Latest Nelson Report

A waterfall feeds a river gorge below Caoling.

The Latest Nelson Report with some comments on Taiwan (bold emphasis mine, red in original). Click on Read more...

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LINES ON MAPS...remember a week or so ago when Japan issued a map showing a couple of hundred islands with Japanese names? Beijing today took it a potentially dangerous step further, defining into "law" some enforcement rights:

Nelson Report on the US Arms Sales

Gardens

The Nelson Report on the arms package for Taiwan.... and don't miss this threat from a PLA general. And this summary of the Atlantic Council Meeting. Also 5 things that should be in the arms sale. What they all show is how Beijing's squalling -- note, nothing concrete ever occurs -- has an effect on arms sales. But US consumer goods, movies, Chinese students, etc all flow unabated. There's a lesson there, if only someone in Washington will read it.

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MORE FROM THE CHINA CAUCUS BRIEF...Your Editor attended the excellent Atlantic Council discussion on the anticipated $1-bil US arms package coming soon for Taiwan...the first in over 4 years, it was noted. Good write-up by the US Naval Institute, below, saves us deciphering our notes.

Of course no way will Beijing be happy about it, but in response to our question, the panel moderated by Foreign Policy Asia Editor Isaac Stone Fish thought it might be less intrusive in US-China relations to do this while the KMT is in power, rather than accentuating China's obvious angst at the imminent return of the DPP, via the Jan. 16 elections.

Much discussion also of what now seems a serious Taiwanese effort to actually build some badly-needed conventional submarines, rather than the more PR-focused demand of the past decade on the US to somehow provide them, going back to the start of the last Bush administration.

A younger audience member asked how today's "Taiwan Lobby" compared to Olden Times, allowing Your Editor the chance to recall the near-death experience of being stalked by Madame Chiang herself, arm in arm with Walter Judd, back during the writing of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Now that was the Taiwan Lobby!

Panel: Anticipated U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan Will Strain Relations With Beijing. "The Taiwanese presidential elections next month - with a change in party control expected and the likely announcement of a new billion-dollar U.S. arms sale to Taipei - will not only "send a signal to Beijing" but likely will, in the short run, increase tensions between Washington and the People's Republic of China, a panel of experts on the region said Wednesday. Speaking at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., Ian Easton, a research fellow at Project 2049, said the reported U.S. sales under the Taiwan Relations Act likely will include up to four Perry-class frigates, amphibious assault vehicles, Boeing Apache helicopters and a variety of missiles for Taiwan's army. No formal package has yet been sent to Congress, so the exact dollar amount requested and numbers and types of equipment are not publicly known. Arms sales, which have been on hold for more than four years, are "the most visible" interaction between the United States and Taiwan, a nation that otherwise is "almost completely marginalized" internationally. "I can assure you China will yell and scream no matter what is in [President Barack] Obama's package," Robert Manning of the Atlantic Council added. He expects Taiwan to be looking for improved anti-submarine warfare capability even as it looks to build up its own submarine fleet. The arms sales "do complicate [Chinese] war planning . . . they have to plan accordingly" to the changed equation in equipment and training, Easton added. "[China's People's Liberation Army] has no experience" with a blockade and possible invasion on this scale when looking at Taiwan across the straits from mainland China. Joanne Yu Taylor of RAND said Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party, which is expected to win the election, will be looking at making "a great push for indigenous defense" capability, especially in cyber, aerospace and maritime. The party signaled such moves in the 12 Blue Papers it has recently produced on Taiwanese defense. But the reality for Taiwan, even with a change in governmental control, won't be much different than it is now. "Its Number One security threat is China, [and its] Number One defender, the U.S.," said Taylor." http://news.usni.org/2015/12/09/panel-anticipated-u-s-arms-sales-to-taiwan-will-strain-relations-with-beijing
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Nelson Report on Adm Owens

The Nelson Report, the Washington insider report, carries news of that awful piece by Admiral Bill Owens in the Financial Times I blogged on a few days ago. Onward....

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"PERSPECTIVE"...as noted in the Summary, a Financial Times OpEd last week by retired Amb. Bill Owens caused some heartburn throughout the China/Taiwan watching community, timed as it was to coincide with President Obama's trip to Asia.

Many in Taipei, and here, wondered if the former Vice Chief of the Joint Chiefs' recommendation to scrap the Taiwan Relations Act in favor of something more suited to his view of current US-PRC relations might be a "covert" message of some kind from DOD, the White House, or perhaps both.

As we read it, the gist of Owens' argument is that because the PRC's military build-up is already so overwhelming, continuing US arms sales to Taiwan in effect feeds an already pointless arms race.

Here's a key section:

It is often politically expedient to paint China as an adversary, or worse, a future enemy. Our national security apparatus is aiming to continue the present level of defence spending and emphasising 30-year-old legislation that is doing more harm than good.

The Taiwan Relations Act was passed in 1979 after the establishment of relations with the People's Republic of China and the breaking of relations with the Republic of China. It is the basis on which we continue to sell arms to Taiwan, an act that is not in our best interest.

A thoughtful review of this outdated legislation is warranted and would be viewed by China as a genuine attempt to set a new course for a relationship that can develop into openness, trust and even friendship.

The first step to halting arms sales might be to observe that the Chinese have stopped the short range missile build-up across the Taiwan Straits (I believe this is true). The US could then stop selling arms to Taiwan unless that build-up was renewed. We must always protect the democracy and freedoms Taiwan has developed - but weapons sales do not do this.

We must consider the facts. China will continue to grow four to five times faster than the US. In less than 30 years China's GDP will equal that of the US and we will live in a world of two great and equal powers. Importantly, if China funds its military at a global standard of 3-4 per cent of GDP, it will have the capacity for a military equal to or greater than that of the US (they get more from the yuan than we from the dollar, manpower costs are less, and production is cheaper because of its scale).

At that time, friends and allies such as Japan, Korea, India and Indonesia will be faced with a difficult choice (and yes, it will be a choice) between China, a rapidly growing and influential regional power, which is continuing to grow and trade in much larger quantities, or stick with the US (a 12-hour flight away). Is that the scenario we would set for the future? I believe not.

The solution is to approach the US/China relationship not with hedging, competition or watchfulness, but with co-operation, openness and trust.

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In fact, Owens' piece horrified former colleagues we contacted, on several grounds, including a concern that his long-standing affiliation with a PRC-sponsored talk-shop might be clouding both his political and strategic judgment. [MT: this is probably a reference to the Sanya Initiative held at CSIS last year, which basically resembled the dinner party in The Remains of the Day, with the Chinese for Nazis and retired US military officers for their British sympathizers. See the anonymous comment on my previous post on this topic.]

Our checks make it emphatically clear that Owen's OpEd of Nov. 17 was poorly received for substantive reasons, including his incomprehensible decision not to reference the very deep concerns still unresolved over the USS Impeccable incident earlier this year.

So we asked Loyal Reader and regular adult supervisor on all such matters, Rear Admiral Eric McVadon (Ret.) for his commentary on the Owen's suggerstions...

ON IMPROVING US-PRC RELATIONS AND SCRAPPING THE TRA
Commentary for The Nelson Report by Eric McVadon

Admiral Bill Owens has boldly suggested stopping arms sales to Taiwan and embracing China. Yes, the U.S. and China should be better friends, just as Admiral Owens suggests. They are, of course, friendly to a far greater degree than they were for much of the last half of the last century. Indeed, I advocate a goal of partnership in the first half of this century--a path the two countries have arguably taken with respect to North Korea, the global economic crisis, maybe global warming, etc. Progress has been made even with respect to Taiwan, but caution is warranted in what is arguably the most complex problem of this sort that the world faces today--including the Taiwan Relations Act, which addresses U.S. support of Taiwan's defensive capability.

