What will Trump do? + Links

A small shrine tucked away in a field

NYTimes reports that Taiwan moves to shore up its central american friends, but the really ominous thing wasn't the possibility that they might bolt, but what happened in Nigeria, where Beijing forced the Taiwan office to move, is far more dangerous. Diplomatic allies are not as important as the everyday engagement Taiwan has with nations all over the world.

This week, another move showed that even countries without diplomatic ties to Taiwan could still isolate it further. On Wednesday, Nigeria ordered Taiwan to move a representative office in the country out of the political capital, Abuja, to Lagos, the country's commercial hub. Nigeria has not had official diplomatic relations with Taiwan since 1971, so it doesn’t have an embassy in Abuja to move; instead, Taiwan was forced to move its trade mission, one of about 50 unofficial representative offices it has around the world.

That mission had been serving the small Taiwan factory investment community there. China offered to sink $40 billion into projects there... wonder how much will actually appear. Meanwhile the US is spending billions bombing wedding parties and barbecues in the Middle East. Hmm......

Another problem: Trump again says "one China" policy up for negotiation. This comment is entirely lacking in definition, though it is widely reported. What does he mean? Though Bonnie Glaser says China is preparing for rocky relations in 2017. If someone senior in the administration would contact me, I would be most grateful. At The News Lens Wayne Pajunen writes:

Among the ongoing tit-for-tat of Trump tweet vs. CCP bark, keeping in mind the Chinese proverb: a barking dog never bites (會叫的狗不會咬人), PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) responded, “China is paying close attention to developments,” Wang said. “I can clearly say that no matter whether the Tsai Ing-wen authority, any other person in the world, or any other force, if they try and damage the one-China principle and harm China’s core interests, in the end they are lifting a rock only to drop it on their feet.”

Beijing is always very careful to respond only with threatening rhetoric while never drawing lines in the sand demarking tangible retaliatory actions. To date, the uncertainty created by CCP bluster has been sufficient to deter the democratic nations to do Beijing’s bidding and isolate Taiwan.

"The barking dog never bites" may also apply to Trump. It's maddening how little concrete information there is about his Administration's views and plans. Rosalyn Hsueh in WaPo writes on his trade policy with China, while Michael Pillsbury argues that Trump can stand up to China without provoking a war.

Shirley Kan: China's military provocations ARE NOT mere responses to Trump
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Daily Links:

• Finally! Gangsters swept up after violence at public hearings
• Taiwan needs to end practices like Indonesian slavery aboard Taiwanese fishing vessels if it ever wants to make friends
• NYTimes: Taiwan moves to shore up its central american friends. Russell Hsiao in The National Interest explores this problem. 
• US lawmakers introduce Taiwan Travel Act to encourage high level exchanges
• Cute: Singapore sings for the return of its armored vehicles but China is using them to pressure Singapore to reduce relations with Taiwan
• VOA: Tsai meets with ranking Republicans: why?
• NCCU removing a couple of CKS statues
• Taiwan film industry should explore collaboration with other centers of the industry
• Japanese lobby IOC to let Taiwan be "Taiwan"
• Indigenous legislator on fight for aboriginal self-determination in Taiwan
• Significance of Taiwan-Japan maritime dialogue
• A person monitoring the BBC "What is the one China principle? site says its improved. *shudder*. It is still pro-China, and wrong. Hilaribad....
• Jeff Bader, former Obama Asia chief, on four proposals for China. As a longtime observer noted, the claim that the PRC going soft on Taiwan issue will result in party collapse is propaganda.
• Global Taiwan Brief latest
• Strategic memory diplomacy, used by Ma?

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Rupert Hammond Chambers excellently responds to criticisms of the Taiwan Arms Deal

Interior of a Buddhist temple near my house.

This is from The Nelson Report of 12/18. Note the last paragraph, which makes the same argument that I always do: "tension" is how Beijing manages the Washington-Taipei relationship and the Washington-Beijing relationship. The international media, which reports constantly on "tension" but never describes its political function, serves Beijing in that way. This form of soft power, in which Beijing's claims about its own history or tension or its behavior are presented without analysis or comment in the international media -- sometimes even as the basis of analysis and comment, is one of China's most important forms of soft power.

If you're reading this Rupert, many thanks for this response.

++++++++++++++

Loyal Reader Rupert Hammond-Chambers, US-Taiwan Business Council, begs to differ with our coverage of the Taiwan arms sale package:

Chris,

At moments when equities that directly impact the Council come up I am particularly attune to what's reported.

There are a significant number of people who share the concerns the Council sent out yesterday in our press release who know the "actual facts". Congressional staffers and leadership at SFRC, SASC and HFRC, the USTBC represents every company involved in every transaction and has had insight into both the programs and the process. We disagree with your presentation of the administration's position.

In response:

- Not ready to integrate what? This arms package? This is second hand gear which they already own and munitions which they already have in inventory. There is no integration issues surrounding this package. If the "it" is new capabilities that would speak to a priority list with consideration of new items but there has been no such review nor any interest in consideration of new capabilities. They are rebuffed before LoRs can be submitted.

- Taiwan has requested items and been rebuffed consistently. The F-16 C/Ds are the most public and recognized example. Not only were their LoRs rebuffed they were instructed not to submit LoRs without permission. The Obama Administration could then claim that Taiwan made no requests. It's fantastically disingenuous. It's good tactics if you want to kill programs at the door. This was the lesson of the F-16 A/B fight with congress. Keep programs out of the system and you won't be pressured to complete sales which in turn may disrupt China military-to-military engagement or climate change conferences in Paris.

- In 2009, the Legislative Yuan budgeted US$500M to purchase F-16s. the US rebuffed their LoRs. The LY budgeted this money because the Bush Administration had rightly accused Taipei of not putting its money where its mouth was after 3+ years of KMT blocking the defense budget. That US$500M could have been used for other defense priorities but when allocated to a specific program that doesn't come to fruition it is returned to the general treasury unused. The LY cannot budget for programs when the US keeps the LoR door shut. The Taiwan budget process and commitment starts when Taiwan brings a program to the US which accepts an LoR. Taiwan then budgets the funds with some surety that the program would go to the US congress in a specific year. Our process is broken. LoRs are refused. Programs are placed on indefinite hold to gauge when to thread the China schedule needle. How can Taiwan possibly budget when our willingness to engage is so erratic. When programs are held for years without notification.

The argument for replacement fighter's you cite is an old crucible that fails when applied to the many more likely scenarios involving crisis in the Taiwan Strait other than China launching everything it has at Taiwan. Wouldn't China want to keep some of its powder dry or direct its forces at the US, Japan and possibly Korea? Is an all-out attack the most likely action by China? Taiwan has a quantitative problem for its fighters with the number of available F-16s to patrol Taiwan airspace falling to almost 70 at present operational rates when the upgrade program kicks in in '17. These planes will experience further wear and tear as they have to be used more in the absence of additional fighters. The most disturbing part of your argument is where it logically ends, with Taiwan fielding no air-force if we're unprepared to replenish its fleet. China's missiles threaten Korea and Japan equally, are you arguing that they too should eventually have no air force? Should we withdraw all our planes from Okinawa because it is similarly threatened? Of course not, Japan and Korea have a right to field a robust air defense to address all scenarios. We have a right to forward deploy our equipment. Your argument is a canard.

On the submarines, the key part of the quote is "Taiwan has a design". In 2001 we committed to assist Taiwan in procuring submarines. In 2003 and again in 2007 the U.S. prepared a design phase to support Taiwan procurement of submarines. The Obama Administration is balking at helping Taiwan secure a design whether through an FMS design phase, such as the Taiwan submarine CN program that is sitting at the Department of State right now or supporting Taiwan's efforts to secure a design from Europe or Japan. This isn't Taiwan failing to act, this is the US balking at fulfilling an obligation because of the political ramifications of support. Submarines would hugely complicate PRC invasion scenarios. The Obama administration could have included the CN sitting at state on subs and partnered in securing a design. The Obama administration chose not to.

