Map of the South China Sea claims
The current
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)(
Wiki summary) began as a conference in in 1973 and was concluded in 1982. It replaces sets of treaties on the territories and their surrounding ocean control dating back to 1958, along with earlier customary and legal practices. Because it enables nations to claim the seabed and oceans surrounding what are essentially uninhabited and useless rocks in the sea, it has led to situations of overlapping claims and tension in several areas of the world as nations rush to grab previously undefined and unclaimed territory, and manufacture "historical" reasons to claim it.
It's been dominating the news lately....
Ian Storey, who writes frequently on China and its neighbors,
was interviewed at NBR this week on the South China Sea. He was asked:
What are the chances of conflict breaking out as a result of the disputes?
I do not think there is any immediate danger of a full-blown conflict in the South China Sea, as this is in no country’s interests. What worries me is the increasing frequency of skirmishes at sea involving warships, vessels from maritime agencies, survey ships, and fishing boats, which raises the risk of an accidental clash at sea. Such a clash, which could easily escalate into something more serious, would raise tensions even further and fuel instability. Unfortunately, there are no conflict avoidance mechanisms in place between China and the countries of Southeast Asia. There is thus an urgent need to implement such mechanisms before tense stand-offs spiral out of control.
This position is a common one. James Manicom at
The Diplomat argued that the row between Japan and China over the Senkakus, which led to an agreement to jointly exploit the Chunxiao Field nearby, shows that these conflicts need not result in war. But as Manicom notes, Japan has a substantial military and is backed by the US, whereas Vietnam is no match for China and the
Hukbong Dagat ng Pilipinas is no threat either. In the South China Sea, things may not end in war simply because the side opposed to China is incapable of offering it. Unless the US decides to stick a hand in.....
The interesting news this week is that China let drop a hint it wants cooperation with Taiwan on the South China Sea. The
Jamestown Brief has the call...
Press release No.186, issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 7, emphasized Taiwan’s support for the U.S. position on the principle of “freedom of navigation” (Mofa.gov.tw, June 7; Wen Wei Po [Hong Kong], June 8). On June 15, Yang Yi, spokesman for the Chinese State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, responded that China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their surrounding waters, and that people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait have a shared responsibility to safeguard sovereignty over the islands and their surrounding waters (Xinhua News Agency, June 15). Yang’s statement has been interpreted by some Chinese media as Beijing’s desire to cooperate with Taiwan on managing maritime disputes in the region (Global Times, June 17).
Readers may recall that there was some talk of CCP-KMT cooperation on the Senkaku issue as well. China has a basic packet of behaviors it engages in irrespective of the territory it is currently targeting, and if Taiwan is involved, angling for cooperation from the KMT is one. Readers familiar with the Tibet situation will recall that KMT agents among Tibetan groups in India and elsewhere, while opposing the CCP, also attempt to block moves that support Tibet regaining its independence.
However, the Jamestown Brief notes that the Ma Administration's moves to beef up Taiwan's military presence in the area may separate it from China:
The Ma government’s emphasis on the “freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea is a subtle but significant departure from the administration’s low-key approach and could have important implications for cross-Strait relations. Coupled with the Taiwanese government’s plan to possibly deploy patrol vessels and additional military assets on the disputed islets may signal a rethink and a possible shift in the administration’s position on maritime disputes vis-à-vis China. Indeed, in spite of the growing tensions and conflict in the South China Sea, since President Ma came into office in 2008, Taiwan had been relatively quiet about the South China Sea. This led some observers to suspect that the Ma administration was leaning too much toward China (China Post, April 18). If, in fact, the Ma administration intends to draw a distinction between Taiwan’s and China’s interpretation of its territorial claim, it would demonstrate Taiwan as an independent claimant to the dispute. This will likely lead to more friction between Taiwan and China over competing maritime claims. Amid growing concerns about his administration’s increasing tilt toward China, Ma’s shift may be seen as a sign of reassurance by the current government to regional neighbors and the United States that it will maintain a balance while still pursuing cross-Strait rapprochement.
This move will also pay dividends domestically. The Chen Administration also milked military posturing in the South China Sea to make itself look tough at home.
Another common tactic China uses in its territorial expansion is to attempt to prevent internationalization of the issue. This week China
took another verbal shot at nations attempt to bring in outsiders (the US, in other words). China's goal is to face down the smaller nations individually. Since the nations bordering the South China Sea have conflicting claims to the region, this may not be difficult.
Meanwhile, the news this week rolled. Absurdly, Philippines has begun calling the South China Sea "the West Philippine Sea", exampled in
this report of Manila urging the UN to enforce the UNCLOS. For the
third straight week protesters convened outside the China embassy in Hanoi, protesting Chinese moves against Vietnam in the area. Philippines also
removed wooden border markers on what it considers its territory, but carefully refrained from speculating about whose they might be.
China's position on the South China Sea is also reviewed at Oceanlaw.org. In "
Creeping Jurisdiction Must Stop" the authors argue:
China’s claims to those resources rest in part on historic claims illustrated in a map in which a series of nine dashed lines indicate some degree of jurisdiction over virtually all of the waters of the region (a similar claim has been made by Taiwan). With regard to U.S. naval operations, China has argued that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits foreign military operations within its EEZ, a contention found nowhere in the text of the convention itself. China has raised the stakes by stating that control of the South China Sea and its resources is a core national interest on par with its claims to Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang.
Yet Chinese claims are ambiguous. Does the nine-dash chart signify territorial claims to the South China Sea and the seafloor, or does it apply only to the rocks and their territorial sea within the marked zone? Are the claims really a “core interest,” or are they a starting point for negotiating the division of fishing and energy resources of the region?
I don't think the claims are a starting point for negotiation but a simple declaration which sooner or later China will have to back up by force. The fact that the dashed lines go through the EEZ of the Natuna Islands (Indonesia) suggests that it is the seafloor and economic resources China is claiming. Why else draw the line there?
Note that despite pious commentary from US officials on UNCLOS, the US has signed but never ratified that agreement, it merely says it will follow it. However, DoD officials are keenly aware of how this weakens the US position, and
in the recent 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, argued that the US should accede to UNCLOS.
The effect of changing climate on the Department's operating environment is evident in the maritime commons of the Arctic. The opening of the Arctic waters in the decades ahead which will permit seasonal commerce and transit presents a unique opportunity to work collaboratively in multilateral forums to promote a balanced approach to improving human and environmental security in the region. In that effort, DoD must work with the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security to address gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, search and rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting capabilities to support both current and future planning and operations. To support cooperative engagement in the Arctic, DoD strongly supports accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
While DoD is discussing the Arctic, another flashpoint being heated up by the humans around it, this also applies to the South China Sea; it is ridiculous for Washington to accuse China of not following a convention that the US has never officially ratified.
_____________
Daily Links:
_______________________
[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums! Delenda est, baby.
PLEA: All you academics on email lists discussing this -- it's time to stop discussing. The next open letter that comes around needs to have YOUR signature on it.
