Final comments on whether Chiang set up 2-28

In Formosa Betrayed, George Kerr’s foundational work on the 2-28 massacre, he describes the provision of intelligence on Taiwan to the US government by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Chungking during WWII, saying:

"In addition to these reports on subversion potential, and on specific communications and industrial objectives, we also received from Chungking a long report on Formosan-Chinese leaders, and on Formosans who were exiles in China."(p14)

The report had been prepared by an exiled Formosan whom Kerr identifies as a notorious schemer, but this brief remark is a window into a world generally neglected in historical writing on 2-28. After opening that window, we can ask: did Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT set up the massacre so they could murder the local leadership, which otherwise might oppose KMT rule?

The problem of historiography
Formosa Betrayed opens with a discussion of US policy toward Formosa during the war, then presents the background of Chen Yi, who would become governor of Formosa in 1945, and then briefly covers the expectations of Formosan leaders in 1945. Kerr then moves on to the arrival of the US and ROC leaders in Taiwan, and from there to a narrative of the development of the revolt.

Similarly, in A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947, another commonly cited work on 2-28, Ramon Myers and Lai Zehan, after setting the stage in the first chapter, move on to a detailed discussion of the people of Taiwan under Japanese rule, followed by a chapter describing the establishment of KMT rule in Taiwan.

This pattern of presenting the Taiwan experience of Japanese rule, followed by the beginning of KMT rule on the island, is true of almost all presentations of 2-28’s history, long or short. Even the Wiki page on the event offers a Background that briefly describes the experiences of Taiwan and its people under Japanese rule, followed by a somewhat longer explication of KMT rule. It then presents the revolt.

There’s a key element missing: this discourse emphasizes the continuity of the Taiwanese experience with Japanese Formosa while ignoring the continuity of KMT experience with Japanese Formosa.

Instead, the KMT in Taiwan in 1945 is always presented as if it had simply parachuted in from China with little or no prior knowledge of Taiwan. Chen Yi’s trip to Taiwan and background is often mentioned, but the KMT’s extensive knowledge of Taiwan and Taiwanese in the prewar era typically draws no attention. Kerr, for example, writes:

“Chiang's personal power within China derived from his consummate skill in playing off one powerful Party or Army faction against another and his family alliance with the leading industrialists and financiers. In mid-year 1945, the so-called Political Science Group was the faction momentarily in the ascendant at Chungking. When a temporary committee was established to plan for the "Provisional Government of Taiwan Province," a member of this group became the Chairman.

This was Chiang's friend General Chen Yi.”(p47)

Kerr provides detailed information on the relationship between Chen Yi, the Soong family, and Chiang Kai-shek, yet tells us nothing about this committee or of the KMT’s knowledge of Formosa. What was its understanding of Formosa? What were its information sources?

Instead of presenting a chapter on the extensive and detailed knowledge the KMT had of Taiwanese and their politics on Formosa, most writers simply give Chen Yi’s background in Fujian and his trip to Taiwan. This unconsciously signals the reader that no other knowledge exists or is necessary. Thus, Chen Yi’s Taiwan-related background comes to stand in for the KMT’s background on Taiwan.

This neglect of the KMT’s connections to Formosans and its knowledge of their political positions functions as an apologetic for Chiang and the KMT in its own right. If the reader never learns of prior deep KMT knowledge of Taiwan, the reader will never make the connection to possibility that Chiang planned it all. Indeed, that possibility is disallowed by the discourse.

It also underpins further apologetic positions, such as the oft-heard “Chen Yi misled Chiang” or “Chiang was too distracted by events in China” and so forth. Such comments only make sense if the analytical context is that the KMT and Chiang were completely ignorant of Formosa prior to the KMT's arrival there in 1945, and Chen Yi was the Party's sole major connection to Taiwan. But that is totally untrue.

As we have seen in my two other posts (here and here), the KMT had deep knowledge of Taiwan’s politics and its major leaders. But there’s another issue with Chen Yi I’d like to highlight.

2-28 was a reprise. When Chen Yi was governor of Fukien province, he imprisoned and killed students protesting for stronger anti-Japanese members, along with members of the People’s Political Councils. According to Kerr, Chen Yi brought in the big state monopolies and Japanese businesses, and drove thousands of small traders into bankruptcy.