The argument that it's all small things, such as this package, or all something else such as F-16s and subs is false. What we sell Taiwan should be driven by a threat assessment. Nothing should be taken off the table to begin with. We should be focused on any platform or system that complicates PRC intentions. We haven't undertaken a proper assessment in over a decade and 2001 was the last time such an assessment drove a serious look at capabilities with new commitments. This package was driven by politics, the politics of US-China relations. This is about the minimum necessary to comply with the TRA while avoiding any disruption to bilateral relations with Beijing.

The biggest straw man in US-Taiwan defense relations is the argument that constituencies in this debate are proposing parity or "overcoming the spending gap". No one is arguing that. Should Taiwan spend more than 2% of GDP? Absolutely. However, this is about Taiwan having access to a range of capabilities that may complicate the myriad scenarios Beijing will consider not just an all-out attack with everything fired at Taiwan which is the scenario presented to kill any discussion of politically sensitive solutions. Again, we shouldn't be negotiating with ourselves by removing platforms and systems that would make a difference because the political lift is hard.

Yes, equipment is being delivered now. This Four year gap, 2011 - 2015, in arms sales will result in a four year gap in deployment of new capabilities that should be being sold now. It's not a stop start process but one that should be addressed year-on-year. You don't just catch up when a sale is made it takes serious lead time to assess, process, buy and deploy these systems. What was sold in '08 and 2010 is being delivered now. What will be delivered in 2020? Nothing. The timeout taken these past 4+ years will have a serious impact on Taiwan in the coming years, a mess the next US president may well be cleaning up.

Rather than Taiwan forces filling the gap created by this 4+ year delay it'll be our forces doing it. Personally, I'd rather have Taiwan personnel defending Taiwan.

Finally, now Taiwan's military is a guerrilla force?

Why was the package delayed four years. How does this package adequately address the changes in the PRC threat over that period?

Why isn't the administration using the regular FMS process to assess, on an ongoing basis, Taiwan requests? Is packaging arms sales the right approach?

The PRC looms like an 800 pound gorilla over this entire broken process. In one place their threat to Taiwan grows daily in another the US refuses to respond to that threat in a meaningful way for fear of upsetting the aggressor. It's genius.

Rupert
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Hegemonic Warfare Watch: The Case of Charles Glaser Worried

Planting rice north of Taichung.

I say to you againe, doe not call up Any that you can not put downe; by the Which I meane, Any that can in Turne call up Somewhat against you, whereby your Powerfullest Devices may not be of use.

*sigh* Charles Glaser really loves to imagine himself as a Great Decider, determining the fate of millions with Grand Bargains. This latest installment of his patented point of view, "sell Taiwan to China for better relations" is A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation (International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49–90). Glaser appears to have learned little from his Foreign Affairs disaster of several years ago.

The "analysis" concedes that it is merely an amoral, unreal fantasy right at the outset of his main argument, where he states: "Analytically, the desirability and political feasibility of U.S. security policy can often be productively separated." Actually, they can't, because politics is about values and the conduct of international affairs (i.e. human affairs) is not value-free. This pretense of value-freeness is created by Glaser here in order to legitimate selling out Taiwan as the "objective" and therefore superior choice. The subtext is: "if you can't see it my way, you're too subjective". The reality is that handing over Taiwan to China is a question of values; the reason it is politically disvalued (i.e. unfeasible) is because it is morally vile and politically stoopid.

EJInsight recently commented on China's lack of soft power. The problem with the kind of analysis that EJInsight presents is that it doesn't recognize the truly key elements of China's soft power. Living in Taiwan and watching the media for years has made many of us acutely conscious of China's actual soft power. The TIME interview with DPP Chairman and Presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen shows one aspect of that soft power -- the way western commentators accept Chinese expansionist propaganda and anti-Taiwan propaganda (and propagandists) as conventional wisdom, and use it to frame their writing about China-related issues. Glaser's piece is another example of how this works: it shows the willingness of commentators in democratic countries to feed the beast. Sadly, this sort of testosterone-fueled control fantasy disguised as "analysis" has become commonplace (Hugh White, for example).

Glaser lays out his thesis on p50:

Specifically, the United States should negotiate a grand bargain that ends its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. In return, China would peacefully resolve its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas, and officially accept the United States’ longterm military security role in East Asia.

After discussion of the international situation, he expands thusly:

The grand bargain I propose is designed to capture the benefits of U.S. accommodation with China, while reducing its risks. China’s concessions on its territorial and maritime disputes would communicate information to the United States about the limited extent of its aims, thereby reducing Washington’s concern that its own concessions would encourage China to push the United States out of East Asia. In addition, resolution of these disputes would eliminate flash points that fuel regional military competition and crises that could draw the United States into a war.

Much this paper is larded with the soft power problem I note above: presentation of pro-China propaganda frames as actual descriptions of China. Note how Glaser adopts Beijing's propaganda line to explain China's desire to annex Taiwan:

From China’s perspective, control of Taiwan is a security objective because China considers Taiwan part of its homeland.45 In contrast, given the United States’ understanding of the status quo, China’s determination to control Taiwan reflects greedy motives.

From the perspective of elites in Beijing, of course annexing Taiwan is pure expansion; the idea that Taiwan is a "lost territory" is strictly for the consumption of their own public and for foreigners who can be successfully propagandized. Like Glaser, for example.

(Of course, there is no Taiwan perspective in this paper. Taiwan doesn't get a vote, because this is a Grand Bargain, the kind Grand Men make over brandy and cigars. You peasants operating out of your own subjectivity don't get it, 'k? Now go fetch my slippers.)

Consider his process for implementing the Grand Bargain:

For example, stages could include resolution of how to divide maritime resources without resolution of the sovereignty issues; agreement to defer sovereignty issues; arms control agreements that limit China’s conventional ability to threaten Taiwan and Japan and the operation of U.S. forces near China’s shores; and the reduction and eventual termination of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Beijing will never agree to any of this in good faith (Nor does Glaser explain why Beijing should trust the US). Moreover, China is trapped; it cannot reduce its conventional forces precisely because it has so many territorial demands on its neighbors, and because it would mean compelling the People's Liberation Army to accept a reduced role in domestic politics. Good luck with that.

Glaser and others who write from this bubbleverse accept the existence of these territorial disputes without inquiring into their origins. The reason they invariably refrain from doing so is because if they did, it would immediately become obvious that China is engaging in territorial expansion, since Taiwan, the South China Sea islands, and the Senkakus were never historically Chinese areas. Instead, they were claims manufactured after the fall of the Manchu Qing dynasty, when China was redefined in order to expand it out to the borders of the Qing. Hence any reading of these territorial demands as "China's need for security" or some such silliness is Beijing propaganda, plain and simple.

This is crucial because if you read Glaser's paper carefully, there is a yawning gap that totally destroys his thesis. He mentions Taiwan, of course, but he also mentions the Senkakus many times.

Yet, he never mentions that Taiwan and the Senkakus (and Okinawa) are all connected in Chinese territorial demands (the ROC fantasy here, the Xinhua rewrite of history here). Chinese claim that the Senkakus were administered from Taiwan and are part of Taiwan. They cannot be separated into unrelated dispute bubbles the way Glaser treats them.

Thus, this current paper, just like his previous one, creates a bubble world in which there is no connection between China's expansionist claims in the South and East China Seas, and Taiwan. Indeed, the only way you can make the argument that Taiwan should be kissed off is if you pretend that Taiwan is not related to any other goal of Chinese expansionism. Which is rank nonsense.