As to specifics, I hope Admiral Owens is right about a cessation of the Chinese ballistic missile buildup against Taiwan. Even if so, there are already deployed against Taiwan roughly a thousand short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (many very accurate) and probably hundreds of land-attack cruise missiles (very accurate)--an unprecedented, overwhelming missile threat against which there is no effective defense. Beijing's saying it has stopped now is not very comforting to the mother's of Taiwan.

Moreover, China has made no move toward renouncing the use of force against Taiwan--and it has built an impressive and modernized military capability focused on the "Taiwan problem." A minor part of this is the amphibious and airborne capabilities that could cap a campaign by missiles and air that had driven Taiwan to its knees. China has modern, capable, and numerous aircraft, ships, submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-C4ISR systems, fifth column and special forces, and much more that, if used effectively, could defeat Taiwan and that stand a chance of deterring, slowing, and complicating timely and effective U.S. intervention. Tensions across the Taiwan Strait have recently eased; an attack is highly unlikely. Nevertheless, Taiwan needs to have some role in deterring China from using this force and in defending itself, if things go the wrong way in the future.

Taiwan does not need offensive weapons to attack China. Those would be pin pricks to a dragon, which has overwhelming military superiority, favorable geography, strategic depth, vast comprehensive national power, sense of purpose, and obsessive motivation.

Taiwan does need weapons to deter an attack by making Beijing realize that the outcome would be uncertain, an attack would be costly, and that Taiwan would not be immediately defenseless and helpless--forced to accept Beijing's terms. Taiwan cannot defend itself against today's China and PLA without U.S. intervention. The Chinese will attempt to deter or delay a U.S. response with military, technical, and political means. Taiwan needs weapon systems that will help it hold on until the Americans can achieve effective intervention. Beijing must recognize that factor, or it will be emboldened or tempted to use military force in some arising crisis, perceived or real, concerning Taiwan's future direction.

It is, therefore, premature to abandon the Taiwan Relations Act. It is not premature to build greater trust and confidence with China. We need the right balance of engagement and cooperation on the one hand and U.S. and Taiwan military readiness on the other. Neither of these goals is easily achieved. Much intellectual energy and sound thinking and leadership are required. There could soon come a day when Beijing will take a more enlightened position (there are hopeful hints of that) or that a solution is achieved otherwise (probably based on economic interdependence). But, for the moment, a bold stroke to fell the TRA won't do the trick.

Eric A. McVadon
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Consultant on East Asia Security Affairs
Director, Asia-Pacific Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

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Owen must have known how poorly his strategically shortsighted and ethically challenged opinion on the TRA would be received in Washington. It's pretty clear who it was written to please.

Nelson, a former Dem staffer who was in on the drafting of the Taiwan Relations Act, also refers to the USS Impeccable incident, in which Chinese boats hassled a US surveillance vessel going about its lawful business in local waters. He says that deep issues regarding that incident remain unresolved. Readers may want to reflect on that: of all the US government arms that do business with China, the Navy has gone out of its way to work with Beijing more than most.
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[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!

Nelson Report -- Still More on the Arms Freeze

The Washington insider Nelson Report doesn't often have remark on Taiwan, and yet here are two in a row that have stuff on Taiwan. This one comments on Wolfowitz's remarks the other day. Pay attention to that first sentence -- does it herald change?:

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TAIWAN ARMS...we can confirm that the Administration is in deep consultation over whether to approve an $11-billion arms package for Taiwan, and if so, when.

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, now president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, predicted in Taipei yesterday that President Bush is "close" to deciding to release what PACOM Adm. Tim Keating perhaps inadvertently last week seemed to indicate was a freeze, due to larger US-China relations and issues.

You can suspect that Wolfowitz was doing his job, and special pleading, and/or you can suspect that given his connections, he may know something the rest of us don't.

Our guess is he was promoting, not reporting, and that while there are those who argue Bush will announce the deal, then hope to "make up for it" with his Beijing Olympics' visit with China's Hu Jintao...that strikes us as are being a little too clever, as per the observations of a directly concerned Loyal Reader who supports the package:

"I think Hu is so concerned about domestic unrest and possible demos that any sign from Bush of bending Taipei's way would be more than Hu could handle.

Many, including me, think Hu is under pressure to show that his policy of 'no unification now' toward Taipei is a good policy. Ma's mantra 'no unification, no independence, no arms race' doesn't sit very well in Beijing. Even more so was Ma's statement that he didn't foresee unification 'in his lifetime.

This has Beijing nervous about giving any leeway to Taiwan for fear that the DPP might return, and that the DPP would pocket all concessions from China, and ask for more.

I worry, by the way, in all this arms 'delay' and optimism over the dialogue that is underway between Taipei and Beijing, that any signs of a DPP resurrection would make Beijing very belligerent.

That would risk the US being caught in a trap somewhat of its own making, ' troublemaker DPP/peacemaker KMT' - so you can't have that DPP be re-elected to power.'

But, as noted at the top, anyone who says they know the outcome of the Administration debate is exaggerating, we suspect. As we await a decision (and not making any announcement may BE the decision) here are some useful considerations we hear from other concerned observers, about points raised in recent Nelson Reports:

"I agree that the Bush Administration is not breaching the TRA. We are in a set of circumstances that the authors of the TRA did not contemplate. If the authors had been in this situation, they probably would be doing the same thing that the Administration is doing now. It's a bit more complicated than that, of course, but not as dire as some people are painting it."[MT: this Loyal Reader is wrong. The situation that the "authors of the TRA did not contemplate" -- the KMT-CCP lovefest -- is not the cause of the arms freeze. The arms freeze predates the current situation. The Bush Administration is full of it on this one. Whether the Bush administration is breaching the Taiwan Relations Act is a matter of one's values, but I don't think it is. It may be in violation of the spirit of the TRA, but the letter of the TRA clearly gives the President the right to do what he wants. Stupid to hand the executive so much power.]

Finally, a security concern you almost never hear "in public", from a directly involved Loyal Reader:

"It is curious that all the comments about accommodating China, Taiwanese politics, obligations under the TRA, etc. hardly mention one of the most important constraints on any arms transfers to Taiwan -- compromise of advanced systems/technologies. Leakage to China from Taiwan of US defense data is already evident.

The KMT's return brings us back to a long-standing assumption about Taiwan's eventual fate -- accommodation with China involving some trade-off of sovereignty for autonomy. If you acknowledge that (whether or not you like it), you must also recognize that US military systems transferred to Taiwan will in effect become transfers to China...something that would surely give pause to any US administrations considering arms sales to Taiwan.

This should not mean the end of US arms support for Taiwan, but it will certainly impact what gets transferred. Mature equipment like the F-16s and utility helicopters could and should be released. Speculation on Aegis systems should stop.

The submarine project -- misconceived from the beginning and all but unimplementable in reality -- should be shelved. Some systems, like PAC-3, will be challenging re. legitimate Taiwan defense needs vs. tech security.

These are the sort of issues on which policy makers and responsible Congressional attention must focus -- an approach to Taiwan's security that finds a sensible middle ground between the extreme swings that have characterized current administration actions."[MT: Actually, we hear this security concern all the time, most recently in the Manthorpe piece a few posts below.]

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[Taiwan]

Nelson Report : More on arms freeze

Once again, the Washington insider report The Nelson Report has another round of inside-the-Beltway analysis on the Arms Freeze.

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TAIWAN ARMS..."fallout" continues from PACOM Adm. Tim Keating's speech to the Heritage Foundation last week, covered in recent Nelson Reports, in which Keating informally confessed that the White House has put a "freeze" (press language, not his) on a big arms package for Taiwan.

