Showing posts with label US. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US. Show all posts

Friday, September 02, 2016

US Vietnam War Servicemen R&R in Taipei + Links

Alexander of the amazing blog Synapticism sent this around Facebook. This is part one of a three part series on US Vietnam servicemen doing R and R in Taipei -- he described it as cringeworthy as you would expect. Mention of Taipei starts after the 6 min mark, but part two is the good part.
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Monday, April 25, 2016

KMT to bash DPP with pork

This is what Taiwan needs: more recycling bikes

The KMT has found the first major issue it can use to bash the DPP with, with the Veep warning the DPP that permitting US pork imports would land it in hot water:
Vice President Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) yesterday denounced President-elect Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) for not caring about citizens’ health. Wu noted that when Tsai was Deputy Premier, she failed to impose a ban on US beef when an outbreak of mad cow disease occurred in the US. According to Wu, it is now even more challenging for Tsai to lift the ban on US pork imports containing ractopamine residue as “people will hold her accountable.”

In response, the DPP retorted that when Wu was Premier, he was the one who allowed US beef to be imported from areas where mad cow disease had occurred without regard for the safety and health of people in Taiwan.
Pork and beef are contentious not because the government cares about the health of Taiwanese, but because both KMT and DPP patronage networks in farming communities are filled with pork farmers. Taiwan produces little beef, but under WTO regulations, if it imports beef with ractopamine, it must import all products containing that drug. Hence, if it imports US beef, it must accept US pork (before the beef mess began years ago, Taiwan took about one-eighth of US beef exports). However, if it takes in heavily subsidized US pork, local producers will scream (as will I, I hate rubbery US pork and prefer the fatty local stuff). Those producers will then blame whichever party lets in the pork.

The situation is even more complicated because the NPP is now bashing the DPP from the left on the pork issue even as the KMT bashes it from the right.

Note also that the KMT assigned this bashing to Wu Den-yi, a classic move -- it allows the Big Man (Ma Ying-jeou) to remain benevolent and distant while the right-hand man says what he really thinks. Moreover, Wu is a Taiwanese and presumably speaks to Taiwanese as one of their own...

Only the first of many such issues...
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Tuesday, September 22, 2015

Foreign Policy Talk-talk Rises With Xi in US

Driving out to work in the fields.

This year is the 29th anniversary of the founding of the DPP, and Presidential Candidate and Chairman Tsai Ing-wen made a speech in front of numerous foreign dignitaries. It's in Anglais here. All those dignitaries were a positive sign for Tsai: clearly they expect her to win. A few excerpts:
As we closely monitor international events, including the Syrian refugee crisis, we believe there is a clear need to establish a domestic legal mechanism that will enable Taiwan to join international efforts to assist refugees.

Furthermore, we plan to expand operations at our rescue training center in central Taiwan, where we will share Taiwan’s valuable experiences in responding to natural disasters at a regional level. We will also actively work to reduce tensions in regional flashpoints, such as the South China Sea, where confrontation is threatening to roll-back decades of peaceful relations in the region.

While being mindful of our strategic interests in the area, we are ready to engage in dialogue with different parties with the purpose of finding a diplomatic solution.

....


To achieve this, a future DPP administration will be committed to following both international law, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and respecting the freedom of navigation. We also see great potential for Taiwan to play a more valuable role globally.

.....

Another one of our international priorities is to build up our relations with our neighbors in Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent. I am pleased to announce that a future DPP administration will pursue a ‘New Southbound Policy’ in the years ahead.
The New Southbound Policy is old DPP wine in new bottles; the DPP has long advocated southward investment. Hung Hsiu-chu, the KMT Presidential candidate, immediately complained that Tsai should be affirming ROC sovereignty over the South China Sea, a position that no doubt pleased her bitter-end nationalist supporter base, but which placed her far outside the mainstream. As usual...

Note that Tsai's comments on Freedom of Navigation -- a term she actually used, not implied, and one beloved of US policymakers -- align her squarely with the US. A southbound turn would be great -- the Ma Administration has done its best to ensure relations with SE Asia and India are not good, yet those are areas where Taiwan will be investing and conducting diplomacy in the future, natural allies against Chinese expansion. Good work, DPP -- I've said for years that Taiwan needs to deepen its relations with India. If China peeves India, a good move might be a state visit by Tsai to India.

Speaking of foreign policy, Peter Enav, once the chief reporter here for AP, now living retirement outside Taiwan, responded to Richard Bush III's blogpost at Brookings. Bush is a longtime Taiwan expert for the US government. Enav lambastes Bush's reticence and misconceptions:
Unfortunately, however, Bush’s article goes rapidly south from there — far south in fact — creating the impression that the “blame” for what might happen in cross-strait relations after Tsai’s election is a direct result of her personal shortcomings and those of the DPP in general. In the main he does this through the deliberate use of misleading and distorted language. Thus, for example, he says, Tsai has made only a “modest effort” to reassure China and the U.S. about her cross-strait policies when in fact she has gone out of her way to proclaim her fealty to maintaining the “status quo” in the area. Similarly, he says “the policies of a DPP government might cause a reversal in cross-strait relations,” rather than “the policies of the PRC [People’s Republic of China] might cause a reversal in cross-strait relations,” which given the fact that it is China that is making all the running on cross-strait pressure seems to be a far more accurate characterization of the facts on the ground.

And that is only the start. Also included in Bush’s article is his unfounded description of the Sunflower Movement as a radical fringe, when in fact it enjoyed widespread popular support and help set the stage for the devastating Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) defeat in last year’s nine-in-one local elections. Beyond that it also features his identification of the Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) candidacy as the main reason from Ma’s low approval rating (actually this began in 2012) and his signal failure to point out that support for Taiwan’s eventual unification with the mainland has traditionally been so low as to hardly bear mentioning. For someone of Bush’s deep-seated knowledge, this is a perplexing lapse.
Enav is right in many ways, and these are all things I've said. Yet...

One thing Bush didn't mention was the 1992 Consensus. This is interesting. Although Bush's essay is carefully positioned to align it self with the Establishment interpretive framework that the DPP disrupts China-Taiwan-Washington relations, he refrains from ordering the DPP into the 1992 Consensus cage. Kudos for that. Also, much of the essay is devoted to telling China what it should be doing, very gently. I'd like to read this as a hopeful sign that Washington is beginning to rethink the script on Taiwan...

Finally, William Stanton, former AIT director, has an outstanding piece at Thinking Taiwan on US China policy... read it all, but here's a chunk:
This strengthening Sino-Russian military cooperation is a deeply ironic refutation of the traditional U.S. geostrategic justification for improved Sino-U.S. relations. It is even more ironic when we consider that it was during the Administration of arguably America’s staunchest anti-Communist President — Ronald Reagan — that the United States decided on June 12, 1984 to allow China to make government-to-government purchases of U.S. military equipment, subsequently including avionics for the Chinese F-8 fighter jet and Sikorsky transport helicopters. In 1985 the United States even agreed to renovate Chinese ships to counter the growing Soviet fleet. In January 1989 the United States went further and decided to sell four of its then-most current anti-submarine torpedoes to China. It was only events in and around Tiananmen Square some five months later that halted all of these plans.
Yup. US China policy is heading in the wrong direction, and has been for years.