In the real world, though, Chinese expansionists having been claiming for decades that the Senkakus were administered by the Qing from Taiwan, which makes them Chinese and part of the Taiwan claim. More importantly, it means that the "dispute" over Taiwan cannot be resolved by handing Taiwan over to China because that will simply bring the war over the Senkakus (and Okinawa) that much closer. Glaser learned nothing from criticism of his 2011 piece -- my comments still apply:

Thus, Glaser's position is contradictory: he argues that the US can avoid war by handing 23 million Taiwanese to Beijing and then beefing up its remaining alliance commitments to show we're still serious -- but in the case of Japan, that alliance is committed to defending territories Beijing covets. Not much point in selling out Taiwan to avoid war if you signal you are willing to go to war over the Senkakus and then beef up your forces in order to do just that. And having burned 23 million pro-American allies along with their armed forces, who would believe you are willing to nuke Beijing for a few rocks in the ocean?

It's not just the Senkakus, though. You'd never know from reading Glaser that the ROC government on Taiwan controls Pratas and Taiping Islands in the South China Sea. The Spratlys are mentioned once -- in a footnote to emphasize how small they are (!). The ROC-held islands in the SCS are not mentioned at all.

At present, you cannot hand over Taiwan to China without disposing of these islands, yet China will never accept any disposition of those islands in which it does not get them. Moreover, once you betray the Taiwanese, in addition to betraying Tokyo, you also betray Manila: Chinese expansionists have made noises about Batan Island and Beijing recently conducted exercises in the Bashi Channel. This means that your brilliant war-avoiding strategy brings China into greater conflict with both Philippines and Japan, two nations the US is bound by treaty obligations to defend in wartime.

Oh, and you increase Chinese power in the SCS by handing over key islands to it, making things worse for Vietnam and Malaysia, increasing the chance of war and giving Beijing a better position to wage it from. Oh, and let's not forget, you invite China to think of new expansionist claims, like to Yoniguni and Ishigaki, not far from Taiwan.

And this brilliant argument -- I laugh to use this word -- is from a "realist".

Far from reducing the chance of a clash between Beijing and Washington, the sell-out crowd ensures that there will be one, with China in a far better position, having gotten Taiwan for nothing, while Washington has given up a powerful asset of 23 million people and their armed forces arrayed against Chinese expansionism, for no gain at all.

But hey, I can think of two authoritarian parties that will be happy to send Charles Glaser on junkets to the Far East, if he keeps writing like this.
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Tsai Ing-wen Rocks DC

Gravel operations on the Lili River.

DPP Presidential candidate and Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen's visit to the US went very well. Enjoy some video of her talking (from here) and check out Walter Lohman's comments in the post below this one. The Taipei Times enthused again...

Following a landmark visit to the White House on Wednesday, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) met US Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Thursday, making her the first Taiwanese presidential candidate to have entered the US Department of State headquarters.

US Department of State officials said at a post-meeting press conference that they appreciated Tsai’s visit, during which she held “constructive” talks with US officials.

Based on the US’ “one China” policy — as stipulated in the Three Joint Communiques between Washington and Beijing and the US’ Taiwan Relations Act — the US has developed solid unofficial ties with Taiwan, the officials said.

For the State Department to welcome the DPP candidate is unprecedented -- remember just a few years ago, in 2007, when the State Department shamefully objected to pixels containing an image of Chen Shui-bian assembling themselves in the United States for a teleconference?

All the behind the scenes commentary I've heard about the visit is very positive. Tsai was very well received. An important driver of this sea change is China's belligerent behavior, which is making Washington reconsider its China policy. Evan Medeiros, the architect of Obama's ailing China policy, is stepping down this week. Perhaps this will put an end to the cloud-cuckooland idea that a "breakthrough" could be achieved with China. Senator McCain released a statement:

Washington, D.C. ­- U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, released the following statement today regarding his meeting with Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential candidate, earlier this week:

"I was pleased to meet with Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, earlier this week. I was reassured of her support for a responsible foreign policy for Taiwan, her commitment to the status quo in cross-strait relations, and her desire to strengthen relations with the United States. I look forward to continuing to work with a democratic Taiwan that remains economically vibrant and an active contributor to regional peace and stability. I also look forward to another round of open, democratic elections in Taiwan this coming January, where the future of Taiwan is decided by Taiwanese and free from foreign intervention."

Hopefully McCain means not merely China, but also the US, when he refers to "foreign intervention."

Back here in Taiwan, the KMT was so disturbed by the idea of Tsai getting positive publicity, it decided to take advantage of the popularity of the death penalty and execute six people, thus shifting the local conversation back to the death penalty rather than Tsai's landmark visit.

Speaking of the KMT, don't miss Solidarity.tw's excellent piece on the declining KMT mainlander core with many good details. For reference, my old one in The Diplomat and Donovan's great one at China Policy Institute. The KMT gives every indication it isn't going to recover. In fact, suicidal pessimist that I am, I wonder what Beijing will do when it realizes the KMT isn't likely to recover.
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Daily Links:

• Chinese coast guard vessel anchored off Borneo

  He explained that one of the areas within Gugusan Beting Patinggi Ali had become a small island, which resulted in many parties being interested in it, possibly with the intention of encroachment.

• Brookings piece on our excellent health care system
• Howard French with a strong piece in Foreign Policy about the US-China clash in the South China Sea. PLAN used social media this week to announce Bashi Channel and Miyakato Strait are its new operating theatres.
• CPI fell last month according to DGBAS. Sure.....
• Phils, Taipei clash over fishing boats in Philippines waters.
• The sole KMT presidential primary contender, raving Nationalist "I'm married to the KMT" Hung Hsiu-chu said that she would lead the fight to keep the KMT in the legislature. She has little support among the Party factions, who would prefer Wang Jin-pyng or Chairman Eric Chu. I can't wait to see how she will chill light Blue and independent support for the KMT. 
• There's nothing like a government that claims all of China, Mongolia, Xijiang, and Tibet from its tiny post in Taipei telling another government that it must face reality.
• Tsai's rally in NY, where over 1200 came out.
• Clothing maker Patogonia is shocked to find that foreign laborers are treated like slaves.

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Remarks from State: Taiwan: A Vital Partner in Asia

Lunch at a Thai restaurant on the road.

Taiwan: A Vital Partner in East Asia
Remarks
Susan Thornton
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Remarks at the Brookings Institution
Washington, DC
May 21, 2015

As Prepared for Delivery

Thank you, Jeff, for having me here today and for that wonderful introduction. I really appreciate all your support, advice and insight and it's appropriate, of course, to have you here, since much of our good work with Taiwan is built on the foundation you laid.... (READ MORE)

Nelson Report: Taiwan Bid to join AIIB = TPP leverage?

An abandoned strongpoint keeps watch over the coast.

Two interesting items here. First, the Nelson Report, the Washington Insider report, observes that the KMT may be attempting to use AIIB entry as leverage to enter the TPP. At the bottom, a reporter tries to get the State Department to comment on the 1992 Consensus, claiming absurdly that the 1992 Consensus was the basis for the CCP-KMT lovefest. China loves that 1992 Consensus and insists Taiwanese politicians hew to it even though Beijing itself has never accepted it. The US State Department is generally considered pro-China by many observers on all sides of the debates (wow to Newsweek). Thus, it is interesting that the State Department didn't make a statement saying Taiwan should adhere to the 1992 Consensus, which was invented in the 2000s to form a cage for the DPP's future cross-strait policies. Kudos to them. Instead, the State Department said that was something for the participants to worry about...

TAIWAN PLAYING THE AIIB CARD? Taiwan clearly wants to join the next round of TPP negotiations, if/when they get going, and while that obviously would require Taipei finally undertaking ag policy and other reforms its long been aware of and unwilling politically to do...from today's State Dept. brief it would appear that the KMT may think it can dangle possible AIIB membership in front of US policy-makers as a form of "incentive":

QUESTION: The secretary general of the Chinese communist party, Xi Jinping, just had a meeting with Kuomintang's chairman, Chu Li-luan. I'm just curious about the reaction of the U.S. Government to this highest-levels talks between cross-strait political parties.