The consequence, observers report..."letters, resolutions, all kinds of things flying all over the place", given what appears to finally be a formal request from Taipei, for the bulk of the arms first offered by President Bush back in 2001. [MT: The presentation here isn't clear that there are seven-eight systems in the pipeline, some already funded by Taiwan. I am still working on getting a list of what has been funded. The Nelson Report also takes the view that the freeze is recent but clearly it goes back a couple of years.]

Indications were clear, even before the controversial Keating speech, that Bush was reluctant to move on his offer at this time...given the current state of US-China relations, and the apparent thaw in China-Taiwan relations under a new KMT government.

As we have been reporting, while it is obvious common sense that the US take into account both the bilateral and Cross Strait situation at the time of any arms sales, the letter of the law, the Taiwan Relations Act, requires that the only consideration is supposed to be an objective analysis of Taiwan's defense needs.

That, of course, can be and usually IS loosely defined to include a strategic and political assessment of all kinds of things, current major examples including US-China relations, such as cooperation at the UN on Iran, and the 6 Party talks with N. Korea...the problem being that while you DO it, you aren't really supposed to SAY it.

Enter Adm. Keating...

Before reprinting the full text of a Republican staff letter seeking support for a Congressional Resolution by HFAC Ranking Member Ilena Ross-Lehtinen, it's important to consider that for most of the Bush Administration, the normally very vocal, mainly Republican Taiwan lobby on Capitol Hill has been forced to keep as calm as possible, so as to not upset China, and the China-Taiwan policies of the Republican White House incumbent.

Not that support for Taiwan or arms sales ever disappeared, but events between China and Taiwan, and statements or actions by the White House, and senior State Department officials which, during the Clinton Administration, might have caused a furor on the Hill...didn't.

You may remember, back in early 2002, then-House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, at the peak of his powers, told an American Enterprise Institute audience that he planned to lead an attack on the "one China" policy which has underwritten US-China relations since the Nixon Administration.

We don't know who made the call, but with Vice President Cheney's office clearly on record as supporting a professional cooperative relationship with China, nothing further was heard from Mr. DeLay about "one China".

Increasingly, mainly Republican, pro-Taiwan inclinations, especially on the House side, were forced by their own rising, if grudging anger at the then-KMT government of President Chen, to join with the White House, State and DOD officials in warning Chen that he was failing to take vital US interests into account, perhaps even at risk of undermining the fundamental US defense commitment to Taiwan.[MT: the "KMT government of Chen"? LOL. Here is the Beltway mentality hard at work -- Chen wanted the weapons, the KMT-controlled legislature blocked them. Naturally, the US blamed Chen, instead of the actual culprits. So much of the US anger at Chen was totally unnecessary and Washington's own fault. The Bush Administration blew an eight-year long opportunity.]

Republicans Warner, then-Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoellick, and then-Asia Subcommittee chair Jim Leach all, at various times, made statements which, even a few years before, would have been politically unthinkable.

Administration and Congressional frustration also was fed by domestic Taiwan political squabbles which made it impossible for Taipei to respond until this year, to the big arms sale package which WAS offered during the summer of 2001, following, not coincidentally, the Hainan Island PC-3 crisis with China. [MT: this is apparently all wrong. A number of weapons systems were approved in the regular budget and supplied to Taiwan during this period, $4.1 billion worth in 2002-5 alone. The big package was not a creation of the US but of Taiwan policymakers who put some of the offered weapons in the regular budget, and other systems in a special budget, creating an inevitable mess. Far from "impossible to respond until this year" Taiwan requested F-16s back in 2006. The italicized letter Nelson includes has a better understanding of the issue.]

We have argued for some time that the next president, whether McCain or Obama, is likely to encounter an increasingly active pro-Taiwan effort from Congress...for a variety of reasons.

First, McCain himself is clearly more skeptical of the embrace of China which Bush has fostered; second, Obama, as a Democrat, is going to naturally face a more combative Republican minority, and it's not hard to predict that a revived effort on behalf of Taiwan will be an early and perhaps constant battleground.

For the sake of further discussion, please note we sincerely stipulate China's escalation of "missile diplomacy" along the coast, and the openly stated plans and objectives of the PLA...armament and power projection which WILL take place, likely regardless of anything the US does or does not do.

Of course these events and policies will affect McCain or Obama decisions on Taiwan arms, as was intended by the TRA back in 1979. The question, as in life, marriage, and all important things, is balance.

Here's the text of a "staff dear colleague" which lays out the issue as seen by Republican staff, following last week's Heritage Foundation speech by Adm. Keating:

"A long rumored freeze on United States weapons sales to Taiwan, a policy which has apparently been in force for all of 2008, was confirmed on July 16 by Admiral Timothy Keating, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific. According to press accounts of his remarks at the Heritage Foundation, Keating observed that there have "been no significant arms sales from the United States to Taiwan in relatively recent times," and that the absence of arms transfers reflected "administration policy." Keating went on to suggest that he had in fact discussed the issue of Taiwan arms sales with leaders in Beijing, noting that "The Chinese have made clear to me their concern over any arms sales to Taiwan."

According to press reports, the list of military hardware being held up includes eight diesel submarines, 66 F-16 Block 50/52 fighter aircraft, four Patriot PAC3 fire units (384 missiles), 30 Boeing-made AH-64D Apache attack helicopters and 60 UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopters. These are all items that the Bush administration has approved in principle for export to Taiwan - and for which Taiwan's legislature has appropriated the funds or put down payments. Indeed, on July 12, 2008, new Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou made a public appeal for renewed arms transfers, saying that the island still needs to secure defensive weapons from the United States, despite a warming of relations with mainland China.

As stated an editorial this week in Defense News, the freeze marks a complete reversal in the administration's policy toward Taiwan, which started in 2001 with a promise to furnish Taipei with new submarines, patrol planes and Patriot missiles. It is also in apparent contradiction with longstanding U.S. law and policy, including section 3(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 ("the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability") and the Six Assurances of July 14, 1982 (including assurances that Washington had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan nor to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan).

The TRA also specifies a congressional role in decision-making on security assistance for Taiwan. Section 3(b) stipulates that both the President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services "based solely" upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. Section 3(b) also says that "such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress." To date, however, the Administration has declined to brief the Congress on the legal justification and rationale for this stunning departure from a bipartisan, consensus approach toward Taiwan that has well-served every U.S. Administration for the last thirty years.

The judicious sale of defensive weapons system to Taiwan has been an essential element in United States support for a secure, stable and democratic Taiwan, as well as peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. In that context, please consider cosponsoring the attached legislation which, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, would require the Administration to consult with Congress in the development and execution of its arms transfer policy toward Taiwan. The Ranking Member hopes to introduce the resolution this week. If you would like to be an original cosponsor, please contact [her office...]."

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Everyone in Washington is saying the same thing: that no matter who wins, Taiwan is likely to rise in importance. And the next president, whether McCain or Obama, will have a much-improved Taiwan policy over the current disastrous presidency.

[Taiwan]

Nelson Report on Freeze:

The Nelson Report, the widely-circulated Washington insider report, recently wrote:

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Taiwan arms...last week's Heritage speech by PACOM's Adm. Tim Keating continues to generate attention in Asia, given his admission of a US "arms sale freeze" in order not to risk disruption of the currently improved China-Taiwan situation.

But we were wrong in reporting that Keating explicitly said he "consults" with China on the arms sale question. We misheard something and did not double-check the transcript until a couple of Loyal Readers said they couldn't find any mention of consultation, per se.