WantWant reports that Xi's policy towards the pre-1949 population is changing. Don't miss this article, which also has a good bit of interesting history. Years too late, and misled by the KMT, told nonsense by its own spies. and misled by Taiwanese businessmen in China -- probably on purpose to keep Xi on his current course, and to save their own skins -- China's Taiwan policy is seriously out of whack with the island's own popular identities.
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Sunday, February 22, 2015

Hegemonic Warfare Watch: Denny Roy on the Collision Course between US and China

Image from here.

Longtime Taiwan watcher Denny Roy has a piece in The National Interest on the coming collision between China and the US over Taiwan. While his central point -- that we are headed for war out here over Taiwan or whatever -- is spot on, the lead up to it is fraught with strange errors. For example:
For several years, some Chinese analysts have worried that Taiwan intended to take advantage of the generous economic terms offered by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) while putting off political negotiations indefinitely. Their skepticism was justified. Economic integration and increased movement of people across the Strait will not necessarily lead to political integration. Taiwanese people may not prioritize an improved material standard of living over maintaining their civil liberties. Even if the sole concern is economic benefit, Taiwan arguably has an interest in delaying unification so as to wait for a point in time where China takes an economic loss and Taiwan profits disproportionately from their bilateral trade. Chinese magnanimity would likely decline after unification.
"generous economic terms". ROFL. Taiwan has been screwed by China's ruthless attempts to poach its technology, steal its industries, marginalize it in international trade negotiations, and hire away its best workers. The trade deals are meant to facilitate this hollowing out of Taiwan, because the foundation of Taiwan's independence is an independent economy. They do not offer generous terms, one reason that the service pact was so decisively rejected by the public (English analysis). Thus, this dichotomy between "standard of living" and "civil liberties" is completely false, because closeness to China has not fostered a higher standard of living in Taiwan. Instead, it has brought lower wages, low quality service jobs, stagnating incomes, and reduced living standards, not to mention damage to the island's media environment and democratic liberties.

Hence, the way that Roy has formulated this paragraph is completely bass-ackward. It should acknowledge that the interaction with China has brought wealth only to a few large businessmen with close China connections, and has worsened living quality on the island in every way. In this way it has increased desire for independence. Not mentioned here is the way in which Taiwanese go to China and become even more independence-oriented, but perhaps it should be...

Further down Roy scribes:
The likelihood of Taiwan voluntarily choosing unification with China is waning. Opinion polls show that Taiwan’s sense of a separate national identity from mainland China is increasing. While a great majority have long favored the status quo of de facto independence over immediate unification, a majority now oppose even eventual unification.
This is a more subtle misrepresentation. Roy is too honest an analyst to give the KMT version of the status quo preference, in which the status quo is presented as opposed to independence. Instead, he correctly identifies the status quo as preferred precisely because it is a weak form of independence. But "a majority now oppose eventual" annexation is plainly false -- annexation to China has always been opposed by the majority in credible polls. It is not something that has become true in the "now." All polls show the same thing -- Taiwanese identify as Taiwanese when forced to choose between Chinese and Taiwanese as identities, and a substantial majority would prefer independence. Annexation to China has little support, and its been that way for years. For example, check out this MAC poll from 2000. The government divides up the numbers to make it difficult to see, but once you do the math, support for annexation is 21%. Not a majority. There never was...

The thing that has changed is not the Taiwanese, who never supported annexation to China. Rather, it is the military calculus in the China-Taiwan-US triangle, as Roy notes. China is now much stronger than it was a decade ago. At some point soon some policy entrepreneur within the Chinese government is going to acquire the authority and position to make a convincing case that China can now defeat the US and Japan combined (the actual military numbers matter only to the extent that some domestic political calculus makes use of them) and then crush the democracy movement on Taiwan. As Hong Kong shows, the second part will in its own way be just as difficult as the first...
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Saturday, June 07, 2014

Ma Gov't Rep Bullshits the US on Radar =UPDATEDX2=

Miaoli county, near Tiangou.

UPDATE 2: J Michael Cole at Thinking Taiwan discusses the affair and provides much detail on MOFA's clarification of who said what. Washington insiders point out that there is no request for radars. Absurd.

FINAL UPDATE: WashTimes has completely rewritten the article

The Washington Times reports:
The [Cong. J Randy] Forbes proposal calls for the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency to explore the costs and benefits of merging a Taiwanese early-warning radar, which has the ability to peer deep into China, with the U.S. military’s own missile defense and sensor systems.

Mr. Jieh said two to four “long-range early-warning radars” have been built along Taiwan’s western coastline, but some in Taiwan are resisting the idea of expanding the system.

President Ma has been enduring so much domestic pressure, questioning, ‘Why do you need these long-range radar towers detecting the long-range missiles of mainland China that won’t target Taiwan but target some other countries?’” he said.

Despite the opposition, Mr. Jieh said, the Ma government has “been very affirmative in helping the U.S. set up these radar towers because the Ma administration does believe that setting up these long-range radar towers not only helps the U.S., but also helps Taiwan.”

“It’s not my personal criticism, but a lot of people’s criticism in Taiwan is that, ‘Hey, why do we, Taiwan, need such big radar towers that can detect the inner land of mainland China?’” Mr. Jieh said. “‘We don’t need that, actually.’ That’s some people’s argument.”
I can't emphasize this enough: no one but some fringe Chinese nationalists within the KMT is resisting these radars, and they do that because they imagine themselves to be Chinese and identify with China. The DPP is solidly behind the radar purchase and deployment and supports increase military purchases and contacts with the US. In my years of riding and talking all over Taiwan I have never heard a single peep against these radars. There is literally no domestic opposition. Again, all the opposition comes from the right-wing freak fringe of the KMT, which opposes anything that might interfere with China's ability to dominate the area.

Two conclusions may be drawn here. First, this misrepresentation shows how weird the dialogue within the KMT about policy truly is: it is so weird and out of touch that fringe groups become "many voices" and insanity is treated as so normal that it can be taken out and displayed before the US as if Ma is making sacrifices in supporting the radar: "See how much the President is suffering?" Except the friction is from his own party, because for Ma, those are the only voices that really count.

It also shows something else, something deep and visceral about the KMT: its abiding contempt for both Japan and the US. Missiles flying over Taiwan aimed elsewhere can only be aimed at Japanese and US military. Clearly many within the KMT, the party that so many in the US support, are happy to have US and Japanese boys killed by Chinese missiles. Because it doesn't concern them... and makes them feel strong and powerful, because they identify with China, not the west, and not Taiwan.

