The China Problem is a US Problem

The Wall Street Journal, which abused UN Secretary-General Ban for his erroneous interpretation of UN 2578 last week, received a comically bombastic letter from the Chinese representative in the US:

King of the U.N." (Review & Outlook, Aug. 13), which lodged an unjustified accusation against U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's rejection of [Taiwan President] Chen Shui-bian's letter regarding "application for U.N. membership." Your editorial questioned the position that Taiwan is a part of China -- a position that is universally held by the international community -- and made irresponsible comments on the U.N. members' decision to reject Taiwan's participation in an international organization of sovereign states. The contents of this editorial contravene the one-China policy of the U.S. government and the principles enshrined in the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqués, and interfere in China's internal affairs. The Chinese people are gravely concerned and firmly opposed to this.

Yadda yadda yadda. Ross Terrill in The New Chinese Empire wrote that In 1997 China protested to the Kyrgyz foreign ministry about Res Publica, a local newspaper, reporting on Uighur riots in Xinjiang. Beijing called it "impudent interference in China's internal affairs," and claimed the paper had "seriously offended the feelings of the Chinese people." Nothing daunted, the paper offered to publish anything the Chinese government wanted to say on the matter, provided it did not "insult the feelings of the peoples living in Kyrgystan." Hope WSJ comes up with something as witty in response. Meanwhile the press agent for the Chinese embassy yowled on:

As an inalienable part of the Chinese territory, Taiwan does not qualify for the U.N., an international organization composed of sovereign countries. This is the universally held position by the vast majority of the countries in the world. Seeking "U.N. membership under the name Taiwan" is a secessionist attempt of the Chen Shui-bian authorities. It has been, and will continue to be, resolutely rejected and firmly condemned by the international community and will never have a chance to succeed.

Usually they use "Taiwan authorities" but here they go a step further -- it's the Chen Shui-bian authorities. Obsessive hatred of Chen Shui-bian is a hallmark of both the CCP and the KMT. If you read some of the editorials at the KMT news site, they apparently believe that Ma Ying-jeou's rival is Chen Shui-bian, although he is not running in the election.

Major media organs are reporting that Taiwan is planning a 16% boost in defense spending. Taiwan's defense spending has been stagnant for a decade or so by some counts, and the US has been pushing Taiwan to spend more. Can't sustain a campaign for independence without a credible military deterrent, sadly. As China attempts to expand to the old Qing imperial borders -- something 60% of the nation is not "China proper" and is occupied wholly or in part by non-Han peoples -- most of the nations on China's border face the problem of what to do about Chinese expansionism. The answer is increasingly the same for all of them, and all of them face same obstacle: US ambivalence. For example, consider India's China policy, from a commentary in the Asia Times:

Yet another Indian thinker concluded, "The choice presented to India is stark and simple. Either India integrates itself with the global powers or it isolates itself to be dominated by China and perpetually countervailed by Pakistan."

The Indians have tied themselves in knots. There seems to be embarrassed silence in Washington. The theorist who saw all international politics as a chessboard, former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezenski, would feel confused at hearing the Indian experts waxing on his pet subject. The "balancer" par excellence in modern diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, must be having a wry smile. Bush's close friend, US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, would turn red in his ears.

Clearly, it is impossible for Washington to see eye to eye with the Indian doctrine that the international system arrays the "world powers" against China. Paulson wishes to see China as one of the most important "stakeholders" in the international system. Paulson sees a China that is estimated to hold more than US$900 billion in a mix of US bonds. And when China sold a net $5.8 billion of Treasury bonds in April, he took careful note.

Paulson is a China expert from his days as head of Goldman Sachs. Bush's choice of him as treasury secretary was itself a measure of the crucial importance that Washington attaches to calming the waters of the United States' relations with a rising China. The hard fact is that the US Treasury has no currencies to redeem its debt. Washington knows it has no hegemony over China's policies.