MR RATHKE: Well, we welcome steps on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to reduce tensions and improve cross-strait relations. We encourage authorities in Beijing and Taipei to continue their constructive dialogue which we believe has led to significant improvements in the cross-strait relationship. And of course, as to the content and the pace and the scope of those interactions, that should be - it should be acceptable to people on both sides of the strait, but we'll leave those details to the people participating in those talks...

...QUESTION: Yeah. Also Chu Li-luan said he hoped Taiwan can take part in the AIIB, and Xi Jinping welcomes that. So will the U.S. support Taiwan's bid to join AIIB?

MR RATHKE: Well, I don't have any comment about the decisions of anyone to participate in the AIIB. The U.S. view on the AIIB has been made quite clear. We consider it important that high standards of transparency be part of the AIIB's approach. I think the President also commented on this just last week, so I don't have anything to add to that...

...QUESTION: And Xi Jinping also mentioned that he has seen some new and important point in cross-strait, and which has impacted Chinese nation and the country's future. I just wonder: Does U.S. have the same point of view?

MR RATHKE: Well, again, we welcome improved cross-strait relations. I'm not going to get into kind of characterizing them further than that. We've seen progress and we welcome that and we encourage continued dialogue.
Yes.

QUESTION: Thank you, Jeff. The '92 Consensus seemed to be the basis for the two sides to actually make the meeting possible. Would the United States think that this may serve as a point of reference for Taiwan's opposition party, the DPP, so that it would be able to open its own dialogue with the mainland some way, particularly when the DPP chair is about to visit the United States? Thank you.

MR RATHKE: Well, I'm not going to comment about how internally these issues are approached. Again, I think our support for improved cross-strait relations is clear.

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Hugh White in Straits Times issues primer on how not to write about the Taiwan Issue

Indonesian maids with their charges

I'm off biking for a few days this weekend. So expect light blogging....

Hugh White in the Straits Times gives a primer in how not to write about the Taiwan issue. Usually when someone flatpeters like this in the international media, I serve it up John-the-Baptist style, as with Bruce Gilley or Charles Glaser. Its tiresome to keep ripping stuff for the same transcendentally obvious mistakes, as naive as if the writer has just discovered that Taiwan exists. But what else can one do? Onward!

Problem 1: Decontextualizing Taiwan
A common approach to wrongly analyzing the Taiwan problem is ripping Taiwan from its larger context of current Chinese expansionism. Observe how, in White's essay, no other nation but China, the US, and Taiwan appear. The closest White gets to mentioning another state is a vague comment about Taiwan seeking support from regional countries (except that it is not, of course, the Ma Administration has not built closer links to any regional power. It's an utter failure in that regard). There's no mention of Japan, for example, though as anyone who actually knows how to think about the problem knows, Japan is intimately related to Taiwan's problems with Chinese expansionism. Hence White's essay only "succeeds" because it proposes a timeless bubble universe that doesn't exist in reality.

The truth is that if geography is the mother of strategy, then Hugh White is an orphan sitting in the street with a begging bowl and a mewling whine. Taiwan in its ROC identity is part of the South China Sea claims. The ROC also claims the Senkakus, which are actually owned by Japan. Eventually China will begin claiming Okinawa, though it is usually silent on this dream (truly fanatical ROCers also speak wistfully about Chinese ownership of Okinawa). The key point is that in Chinese minds the claims to the Senkakus, Taiwan, and Okinawa are all interconnected. Should Taiwan actually sell out to China, this will only increase the pressure on Japan while giving China a far more advantageous position. No doubt China will begin eyeing Yoniguni and Ishigaki to the east of Taiwan, and islands off Philippines as well. And of course, China will pick up Dongsha and Taiping Island. What will that do for stability in the South China Sea?

Thus, as I always point out, selling Taiwan to China won't solve the problem, because the problem is Chinese expansionism, which Taiwan has no control over. Indeed, it will increase the chance of war between China and the US and Japan. Never mind what it would do to the Philippines, which also faces territorial threats from China. The US is committed by treaty to defending Philippines and Japan, it can't hide behind ambiguity. Annexing Taiwan to China thus simply pushes the sellout or fight choice back one level, to the Senkakus and Okinawa on the north and to Philippines on the south. If White seeks to avoid a general war between China and the US, he is going about it precisely the wrong way.

Anyone who looked at a map could figure this out. Why couldn't White?

Problem 2: Patronizing Taiwan

That is why Taiwan and its friends and admirers everywhere have to think very carefully about how to handle the dangerous period that lies ahead and to consider what is ultimately in the best interest of the Taiwanese people, as well as the rest of us. The conclusions will be uncomfortable, but inescapable.

One hears this silliness from time to time: advice to us poor foolish denizens of Taiwan to think carefully. Think! Because god knows we've never thought about the China problem before.

Gosh, thanks Hugh! Without this sage advice, we might never have realized there is a China threat which could result in a general war.

Problem 3: Directly incorporating Chinese propaganda tropes

In the 1990s, after Taiwan became a vigorous democracy, presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian started to push the boundaries of this status quo, seeking a more normal place for Taiwan in the international community. This infuriated Beijing and escalated tensions between China and America.

Two interrelated tropes -- Taiwan provokes China and it escalates tensions. As I've remarked countless times, tensions are caused by China, which manipulates tensions as a foreign policy tool to influence Washington's foreign policymaking and to transfer tension from the Beijing-DC relationship to the Taipei-DC relationship. Understanding this is basic to understanding the deployment of "tensions" in the Taiwan Strait. Or elsewhere.

What's disappearing? Oh yeah, China "pushing the boundaries of this status quo" via a military buildup and forging links with the pro-China parties in Taiwan. Lee and Chen were pushing back against this move, against China's attempts to reduce Taiwan's international space.

 President Xi Jinping seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation 

No shit. White seems to think China has endured absolute centuries of humiliation. Even the PRC claims only a modest century of humiliation, which as we all know, is an expansionist reconstruction of history (here). The whole idea of "humiliation" in its modern form is Chinese propaganda. Writers should stop regurgitating it.

More subtle is the common pro-China trope in which the writer speaks for Beijing and informs us that Beijing's motivation is avenging humiliation, as if China and its leaders were unaware it is engaging in a naked territorial grab. Beijing knows perfectly well what it is doing. The common people, deluded by decades of propaganda, may understand things that way, but elites know they are engaging in territorial expansion.

And China was happy to replace sticks with carrots in dealing with Taipei, apparently expecting that economic integration would eventually pave the way to political reunification

would lead inexorably to precisely the political reunification that Beijing so clearly wants and expects.

But of course, what is happening is not reunification but annexation. "Reunification" is pro-Beijing propaganda.

Academics should adopt more neutral language -- which even the international media has done. "Reunification" seldom appears in the international media now, "unification" is more typical. I don't expect him to use an accurate description of the actual state of affairs such as "annexation". I suppose it's too much to hope that poli sci and strategy types speak truth. Otherwise, how could they find employment in the government?

Problem 4: Seduced by the allure of the "hard" choice

No one visiting Taipei can fail to be impressed by what the Taiwanese have achieved in recent decades, not just economically but also politically, socially and culturally. But the harsh reality is that no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China in order to help Taiwan preserve the status quo. 

Pieces like White's which advocate that Taiwan sell out to China are often presented with a kind of wistful this-hurts-me-more-than-you regret. The writer presents himself (always a male, of course, females seem to be less afflicted with such testosterone delusions) as making the tough choice, the manly choice, the hard choice. Because, as we all know, the greatness of a realpolitik policy is measured by the number of one's friends its betrays.