The US needs to rethink its support of the KMT and the Ma Administration. Note again: these facilities and other US defense policies have the solid support of the DPP. The US is backing the wrong.... Horse.

UPDATE: Taipei Times has latest. Privately I've heard that Jieh says Washington Times put the words of others in his mouth.
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Friday, December 20, 2013

Max Baucus? I think it be the cows, sir.

East of Dongshih, a couple of years ago, with my man Drew. 

Quote of the day: A friend passed this one around while discussing the Baucus appointment as Ambassador to China. BR Myers:
"The question of where Europe ends and Asia begins has troubled many people over the years, but here's a rule of thumb: if someone can pose as an expert on the country in question without knowledge of the relevant language, it's part of Asia. "
Dem Senator Max Baucus to become the new ambassador to China? The reason is obvious: it goes moo and then gets injected with drugs before being killed and chopped up for sale to Asia. Baucus was at the forefront of efforts to get Taiwan to accept ractobeef (for example). He's from the great state of Montana, noted for its wide open spaces filled with cattle, who outnumber Montana residents by a three to one margin, 2.6 million of the four legged future exports. Commonwealth ran a piece on Baucus last year:
Senator Baucus, 71, is none other than the "commander-in-chief of American beef" contributing to the maelstrom that is currently sweeping Taiwanese society. A Democrat from Montana, Senator Baucus has lived in Washington, D.C. for 34 years. His seniority makes him the third most powerful man in the Senate, behind only the heads of the Democratic and Republican party caucuses.

.....

Senator Baucus is sure to be prominent wherever U.S. beef is promoted internationally. Despite the opposition of local farmers, no matter how numerous, Japan, South Korea, Chile, Columbia and Panama have all caved in to trade pressure from the U.S. and opened their markets to American beef.

Naturally, Baucus is an instrumental figure at U.S. trade negotiations around the world. While in China imploring Vice Premier Wang Zhishan to allow the renminbi currency to appreciate, the Senator took advantage of the occasion to pressure the Chinese government to open its market to U.S. beef.
Pretty obvious what is going to happen with China: the US is going to try to crack that market. This analysis observes:
While a limited number of countries including Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay have formal access to China, ‘front door’ trade is not the only way into the market. Official import volumes do not reflect other beef imports making their way into the country via the ‘grey channels’, which consist mostly of uncertain volumes of buffalo exports from India that are imported by Vietnam and Hong Kong, then re-exported into China.

Despite US beef also entering China via grey channels, ongoing trade restrictions limit the competiveness of US exports including the ban of growth promotant – ractopomine – and BSE disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or ‘mad cow disease’) history.
Right. The US is clashing with China on any number of fronts, the relationship is fraught, war is looming, and what kind of ambassador do we get? A single minded promoter of beef interests! *sigh* Taiwannews says he's been "deepening" the US-China relationship for two decades... does Baucus speak Chinese? Nope. Both the WaPo and Taiwannews pieces point out that appointing Baucus solves some domestic Congressional issues for the Administration. CSM points out that Baucus has been interested in China for years:
Lampton says he got the impression from the informal conversations on China that Baucus was interested in expanding his knowledge of Asia as other senators “from the agricultural states between the Appalachians and the Rockies” had done before him.

Two examples are Jim Sasser, the former Tennessee Democratic senator who served as ambassador to China in the late 1990s, and Mike Mansfield, the Montana Democrat who was the longest-serving US ambassador to Japan but who actually started his lifelong Asia focus as a result of a short stint as a Marine in China.

“It was clear from those [Senate] meetings that [Baucus] saw Mansfield as a great statesman,” Lampton says, “and I think he saw that as the kind of role he’d like to play.”
Mansfield was seen in many quarters as too sympathetic to the Japanese... let's hope Baucus gets good advice.

Meanwhile, US beef is once again surging into the Taiwan market. Although the ractobeef controversy knocked beef exports to Taiwan back, US marketers say they are recovering ground lost to Australia and New Zealand:
This year, U.S. beef has made great strides in regaining lost market share in Taiwan. Through the first nine months of 2013, sales of U.S. beef have grown nearly 214 percent in value to $199 million, taking 41 percent market share versus 34 percent for Australia and 20 percent for New Zealand.
I seldom eat beef in Taiwan; you can't know what you're getting.
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Saturday, November 30, 2013

More on the ADIZ

My first half-decent photo of Venus.

Lots of stuff out there. This Volokh Conspiracy post has good links to other posts and resources and notes:
China’s assertion of an ADIZ, as Julian Ku says, is not per se impermissible. But the devil is in the details. China’s ADIZ raises two large questions of legality. First, the “not-impermissible” scope of an ADIZ, that which is accepted in widespread state practice, is a projection outwards from the coastline of a coastal state. One might argue as a matter of international law as evidenced by state practice that a ADIZ has to bear a reasonable relationship to that coastline and the protection of its sovereignty, in the sense of both national security and domestic regulation (e.g., air traffic management, anti-smuggling, etc.). Those requirements can be fluid, addressing the nature of technology and threats to sovereignty, while still being “reasonably” connected to the protection of the sovereign coastline from unlawful encroachment.

Whatever can reasonably be projected as an ADIZ related to the coastal state’s coastline, the legality of an ADIZ created in such a way as to allow China to assert a new legal claim regarding contested rocks far out at sea has to be considered at issue. It’s a “bootstrapping” claim, assuming its conclusion: China declares an ADIZ around a contested territory, and then uses that as a basis to control the airspace as though it were an ADIZ declared along its uncontested home coastline. But an ADIZ cannot create sovereign territory or vindicate a claim to it. Unfortunately, enforcing that fundamental point requires that other states ignore and denounce the ADIZ – in the teeth of a threat, implied or express, that whatever regulatory terms China has dictated (see below) will be enforced.

Whereas it seems clear that state practice is limited to uncontested home territory. No bootstrapping. The virtue of an ADIZ is that it can reduce risks of confrontation, mistake, and dangerous brinksmanship as aircraft come close to unquestionably sovereign, territorial airspace by regularizing the passage of civilian aircraft, especially, as either intending (in which case ADIZ procedures apply) or not intending to enter the sovereign’s airspace (in which case ADIZ procedures do not apply) is turned into a mechanism for contesting sovereignty, and becomes a pretext for confrontation.
It's so like China to follow the letter while subverting the spirit of the procedure. The whole post is excellent.

The ADIZ also shows how the US policy on the Senkakus has now impaired its own response. It can't take a strong position and point out that the Senkakus are sovereign Japanese territory because for years the US hasn't taken a position on the "dispute" (the US might even consider retaliating by recognizing Japan's sovereignty formally). D'oh! Once again, failure to do the right thing ramifies....

The BBC reports that the US has required its carriers to comply with the ADIZ. But when you read it closely...
But on Friday, the state department said the US government "generally expects that US carriers operating internationally will operate consistent with Notams [Notices to Airmen] issued by foreign countries".