TAIWAN ARMS...as noted in the Summary, we owe PACOM Adm. Tim Keating an apology for taking what he did say about Taiwan arms, and mistakenly thinking he was also explicitly saying he consults with China about Taiwan arms.

We were listening to his remarks at Heritage last Wednesday at about 400 miles an hour, and a private email seemed to confirm what we thought we heard, which, HAD he explicitly said it, would seem to be in violation of the spirit, if not also the letter, of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Careful reading of the transcript by faithful Loyal Readers has confirmed that we were wrong...he didn't say it. He didn't even use the word "freeze" still being attributed to him, as per today's Wall Street Journal story, which is a useful summary of the current situation [MT: this piece is by the excellent Ting-yi Tsai, now the Wall Street Journal correspondent here]:

TAIPEI -- The White House appears increasingly unlikely to proceed with a planned $11 billion weapons sale to Taiwan, a decision that critics say could alter the strategic balance between the island and China and that could leave a thorny issue for the next U.S. president.

The weapons package -- which includes antimissile systems sold by Raytheon Co. and helicopters from United Technologies Corp. and Boeing Co. -- originated with an offer by U.S. President George W. Bush just months after he took office in 2001. The arms offer was the biggest for Taiwan in at least a decade, but political infighting on the island blocked allocation of funds until last December, when its legislature finally approved funding.

Since then, however, the Bush administration has yet to send formal requests to Congress that are needed for such sales, raising questions about the deal's prospects.

Then, in remarks Wednesday, the top U.S. military official in the Pacific effectively acknowledged that the Bush administration has frozen arms sales to Taiwan, at least temporarily. Adm. Timothy Keating said U.S. analysis "indicates there is no pressing, compelling need for, at this moment, arms sales to Taiwan of the systems that we're talking about."

Some proponents of the sale are now worried it won't happen before Mr. Bush finishes his term in January. "It seems reasonably clear that the [Bush] administration has decided not to sell arms to Taiwan," says Harvey Feldman, a distinguished fellow at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank in Washington.

The U.S. is obligated to provide Taiwan with "arms of a defensive character" under the Taiwan Relations Act, passed in 1979 to govern relations with the island after the U.S. severed formal ties with it and recognized Beijing. China's government, which claims Taiwan as part of its rightful territory, has long demanded that the U.S. cease all weapons sales to the island.

The delay comes as relations are improving between Taiwan and China under new Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, after years of tension. Officials from the Ma administration and his Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang, say the president remains determined to acquire the weapons that Taiwan needs.

Critics say Mr. Ma isn't doing enough to push for the arms package. They point out that the Kuomintang fought budgetary allocation for the weapons for years when it was the opposition party.

Observers suggest there may be less urgency in Taiwan to push for such a sale as relations with China evolve and that a deal would strain any tentative overtures. Two weeks ago the two countries began the first regularly scheduled nonstop flights between them in nearly 60 years. The two sides also agreed to a sharp rise in the number of Chinese tourists allowed to go to Taiwan.

Lawrence Walker, a spokesman for the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto U.S. embassy in Taipei, said the U.S.'s position on arms sales to Taiwan remains unchanged.

Some analysts say Mr. Bush may only be delaying the sale until after he travels to China next month for the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics. "The best chance [for the sales] is right after the Olympics," said Randall Schriver, a former senior Asia official at the State Department under Mr. Bush.

The $11 billion package includes Boeing Apache Longbow attack helicopters, Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters, Raytheon Patriot PAC-3 air-defense batteries, and designs for diesel electric submarines. For those sales to go through, the State Department must first issue formal "notifications" to Congress, but it hasn't done so.

Unless the U.S. completes legislative approval of the sales by the end of September, the package might have to be reviewed again next summer by the next administration. In addition, Taiwan's allocation for the weapons expires at the end of this year, meaning the legislature would have to approve it again.

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Now, on the point of a "freeze", whether or not "consulted" about...the then-necessary amendment to the TRA (inserted back in 1970 over the figurative dead-bodies of the State Department and White House) was a major part of the "price" paid to Congress by the Carter Administration for "normalization" with the PRC.

Since then, as relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, in all of their combinations, have become more complex, a normal human being can be forgiven for thinking that it's plain common sense that the US and China would "consult", in some fashion, before the US decided to introduce sophisticated new armaments into the Cross-Strait equation.

Similarly, the US has complained, for years, to Beijing about its policy of a massive conventional missile build-up along the Strait, although pro-Taiwan critics of the Clinton and Bush administrations would not agree the "complaints" have had teeth.[MT: the issue was two-fold. Not only were the complaints not as loud as they could have been and were not backed by action, the US also complained even more loudly about Chen Shui-bian's essentially harmless political moves. For example, it made a much greater fuss about the harmless NUC shutdown than any noise it made about China's military.]

In any event, as Adm. Keating made abundantly clear, the US policy for now is not for us to introduce potentially de-stabilizing arms into the region...so long as current trends continue.[MT: that is not quite correct. The US policy is to prevent all arms from entering Taiwan, des-stabilizing or not. Previously it had only been to prevent offensive weapons from reaching Taiwan. Nelson's formulation argues essentially that any weapons are destabilizing.]

The really difficult part of this policy is measuring the sometimes very fine line between building Taiwan's confidence that it can peacefully negotiate its future with China, vs undermining Taiwan's ability to do so by holding back sales, despite improvements by the PLA.

The equation is further complicated by the US military role, sometimes implied, sometimes directly stated, in providing a security umbrella under which both Beijing and Taipei can more productively interact.

These are interlocking equations, and during the Bush Administrations' unhappy experience with the DPP government of President Chen, domestic political contradictions on Taiwan often made calculating the right balance increasingly difficult.

Hopes are high that the Ma KMT government will make the various computations easier for all involved...but that's a calculation which still rests very much on decisions in Beijing, and deployments of and by the PLA.

At a certain point, the question of purely the military balance, if one can separate that from strategic intent and geo politics, may "un-freeze" the US arms sale package on the table since 2001.

Next time Adm. Keating talks about it, we promise to listen better.

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[Taiwan]

Nelson Report on Upcoming Taiwan Problems

Chris Nelson's latest missive straight from the Beijing-dominated heart of the Washington Establishment (my comments in brackets):

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TAIWAN...we've noted in many Reports that while the US has tried for years to encourage a more productive Cross-Strait dialogue, in hopes of reducing tensions between China and Taiwan, there is a built-in potential contradiction.

That is, as much as the US supports the people of Taiwan and their right to international space, as a practicing democracy, the US recognizes that the bedrock of its relations with China requires agreement with the "one China" principle as it regards "Taiwan independence". [MT -- the US position is actually that Taiwan's status is undetermined. It weasels its way between that position and kowtowing to China.]

Veritable East China Seas' of ink have been spilled parsing the fine points of legal, diplomatic and alternative universe definitions which allow Washington, Taipei and Beijing to...if not keep the peace, exactly...avoid the disaster of war.

Now, after eight years of sometimes high tension because the US supported Taiwan's democracy, but not always the independence-minded goals and actions of Taiwan's democratically elected DPP government, the newly-elected KMT government is moving rapidly to consolidate a more cooperative working relationship with Beijing.[MT -- this paragraph is just plain silly, and it is silly in a terrifying way. In the first sentence note that the "tension" is cause by -- yes! -- US support for a democracy. The Washington Establishment has now completely absorbed Beijing's point of view, under which "democracy" creates tension. The reality is, as everyone knows, is that the Straits are tense because China has threatened to maim and murder Taiwanese in order to annex their island, and to kill anyone who gets in its way. Tension is caused by threats to democracy, not support of it. Yet Nelson here identifies the US with the cause of the problem!]