The "hard" choice appeals to one's sense of one's own toughness. "Hey, I can make the tough call! Look how manly I am! I can betray millions of my own friends and allies!" The reality is that the sell-out is the easy choice. The hard choice is the quiet, long-term effort at alliance building, at awareness raising, at humble day-to-day slogging on behalf of a worthy ally. At changing the world, one mind at a time, one policy at a time, one administration at a time.

Resistance is the real hard choice, Hugh.

Problem 5: Errors of fact and interpretation

But the stark reality is that these days, there is not much the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious pressure from Beijing.

Back in 1996 when they last went toe-to-toe over Taiwan, the US could simply send a couple of aircraft carriers into the area to force China to back off. Today the balance of power is vastly different: China can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade sanctions of the kind the US used against Russia recently are simply unthinkable.

Writers producing this frequently resort to rhetorical tropes like "harsh" and "stark" to describe reality and choices. They present the writer as one able to make tough choices, unlike those squishy-soft Taiwanese (you know, the ones who, unlike White, resist rather than accommodate Chinese expansionism, require all their sons to enter the military, and occupy legislatures when they are pissed off). This acts as a petri dish for breeding false dichotomies, which of course is its rhetorical function.

Note that White says that there is little the US could do. LOL. There are many things the US can do short of the military intervention he actually presents (which was not toe-to-toe in any case, the carriers loitered far from the island, just a gentle reminder). It's not only a choice between military intervention and not intervening in support of Taiwan, except in the case of a hot war.

If "serious pressure" -- whatever that is -- is put on Taiwan, the US can respond by upgrading weapons sales and military contacts. By arranging the sale of Japanese subs to Taiwan. By upgrading its treaty and legal situation with respect to Taiwan. By moving military assets closer to the island. By sending cabinet officials to visit. By making loans and other commercial engagements. By organizing support from and for other regional actors. By a wide range of gestures both symbolic and real. Even by landing two F-18s in Tainan...

The US may or may not choose to do such things. But it always has the ability to.

Rhetorical constructions above and below are examples of how White's essay creates a bubble universe with no relation to reality.

In the past few years, [Taiwan] has slipped quietly into the background as tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea have posed more urgent threats to regional peace and stability. 

White has failed to connect all the dots with this opening comment -- an outcome of his relentless construction of a bubble world. Taiwan is intimately connected to both these areas (d'oh!). One reason the Senkakus and the South China Sea have become more urgent in recent years is that the election of Ma Ying-jeou has enabled Beijing to reduce its tension-mongering with Taiwan and ramp up tensions elsewhere. Tensions have not fallen, they have merely shifted, and increased.

In the 1990s, after Taiwan became a vigorous democracy, presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian started to push the boundaries of this status quo, seeking a more normal place for Taiwan in the international community. This infuriated Beijing and escalated tensions between China and America.

These tensions eased when, in 2003, then US President George W. Bush made it clear that the US would not support any Taiwanese push to change the status quo.

Hahaha. This is simply wrong, more of the same bubble universe that views tension through the lens of what Washington is doing. Here, I'll quote the awesome Mark Harrison in 2005:

The months since the re-election of Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian have seen a rise in tensions across the Taiwan Straits. The softer line which the Chinese government had adopted during Chen’s previous term has been seen to fail with the election result, and there has been a noticible shift in policy and much stronger rhetoric coming out of China.

Anyone could find this out using Google or searching tension on my blog.

This reality does not yet seem to have been understood in Taiwan. The overwhelming desire on the island is to preserve its democracy and avoid reunification by preserving the status quo.

Read the piece carefully: White's essay contains many claims, not a single one which is sourced, evidenced, or given concrete information. What is his source for "this reality does not seem to have been understood in Taiwan?" It's rather strange to think that the military and economic balance between China and the US is not "understood" by millions of people who live inside it everyday, and in a society where every male has to serve in the Army and hundreds of thousands work in China and export to the US. This may come as a shock for White, but perhaps the people who live this problem every day might actually know something about it.

What is the "overwhelming desire" of Taiwanese? It's for independence and international recognition, as poll after poll shows. People support the status quo precisely because it is a watered-down form of independence. They are not avoiding "reunification" but "annexation". White's claim is not wrong on its face, but it certainly requires explanation.

Problem 6: It's Taiwan's fault.

But now old questions about Taiwan's longer-term future are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan could rupture United States-China relations and drive Asia into a major crisis.

Taiwan could rupture US-China relations? Taiwan is one actor -- this may seem incredible, you might want to sit down for this: all the actors in these relationships have their own agency. Poor put-upon Beijing is not the helpless victim of Taiwan's desire to remain free and independent. If relations between China and the US rupture, it is because Beijing or Washington has chosen for them to rupture. Taiwan is not the cause of the problem, because the problem is Chinese expansionism, not Taiwanese resistance. Note that this observation totally vanishes from White's piece. This is another example how people like White who assign agency to China in all other areas of its territorial expansion (for example) take a totally different view of Chinese expansionism when it concerns Taiwan. This attitude hinders both understanding and policy-making.

There's not much more one can say except: see ya on Tuesday.

UPDATE: Michal Thim continues the roasting of White
ALSO: Hugh White rebutted by J Michael Cole in the National Interest
AND THIS: In NASDAQ
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Daily Links:

• A couple of pieces on the unfolding ecological catastrophe in the South China Sea, in The Diplomat and in Eurasia Review. 
• Bevin Chu over at Dateline Taipei translates a UDN editorial calling for a different nomination process. The editorial recognizes how badly the KMT is doing.
• Ketagalan Media on how Taiwan should solve complex international relations affairs like the AIIB
• Interview with Director Barney Cheng on his new Taiwanese-American film.
• Taipei Dome, Mall, facing demolition. This is awesome. I'm giddy contemplating how this may embolden others to take a stand against the construction-industrial state monster consuming Taiwan.

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Robert Sutter Rocks on China

Danger lurks behind every leaf.

Robert Sutter, the longtime US government Taiwan specialist, nails it in a brilliant piece saying, essentially, it's about time the US actually imposed some costs on China for its behavior. He then goes on to lay out some of the actions that the US can take. That the piece is at CSIS, a corporate establishment thinktank which usually advocates unicorns and rainbows for China, is even more impressive. The key point for us is the Taiwan part [emphasis mine]:

2)Taiwan is an area of acute sensitivity for China; one where the United States has several options to raise significant costs for China. As the United States seeks to check China’s recent coercion and intimidation of neighbors, it could devote more attention to Taiwan – which has faced unbridled Chinese military coercion and intimidation for almost two decades. One option is to complicate Chinese defense plans and overall strategy toward Taiwan by allowing the sale of the 66 F-16 fighter jet long sought by the Taiwan government. The cost to China of such action involves not just the planes themselves but the significance of the substantial US demonstration of support for Taiwan in the face of China’s pressure and threats. Another option would involve a more active US posture in support of Taiwanese free expression and identity represented by the so-called Sunflower Movement on the island. Beijing has shown no postive response to the rising importance of such demonstrations of Taiwan identity at odds with Chinese interests. The demonstrations tend to support Taiwan’s political opposition’s wariness on dealing with China. US support for such expressions of Taiwanese identity could further shift Taiwan politics in favor of the opposition against the unpopular government of President Ma Ying-jeou. China would face costly and difficult reevaluation of its reasonably successful policy toward Taiwan, should the opposition win the 2016 presidential election.