It added: "Our expectation of operations by US carriers consistent with NOTAMs does not indicate U.S. government acceptance of China's requirements for operating in the newly declared ADIZ."
The US position is that its carriers should behave as they do in all other ADIZs and ignore Beijing's special reporting requirements. Nope, they are complying with Beijing's demands. The Volokh piece above gives other examples of how normal the US military response is. The BBC piece contains a little tidbit:
South Korea claims a submerged rock, known as Ieodo, also within the zone.
If China is "boostrapping" the ADIZ as a form of territorial claim.... no wonder the Koreans are suspicious.
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Friday, November 29, 2013

Hegemonic Conflict Watch: China's ADIZ roundup

Took the Motao out to Shihlin Night Market the other day.

So much commentary -- apparently China's new ADIZ woke the world up. We've arrived at one of those historical moments when even the densest dunderheads can see, a Panay moment, or a remilitarization of the Rhineland moment, when onlookers are beginning to realize the coming course of events....

...China has already scrambled planes in response to US and Japanese flights, Chinese media reports. Japan denies this.

Lots of good stuff out there. Corey Wallace over at China Policy Institute observes:
The Chinese government is increasingly perceived in Japan to be implementing a calculated and “staged” approach to undermining Japan’s claims to the Senkaku Islands, and using antipathy towards Japan as a justification for pursuing a more expansive military policy. For example, in September 2012, the PRC submitted to the United Nations the coordinates for demarcating the territorial seas around the islands. This was identified a precursor to maintaining a routine presence in and around the islands, and since this point incursions in the territorial waters around the islands have rapidly increased. Just two days prior to the ADIZ announcement, it was reported in Japan that Chinese maritime authorities had escalated the stakes again by boarding Chinese fishing vessels in the EEZ waters around the Senkaku Islands. It was confirmed by the JCG that this had happened three times since August, 2013. The ADIZ will therefore be interpreted as a signal of a Chinese intention to further implement its jurisdictional claim.

Indeed, Japanese media has been quick to explore the dangerous implications of the new ADIZs. For example, the Yomiuri labelled China’s action of declaring an ADIZ that includes airspace over islands under the administrative control of another nation to be of “an unusual nature in the international community.” The ADIZ move is seen as providing further evidence of Xi Jinping prioritising China’s “great power” ambitions, rather than steering China towards becoming a cooperative player in building a mutually beneficial East Asian regional framework. Xi’s advocacy for a “New Type of Great Power Relations” for managing future diplomacy, which excludes the interests of regional and global players other than the United States or the PRC, has also not gone unnoticed in Japan. The Japanese media has even reported that various Chinese diplomatic sources have admitted that hard line elements within the Chinese government and the PLA have settled on a strategy to challenge Japan on the Senkakus, to drive a wedge through the US-Japan alliance, and take a hard-line towards relations towards Japan in general. This strategy was apparently consolidated at the end of the recent third plenum, which saw China setting up a National Security Council, and Xi Jinping noting that China needed to directly face external and internal threats to China’s sovereign rights and national security. As such, the East China Sea ADIZ will be seen as setting the stage for a long-term exercising of military influence in the area, especially if the PRC goes on to announce a similar zone for the South China Sea. With the maiden South China Sea voyage of the Liaoning also being heavily reported in Japan, Japanese politicians and officials have quickly moved to discussing extending Japan’s own ADIZ eastwards to cover the Ogasawara islands in anticipation of future Chinese aerial activity on the back of its new ability to project aerial power.
Michal Thim at CPI similarly observes:
There is another important aspect to consider while analysing recent Chinese actions. Beijing may be motivated to take a stance in regards to its sovereignty claim and it is consistently pushing the envelope in this matter. However, it is also interested in testing the reactions of the U.S. and its allies to get a clearer picture for its actions in the future. The Taiwan Strait missile crisis in 1995/96 might have backfired and in the short term it was Beijing’s debacle but at the same time Chinese leaders tested U.S. reaction. In addition, the crisis provided critical stimulus for the development of Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) capability that nowadays represents significant challenge for any future deployment of carrier battle group near Chinese shores. More recently, during 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff with the Philippines, China has tested whether the U.S. would go beyond rhetorical support of its treaty ally when the subject of dispute is relatively insignificant elevation. Creation of ADIZ and increased number of naval and air incursions in the disputed area should be understood as part of broader strategy to change the status quo. Should the ADIZ face no strong reaction or should the extent of backlash be acceptable for Beijing, second ADIZ may come soon, this time over the South China Sea.
At the Diplomat, the really bizarre writing:
The islands, when referenced in Chinese historical documents, are generally considered to have been part of the administrative zone of Taiwan. In other words, if mainland China does gain control of the islands, it would effectively be administering part of Taiwan. Obviously, this give the dispute a deep symbolic meaning for Taiwan’s government.
The was never any administration of the Senkakus from Taiwan. That's a post-1971 lie. Where do people get this crap? -- especially since several of us have now published at The Diplomat showing that these are lies. Do they not consult their own stuff? The writer does make one good point, however:
In this context, Beijing’s ADIZ could have lasting ramification for cross-strait relations. The PRC seems not to have considered the potential backlash on Taiwan — particularly since the ADIZ roll-out occurred only days before an important visit to Taiwan by Chen Deming, the head of the mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. The timing of the announcement has marred Chen’s visit. The DPP and other critics have demanded that Ma lodge protests with Chen and even expel him from Taiwan if his response is seen as inadequate.

Beijing could easily have avoided this by holding off on the ADIZ for even a week, or even done Ma a political favor by informing him of the decision in advance. Instead, mainland officials missed an opportunity to ease the political shock in Taiwan. As a result, China’s aggressive move to solidify its claims over some uninhabited rocks might jeopardize its chances at a far larger prize — eventual unification with Taiwan.
Exactly -- the ADIZ not only screwed Korea, it also screwed Beijing's friend and ally, Ma Ying-jeou. The ROC government has announced that it will go along with the requirement of reporting its airlines movements in the ADIZ to Beijing, unlike Korea, Japan, and the US. Speaking of Korea, at The Diplomat resides a piece on the ADIZ and Korea:
The beauty of a unilateral move like an ADIZ is that the country imposing the zone gets to decide how the lines are drawn on the map. The Chinese decision to draw the ADIZ such that it was guaranteed to raise the ire of South Korea is odd. With South Korea, the PRC was fortunate enough to avoid the sorts of territorial rigmaroles it often finds itself in with Japan, Taiwan and various Southeast Asian states (over the South China Sea). South Korea and China had also found themselves converging over their common historical distaste for Japan along nationalist lines — a phenomenon abetted by the almost concomitant election of conservative Park Geun-hye in Korea and Shinzo Abe in Japan.