“In the period of Chen Yi's governorship the Province of Fukien was systematically looted. Hot-headed students demonstrated, rioting broke out again and again, and Chen Yi reacted without mercy. The brutality with which students were tortured and killed in Fukien set something of a record even for China”(p55).

The province was “systematically looted” according to Kerr. Sound familiar?

When Chen Yi was posted to Taiwan, there were protests from both Chinese and from expatriate Formosans living in China. Indeed, it was Formosans who were familiar with Chen Yi’s record from Fujian who were among his biggest critics after he took over Taiwan. These vociferous criticisms and predictions were of course known to the KMT and to Chiang.

Did Chiang set up 2-28? Either Chiang understood the consequences of Chen Yi’s appointment and meant for something like the revolts in Fujian to happen so that a generation of Formosan leadership could be wiped out, or he was completely indifferent to the fate of Taiwan, or he was stupid beyond belief.

Yet remember, when you pick, that whatever his innumerable faults, one strength Chiang had was strong political skills...

UPDATE:
Great comment

Anonymous Anonymous said...
Actually quite some research has been done on the preparation committee you mention (especially by Taiwanese historians and published in Chinese). [mt: yeah, so its influence on the construction of the discourse on KMT entry into Taiwan is limited]. Among other things, the committee did not have any Taiwanese members when it was founded in April 1944. CKS insisted on putting some Taiwanese on only after the first few months, but even then their influence remained restricted. The whole thing was more for show and to appease the few voices within the KMT, who argued for Taiwan's incorporation into China, most of whom were banshan.

The committee eventually did publish a report and made all kinds of suggestions about the future rule of Taiwan, it even mentioned the possibility of some kind of self-rule. Of course, all those suggestions remained non-binding in the end and the government opted for what was in fact a military occupation. One of the main reasons being that the KMT didn't even know if the Taiwanese, in particular the soldiers, were actually going to welcome them (remember that Taiwanese in general were still despised by the KMT high echelons during the war and seen as collaborators and/or slaves of the Japanese [sound familiar?]).

I think it's also important to remember the larger historical context here, namely that the KMT had never considered "getting back" Taiwan before the Cairo Conference in late 1943, when the allies winning the war had already become an increasingly realistic scenario. However, they were surely not prepared for the rather sudden end of the Pacific War. This is easily forgotten, but by August 1945 there was just no internal consensus among KMTers of how to rule Taiwan after the war, which was another reason CKS opted for the military occupation. The military occupation had nothing to do whatsoever with what the committee had been working on.

Nothing of this exculpates CKS of course, quite to the contrary. He might have not really been able to anticipate the situation in Taiwan, but as you said, he did know Chen Yi and he gave him all the powers to do as he wanted.
_______________________
[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Was Chiang Responsible for the 2-28 Massacre? Yes of course.

The March 2, 1947 telegram. Academia Historica via Taiwan News.

“Anyone with basic common sense can determine that Chiang is the one who should be held responsible,” Chen said (Japan Times).

Soon I must remove him , the Baron thought. He has almost outlasted his usefulness, almost reached the point of positive danger to my person. First, though, he must make the people of Arrakis hate him. Then - they will welcome my darling Feyd-Rautha as a savior .

A new telegram from 1947 published this month confirms, if any further evidence were needed for evidence-based minds, that KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek provided troops to Chen Yi, governor of Formosa, to murder the Taiwanese who had resisted KMT occupation. The wonder is not that there is disbelief about Chiang's role in the massacre. The wonder is that we are still asking the stupid question of whether Chiang is responsible.

The oddity of this discourse stands out. There's very little literature attempting to absolve Stalin or Pol Pot of their crimes. There is for Hitler, but only because he still has worshipers (precisely!). Why the struggle over Chiang's responsibility for 2-28? Same as for Corporal Schicklgruber: partly because there is enormous pressure from the KMT which reverberates down through time, as well as constant steering from pro-KMT academics that skews assessments of Chiang, and KMT funding for those who want to write about him, to block any negative presentations of their culture-hero Chiang Kai-shek, Joshua to Sun Yat-sen's Moses. The man has a personality cult, after all, with its own massive temple-memorial in downtown Taipei.