Hello! We out here have been advocating these two positions for a while now. Good to see someone in Washington catching up. As I pointed out in 2011:

In need of an update, but still relevant. I'll note once again, as I have so many times, that the constant call for a sell out of Taiwan simply moves the defense against China back to the Senkakus -- uninhabited rocks, without 23 million people who don't want to be part of China, armed forces, and a forward position. Taiwan is a massive inconsistency in US strategy. Not does the US not include it in this strategy, the US even supports the pro-China party in Taiwan. Should they survive our climate policies, future historians will scratch their heads in puzzlement....
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Daily Links:

• SPECIAL: Official Taiwan typhoon closings in Chinese and English
• The KMT army in SE Asia: China's forgotten army
• Interview with China expert Alan Romberg on Cross-Strait Relations after the Sunflower Movement.
• Glenn Smith with another good piece at FPIF: Youth Movements Flourishing on China's Doorstep

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

US Experts Throw Beijing a Helping Hand

Camouflage expert.

In the Washington-Tokyo-Taipei-Beijing quadrangle, one of Beijing's most important strategic goals is to transfer tension from the Washington-Beijing relationship to the Washington-Taipei relationship. Not only does that occur often, in each case to the detriment of Taiwan, but one also sees, sadly, that US experts frequently incorporate this idea "tension" into their analyses of the Washington-Taipei relationship. As in this piece the other day that Ben Goren ripped (link below). The writers of the report, Michael O'Hanlon and Jim Steinberg, note:

Beijing should make its stated intention of seeking a peaceful path to unification credible by putting some limits on its military modernization and stopping military exercises focused on intimidating Taiwan through missile barrages or blockades, they added.

“For Washington, it means making sure that the arms it sells [to] Taipei are in fact defensive and demonstrating a willingness to scale back such arms sales in response to meaningful, observable, and hard-to-reverse reductions in China’s threatening stance toward Taiwan,” they added. “Fortunately, both sides are already pursuing key elements of such an agenda.”

What a lame piece of analysis which incorporates a pair of ugly American analytical habits. First, they demand that the US put a crimp in arms sales. In exchange -- no, I kid you not -- they ask Beijing to stop military exercises that might intimidate Taiwan and stop some arms buildup. This is the classic US vs China negotiating stance, in which the US gives up some permanent interest in exchange for limited and temporary gains. No point in even commenting on how silly it is to ask Beijing to give up exercises in exchange for not selling weapons.

Exercises might even be useful -- they remind the Taiwanese that things are not well. Useful, since other US experts want Taiwan to spend more on defense. Reducing exercises might well lead everyone to the false conclusion that things are better than they actually are... creating complacency among the Taiwan (and US) public.

The writers also identify two sets of tension. The first is Beijing's desire to annex Taiwan which causes Beijing to threaten it, leading to tension. The other is US arms sales to Taiwan, which causes tension.

LOL.

In both cases the tension is caused by Beijing's desire to annex Taiwan. Beijing objects to arms because they complicate its desire to annex Taiwan. Arms sales do not "cause" tensions -- to make that claim is to deny that Beijing has agency, as if Beijing were a coin bank that makes a noise every time you toss a quarter into it. Beijing chooses to ratchet up "tensions". Beijing employs "tension" against arms sales as a way to shape the way policymakers think about the relationship with China -- "tension" is a policy, not a visceral reaction. A very successful one, in this case. The correct response to such artificial tensions is to ignore them, politely.

And definitely, not to incorporate them into your own analyses. That just legitimates the "tension" tactic of Beijing and encourages it to deploy "tensions" more often. Argh. Way to go, O'Hanlon and Steinberg.
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Daily Links:

• The start up ecosystem in Taiwan at a glance
• Ben G: US policy: a headless pushme-pullyu. Beijing's ability to transfer tension from the Washington-Beijing relationship to the Washington-Taipei relationship is one of its great policy triumphs. O wait, already said that....
• Beijing attacking democracy sites in Hong Kong -- and Apple media in Taiwan with denial of service assaults?
• Ben G is interviewed by Ketagalen Media. Well done!
• MKL with a great post on scooter ownership and other driving stats.
• Taiwan fishing boat hijacked by its indonesian crew
• The fight over bail for the Keelung city council speaker continues.
• Taiwan scholar prevented from entering Hong Kong

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Just a note on the Senkakus/Diaoyutai mess

Oops.

Jon Sullivan over at the U of Nottingham tweeted round this paper on the Senkakus/Diaoyutai and western and eastern systems of international governance (the next paper in that file discusses Taiwanese netizen attitudes towards the Senkakus and sovereignty). It makes some interesting points and is constructed in a very articulate and smooth propagandistic way. However, it contains an interesting anecdote about the Senkakus that I hadn't heard before....

...when former US President Ulysses Simpson Grant was visiting China and Japan in mid-1879. Grant agreed to mediate the dispute at the request of Li Hongzhang and Prince Gong, and offered a proposal with American diplomats in Japan as a basis for negotiation. The proposal suggested dividing the Ryukyu Islands into three parts: the central part would belong to the residual Ryukyu Kingdom protected by Chinese and Japanese consuls, the southern part would belong to China, being close to Taiwan, and the northern part would belong to Japan, being close to Satsuma (Kagoshima).

Think about it for a second. If the Manchus thought the Senkakus were part of their colonial empire, they would have said "we already own that, the issue is the islands to the north." But no one did. Instead, Grant had to suggest that the southern islands of the Ryukyus be annexed to Taiwan... because they weren't at that time. D'oh.
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Another problem with ending strategic ambiguity

Taiwan currently controls Pratas Island (Dongsha) and Taiping island, the largest of the Spratlys. Map source.

Lately calls for ending US strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan have appeared in the media, as they do cyclically. I raked one by Etzioni over the coals a couple of weeks ago. Joseph Bosco has also been calling for the US to unambiguously declare it would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack (2010 for example).

Responding to the piece on Etzioni I wrote:

In the Senkakus the situation is crystal clear: we have an exact analogy for Taiwan, a foreign territory, Japan, backed by the US with strong and periodically renewed clarity. Everyone knows that the Senkakus are currently Japanese, that China wants to annex them, and that the US will defend them.

I had forgotten of course, that Taiwan also offers a mirror to the Senkakus: the ROC holdings in the South China Sea.

Imagine if the US were to declare that it would defend Taiwan in case of Chinese attack. Because the ROC/Taiwan holds islands in the South China Sea, this may commit the US to defending them without -- as always -- declaring who is the proper claimant. These islands are claimed by several nations, not just the PRC and ROC, meaning that the US could find itself angering nations whose friendship it needs (just as Taiwan already is with these claims). And that's just the beginning...

...because what is happening in the Senkakus, the slow growth of tension via military and diplomatic moves, creating Japanese countermoves that Beijing can portray as "aggression", can just as easily happen in the South China Sea, if the US position becomes unambiguous, just as it is in the Senkakus. A well-defined policy invites testing of limits, a policy with no definition has no limits that can be tested.

 In addition to creating incidents Beijing can use to construct an "aggressive Japan" narrative, tension generated by Beijing is used by Beijing to harm the relationship between the US and its allies -- in other words, one of Beijing's most important strategic goals is transferring tension from the Beijing-Washington relationship to the Washington-Taipei and Washington-Tokyo relationship.

Just tossing this idea out there. But by unambiguously promising to defend Taiwan, the US may simply involve itself even deeper in the South China Sea disputes in unwelcome, complicated, and unpredictable ways.