It’s perhaps too early to make a definitive determination about the impact the Chinese ADIZ will have on future relations between China and South Korea. South Korea’s restrained rhetorical response and China’s immediate attempts to set the record straight on Ieodo indicate that the ADIZ’s northeastern frontier, near Jeju-do, may have been an oversight on China’s part.

..........

What should give South Korea pause over the ADIZ is the possible imposition of such zones in the future by China, something Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesman Yang Yujun claimed was in the pipes: “China will establish other Air Defense Identification Zones at the right moment after necessary preparations are completed.” A future ADIZ off the Bohai Sea and into the Yellow Sea would have serious implications for South Korean security
For me the scariest article was a WaPo piece on it by Simon Denyer, which reads as if it softened something dictated by Xinhua propagandists:
It was designed as a forceful response to Japanese assertiveness. [Hahahaha - mt] But Beijing’s creation of an air defense zone may have backfired, experts said, eliciting a strong joint response from the United States and Japan.

In Chinese eyes, the standoff began in September 2012, [Why are we regurgitating Chinese propaganda? Who cares what Beijing wants outsiders to think? Don't we do our own research? - mt] when the Japanese government purchased three of the islands — known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in China — from a private Japanese landowner. In response, Beijing stepped up its own claims to the rocky landmasses, increasing sea patrols and pressing Japan to accept that the territory is disputed.[Reality: the Japanese purchase was driven by China's escalating pressure. - mt]
This next bit is so comical it deserves to stand alone:
Beijing’s actions appear to fit a recent pattern, experts said. Reluctant to be seen as the provocateur, China tends to respond forcefully to what it sees as provocations from others and then advance its own claims even more strongly.
A totally Beijing-centric presentation. Ugly to see this in a US newspaper... but expect more in the future: the new normal is going to be US media presentations shaped by Beijing's power.

Finally, James Fallows has a good piece over at The Atlantic:
3) Is this likely to do China any good? The puzzling nature of Chinese foreign policy, especially its generally self-defeating "soft power" aspects, is a subject too vast for our purposes right now. In brief: the very steps that, from an internal Chinese-government perspective, are intended to make it seem confident, powerful, and attractive often have exactly the opposite effect on audiences outside China.

One famous illustration followed the world financial crisis of 2008. The Chinese economy recovered much more quickly than others; the U.S. looked like a house of cards; and the Chinese military made a number of expansionist-seeming moves in the South China Sea that quickly got the attention of neighboring countries. The result of this "over-reach" episode, as it is described now even in China, was to bring Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and other countries into closer alignment with the U.S. than they had thought necessary before. By acting super-tough, the Chinese military made its real situation weaker.

This ADIZ case may become the next famous example. Whether it seems, either now or later, worthwhile from the Chinese leadership's perspective I have no idea. But at least in the short term, it appears to have alarmed the South Koreans, with whom Chinese relations had been steadily warming, plus introducing new friction into China's most important relationship, which is with the United States.
Great stuff. UPDATED: And don't miss this piece on the Chinese perspective from a Chinese PHD student in the China Policy Institute.

The Lew-Rockwell Antiwar.com types are still off in some La-la land where all evils are due to the US and China is all rainbows and unicorns, but I noticed that over at the progressive website CommonDreams writer Gwynne Dyer actually thought the ADIZ was deliberately provocative. I'm remaining optimistic that the Left will come around on China...
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Wednesday, November 27, 2013

Hegemonic Conflict Watch: US Responds to China's ADIZ =UPDATED=

Wow (Yahoo):
Two US B-52 bombers flew over a disputed area of the East China Sea without informing Beijing, US officials said Tuesday, challenging China's bid to create an expanded air defense zone.

The flight of the giant Stratofortress planes sent a clear signal that Washington would push back against what it considers an aggressive stance by Beijing in the region.

The move also represented a robust show of US support for Japan, which is locked in a mounting dispute with Beijing over disputed islands in the East China Sea.

The unarmed bombers took off from Guam on Monday on a scheduled flight, as part of what defense officials insisted was a routine exercise dubbed "Coral Lightning Global Power Training Sortie."
This was exactly the right move. China still nurses fantasies of splitting Japan from the US, while pursuing policies that are actually driving Tokyo closer to Washington. The time when Beijing could have wooed Tokyo passed several years ago, thanks to Beijing's belligerent attitude...

One function of this ADIZ declaration is thus to show Tokyo that Washington won't support it in the pinch. This move has precedent -- at least one motive for the Sino-Vietnamese War was for Beijing to demonstrate that the treaty between Hanoi and Moscow was simply a worthless piece of paper. There too China's ostensible motive was islands (Spratly Islands) and alleged mistreatment of ethnic Chinese minorities in Vietnam, eerie echoes of China's bogus claim to the Senkakus and its claim that Taiwan should be part of China because they are all one big happy culture.

Hence, Washington's move was exactly the right move -- giving the middle finger to Beijing, but not using something more aggressive, like a fighter sweep. Kudos to the White House and Pentagon for this move. Hopefully now with the beginning of serious negotiations with Iran, the Obama Administration can shift the US perspective away from its hopeless fixation on that sideshow of a sideshow in the Middle East to Asia, where the future is.

Good work, guys. Very happy to see this.

UPDATE: Probably be on this one all day as news flows in. The Diplomat with a great write-up which observes:
There has been some dispute among defense experts about whether China has the capability to actually enforce its conditions. Defense News quoted an unnamed U.S. defense industry source located in Asia as saying, “Let China run itself crazy trying to enforce this. I just can’t see how China will sustain the enforcement. Too much traffic goes through there. If no country recognizes it, [and] don’t respond to China’s IFF [identification friend or foe] interrogation or VID [visual identification], then this new ADIZ is meaningless.”

Notably, China’s announcement also won it the ire of South Korea, one of the few states in the region that Beijing had thus far avoided offending over sovereignty issues in the past few years. According to the Wall Street Journal, China’s new ADIZ overlaps with about 3,000 square kilometers of South Korea’s own ADIZ. It also encloses Ieodo (Suyan) Rock that South Korea administers but China also claims. Seoul and Beijing will discuss the issue an already scheduled vice defense ministerial-level strategic dialogue in the South Korean capital this week.
Way to go, Beijing! Totally unnecessarily peeving erstwhile friend. This is all about Beijing appealing to domestic audiences. Scary, because those right-wingers aren't going to be appeased until they and others are bleeding...