Several reports this week on the new information. Japan Times:

Among the new evidence is a letter dated March 2, 1947, sent by Taiwan Gov. Chen Yi to KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek informing him that he had requested Chief of the General Staff Chen Cheng to send more troops to crack down on civilian protests.

While Chiang publicly said he did not agree to send the troops until March 7, the March 2 letter is the newest proof that Chiang, who died in 1975, should shoulder most responsibility for the massacre, said Chen Yi-shen, an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History.

Published even earlier is a March 4 telegram that Chen Yi sent to Chiang requesting more troops from the mainland.

The telegram above requests army units with "superior qualities" to su4 qing1 (肅清) "eradicate" the protesters in Taiwan, whom he labeled "bandits". There's absolutely no question about the intent of the language. It's quite clear.

It was always been clear. Kerr observed in Formosa Betrayed that Chen Yi was simply playing for time while the army, equipped with hastily painted over American weapons and vehicles, arrived to kill the protesters. Taiwan News reported:

National Taiwan University Professor Chen Tsui-lien (陳翠蓮) said that the historians had been looking for the critical document of a telegraph issued by Chen Yi but to no avail, and the discovery has proved the assumption that Chen on the one hand tried to buy time by promising reform and appealing to the native Taiwanese not to take to the streets, but on the other hand pushed Chiang to send troops across the sea to end the uprising.

Ming-yeh and Gary Rawnsley have a well documented historical essay from 2001 on Chiang's culpability. They argue that Chiang did not intend that the response be violent, but his control of the faction-ridden bureaucracy and military was poor. The recent telegrams lay that set of apologetics, often put forth by pro-KMTers (which the Rawnsleys are not), forever to rest. The Rawnsleys lay out some of the old arguments for Chiang's culpability:

That the violent response to 2-28 went against direct orders issued by both Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Yi has been contested. Chen Yi-shen (陳儀深), for example, has advanced three key points that together make a compelling argument. First, why did Chiang not punish those who disobeyed him? In fact, Chiang rewarded Zhang Mu-tao, Chen Yi, and Peng Meng-qi for their military actions. Second, according to former members of the Taiwan Garrison Command, many individuals were singled out for execution on the orders of Chen Yi. Finally, temporary martial law‖ was proclaimed in Taiwan from February 28 to March 1, 1947, and then from March 9 to May 15, 1947. According to the law of Nationalist China, temporary martial law‖ could only be formally recognized when the highest local commander (Chen Yi) asked for official consent from the central government (Chiang Kaishek).

Their discussion of the then-documentary evidence is thorough and interesting, and contends that the factionalization of the KMT and the army was a major factor in the handling of the 2-28 revolt. Their conclusions:

Our conclusion is that, according to archival evidence, Chiang Kai-shek must bear a share of the responsibility for 2-28 in the following ways. First, Chiang was responsible for Chen Yi‘s appointment in the full knowledge of his record for violence in previously held administrative positions. Second, Chiang was preoccupied with the civil war in mainland China at the time, and was therefore vulnerable to misleading information, especially information that Communists were responsible for 2-28. In other words, Chiang Kai-shek was guilty of placing far too much trust in Chen Yi, and of having too little confidence in other sources of information. Third, the style of politics that Chiang Kai-shek had engineered allowed factionalism to dominate the administration and the military both in China and in Taiwan. During the crisis of 2-28, factional struggles were so intense and complicated that even Chiang could not exercise ultimate control over different local commanders. Nevertheless, we are unable to hold Chiang Kai-shek directly responsible for the massacre unless further archival evidence reveals otherwise.

It's a historians paper, very conservative, and it relies on archival evidence, which the Rawnsleys make clear is subject to new findings. The conclusion is reasonable, so long as you only think about the archives, and it is one that the KMT has attempted to steer historians into reaching.

But, the political reality is something else. The idea that Chiang would permit Chen Yi to amass an army in Fujian, and then transport it to a large productive island which he could use as a base for independent rule, without Chiang's express permission and approval, is absurd. Dictators do not operate that way: they trust no one, even close subordinates and especially close subordinates, and they do not hand them large armies for independent operations without good reason and without good control. There is no way that Chiang did not know what Chen Yi intended to do with those troops -- Chen Yi had already done so in the 1930s when he was governor of Fujian and massacred rebellious soldiers. Indeed, Chiang had known that. One could just as well argue that Chiang realized that if Formosa was going to be looted, Chen Yi was no man to scruple at killing to accomplish it.