There are observers from the DPP side of the debate who don't like much of what they think is going on, either openly, or behind the curtain...and you have to ask how much of their concerns will start to be echoed by some US supporters of Taiwan, either now, or next year:

The basic problem is seen as Hu and Ma's priorities now being reversed, with Ma under far more pressure to deliver on his campaign promises because he lives in a democracy...people do "throw the bums" out when they don't deliver, especially on economic issues.[MT -- maybe somewhere else, but not here -- we are in our 60th year of KMT control of the legislature, and so far the public has given two previous presidents both their terms. It is fascinating how often people repeat the mantra of "Taiwanese will change their leaders!" without ever looking to see if they have actually done that before.]

Per the "one China, two governments' idea, one key to viewing all this is the Ma Administration's willingness to fudge the meaning of the so-called "1992 consensus." Su Chi and Ma's formulation has always been "One china with different interpretations."

The Chinese never say "different interpretations" because, fundamentally, this means two Chinas - one PRC and one ROC. Both Hu and Ma talk about "shelving differences" in order to go forward, and there is much support for that view in Washington.

Perhaps, DPP advocates argue. It has meant that negotiations have gone forward swiftly and, apparently, smoothly. But friends in the DPP worry that the Chinese hold on their one China principle - that sovereignty is not possible to divide up- means that the Ma folks are involved in a game of Go in which Taiwan is already surrounded even if they don't see it yet. [MT -- this is too charitable a view of KMT plans, though I suppose Chris cannot -- yet -- openly suggest that the KMT plans to sell out Taiwan.]

One obvious area of conflict...right now...between the traditional Taiwan lobby here and both the new KMT government, and the Bush Administration, is arms sales.

If the whole goal of the Bush Administration has been to lower tensions and hope for improved dialogue Cross Strait, and if those goals are now being actively pursued by both sides...why is the US-Taiwan Business Council, led by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, loudly demanding that a large US arms sale package be announced for the island?[MT -- duh! Because we need new weapons here. Not selling weapons to Taiwan will only serve China's interests, not ours.]

Either McCain or Obama will likely face an increasingly complex, possibly very contradictory "Taiwan lobby" next year.

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In reality, the "area of conflict" is not between the "Taiwan lobby" and the KMT government, but lies deep within US policy, which seeks to be all things to all men. The various pro- and anti-Taiwan positions simply reflect the fundamental contradictions in US policy. No doubt, though, when things get screwed up as they inevitably will, the "Taiwan Lobby" will take the blame. Because the realpoliticians who craft US policy save admissions of error for their memoirs......

[Taiwan]

Nelson Report on Diaoyutai Mess

The Washington insider report The Nelson Report talks about the Diaoyutai mess from the US perspective, including worries about Ma's ability to control his own people....and the backchannel discussions between Washington, Taipei, and Tokyo.

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JAPAN/TAIWAN...observers actively involved in Taiwan affairs are expressing relief that President Ma today seems to have re-established a degree of adult supervision over extreme nationalist elements in his own KMT party...thus helping to defuse the maritime crisis boiling away since a June 10 incident with Japan.

US experts note that Ma was able to coordinate with his defense officials, blocking any further dispatch of boats to the Senkaku and/or Diaoyutai Islands...and then was able to prevent a delegation of KMT extremists from conducting a highly provocative "fact finding mission" to the region.

Our sources say that while the outcome for now must be credited to Ma, today's actions came after "conversations, consultations, you name it, between Washington and Tokyo, Tokyo and Taipei, Washington and Taipei, and every combination...everyone talked to everyone."

This, after the US had nearly 7 years of "difficult" relations with the independence-minded DPP government, and what President Bush himself perceived as a consistent failure by Taipei to take US interests into account.

This time, "We made clear we didn't want this 'politicized'," an informed observer explains...a reference to the problems with the KMT.

Other observers admitted they were a little taken aback by language used yesterday by the State Department calling for a "peaceful" resolution of the standoff, explaining, "it's a little worrisome that we didn't call for a 'diplomatic' solution...it would seem to imply a genuine concern about the potential for violence..."

For what it's worth, President Ma also picked-up on the word "peaceful", rather than "diplomatic", before he apparently took the actions which today, at least, seem to have calmed the waters.

US observers noted that Prime Minister Fukuda expressed "regret" over the original incident of the 10th, in which a Japanese Coast Guard vessel collided, and sank, a Taiwanese fishing boat which had ventured into the disputed waters.

So the US was pleased that Ma said he "agreed" with Fukuda's statement that "both sides should remain calm".

For the longer run, we should note that during our visit to Taiwan for the elections, in March, observers in Taipei expressed concern, and some frankly offered a considerable degree of doubt, that President-elect Ma would be consistently able to exert control over powerful senior KMT players.

Today, an observer here, looking at the overall situation, concedes "Japan has much reason to be concerned..."

Back during his Inaugural speech, Taiwan President Ma worried observers in both Japan and the US by not reading a paragraph praising Japan...a deliberate omission seen in some quarters as a harbinger of Ma's determination to patch-up relations with Beijing regardless of Japan.

We mention that as there are some observers in the DPP who feel that the recent "invasion" of disputed off-shore islets and energy exploration areas by right-wing activists and KMT members was somehow orchestrated by China.

But most experts we mentioned this to say it seems unlikely, given China's recent campaign to patch-up relations with Japan...as per the joint energy exploration deal being announced this week.

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Think about it -- US officials were pleased that "Ma was able to coordinate with his defense officials." Ma's position among his own people is so weak that it is notable he was able to give orders to his own officials.

[Taiwan]

Nelson Report on Ma Speech

The latest Nelson Report contains more insight on the Ma inaugural address. My comments in brackets:

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TAIWAN...President Ma was inaugurated this week, an event witnessed by a large and varied US delegation, and his speech was much anticipated as an indicator of how he intends to pitch the political/diplomatic relationship with "the Mainland"...and with the US.

We note in the Summary our sense of the letter personally delivered to Ma by a representative of Obama, that it reflects a sophisticated understanding of the language and nuances required in the cross Strait relationship for all three players...Washington, Taipei, and Beijing.[MT: the neglect of Japan and other nations is not just a Ma problem. Japan is also a player here, potentially a big one. More on that in a moment.]

US-Taiwan relations under Ma's predecessor can best be described as "difficult", and as we reported at the time, they frequently sank to the level of toxic.

The net is that friends of Taiwan, regardless of their political persuasion, have every reason to be concerned that the loss of trust may have fundamentally altered the equation between Washington and Taipei.

Ma knows all of this, of course, and it will be interesting to see if his administration take advice suggesting a more sophisticated approach to making friends in Washington, one which includes a more serious focus on who is actually able to deliver help, and not just throw bombs.[MT: Haha. Washington is going to be very surprised when its love of Ma is returned with contempt.]

In any event, we asked a senior US observer for an informed reaction to President Ma's speech:

"The first task of any such speech is to do no harm. Don't make any big mistakes and don't offend anyone, for that can define the future. President Ma certainly fulfilled that goal.[MT: the "senior US observer" really missed one here. First, the Japanese were miffed that Ma didn't mention them. And second, Ma deeply offended his core aboriginal constituency with his comments on the "Chinese race," along with many on the pro-democracy side.][UPDATE: Max Hirsch at Kyodo has a great piece on the Japanese take on all this. A quote:

Despite reports last week that Ma would pledge to bolster ties with Japan and reiterate his support for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in the speech, he made no mention of Tokyo.

''Some Japanese delegation members were disappointed by the omission and aired complaints to President Ma,'' says a Japanese official on condition of anonymity.