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Sunday, January 27, 2013

Richard Bush on ROC 100th, Sept 2012

Richard Bush's speech to the Academia Historica in Taipei last September, up at Brookings this month. Bush is a major US government expert on Taiwan. The speech is studded with errors and omissions, most likely the result of a need to play to its audience. I'd like to isolate a couple of points. Bush writes:
Civic nationalism, I would suggest, is becoming the dominant type for a majority of Taiwan people. It is an attachment to the island’s democratic system and its norms of popular sovereignty and majority rule. To put it simply, it is an attachment to today’s ROC and all it stands for.
The last sentence has everything backwards. Taiwanese are attached to their democracy and link it to the ROC only to the extent that the ROC equates itself to Taiwan. The Taiwanese are hardly attached to the ROC's grandiose territorial goals and do not see themselves as the rulers of China. Moreover, as I have noted here many times, prominent ROC symbols, such as the flag are increasingly being reinterpreted by the locals as symbols of Taiwan. Of course, the attachment to democracy is not an attachment to the ROC and all it stands for -- to get democracy, the locals had to fight the ROC and all it stood for. But Bush can't say that to a bunch of crusty old deep blues at a national nostalgia fest, I suppose.
These differences between ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism and between territory and the state are not simply an abstract academic matter. They have significant consequences for cross-Strait relations. A Taiwan that cannot agree on these issues is a Taiwan that is in a weaker position visà-vis the PRC.
Skipping over his remarkably bass-akwards construction of ethnic and civic nationalism, Bush has been making this point about Taiwan's lack of internal consensus for a while (for example). This point is often made, but it is never made concretely. For example, Bush has never identified what would count as "consensus" or explained how such a "consensus" would help Taiwan concretely.

Indeed, does Bush really want Taiwan to internally resolve the issue of whether it is a territory or a state? Fact is, Washington analysts like Bush would be buying ulcer medicine by the case if Taiwan ever actually came to a consensus and formally resolved the issue of whether it is a territory or a state. Because everyone who has ever lived here for twenty minutes knows which outcome the Taiwanese would prefer. The actual consensus on that issue -- do nothing, hope we can muddle through somehow -- is what keeps Washington happy.

Ironically Bush already named some of the elements of the Taiwan consensus in another piece of his, a response to Bob Sutter he co-wrote with Alan Romberg (here with my responses). The actual, real consensus in Taiwan rests on the bedrock of Taiwan's democracy and is quite clear. So is the consensus about dealing with China -- everyone wants the economic benefits, nobody wants political talks. And nobody wants to pay to clean up the mess.

Further, it is hard to see how this alleged lack of consensus makes Taiwan any weaker than it already is in talks with China. Taiwan's problems are caused by China's rampant military buildup and growing economic might. There is little Taiwan can do about that. This situation is compounded by the fact that Washington has burned trillions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives over the last decade making central Asia and the Middle East safe for Chinese investment and expansion, instead of having its eye on the ball in Asia and investing in its people at home.

The truth is that Taiwan's divisions over China mirror the Beltway's own schizophrenic behavior -- it formally defines Taiwan's status as undecided but breaks out in hives if the I-word is mentioned. It lauds democracy, human rights, rule of law, and social consensus, but then supports the KMT, the party that benefits the most from ruling a divided society with a rough, imperfect democracy. It worries about China's growing power and influence, yet trades with it, transfers new technologies to China, trains its engineers and technologists, and invites its state-run economy to play in capitalist markets. Even Washington's China experts and punditocracy fill the airwaves with China commentary and advice to the government, while quietly doing lucrative consulting deals with Beijing. In fact, it seems to me that the real division and lack of consensus lies in Washington, and that as soon as the Beltway starts providing real leadership on Asia and displays a consistent, forward-looking, and concrete policy attitude on China, Taiwan will respond.

Lead, Washington.

REF: Bush once wondered aloud why China continued with the military build up since Ma was playing ball. Washington amazes me sometimes.
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Monday, November 26, 2012

Blast from the Past: President Ford, Teng Hsiao-ping on Taiwan

Beijing, Dec 4, 1975:

Vice Premier Teng: So we now enter our third session and I think the final session for this visit. I believe in the talks we had yesterday, we have covered almost all the ground, and I think especially the deep going conversation you had with Chairman Mao shows we have touched upon all aspects.

And the Taiwan issue that both sides are concerned about actually was also discussed during your wide-ranging conversation with Chairman Mao. And we have understood Mr. President's point; that is, that during the time of the election it will not be possible to make any new moves.

As for our side, we have told the Doctor many times that we are very patient. And in our relations we have always put the international aspect first and the Taiwan issue second.

The President: 

Wednesday, November 21, 2012

1957 Anti-American Riots

A friend of mine passed me these photos off of eBay from the Baltimore Sun (thanks, M). They are pictures of the US embassy in Taipei after the destructive 1957 riots. Others are here, here, and here. The riots were apparently stage-managed. This site has the story.
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Sunday, May 13, 2012

Rep Bill Owens and Taiwan Lobbying Violations?

Ruh-roh (source):
Congressman Bill Owens says he will repay more than $20,000 dollars for a junket that he took last December to Taiwan. The trip was paid for by a university in Taiwan. And it was planned and organized by a New York lobbying firm, which is no longer allowed under House ethics rules.

As Brian Mann reports, Owens says his office never reported that the firm Park Strategies organized the trip because "there was no place on the form to disclose it."
Politico has a nifty piece on the mess with tons of information. Park is very close to the Ma Administration and lobbies for the Taiwan government in the US.

This kind of thing is actually kind of normal for Taiwan and happens periodically. Remember this Bush-era mess? And the now-legendary Lafayette mess. Wait a couple of years. There will be another one....
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Saturday, April 14, 2012

Stokes and Hsaio on the US Strategy and Taiwan

Somebody is at last saying openly that Taiwan needs greater integration into the US defense screen. Stokes and Hsiao rock the conventional wisdom in explaining Why the US Military Needs Taiwan....
Addressing these challenges requires greater collaboration not only within the U.S. defense establishment, but effective leveraging of talents of allies and ad hoc coalition partners in the region. The U.S. reportedly has begun examining how to diversify defense relations with traditional allies in the region, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Yet, little consideration appears to have been given to the significant role that Taiwan could play in an evolving U.S. defense strategy, including the JOAC and Air-Sea Battle. Taiwan’s future and U.S. interests in regional security are intimately related. Indeed, Taiwan is a core interest of the United States and has a pivotal role to play as an ad hoc coalition partner in Air-Sea Battle, JOAC, and the strategic rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific.

First, Taiwan should be the central guiding focus of defense planning in the Asia-Pacific region. In assessing JOAC and Air-Sea Battle-related requirements, the greatest emphasis should be placed on contingency planning for a PLA amphibious invasion of Taiwan with minimal warning. Based on a premature and faulty assumption that cross-Strait trade and investment will inevitably lead toward Taiwan’s democratic submission to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authoritarian rule, prominent analysts have asserted that the focus of U.S. defense planning should shift toward the South China Sea and defense of the global commons.
Stokes and Hsiao call into question the inevitability thesis, that sooner or later China will absorb Taiwan as the inevitable result of increased links between the two. Like the way the US inevitably absorbed Canada... Consider also...
The fact is that no free and open society understands China as well as Taiwan. Unfortunately, few U.S. military officers conduct in-country training in Taiwan, and there are no known students attending Taiwan’s National Defense University (NDU) or other intermediate/senior service schools. More educational exchanges between the two defense establishments are warranted, particularly for junior and non-commissioned officers. Even as the Pentagon has actively pursued deeper and broader military-to-military relations with the PLA, the number of U.S.-Taiwanese conferences held on the PLA has dwindled.
Taiwan is a fabulously under-utilized platform. This piece would have been stronger if Hsiao and Stokes had explained how the US is going to get around the interpenetration of Taiwan's intelligence services by Beijing. Or how the US is going to work on deepening the alliance when a pro-China ideologue like Ma is in power. What S and H are really arguing is that the whole strategic thrust of US policy is headed down the wrong road. Those who envision standing up to Chinese expansion while handing over Taiwan to China are setting out to fight with one hand tied behind their back. This also means that the US is supporting the wrong party in Taiwan's politics; making the Chinese feel secure about Taiwan simply allows them to ramp up tensions elsewhere. But that goes without saying.

