Nelson Report: The US is peeved

Chris Nelson at the Washington Insider report, the Nelson Report, explains how peeved the US is with the UN bid and how badly it has backfired.

CORRECTION...earlier this week we misread a note on a Taiwan arms sale being sent to Capitol Hill for approval, and thought it was referring to the long-stalled 2001 package offered by President Bush, but delayed until a month or so ago by KMT/DPP domestic politics in Taipei.

Even then, the Legislative Yuan only approved a couple of major aircraft and anti-missile systems, while voting to "study" the conventional (non-nuclear) submarine offer which most experts here have long derided as a costly white elephant, and which in any event seemed to upset Beijing far more than any utility it might provide.

In fact, the arms sale sent up for Congressional OK this week was only for Harpoon missiles, and not anything to do with the surviving portions of the 2001 package. We apologize for the mix-up, which was entirely our fault.

The net is that there is still something of a controversy over whether there is a policy-based "hold" on notifying Congress about the 2001 package approvals.

Directly involved sources say there is no truth to concerns expressed by some "friends of Taiwan" that it is working-level, desk-level disapproval which is causing the delay.

And it is further argued that to imply a "political hold" is wrong, and that it's been barely a month, so the delay should be seen as just the normal time it takes for the bureaucracy to grind out the paperwork.

This claim or thesis should be easily proved or disproved shortly, we'd suggest. And in the meantime, there are authoritative, if very on-background claims that in fact, there is a "political hold" from the highest levels at State, for reasons which can only be speculated upon.

-0-

Our personal guess is that IF there is such a hold, it represents concern about timing and even more about ramifications...it is well known that the PRC is increasingly nervous about the trajectory of the DPP and its campaign for Taiwan Identity and "international space". We've covered that extensively in recent Reports.

Since all Taiwan arms sales over the years have had unavoidably important "psychological support" intention and impact, the legitimate strategic need factor is often secondary.

So since the US President himself is, once again, angry with the DPP President, you don't have to stretch to suggest why a major arms sale announcement might stay on a back burner for a while longer, since it's been six years already.

DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh certainly encountered one of the practical effects of the Bush's concern, as reflected in Hsieh's rough treatment during his meetings with State and NSC personnel.

In fact, we're told, the meetings were so short, the only topic covered in depth was the specific Administration anxiety over what it sees as President Chen's mis-handling of his demand that Taiwan be officially recognized by the United Nations.

Not only was (and is) the Administration angry about the lack of consultation on this move by Chen, it is equally, if not more angry at the UN Secretariat's written policy declaring that the UN recognizes China to be in control of Taiwan (Nelson Report, July 26).

This is not, in fact, what the UN policy is, the US argues, but the net may yet be a Chinese demand for some kind of a vote in the General Assembly to "confirm" the mistaken interpretation by the Secretariat.

If you think the US hates to be put into the position of fighting anti-Israel resolutions at the UN, just wait if it finds itself having to explain the US's unique interpretation of "one China".

Even worse, friends and observers of Taiwan worry (privately) such a UN debate runs the risk of seeming to force the Bush Administration to change the long-standing US formulation that while it does not "support" Taiwan's independence, it does not "oppose" it, either.

As we quoted directly involved sources in our July 26 Report, one of the many reasons the Administration was furious with Chen (and took it out on Hsieh) was that Chen's action has now set in motion the risk of a damaging and divisive fight at the UN which would pit the US directly against China's most fundamentally expressed foreign policy positions.

You think maybe this might explain a timing-based "political hold" on the surviving portions of the 2001 arms package?

I have to admit that I figured this UN thing would die stillborn and nothing would come of it in the world body. But then I also figured Chen would be consulting with his US allies. *sigh*

If the US is forced to declare a position on the Taiwan issue, given the Bush Administration's obsession with the Middle East, the State Department's lean toward Beijing, and the general loss of power and influence in the world we've suffered under the Bush Administration, it isn't going to adopt a position that Taiwan supporters will like. China might not push for a vote on Taiwan's status -- that would mean admitting that other nations have say in what is part of China and what is not. But if it does, I don't look to the UN to uphold the right here.

[Taiwan] [China] [UN] [US]