Namely, delegation leader Takeo Hiranuma, who serves in Japan's powerful House of Representatives and leads a pro-Taiwan caucus, politely rapped Ma after the speech.

''If you are reelected in four years, I hope you'll clearly mention Japan in your next inaugural speech,'' Hiranuma told Ma, according to Taiwan's Government Information Office and the Japanese source. UPDATE: This is now revealed as a translator error -- Hiranuma merely asked him to make his next inaugural speech in Japanese.]

[Nelson Report continued]
One could take slight issue with some of his formulations about cross-Strait relations (sovereignty is an issue), but there were no medium or big mistakes at all.

At best, a speech should be very inspiring. It should reshape the mental outlook of the listener. Barack Obama's speeches come to mind, but Obama is a very high standard to reach. And there are other considerations.

Ma's speech, I am told, was written by a group. A group product is never completely satisfactory. Second, an inauguration speech has a different job from a campaign speech. Third, this speech came at the end of a long series of campaign speeches, so it's hard to be too much better.

There is, I am sure, a cultural dimension here. American listeners may expect more from their politicians as speakers than Taiwan audiences. The language that Ma used may be as satisfying for a Taiwan audiences as that Obama uses for an American one.

One potential task of an inaugural speech is to lay out a detailed program or detailed vision. Ma chose not to do that, and that is fine. It would be interesting to compare it in length to Lee Teng-hui's 1996 inaugural and CSB's two speeches. But after all the speeches and policy papers he had provided on a variety of subjects, the length was just right.

It certainly was right for the crowd, which had been waiting for a long time, listening to often deafening music.

An essential task of an inaugural speech is to reassure the various constituencies and stakeholders of a society. On the whole he did this very well. To the business community, he said, a KMT government will reshape economic policy to adapt to globalization (I hope he is truly serious on this).

To the international community: Taiwan will not be a trouble-maker. To the Taiwanese majority: in terms of my upbringing, I am as Taiwanese as you are and will not betray your interests.[MT: but Ma clearly said that sovereignty is not important, a gross betrayal of Taiwanese interests. And further, there is the problem of Ma's concept of "the nation" as a distinctly Chinese polity.]

I was particularly pleased that he began with his stress on making the Taiwan political system work better for Taiwan citizens. This is a crucial challenge and cannot be ignored.[MT: since the KMT is the chief architect of its problems, it is hard to see Ma making progress here.]

The section on cross-Strait relations wasn't particularly new, which is fine. There were two important elements. One was to make an appeal for improving cross-Strait relations by referring to Hu Jintao's own recent statements. That is probably appropriate because it will be Hu who will have to make the strategic choice to engage Ma.

The other is to talk about how the Republic of China and Taiwan have been intertwined. That is important because it is a reminder of the reality of the ROC and Beijing's need to face that reality at some time and in a way that is acceptable to the people of Taiwan."

A shorter, but also informed take on Ma's speech by an observer on the (now minority) DPP side of the discussion...let's listen to see how the new Opposition might approach the handling of issues like sovereignty in the coming months:

"I must say that on first reading I find Ma's speech interesting in three respects: first he mentions the relationship with the US in one short sentence, albeit with an emphasis on how the US is 'our foremost security ally and trading partner,' but then goes on at great length about the relationship with 'mainland' China.[MT: Yep. Ma placated the US but he identified with China. Can anyone guess which direction he's moving?]

I realize this is all traditional territory for the KMT, but it does strike my ears as overwhelmingly focused on the relationship with the 'mainland.

I was particularly struck by the sentence, 'In resolving cross-strait issues, what matters is not sovereignty but core values and way of life.'

Sovereignty doesn't matter in resolving cross-strait issues? A lot of people are going to ask, 'What, is he giving away the farm already?'

Second thing that I find interesting is the emphatic 'Chineseness' of the speech - the emphasis on the whole overseas Chinese community, Chinese values, the Chinese nation.

Apparently a KMT Legislator who is an aborigine walked out of the speech and held a news conference when Ma said in the Chinese text, but not the translation as given, that 'we are all Chinese people'."

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Affairs with China proceed apace -- Kyodo News is reporting that China and Taiwan plan to open representative offices in their respective capitals to facilitate the burgeoning exchanges. Bruce Stokes has a piece in the National Journal on policy changes associated with Ma. As a piece of analysis it is thoroughly conventional and not very useful -- it even repeats the "Harvard-trained lawyer" nonsense -- but it does provide some insight into the way that many US analysts view Ma. I'll be examining it in detail when I have time today or tomorrow.

[Taiwan]

More on Wolfowitz to Chair US-Taiwan Business Council

In the latest Nelson Report Rupert Hammond-Chambers of the US-Taiwan business council explains the reasoning behind the choice of Paul Wolfowitz as Chairman of the organization:

TAIWAN...reaction, informally, in US-Taiwan circles to the surprise announcement of Paul Wolfowitz as chairman of the US-Taiwan Business Council has been, to be frank, incredulous.

To outside observers, the pick seemed to reflect a giant bet on the McCain campaign, as it's hard to see how Wolfowitz, as a major architect of the failure in Iraq, would be able to make arguments on Taiwan's behalf which would be received in the same way in a Democratic administration.

But the very able, respected president of the group, Rupert Hammond-Chambers, has very kindly explained the thinking behind Wolfowitz's appointment:

"Chris, I just want to reiterate why we at the Council don't view your concerns as relevant to our work. We don't view our chairman through the prism of US domestic politics.

Our Council has had a number of Chairmen since our inception in 1976. We have had Republicans as chairman during Democratic presidencies and Democrats as chairman during Republican administrations. We don't attempt to game out who we think the American people will choose to run the country when we deliberate over who we think would make a good chairman.

Our approach is to identify senior former government officials or business leaders who have an in-depth understanding of US-Taiwan-China relations. It's critical to our work that our leadership understand the pitfalls inherent in just speaking in front of an informed audience let alone attempting to act as a platform to conduct a complex economic relationship. Our entire success is predicated on our ability to chart a course that doesn't attempt to make decisions based on picking winners. We work with Republicans, Democrats, KMT and DPP. The Council is proud to call many in each community friend and have the highest regard for their views on US-Taiwan-China relations.

I have no idea who will win our election in November but I do know that Dr. Wolfowitz has an outstanding background in Asia and he will surely make a superb chairman for our group."

[Taiwan]

Latest Nelson Reports

The Nelson Report from last week noted (highlights are mine):

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US/CHINA/TAIWAN...Asst. Sec. State Chris Hill, somewhere in Indonesia today, apparently told a journalist that the President has ruled "no" on a visa request by Taiwan President-elect Ma Ying-jeou to visit Washington prior to the Inauguration in May.

No one involved will be surprised when this is formally announced. So attention has already turned to how the White House plans to compensate for so obviously catering to Beijing's concerns.[MT: Ouch! Wouldn't it be nice when we can have our very own US foreign policy, instead of Doing Whatever Beijing Wants?]

Most likely by sending a much higher-level official US delegation to the Inauguration than has been seen before...a decision now being worked on at the White House, Administration sources privately confirm.

Taiwan journalist sources say they've been told that Chris Hill himself will lead the US delegation, but former Administration officials here say they think that unlikely, given the self-imposed US ban on such a high-ranking State Department official visiting Taiwan in any capacity.

Rather, it is suggested, look to a delegation of high, and perhaps higher-level former officials...which opens up all kinds of interesting possibilities, so stay tuned.

(Since Commerce Secretaries and other Cabinet-level officers have previously visited Taiwan while in office, the distinction allegedly militating against an A/S from State is just one of the many weird bits of political catechism which makes parsing the Cross-Straits situation so interesting, we should note.)