As if an ill omen of the coming hegemonic conflict in Asia, the standoff at Scarborough Shoal (the A on the map) is still ongoing as of yesterday....

Philippines has no real navy to speak of, China can simply brush it aside if it came to conflict. But the US has a security treaty with Philippines. I don't know how Washington interprets that treaty (would we go to war over some shoals in the South China Sea?). But I loved this report:
On Thursday, a Philippine Coast Guard vessel and a third Chinese ship from the Ministry of Agriculture arrived. Shortly after, BRP Gregorio del Pilar and one of the Chinese maritime surveillance ships pulled out of the area.
Does the Ministry of Agriculture in the PRC operate armed fishing vessels? It would indeed seem that way.
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Daily Links:
  • Haha. Last time this ad was forwarded to me, "Amy Livingston" was in Taipei. If you run some Google searches you'll soon find that Amy is one of the great world travelers of our time, having made thousands while living in Dar es Salaam, Addis Ababa, and Goth Hashim Khan.
  • KMT wusses out, won't hold KMT-CCP forum in Taiwan. This means that the party forums are always held in China, where they can't be seen by pesky democratic eyes or protested by pesky democratic protesters. 
  • Satellite views of Taiwan
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Monday, June 27, 2011

China digital times with leaked guide for internet posters?

China Digital Times posted a list of guidance for Chinese internet commentators, the infamous 50-center crowd. They all spur the usual sort of whining history-twisting we've come to know and love from that useless crowd, but the first one is the most important from our point of view:
(1) To the extent possible make America the target of criticism. Play down the existence of Taiwan.
If this leaked document is true, this first directive would tend to confirm what I've been saying -- that the CCP's strategy is to transfer tension between China and Taiwan caused by China's desire to annex Taiwan to the US-China and US-Taiwan relationship.
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Thursday, June 02, 2011

Random Thoughts and Observations

Today in class I asked the students to write about three major problems for Taiwan's future. One student eventually mentioned bullying, which apparently haunts many students years into their future. Paul M Fussell once remarked that Americans spend adulthood getting revenge for what happened to them in high school, but Taiwan seems to be even worse. Do you think the Chinese leaders who bully Taiwan learned that in junior high?

Here's a headline you'll see more of: Gates to Reassure Asian Allies. As all our pomp of yesterday becomes one with Ninevah and Tyre, expect to see more headlines down the years in the generic form (HIGH RANKING PERSON) to reassure (NERVOUS ALLIES) until at last we reach Sec of Defense reassures Mayor of Honolulu....


Meanwhile Adm Willard, the US Navy's chief in the Asia-Pacific region, expresses concern about Chinese territorial expansion in the South China Sea. Not only is Taiwan linked to that increasingly tense issue by its direct claims on the area, but it also has a large military base on an important island in the South China Sea. This shows that you can't advocate quietly handing off Taiwan to China without (1) strengthening China's claims to the South China Sea via eliminating a rival claimant whose claims it now takes over and (2) handing Beijing a major military installation in the area. Beijing's territorial claims are both intertwined and self-reinforcing. What will Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi say when Chinese jets operate out of Taiwan's former base on Dongsha Island in the Spratlys?

Local politics: As we slouch toward the January election to be rebooted, KMT Vice President Siew will not seek re-election. Siew suffered a slew of health problems during his term. This leaves Ma and the KMT free to pick someone young and energetic and Taiwanese. Tell me who you think he should pick in the comments below.

Collin Spears asks whether ECFA will be the end of Ma if the Taiwanese don't choose right..... in this piece which links to me (and therefore is totally awesome, thanks Collin!) he writes:
The landmark agreement is not helping Ma in Taiwan as much as some Western critics tend to think.  Ma’s Taiwanese critics contend that the economic data he flaunts as proof of the  ECFAs success are not coming from Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), but China, therefore they are bias.  Further, they argue that Ma’s policies do nothing but to further hollow-out the island’s industrial base, which only benefit the wealthy while taking Taiwan from a industrial economy to a service economy which is ever increasingly dependent on the Mainland.  At the same time, Taiwan, due to Beijing’s objections, is unable to make independent trade deals with many of its neighbors (such as the ASEAN states), due to China’s diplomatic objections, which it uses as blackmail for “good behavior”.  In fact, opponents point to Tung Chen-yuan, a professor at Taipei’s National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of Development Studies, who claims that the ECFA has not been responsible for an increase in exports to China, because no increases occured:
The Ma Administration dug its own grave -- had they not attempted to gain public support by constantly conjuring up new, urgent, mortal threats that Taiwan could only dealing with by signing ECFA now now now, the public would not now be expecting that ECFA would bring them two chickens in every pot of san bei ji. Imagine an alternate universe where ECFA had been put forward in a low key and rationale manner, instead of being presented as a panacea for the island's economic problems.

Off to town to drink tonight at a couple of expat happy hours. Hope to see you there!
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Sunday, December 19, 2010

The Rover Incident of 1867

Formosa Chewing tobacco c. 1872

There I was, surfing the net, when I came across this little note:
U. S. Grant.
Washington City, April 13, 1869.
To the Senate of the United States:
I nominate Capt. James Forney, of the Marine Corps, to be brevet major in said corps for gallantry in action against the savages of Formosa, to date from the 13th of June, 1867.
Marines in action against the "savages of Formosa"? James Forney later became a civil war hero and rose to high rank in the marines before being court martialed for corruption, but the incident to which this citation refers is one of those fascinating little moments in 19th century imperialism, when a punitive expedition was driven off in defeat.

On March 12, 1867, the American merchant ship Rover hit a reef near Oluanpi, Taiwan's southernmost point, and drifted north towards what is now Kenting. The ship soon sank, but the Captain, his wife, and the crew got off in small boats. In revenge for previous killings of local aborigines by foreigners, the local aborigines (called the Koaluts at the time) killed everyone who made it to shore, excepting one Chinese sailor. That sailor found his way to Takao (Kaohsiung), where he notified the British consul, who in turn notified the British ambassador in Beijing, who passed the information along to the US ambassador there.