ADDED: I also wanted to point out that if the US guarantees to defend Taiwan against attack, it guarantees the South China Sea holdings, which are held by the ROC as Chinese claims. This would put the US in the very awkward position of fighting for Chinese claims over the South China Sea islands (against China!), or else rejecting those claims formally by refusing to defend them.
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Daily Links:

• BREAKING: Sean Lien declares his candidacy for Taipei mayor.
• Japan's maritime and security interests in the various territorial disputes.
• US stake in the cross-strait dialogue: not a bad review, but for some reason the writer imagines that there is a treaty that says the US thinks Taiwan is part of China.
• Taiwan and China to build water main to Kinmen
• Hear in Taiwan reflects on a billboard for beauty treatments
• Annette Lu asks Sean Lien and Ko Wen-je to explain their China ties. The Taipei mayor election will be fun this year.
• Yet another poll finding that majority support independence, reject annexation.
• Ben: Hilarity ensues on the intertubes as a statue of Sun Yat-sen is pulled down
• Smartphone industry takes year-end sales hit
• Awful Forbes piece from corporate-funded "pro-business" group wonders why the US funds Taiwan. No really, it's not an Onion piece.
• PHOTOS: Darren Melrose's series Diptych
• NOT TAIWAN: How did I never hear this gorgeous symphony by Erkki Melartin until this year?
• EVENT: LSE sent this around:
  I am very pleased to announce two seminars that will be taking place during March 2014 as part of our series on “Taiwan and Hong Kong in Comparative Perspective”. Both deal with topics relating to identity and education.
  
  Title: Schooling, History and the Construction of Identity in Hong Kong
  Speaker: Paul Morris (Institute of Education)
  Date: Wednesday 12 March, 6pm-8pm
  Location: Room G.17, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, LSE
  
  Title: Officially-Sanctioned Narratives of the War and Occupation in Hong Kong
  Speaker: Edward Vickers (Kyushu University)
  Date: Wednesday 19 March, 6pm-8pm
  Location: Room G.17, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, LSE

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

BLAST FROM THE PAST: Globe and Mail, 1982

A friend sent this around, in case you were wondering what the official US stance on Taiwan is....

The Globe and Mail (Canada)
July 19, 1982 Monday
AROUND THE WORLD China warns Shultz
BYLINE: GAM
LENGTH: 82 words
DATELINE: Peking CHINA

PEKING - China told U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz yesterday that the Reagan Administration would sabotage Sino-U.S. relations if it bowed to pressure from Washington's Taiwan lobby. The official People's Daily newspaper accused Mr. Shultz of contradicting himself during his Senate confirmation hearings last week, quoting him as saying that the United States never formally recognized Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, but as acknowledging at the same time that there was only one China.

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

US Arms Sales vs China's Military Build Up

A delicate damselfly.

Two counterpoints in the Taipei Times today. First, longtime Taiwan supporter Randy Shriver, speaking at a conference this week, urged the continuance of US arms sales....

However, despite the economic, diplomatic and political improvements, the PLA has not “removed a single missile, a single military unit,” he said.

“They have done nothing to reduce the posture opposite Taiwan in a way that reduces their military capability and presence,” he added.

In fact, the Chinese military buildup opposite Taiwan has “continued apace” while Taiwan’s own military budgets have fallen, Schriver said.

“Perhaps the PLA and the PRC [the People’s Republic of China] leadership is not confident in the ultimate trajectory of Taiwan,” he said. “Perhaps they understand some things that a lot of Americans miss.”

Meanwhile President Ma said he would continue to purchase US arms. Both sets of remarks came in response to reports in the media that China had claimed the US had responded positively to discussing the sales. Reports even said that China would "adjust" its military deployments against Taiwan in exchange for reduced arms sales. Adjust upward, they no doubt meant. Washington later said that talks would be held with Beijing on several issues, but arms for Taiwan would not be included.

From the number of people who echo Shriver's last observation there -- that American observers are not getting what is going in the cross-strait relationship, it seems that, well, lots of people aren't getting it. It seems obvious that if the military build up continues apace, then tensions are not being reduced. They are merely being obscured.....
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

UPDATED: Hegemonic Warfare Watch: Taiwan, pivotal or not?

Catholic facility in Tanzih, probably aimed at the large population of Filipino workers in the nearby export processing zone. With what's coming in Asia in a few years, we'll need all the help we can get.

Typing this on my new Nexus 7 tablet with a mobile Bluetooth keyboard. Got it so I'd have a light computer solution for biking and travel. The two together weigh roughly 750 grams....

The resignation of Andrew Yang after only six days as Minister of Defense for plagiarism has rocked the nation. The local media and several longtime observers who know Yang personally are saying it appears to be the result of a power struggle within the Ministry of National Defense.... UPDATE: J Michael Cole has a great post on it pointing out that two DPP politicos sparked it, and he detects the hand of China in it. What purblind stupidity. Not only does this attack on Yang appear to have violated DPP goals and policies but it also appears to have hurt Taiwan. By all accounts Yang would have made a great Defense Minister who was truly committed to the island's defense. The Kuan Bi-ling who brought up the alleged plagiarism charge against Yang also has her name on the credulous "Two Minutes, One Fact" video that went viral during the crisis with the Phils two months ago. Self-promotion, much? Can we have some Party discipline laid down on these people.

The Diplomat says China's new aircraft carrier should be put into perspective... and that perspective should be Sino-Russian cooperation.

There are also long-term regional factors that must be evaluated. While Russia today is considered a regional partner and not a threat to China's borders, history shows that the situation can change rapidly. Beijing has been able to pour tremendous resources into its naval assets in part because Sino-Russian relations have transformed in recent decades.

...this will last only as long as China and Russia are friends. When they break up, then resources will have to shift to the land forces. Meanwhile, Manila expanded its Navy by taking aboard a US coast guard cutter. Which is 46 years old. Beijing must be quaking in its boots.

A former staffer for Cong. Ros-Lehtinen, a strong Taiwan supporter, added another piece to the ongoing discussion inside the Beltway over whether the US should continue to support Taiwan:

Any hint of a diminution of American commitment in the Pacific, however, could trigger a slow unraveling of this very alliance structure that maintains the peace and prosperity of the most economically dynamic region of the world. Imagine the shock waves, from Seoul and Tokyo in the north to Manila and Canberra in the south, which would follow in the wake of an American accommodation to a coercive move by Beijing against Taiwan. The imposition by force of an externally mandated political settlement contrary to the aspirations of the people of Taiwan would not only be diametrically opposed to America's own core values but would raise doubts about the durability of Pax Americana in the Asia-Pacific.

Whatever the restraints placed on Asian capitals' freedom of action by Beijing's coercive “one China” policy, diplomats in most of these capitals look to Washington as a strong counterweight to a re-emerging but still authoritarian China. If this counterweight is brought into question, policy makers in Seoul might conclude that Korea's best, if painful, option would be to return to its traditional, compromised relationship with the resurgent Middle Kingdom. An increasingly isolated Japan, concerned once again with the acquirement of energy resources in a post-Fukushima era, might see a risky go-it-alone strategy as the only option. Southeast Asian nations might also view further accommodation to Beijing's mercantile and territorial demands as the only viable alternative.

Sturdy, familiar language, all true, of course. I wonder if it too strongly echoes the kind of strong claims made about "losing" Vietnam. Not so much a criticism, as a thought about rhetoric and positioning. Yet what other language is there to speak?

USA Today also ran a piece recently on the limits to US engagement with Taiwan:

But three weeks from now, on August 11, the president of another Asian territory with close proximity to China will be slipping as quietly as possible into the United States. Ma Ying-jeou, the Harvard-educated lawyer who is president of Taiwan, will find himself treated to none of the pomp and circumstance of a White House welcome. Indeed, he's not welcome in Washington at all. He'll be touching down in New York, en route to Paraguay where he will be an honored guest for the inauguration of their new president. But in New York, President Ma will be whisked off as quickly and quietly as possible to an undisclosed hotel where folks into whose ears his arrival has been whispered will be allowed to pay him a stealth visit. There'll be no press conference. Not even a press release when he is still in the U.S. And the folks in the Taiwanese consulate in New York, when queried, simply raise a single finger to their lips. On the return trip, he'll repeat the same, stealth-style visit to Los Angeles.

Another one of those don't-they-have-google moments: Ma is not a lawyer. That silliness will never die. It's not much of a piece, merely noting that the US begrudges Taiwan less than it deserves, and that Taiwan is being moved closer to China.