The political reality is that Chiang had to know what he was doing and why, or else it wouldn't have happened. Chiang had people in Chen Yi's organization watching Chen Yi and reporting to Chiang, because that is how organizations everywhere in the Chinese world are conducted, from cram schools to the President's office (the army's political officers were gone as a result of the war and not to be reinstituted until 1950 when the KMT had to clamp down on the army to maintain control in Taiwan). Moreover, Chiang had a stream of independent reports on the situation in Taiwan, some of which suggested that Chen Yi be replaced because he was stirring up a revolt, and when the revolt occurred, that Chen Yi's administration was a major cause. Indeed, the Americans and local newspapers had told Chiang so months in advance of the massacre.

Much of the discussion of Chiang's culpability hinges on the (unspoken) assumption that Chiang would have acted to right the situation, had he known/properly understood/had not been distracted. This is what normal people would do. Hence it is typical to construct a set of explanations of why Chiang didn't act sooner. But Chiang is not a normal person, but a murderous dictator who ran a brutal police state. What if that assumption is wrong?

Why did Chiang retain a subordinate who was known to brutal -- whom Chiang knew was brutal and a terrible administrator because he had been told so again and again when Chen Yi was running Fujian Province -- and likely to stir up a revolt? Why would he retain that subordinate in Taiwan who he had repeated warnings about? Why was Chen Yi permitted to brew up a revolt? One interpretation is that Chiang was busy with the civil war and distracted, etc. We've all heard that. Indeed, after Chen Yi was removed from Taiwan, he was sent to run Zhejiang Province.

But another is: his known brutality is precisely why Chiang left him in Taiwan. Here was an island fresh out of Japanese hands with a wide range of people who were "tainted" by long association with the Japanese, who would have to be suppressed. Remember what happened to the individuals in the collaborationist Wang Jing-wei government: most of them were liquidated. But Chiang couldn't simply walk into Formosa and execute everyone, he needed an excuse. And Chen Yi obligingly furnished him with one...
_______________________
[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Harlow M Church Dispatches from Formosa, 1946

The caption on the website reads "This photograph appeared in American newspapers on April 8, 1946. The caption read, "These are Formosan col miners. Barely 8 years old, the boys toil underground to extract coal that never reaches the Formosan people, except through the black market whose prices are far beyond the nudgets of miners' families. This exclusive Acme photo was made by Harlow M. Church, first Occidental photographer to visit Formosa since 1936, when the Japs banned all Occidentals from the island."

Harlow M Church wrote several articles on the transition from Japanese to Chinese Nationalist rule in April of 1946, apparently one of the first foreign correspondents to arrive on Formosa after the occupation by the Chiang regime. As you can see he found what other correspondents, arriving later, would also find: a corrupt regime busy devastating the economy and alienating the locals. [UPDATE: A commenter found this article on Google News. It is much easier to read. Thanks!]

One article he wrote (Altoona Mirror, Apr 15, 1946):