The British dispatched a gunboat from Taiwanfu (Tainan) in late March to search for survivors. The aborigines descended on the sailors searching the area, driving them back to the ship, which responded by shelling them, and then leaving.

Early in April of 1867 the US Consul in Amoy, Charles William Le Gendre, traveled to Foochow to see whether he could persuade the Qing authorities to act. The governor-general gave Le Gendre a letter of introduction to the Qing official in Taiwanfu (Tainan). Le Gendre arrived in Taiwan on April 18, where Qing authorities evinced little interest in the incident. They told Le Gendre that the aboriginal districts lay outside their authority.

Hartford in 1864.

Months went by as diplomatic messages were exchanged, and finally on June 13, 1867, two ships, Hartford and Wyoming, along with 181 officers, sailors and marines, were dispatched by the Americans to punish the "savages", accompanied by the British consul at Takao and a couple of British citizens. Davidson complains that this was far too late, since even if some Americans had survived, it would be unlikely that any were still alive after so long a delay.

Alas for the Americans, the punishment was meted out to them. The marines and sailors landed on June 13th. The heat was overwhelming and the troops were felled by sunstroke and exhaustion. "The savages," wrote the commander of the land expedition, "dressed in clouts, their bodies painted red, were seen through our glasses, assembling in parties of ten or twelve on the cleared hills about two miles distant." The aborigines sensibly fought from cover on a hill above the Americans, remaining invisible to the American force but keeping the sailors and marines under constant musket fire. "It was impossible to tell the position of the enemy until we saw the smoke of his pieces, and we were obliged to fire at the flash. We were in plain sight, an open mark for the enemy, while they were hid in this undergrowth, into which we could not see ten feet," complained one of the officers in the NY Times. Forney was in charge of skirmishers deployed in front of the US troops in this battle.

"Attack of the United States marines and sailors on the pirates of the island of Formosa, East Indies."

After several hours of plunging into ambush, the first battle casualty occurred when Alexander Slidell McKenzie, second in command of the expedition, was killed leading a charge uphill against the aborigines. Despite the Sharp's rifles that half the company possessed (aborigines in southern Formosa had fled from volleys of the new breech-loading rifles of the Prussian steamer Elbe in 1860, the first use of the revolutionary new Prussian weapon in combat), they were unable to drive off the locals. Instead, the "Pirates of Formosa" as they were styled in the NY Times, had driven off the expedition in defeat and disarray. The retreating Americans made up for the defeat by burning a few huts on their way back to their ships.

The aborigines, observed the US ground commander, displayed "a strategem and courage equal to our native indians." Davidson's comment on the incident summarizes the attitude that underlies 200 years of American intervention in foreign lands: "After this ineffectual attempt to bring the Koaluts to reason...."

A. S. McKenzie, killed in the skirmish.

Rear-Admiral Bell reported that it seemed unlikely the area could be stabilized unless a Power was willing to create a settlement there to pacify the area, but the Qing appeared reluctant to do so.

A second attempt to "reason" with the aborigines was made by Le Gendre. In September of 1867 he arrived in person on Formosa to take charge of a punitive expedition with a large force, which the Qing Viceroy had promised to send. Arriving with orders in hand from the Qing authorities in China, he compelled the Qing general on Formosa in charge of the island's troops to supply him with the troops, though only 500 of the promised 1,000 were delivered, and off he marched into southern Taiwan.

Le Gendre had been a general in the civil war and was an experienced leader of troops as well as an experienced diplomat. He basically assumed control of the expedition from the Qing general in charge, and led it on an exemplary march across hill and dale, road building along the way, entirely free of violent encounters. Davidson reproduces his expedition report in its entirety, well worth reading. For example:
"We spent the night in a sugar mill, and left at daylight for Pangliau, which we reached the same night. Pangliau extends along the shore at the summit of an arc of a circle, forming a bay, and is, therefore, too open to be secure. The products are rice and peanuts. Women pound the rice and till the fields, while the men are entirely taken up with fishing. To the east, at a cannon shot from the sea, rise abruptly from the valley, high mountains, the exclusive domain of the savage aborigines, who receive from the Chinese (or half-caste) population a certain share of their crops, as a royalty for the lands they have rented to them forever. There for the first time we notice that none leave the village without being armed."
This sounds like a description of modern Fangliao. It is interesting that Le Gendre records that the locals paid the aborigines "rent" which sounds suspiciously like a Dangeld. While they waited at Pangliau two Englishmen showed up. They would be indispensible in Le Gendre's later negotiations.

Why did they wait at Pangliau? They were having a road built over the mountains, which they promptly set out on once it was completed. Despite predictions of imminent attack, the expedition skillfully blocked the local passes with troop detachments and proceeded unmolested into the aboriginal demenses.

Le Gendre proved himself equal to the daunting tasks before him. He recognized that retaliation was pointless and it would be better to obtain a promise of future protection of shipwreck victims from the local aborigines, which he described as consisting of 18 tribes led by a paramount leader named Tooke-tok. It was US policy, he wrote, “to sacrifice a vain revenge (which might be hereafter used as a pretext for retaliation) to the incomparable advantage we would gain in securing ourselves against the recurrence of crimes we had come to punish.” Le Gendre also realized that the aborigines, far from acting out of some savage preference for violence, were aggrieved parties retaliating for attacks on them by foreigners. Finally, the large body of troops he had brought represented muscle that could be deployed in punishment should negotiations break down or agreements be broken.

Le Gendre was able to negotiate an agreement which Davidson avers saw attacks on shipwreck victims in the vicinity fall. This agreement included a provision calling for the Qing to build a "fortified observatory at the southern bay" which would eventually evolve into the walled lighthouse at Oluanpi. Le Gendre saw a fort in the area as an urgent necessity which would enabled the Qing to assert their authority over the area, command respect from the Koaluts, and provide a safe haven for the many victims of shipwrecks in the area. In response to Le Gendre's demands, the Qing General Liu erected a walled enclosure in area in just two days.

Davidson records that the mission was successful and that the local aborigines often helped shipwreck victims and notified the Qing authorities of their existence. But the "confederation" of local peoples fell apart -- if indeed it had ever existed -- and Tooke-tok found it difficult to exert his authority, records Davidson.

After "a hard trip of nearly two months", Le Gendre returned to Amoy. In 1874 he would return to the area with a Japanese punitive expedition as its advisor, along with several other Americans. The Japanese were sent to punish the aborigines for the murder of 54 Okinawan sailors by aborigines of the Mudan area in 1871. The enterprise was doubly colonialist, first against the aborigines, and second, against Okinawa. By "avenging" those deaths, the Japanese would demonstrate that they spoke for and acted on behalf of, the Okinawans as their rulers. That expedition would lead to the famous Battle of the Stone Gate, not far from modern Checheng. But that is a story for another day.

REFS: This great blogpost, NYTimes, Davidson, Wiki, here.
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