Further gossip: it is now accepted by all concerned that in defiance of what may seem logical to the entire world outside of China, Beijing will continue to block Taiwan being granted "official observer status" at the World Health Association, when the meeting takes place in May.

The unofficially stated reason? Because DPP President Chen will still be in office, and Beijing is simply not going to give him any satisfaction on the "international space" issue, even though Ma's inauguration is the very next day.

(Remember Jimmy Carter and the Iranian hostages? The plane took off as Ronald Reagan was being sworn in, and not one minute sooner...)

There is considerable support here for having the White House tell Beijing it IS granting Ma a pre-inaugural visit precisely to underscore US anger at China's continued bullying on the WHA and similar issues, but apparently that argument is losing.

Also on the Taiwan wish-list agenda is, or are, whether the US will sell F-16's, an obvious heart-burn issue in Cross-Strait relations, if only as an offset to China's continued missile build-up on the coast.

Our sources indicate that the White House does not intend to deal with the F-16 issue in any way UNLESS it is formally requested to by DOD Secretary Gates...and they add that Gates won't unless HE is officially informed by PACOM that the Pacific commander considers F'16's to Taiwan to be a "military necessity".

OK, so if China is known, or felt, to be still opposed to WHA and other international space issues, and, of course, to enhanced military sales, what's the buzz on what Beijing IS willing to consider, now that it (and the US) have their wish of a DPP defeat, and a KMT victory?

Senior Chinese sources tell us that an immediate sphere of confidence building suggestions seem likely in the economic sector, since a strong Taiwanese economy is in Beijing's interest as much as Taipei's.

Included under that rubric would be direct flights, etc...issues firmly opposed by the DPP government on Taiwan, sources note.

But perhaps the most interesting potential indicated by our Chinese sources is a willingness to back-off from the expensive, often demeaning "competition" with Taiwan for official recognition by mainly African and Latin American nations willing to sell to the highest bidder.[MT: China could easily buy all those nations if it wanted....]

Obviously, an "international space" concession of this nature will be 100% contingent on the new Ma/KMT government proving itself to Beijing...something of a chicken and egg process, given Beijing's blockage on the WHA, etc.

What about those 1200 missiles along the coast of the Strait? Well, actually, yes, Beijing understands the symbolic importance of making some kind of gesture in that area.[MT: Rumor printed in today's Taipei Times says China will reduce the missile force by half.]

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And this from a few days later, just three days ago:

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TIBET...TAIWAN...the two issues are not formally "paired" but for tonite's Report, we want to follow-up on a discussion at Brookings yesterday, and Heritage last Friday, and see if Beijing can make a virtue out of necessity.

That is, everyone agrees that with the return to power of the KMT, even if a KMT which now fully accepts the nationalist implications of "Taiwan identity", that the coming months will see an improvement in both atmosphere and substance between Taipei and Beijing.

Whether these same moves help push a split between the new KMT and the "old" Taiwan Lobby here, founded as it is on conservatism and anti-China views and defense policies, is something we've warned about in past Reports, and will be watching for future Reports.

Of interest to the "old" faction, and a possible challenge to the "new" KMT, will be the apparent view of the Bush Administration that it IS willing to sell F-16's to Taiwan, but that given the KMT/DPP domestic political games of recent years (and, of course, the implications for cross-Strait relations) Ma will have to make the request.

(From the above, we can deduce that the necessary preconditions for an F-16 decision have taken place. That is, PACOM has formally told DOD Secretary Gates the jets are a "military necessity", and Gates has so informed the White House.)

For tonite, let's take a quick survey of what is expected bilaterally across the Strait.

First move, we'd argue, has been made by President-elect Ma, who said this week that he's OK with the "Chinese Taipei" name if it allows Taiwan to join international organizations, such as the World Health Association...a decision due the day before Ma's inauguration, and thus in doubt.

(Note to friendly Loyal Readers...for ONCE we are right in a factoid. The WHA is a sub-group of the WHO, and consists of the Ministers of Health of the members.)

WTO is, of course, a different animal. There Taiwan is the "customs territory of Penghu, Kinmen and Taiwan", and the deal with Beijing back in 2000-2001 was that Taiwan could join as an "economic entities."

Semantics have been matters of potential life and death, in the Strait, since 1972.

Anyhow, after our trip to Taiwan for the election, we've had a chance to compare notes with informed experts on what a Ma Administration can be expected to try, and on what schedule.

Here's a summary of the most informed current thinking on Ma's intentions, which experts see as occuring in three stages:

(1) Weekly charter flights and Chinese tourists. The negotiations on these two linked issues (carried out under the "Macau formula" in which the two sides are represented by their industries, but with government figures present using non-government titles) are essentially complete. But Beijing has put completion on hold until CSB leaves office. Most people expect this can be wrapped up by July 1, as Ma has publicly called for. The result probably wouldn't have been much different under Hsieh.

(2) New economic/trade issues: Progressing to even more frequent flights, going from charter to regular flights. Direct shipping and cargo flights. Relaxing rules on investment/allowing banks to open branches on the other side (some of this can done by each side unilaterally). A more advanced part of this stage could be a trade and investment agreement between the two sides.

Early aspects of Stage 2 could be done under the "Macau" formula, but eventually the two sides would probably have to go to the Straits Exchange Foundation of Taiwan, and Association for Relations Across the Strait of the Mainland (SEF/ARATS) quasi-official format that has been virtually in suspension for ten years.

(3) The tough political issues: Taiwan's international space; the missiles and military pressure in general; and ultimately, a peace agreement.

Ma is reported by our expert sources to believe that these three stages will be mostly sequential, and that they may not get to stage three in Ma's first four-year term. But negotiations need not be completely sequential: quiet, non-publicized contacts on the Stage 3 sensitive issues could be going on while more public discussions on the trade and economic issues are making progress.

The new government understands that it has to move at a measured pace. The election results show that 40% of Taiwan's population is solidly "Green" and not enthusiastic about most of this agenda. If the new government moves too quickly, there is risk of large demonstrations in the streets once again. But Ma and his people seem to understand that.[MT: The demonstrations will occur when Ma finally sells out. The pro-Taiwan side is already talking about it. But such mass energy will be too little, too late, without the revival of the DPP.]

Finally, even without the complication of Tibet, there is the question of whether Beijing will play this right. Subtly and flexibility in cross-strait relations has rarely been Beijing's strong suite, especially when it feels beleaguered by "splittism" in other parts of the empire.

The Ma government presents Beijing with a great challenge. He is the best they are going to get. If they don't deal with him skillfully, he could easily be replaced by another DPP government. But he also has made clear that Taiwan's future will be decided by the 23 million people of Taiwan.[MT: Does anyone actually believe him? I guess in Washington, they do.]

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So in sum (1) we're going to see Ma pass many of the investment measures that will hollow out the economy. It will be interesting to see whether the legislature generates any resistance to Ma's program. Likely not; the big infrastructure programs will buy the hearts of many of a local. Perhaps the wisdom many assert, that the companies that wanted to move have already moved, will turn out to be true and our manufacturing base won't disappear; (2) The F-16s sold to Taiwan; (3) Ma will take office -- and the Olympics will open, soon after. The perfect stage for a Ma-Hu summit?

[Taiwan]

Nelson Report on Election Results

An excerpt from the Nelson Report, a Washington insider report that gives a sort of precis of official views in Washington. As can be seen, in Washington, the problem in Taiwan-China relations is the DPP, showing once again that while democracy is destabilizing, hundreds of missiles are a force for stability *sigh*. It shows also how welcome a Ma victory is to Washington. On to the report:

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TAIWAN...despite analogies in the press, and especially in the recently concluded presidential campaign on Taiwan, the differences between Taipei and Lhasa are too obvious to require much discussion.