As the recent CFR report makes clear, US decisionmakers are attempting to treat China as a responsible player in the international system -- read, willing to play along with US hegemony. This is a massive error that will cause much doleful shaking of heads among future historians. China buys US bonds not because it wants to demonstrate rationality and stability, but because it knows that with each and every dollar of debt it underwrites, the Bush Administration will stay in Iraq that much longer, further reducing US power and influence in the world. This is situation unique in history: not many nations have been in a position to obtain interest payments while helping their chief rival dig its own grave.

The fact is that the China problem is not merely a "China problem." It is a US problem -- without the US obsession with the Middle East and its faltering foreign policy elsewhere, China would not be "a problem." Randall Shriver alluded to this with a recent commentary in the Taipei Times. Writing on Taipei's requests for a re-iteration of the six assurances, he observed:

While it's true that the language was actually proposed by the Taiwanese side, it is also true that circumstances were very different in 1982.

Would Taiwanese leaders today feel "reassured" if the US pledged that the sovereignty of Taiwan should be "determined by Chinese [on both sides of the Strait]" themselves?

With the People's Liberation Army build-up opposite Taiwan unabated, are there still remaining concerns that the US would set a date to end arms sales to Taiwan? In 1982 Taiwan was happy to hear that the US wouldn't alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), but in 1999 Taiwan lobbied very hard for a Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. And cross-strait interaction was at a very nascent stage in 1982.

The real concern for Taiwan in 1982 seemed to be potential pressure from the US to enter into dialogue, whereas now the concern is "too much dialogue" (in the form of business people, political parties, and people-to-people contact) without a proper political framework for this interaction.

While I continue to wonder why the US government seems reluctant to publicly state the six assurances and to endorse its sustained relevance to US policy, I come back to the conclusion that our problems run much deeper, and the required solutions are likely more bold than a restatement of long standing policy.

It has been over three years since the last major policy address by a Washington-based, senior US official on US-Taiwan Relations. The last such occasion was when then-assistant secretary of state James Kelly testified before the House International Relations Committee in April 2004 marking the 25th Anniversary of the TRA.

In his testimony, Kelly said, "our position continues to be embodied in the so-called `six assurances' offered to Taiwan by [former] president [Ronald] Reagan."

While his words were reassuring at the time, I think over the three years since this testimony trust between the US and Taiwan has weakened. Thus there is a need today for a strong, clear statement from a senior US official that will move us toward genuine reassurance. If the US government does see fit, I suggest they not think about reissuing the old six assurances -- rather, they should consider delivering "six new assurances."

Internally, actions taken by both Taipei and Washington have damaged the relationship. Externally, China's rapid rise in East Asia, and the declining US position in the world, have also changed the context of US-Taiwan-China relations. This is why Nat Bellocchi, former head of the officially unofficial US representative organ here, AIT, recently commented in the Taipei Times:

Now both sides of the pan-blue pan-green political spectrum support including a referendum in the next presidential election. In expressing disapproval of the referendum effort, the US may now have helped ignite stronger disapproval from China. It is clear that some means of preventing a serious problem in the Taiwan Strait is needed, or -- at the very least -- means of minimizing any harm to US interests.

Clearly the US needs to stop signaling China that its territorial aggrandizement is acceptable in today's world. Taiwan is not "the final piece of the puzzle" and letting China have it will only encourage further expansion by Beijing. The Qing Dynasty, whose imperial holdings the current PRC state inherited, doubled the size the Ming holdings, and China looks hungrily at the Qing possessions it does not yet hold, as well as at other islands. The proper response to Chinese expansionism is the carrot of international legitimacy and peaceful economic growth, backed by an alliance system that takes in nations from India to Japan. But such a response requires leadership from a vigorous and confident US that is looked up to by the international community -- and achieving that requires restoration of sensible, credible, competent leadership to the White House.

[Taiwan] [US] [China]