Curtis began an undertaking that would consume him for the next 30 years: the creation of his magnum opus, "The North American Indian," a 20-volume set of handmade books with 1,500 photos, financed in part by industrialist J.P. Morgan.

Curtis visited more than 80 tribes across the country, north into Alaska and parts of Canada. Eventually, he took more than 40,000 photographs, made over 10,000 recordings of Native language and music, produced lectures, slide shows, and a multi-media Curtis Indian Picture Opera throughout the U.S.; and in 1914 directed "In the Land of the Headhunters," an innovative, seminal film documentary on the Kwakiutl tribe.

Curtis' pictures of Native Americans between 1900 and 1930 are the most comprehensive photo-ethnographic record of the North American Indians ever created. In many cases, his material is the only recorded history in existence.

UPDATE: Don't miss additional information in the comments below.

DPP Determines 'Taiwan' Policy

As the DPP decides its view on Taiwan's future status, China fulminates. But as always, it is important to ignore what Chinese say and watch what they do. And what China has done is a clear signal. It has reshuffled its military leadership to bring to the fore officers with Taiwan-related military backgrounds:

At least five members of the new CMC lineup have Taiwan-affairs credentials: both Chen Bingde and Liang Guanglie in the 1990s worked successively as Commander of Nanjing Military Area Command, which covers and concentrates on the Taiwan Strait. Wu Shengli used to be the chief of staff and commander of a navy base in Fujian province, facing Taiwan across the strait. Both Li Jinai and Jing Zhiyuan are experts in missile deployment, which would be the opening salvo and a major force in any potential attack against Taiwan.

Their promotion highlights Beijing’s growing concern with the situation on the Taiwan Strait. Beijing has become increasingly unhappy with Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s proposed referendum on the island’s UN membership bid, which Beijing regards as a big step towards de facto independence. Beijing could use its Anti-Secession Law to justify using force against Taiwan if the island declares formal independence. Therefore the new military lineup sends a strong political message.
The Communist Party Congress, slated for later this month, will all be about Taiwan. It is probably dawning on wiser heads that the long-term does not favor the PRC -- the PRC's local ally, the KMT, might not win the election, and Taiwanese are increasingly pro-democracy and pro-Taiwan. Meanwhile PRC propaganda has been too successful: the population is convinced that Taiwan is necessary to secure its future happiness. Probably shouldn't have hung the government's legitimacy on Taiwan....all of this would be so much blather, if the Bush Administration wasn't breaking our military and our treasury in two losing wars, and now contemplating another loss against Iran. Of course, there are those who might perceive that the putative strike on the Republican Guard of Iran is actually a warning to China....

Speaking of legitimacy, the DPP put on a very well staged show last weekend that basically said: "we're gonna keep doing what we've always been doing:"

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) national congress yesterday passed the party's "Normal Country" Resolution, maintaining the version approved by the party's Central Executive Committee on Thursday while rejecting a proposed amendment that stressed the need for the nation to change its official title to "Taiwan."

The final resolution stipulates that the nation should "accomplish rectification of the name `Taiwan' as soon as possible and write a new constitution." It also highlights the need for the nation to hold a referendum to "emphasize Taiwan's independent statehood at an appropriate time."

The congress passed the resolution with applause rather than resorting to a vote.

The congress, however, rejected a proposed amendment initiated by former chairman Yu Shyi-kun, who sought to include a clause that read: "Our nation should write a new constitution and correct its official title to `Taiwan.'"

Yu's proposal, endorsed by 37 congress representatives, only won 43 affirmative votes out of 328 representatives present at the congress.

The interesting thing here is the behavior of Yu. Is the whole thing political theatre? In some articles in the foreign media Yu was represented as a "radical." Observe first that the name change to "Taiwan" is represented as the brainchild of the "radical" Yu -- it's Yu's proposed amendment. Obviously, all pro-independence types want to change the name of the nation to Taiwan, so here is a case of delegates deploring in their public capacities what they cheer in their private. Why?

I read this as saying that the Congress rejects "Yu's" amendment, thus by implication rejecting 'radical' moves. The resulting position permits the DPP to affirm its long-term goals, while giving the appearance of rejecting 'radical' moves and seeking 'moderation.' Note that the normal country resolution was approved by acclamation, saving the trouble of arranging a vote....



Monday, October 01, 2007

Doug Bandow on US-Taiwan-China Relations

Doug Bandow has a long piece on US-Taiwan-China relations in the current American Spectator. A highlight:

AT THE SAME TIME, the presumed U.S. security commitment has discouraged Taiwanese military investment. For four years the KMT-dominated legislative Yuan blocked the government's military budget. The two sides recently agreed on new orders for U.S. arms, but the effort remains seriously underfunded. The Chen government possesses no more political clout in pushing its proposed 16.4 percent defense spending hike next year.

Justin Logan and Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute warn of "a massive disparity in defense capacity" and that "Taiwan's qualitative military advantage over China is dwindling along every metric." While Taipei cannot expect to match the military forces of its much larger neighbor, it need merely make the chance of success too uncertain and the price of success too high to deter Beijing from military adventurism. A robust Taiwanese defense capacity is the best means to encourage continued Chinese caution and patience.