(Most fundamentally...while Tibet was basically independent for most of the 20th Century, but has not been since China's military take-over in 1951, Taiwan has been functionally independent of Beijing for the better part of 200 years. And unlike Tibet, of course, Taiwan is now a vibrant liberal democracy, with capitalism in full flower.)

It should be noted, however, that the KMT's president-elect, Ma Ying-jeou, managed to miss the obvious when confronted by a last-minute DPP charge that "Tibet shows what Taiwan is in for under KMT rule".

A more apt argument would have been that continued DPP agitation of Beijing risked leading to tragic excess by the Mainland, so that's one more reason why the people of Taiwan should favor the KMT.

(Indeed, one can argue that the Bush Administration implicitly...and sometimes very directly...made that point for the past six years. To arguments that the US didn't actively interfere, we'd respond that's true only if one's definition of interference required a cruise missile on DPP headquarters...)

In any event...the fundamental Bush concern was two-fold: first, that maintaining a good working relationship with Beijing was, to be brutally frank, obviously more important to the US, and to the world, than maintaining a good working relationship with Taipei; but second, that protecting the newly emergent liberal democracy on Taiwan was simultaneously a genuine US interest.

The dilemma became that DPP policies and actions increasingly put each of these interests at risk, due to the nearly universal assessment that for Beijing, nationalism as state policy potentially trumps all other interests.

Which brings us to the new government on Taiwan, headed by the avowedly more Mainland-focused KMT.

We had the pleasure and privilege of being on Taiwan as the guest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the days leading up to the election, and we can personally testify to the vigor of democracy in action...and the seriousness of both the policy debate, and the alternatives presented by the contending parties.

Election of the KMT raises issues in management of US relations which we don't have time for tonite, but will definitely explore in a later Report.

To the basic theme of tonite's China/Tibet section, we'd argue that the task of Presidents Hu and Ma is to bridge the spiritual and policy disconnects between Beijing and Taipei.

Especially must the new KMT government work to meld consciousness of the now universal acceptance of "Taiwan identity" by the 32-million people on the island to the power realities represented by both Beijing and Washington.

That includes helping Washington and like-minded allies to persuade Beijing that WHO observer status (one very important example) is in everyone's interest.

Delegation colleague Denny Roy, of the East-West Center on Hawaii, has written a really thorough analysis of what our group saw and thought, so let's turn the discussion over to him for now, with a promise to pick-up later this week on things like F-16 sales, et al:

[the Denny Roy piece is linked in the post below]

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[Taiwan]

Nelson Report on the Kitty Hawk Incident -UPDATE-

The Nelson Report, the Washington insider report, gives the point of view of Beltway insiders on the recent flap over the recent problems with the visit of the carrier Kitty Hawk to Hong Kong:

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US-CHINA...let's start with the bad news. You saw last week that Beijing embarrassed itself by completely mishandling a long-planned Hong Kong courtesy call by a US carrier...first canceling, then lamely trying to reverse the verdict on "humanitarian grounds".

By then it was too late, PACOM commander Keating had already reversed course, and, we understand, bad weather meant the most prudent track back up to Japan lay right through the Strait of Taiwan.

We are assured by official sources that weather really was the reason for this politically interesting route...it was not a "right back at you" from the Navy, even though there's no question that the admirals are plenty steamed-up about Beijing's actions.

(We say "Beijing" because under the Basic Law, Hong Kong Authorities have absolutely no decision-making authority on the substance involved here...foreign policy, and military to military relations. This whole game was played out in Beijing.)

Adm. Keating allowed as how he was "perplexed" by China's screw-up. He was being polite. Every serious China player we know, including likely officials in a Democratic presidential administration starting in '09, had the same reaction we did...this is bad news on multiple levels.

First, the action and reversal indicates, once again, a weak, inconsistent command and control system at the very top levels of Chinese leadership. As with the ASAT shoot-down earlier this year, and the EP-3 incident in 2001, it shows that you can't always count on the senior political leadership to be on top of the PLA leadership, except to react to bad decisions.

"We have no 'incidents at sea' agreement with China, even though this helped keep the peace with the Soviets for a generation; we still don't have more than an alleged decision on a 'hot line'; 'transparency' is almost entirely one-way, especially on exchanges", was the "indictment right off the top of my head, since you ask", from one likely senior player in a Democratic Administration.

Sources in Beijing say the Hong Kong cancellation was made because of Chinese pique at the US announcement of PAC-2 upgrades for Taiwan, and that the reason China was angry was an alleged failure by Defense Secretary Gates to brief them on the upcoming decision while he was in Beijing.

Experts here say the PAC-2 upgrades have long been in the works, and that even if Gates didn't give a specific "FYI", China's hitting out at the US Navy was not simply out of proportion, it shows a systematic failure of analysis on the part of the PLA. Both Adm. Keating, and CNO Adm. Roughead have both visited China this year, among many Navy efforts with Beijing.

As one defense analyst argues, "the Air Force is using 'China rising' as its main 'sales pitch' reason for future long-range bombers, but the Navy, despite China's talk of a 'thousand ship navy', has taken a calculated path of out-reach and cooperation, whenever possible, and the Navy is assiduously working to engage China in maritime security cooperation."

In fact, we'd note, that's the title of a conference set for Dec. 5-6 at the Naval War College, with many important PLAN and other officials invited. Whether these senior Chinese will be allowed to attend is still, apparently, an open question. Other sources note that back in October, apparently to show Beijing's displeasure over the Congressional Gold Medal subsequently personally handed the Dalai Lama by President Bush, China cancelled "a whole slew of mil/mil activities, although unlike the Hong Kong decision, this was done quietly", we're told.

Since then, "there are a lot of delegations going back and forth", so perhaps next week's conference will be a chance for the authorities in Beijing to demonstrate to the US Navy, at least, that it does "get it" and is serious about reciprocating in a fashion appropriate to a mature power.

As one email read last week, over the Thanksgiving break, "the Chinese really don't seem to understand that military-to-military relations are important in and of themselves, and as a critical component of keeping the peace. No one is naive here, obviously, about 'friendship', but if China continues to play mil/mil as just a cheap, signal-sending game, and refuses to understand the strategic importance of what we're offering them, this should concern every government in Asia as much as it does us."

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UPDATE: The Kitty Hawk issue is not the only thing the Navy is concerned about, according to AFP:

Admiral Gary Roughead, the chief of US naval operations, said he was even more bothered by China's refusal to allow two small US minesweepers to enter Hong Kong last week to avoid a tropical storm and refuel.

"As someone who has been going to sea all my life, if there is one tenet we observe it's when somebody's in need, we provide, and we sort it out later. That to me was more bothersome," Roughead told reporters here.

He said the navy sent a tanker ship to refuel the minesweepers, the USS Patriot and the USS Guardian, which then proceeded to their homeport in Sasebo, Japan.

He called China's actions "surprising and unhelpful."

Roughead said the Chinese have given no reason for the action. He said denying US navy ships port calls at Hong Kong was unusual although not unprecedented.

Keating said the incident with the minesweepers was "very unusual."

"Those two minesweepers were engaged in an operation, not against China, but out in international water, and a storm blew up and they needed to get into a place of refuge. And you know, Hong Kong's nearby and it's a great place to go," he said.

"So, for the Chinese to have denied those two ships in particular, small though they may be, that is a different kettle of fish for us, and is in ways more disturbing, more perplexing than the denial for the Kitty Hawk's port visit request," he said.

More in the article....

[Taiwan]