Finally, an interesting recent piece in The Diplomat observes what so many of us have remarked on: that China is basically containing itself:

Today, a new bipolar competition is taking shape. While not a global chess match for influence or a new "Cold War" as some theorize, the United States and the People's Republic of China faceoff in a competitive contest in the Asia-Pacific and larger Indo-Pacific region. In November 2011 in a now famous long form op-ed in Foreign Policy, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out American's strategy of a "pivot" to Asia. Chinese pundits and media have panned the pivot or now respun "rebalance" as a blatant attempt to contain China's rise. One Chinese professor even remarked, “The pivot is a very stupid choice… the United States has achieved nothing and only annoyed China. China can’t be contained.”

I agree — unless China makes the choice to contain itself.

Instead of sweet-talking the region and exploiting its strong opposition to imperialism and colonialism from the west, Beijing's very obvious expansionism has made enemies of would-be friends, driving them to contain it.

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Daily Links:

• Only in Taiwan: making dictators cute.
  

  "I have remarked elsewhere that he still lords it up in some spectacularly inappropriate locations, such as the Zhongzheng Park (中正公園) in Chiayi (嘉義) opposite the museum dedicated to the artist Chen Cheng-po (陳澄波), a man who Chiang had shot in the street for daring to ask for Formosan participation in government."

• Legislature agrees to try Hung case in civilian court. This will have zero impact on the military's culture and atmosphere, but it does give the appearance of actually doing something.
• HSR tix to rise nearly 10%.

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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

State Department Brief May 15, Taiwan section on Phils/Taiwan clash

A walkway along a section of the old Hengchun city wall.

State Department Daily Press Briefing, May 15, 2013. Main questioner, I heard, was John Zhang of CTITV

+++++++++++++++++

MR VENTRELL: It looks like we have some questions maybe on the Philippines and Taiwan. (Laughter.) I’m just guessing.

QUESTION: Yeah. Patrick, do you have anything new to say on the fatal shooting of the Taiwanese fisherman by the Philippines? Jen said a couple of days ago that the United States was in contact with both Taiwan and the Philippines. How is your communication with both sides? How effective is your communication? Because the problem seems to be far from ending. Thank you.

MR. VENTRELL: Thanks for the question – John, am I correct?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. VENTRELL: Thanks, John. So, we’re concerned by the increase in tensions between two neighboring democracies and close partners of the United States in the Asia Pacific region. We note that the Philippine President appointed a personal representative to Taiwan to convey his deep regret and apology to the family of the fisherman and the people of Taiwan. We welcome the Philippine Government’s pledge to conduct a thorough and expeditious investigation into the incident and cooperate promptly and fully with Taiwan investigators. We urge the Philippines and Taiwan to take all appropriate measures to clarify disagreements and prevent recurrence of such tragic events. And we continue to urge both parties to ensure maritime safety and to refrain from actions that could further escalate tensions in the region and undermine the prospects for a rapid and effective resolution of differences.

QUESTION: How is your communication with both sides so far?

MR. VENTRELL: You know that these are partners with whom we have extensive relationships. I’m not going to get into the day-to-day readout of our diplomacy, whether it’s from Washington or our posts overseas. But I’m just not going to get into that level of detail.

QUESTION: Patrick, just about some factual data, is it – have you learned exactly the location of the incident? And when the investigation will be revealed to the public? So far, how much fact have you learned?

MR. VENTRELL: I don’t have any information on when the investigation may be completed, and refer you to the Government of the Philippines. But it appears the incident took place in or near disputed waters where the Philippines and Taiwan both claim fishing rights. The United States does not take a position on the proper location of a maritime boundary in that area.

QUESTION: What is “in or near disputed area” – so it’s disputed whether it’s in disputed area or not?

MR. VENTRELL: I mean, again, that’s a pretty rough estimate.

QUESTION: Can’t you just say it’s in disputed area then?

MR. VENTRELL: Again, this is in or near disputed waters. That’s all the accuracy we – that’s all the level of detail we have.

QUESTION: And that’s everywhere in the world, correct?

MR. VENTRELL: (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Everywhere in the water, it must be in or at some point near to disputed waters. (Laughter.)

MR. VENTRELL: The point is, Brad, we’re not able to pinpoint exactly whether it was inside the disputed waters or --

QUESTION: It was in the water.

MR. VENTRELL: -- or very nearby that disputed area.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. VENTRELL: That’s the point. Bingru, go ahead.

QUESTION: Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou actually rejected the Philippines apology as lacking sincerity. Do you consider Philippines apology is sincere?

MR. VENTRELL: Well, again, in terms of an apology, this is a determination for the Taiwan authorities to make, and they can discuss that as appropriate directly with the Government of the Philippines. So that’s a judgment that they’re making.

QUESTION: And you also mentioned your concern about the increase tension. Are you concerned this conflict, as it’s rising, would undermine the U.S. interest in Asia Pacific?

MR. VENTRELL: Again, I’m not going to draw sort of that broad a conclusion, other than to say that we’re concerned about this increase in tension. And so these are two partners that we have a robust relationship with both of them and we want them to work through their differences on this issue as expeditiously as they can.

QUESTION: So, to what level do you have contact with both side?

MR. VENTRELL: I already answered that question, that we have diplomatic discussions, but I’m just not going to get into the back-and-forth of every discussion at every level.

QUESTION: Patrick, the death of the Taiwanese fisherman was a main factor why there has been outrage all over Taiwan. The United States has expressed regret over the death of the fisherman. Would the United States express something more than regret? Sympathy or – because, after all, Taiwan is an ally of the United States, as you say.

MR. VENTRELL: It is up to the Philippines and Taiwan to determine the specific terms of the resolution on this immediate issue. We’ve said we have already on the specific incident.

Nike, you go ahead. You’ve been waiting in the back.

QUESTION: Yeah. Patrick, you mentioned several times about maritime security. Broadly speaking, is it against the code of conduct or the freedom of navigation to use violence against any party in disputed waters?

MR. VENTRELL: Well, code of conduct is something that’s still being worked through, and it’s something we’ve encouraged, so that there are rules of the road. And so this is not something that is a process that’s been completed, but it’s precisely incidents such as this which underscore the need for a code of conduct as we work through these issues in the wide range of the Pacific where there are disputed areas of territorial waters and other claims to various territories.

QUESTION: Well, Patrick, there are some story indicated that U.S. has dissuaded Taiwan to send a military ship to protect their fishermen. And – so I would just wonder, do you want it clarified, does U.S. really involve in this kind of conversation? And – because there is some criticism from Taiwan about a U.S. action.

MR. VENTRELL: Yeah, I’m not aware – I don’t have any information on that one way or another on that specific item. I think I’ve done what I can on this issue. Are there – one more.

QUESTION: Yeah. Taiwan says apology from Philippine over the shooting is inadequate, and threatens to impose more sanctions. How do you see these sanctions?

MR. VENTRELL: I already answered that question. So, okay.

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

MR. VENTRELL: Different topic?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. VENTRELL: Nike, go ahead.

QUESTION: Yeah. I apologize if this issue has already been addressed, because I’m a little late. Secretary Kerry is in Sweden for the Arctic Council --

MR. VENTRELL: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- and today six countries, including China, Japan, South Korea, have become – has become the permanent observer. And so I wonder if you have anything on that. What is the rationale for the United States to support China’s permanent observer status, and what does the United States expect from China in the Arctic Council? Thank you.

MR. VENTRELL: Well, the Secretary already spoke to this pretty extensively, so we’ll get you his comments and reaction. You know that the chairmanship will go to Canada for the next two years, and then we look forward to the U.S. having the chairmanship here, and that these additional observers were added. But I really don’t have any information beyond what the Secretary said.

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