The assumption that America will protect Taiwan, irrespective of how irresponsibly its leaders might act, has created an extraordinarily dangerous situation. Note Logan and Carpenter: "A bold cross-strait policy coupled with inadequate defense spending virtually invites a PRC challenge at some point. And America would be caught right in the middle."

The potential for a series of mistakes leading to war brings to mind the summer of 1914 and World War I. Taiwan challenges China, assuming Washington will step in if things go awry. The PRC acts aggressively, assuming the U.S. won't get involved. The U.S. intervenes, assuming China will back down. A shot is fired by someone. And so begins the first Sino-American war.


IT'S TIME FOR A SERIOUS rethinking of American policy towards the Taiwan Strait. Washington should not allow a client state to determine its defense strategy. Lecturing Taiwan not to behave provocatively has failed. Washington must not allow even a close friend to drag America into war with a significant regional power where U.S. security interests are marginal.

Thus, Washington should inform Taiwan that nothing -- the Taiwan Relations Act, America Cold War defense requirements, or profitable economic relationship -- commits the America to intervene in a conflict involving China. While the U.S. will sell Taipei whatever weapons that it desires, Taiwan will be responsible for fashioning a political and military strategy to deter PRC adventurism. America always could intervene if the circumstances warranted, but would do so only if the threat to U.S. interests warranted the risk of nuclear war, an unlikely contingency.

On the other hand, American officials should no longer opine on the perceived merit of Taiwanese domestic politics or international relations. Moreover, Washington could dismiss complaints from China about other aspects of U.S.-Taipei dealings -- providing visas to Taiwanese officials to visit America, for instance.

At the same time, the U.S. should make clear to Beijing that war would have a disastrous impact on the PRC's "peaceful rise" strategy. Economic retaliation from America, Europe, and Japan would be inevitable. China's Asian neighbors, particularly Canberra, Tokyo, and Seoul, would be forced to adjust their policies towards the PRC. Beijing would end up tossing away the gains of years of patient diplomacy in its reach for global leadership.

It is unfortunate that Taiwan is caught in the ever- lengthening shadow cast by its huge neighbor. But guaranteeing Taipei's independence is becoming ever more dangerous for Washington. China is becoming stronger and more assertive; Taiwan is becoming weaker and more assertive. The combination is combustible. Now, before a violent confrontation, is the time for Washington to refashion its Taiwan policy.

Has the presumed American security commitment discouraged Taiwanese military investment? I reviewed this claim before when exploring Justin Logan's and Ted Carpenter's highly flawed thesis that Taiwan is "free riding" on US defense. As the CRS report I cited there noted:

From worldwide sources, including the United States, Taiwan received $13.9 billion in arms deliveries in the eight-year period from 1998 to 2005. Taiwan ranked 3rd (behind Saudi Arabia and China) among leading recipients that are developing countries. Of that total, Taiwan received $9.8 billion in arms in 1998-2001 and $4.1 billion in 2002-2005. In 2005 alone, Taiwan ranked 6th and received $1.3 billion in arms deliveries, while the PRC ranked 5th and received arms valued at $1.4 billion. As an indication of future arms acquisitions, Taiwan’s arms agreements in 2002- 2005 totaled $4.9 billion. The value of Taiwan’s arms agreements in 2005 alone did not place it among the top ten recipients that are developing countries.

I've argued before that US commentators fundamentally misunderstand. China's "being provoked" is a policy choice of the Chinese, not some visceral reaction it can't control. It directs that at the Chen Administration, which it will not negotiate with, and uses "being provoked" as leverage to squeeze Taiwan's space and to gain leverage over US foreign policy. By blaming the Chen Adminstration, US analysts essentially let China define the shape of Taiwan policy, and encourage China to suppress Taiwan even further. It would be great if the Bush Adminstration put some effort into criticizing China's attitude and military buildup with respect to Taiwan.

Bandow also has a nice observation that many on the democratic side have noted:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas J. Christensen attempted to soften the blow by saying the U.S. was not against Taiwan resisting PRC pressure, but "Taipei needs to push back intelligently and in a sophisticated manner that plays to its strength." Yet being a democracy is one of Taiwan's principal strengths.
Since China "gets provoked" whenever Taiwan exercises its democracy, it follows that any policy that demands that Taiwan stop "provoking" China is essentially a demand that Taiwan stop cultivating its democracy. US policymakers may roll their eyes at a UN entry referendum that uses the name "Taiwan" but if it weren't that, there'd be something equally "provoking." One of the core strategies of the democracy movement for the last three decades has been the construction of a localized political identity, and stroking that identity is a structural feature of Taiwan's politics. This "provocation problem" isn't going to go away.[UPDATE: The Only Redhead and I are channeling the same muse on this one.]

One thing fascinating about the UN referendum imbroglio is the stretching silence from the Bush Adminstration, now in its second week. As China fulminates, with warning after warning (genuine warnings? testing global opinion? political theatre? you make the call) the US watches in benign silence. Interesting....