CHINESE POLICE INADEQUATE

The handful of Chinese police sent to Formosa like the one shown above chasing a would-be train passenger from an over-crowded train at Taihoku cannot cope with liberation crime wave. They replace a large efficient police force maintained by the Japs who didn't make any allowances for the barrier that separates them from the Formosans. The Formosans speak a south China dialect that few of the officials know or understand. Some 65 per cent of the population speak the Japanese they learned during the Nips occupation. But all official documents and proclamations were printed in Mandarin, the official Chinese which is completely incomprehensible to the Formosans and Mandarin was the only language spoken by central government officials and police who first arrived to administer the island. Only a handful of Chinese police have been sent to the island to take the place of the large contingent of Japanese police force that maintained law and order. And the Chinese seem reluctant to employ native Formosans as police. As a result a wave of crime and gangsterism has swept the island. Most Formosans fear to leave their homes after dark or leave them unattended during the day. Child kidnapping became so widespread that newspapers pleaded with Formosan mothers not to leave their children alone for a minute lest they be kidnaped and sold into slavery in China The most feared and best gang of thugs and bandits are the Roma, Formosan for Slimy Eels. The Slimy Eels were suppressed by the Japanese during their occupation and the Nips maintained a special prison with special methods of punishment for them. Now in roving bands that cover every province they keep the local population in abject fear. Many arrests have been made but they haven't resulted in any business for the island's criminal lawyers. The Slimy Eels have apparently been able to settle their cases by negotiating directly with local authorities. The government's failure to distribute rice, sugar, and coal with resultant black market prices that have skyrocketed. The cost of living has caused widespread discontent. The Chinese government's avowed intention to keep Japanese technicians as slave labor to keep Formosa's industries going has raised a large cry of public ment. The Formosans feel that they're technically able to fill most of the jobs and that the use of slave labor will  cause mounting unemployment. The Formosans place no small share of the blame for the present plight on the United States. They feel that the lion of least until the formal peace treaty has been signed should have been a joint affair with the Formosans left in control of civil government as much possible. The American army and navy trained thousands of special officers for Formosan administrative posts in anticipation of the invasion of the island that became unnecessary after Japan's surrender. FIRST SINCE 1936 who went to Taiwan, Harlow M Church. "Lighting or aborigine from Formosa's..." Only one of the thousands trained Is actually serving in the Island. In August the United States offered an American army and navy advisory group to assist the Chinese in administrating the land but the Chinese have completely and consistently ignored any advice or suggestions or the ment no authority and furnished no backing by our state department despite repeated pleas and requests. The advisory group became the Formosan liaison group. Then after scores more of requests for clarification of authority and a clear definition of Its ties in Formosa went unheeded. It degenerated into the Formosan repatriation group, an organization of less than 100 men in the entire Island, whose sole task it is to repatriate the Japanese soldiers and civilians from the island. Chinese responsiveness to American aid or advice In the governing of the island can best be summed up by one Chinese colonel's answer to an American request "The Americans should be driven into the ocean at the point of Chinese bayonets" [MT: lotsa editing by me, sorry couldn't rescue it all]

"newspapers pleaded with Formosan mothers not to leave their children alone for a minute lest they be kidnaped and sold into slavery in China" ... Was this the origin of that longstanding urban legend of babies kidnapped and sold to China as slave beggars (Ex: "My uncle found his neighbor's boy in Shanghai with his tongue cut out.")

Other versions of this report may be found at the Brownsville Herald, Gastonia Daily Gazette, Portsmouth Times, and Lima News. Church had another piece in the Independent Record which is a mess, but you can still get the flavor:

June 2, 1946 

Rice Market Is Problem For Formosa 

Graft and Thievery Flourish in Unfortunate Land 

By Harlow M. Church

Is the watchword of Chinese rule in Formosa The in Its is an arresting picture of democracy at not in American occupation forces cured tho Island after the nese surrender and turned it over to Chinese forces when their first troops landed on Oct. 1040. Government by has been in active operation ever One of tho first acts of the Chinese administration was the seizure of tho Taiwan Development tho Japanese sored monopoly corporation that completely controlled the chase and sale of the Island's principal conl and well as the bulk of the island's the Chinese look over all of tho Japanese army and navy rice All of they told the was to assure sufficient rice for the Chinese occupation They didn't point out to the For- mosans that the Japanese had a two-year supply of rico for their troops and that the Chinese occupation forces totaled something less than The Taiwan Development company then purchased the entire 1945 fall rice crop which had Just been ed yen per a Chinese weight unit that equals 1.33 This move didn't surprise the Formosans because the com- when controlled by the bought the island's entire with the exception of needed by the ors for their own then of- tho rice for public salo at four yon per The Japanese used the com- profits on these tions to purchase commercial needed by the rice growers or yield that fed tho entire Island nnd still allowed per cent of tho to exported to The Chinese government ised to administer tho company In tho siime but tho ad- ministration line beon n ly one-way Tho Is bought nl tho two yen price

I had never heard of Harlow Church before, so hope you enjoyed finding out about his existence as much as I have....
_______________________
[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums! Delenda est, baby.