RAND on the Taiwan Strait

The RAND Corporation, the famous thinktank, has a new monograph out on the probable future of Taiwan (download PDF). The introduction notes that things are likely to remain the same for the near future:

For all these reasons, for at least the next four or five years, the most likely possibility with regard to Taiwan’s status is that the current unresolved but peaceful situation will continue unchanged. If there were a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in this time frame, there is a small chance that China would prevail decisively, leaving the United States and its partners (if any) to decide whether to try to "liberate" Taiwan. The more likely outcome, however -- assuming U.S. intervention -- would be a Chinese defeat, leaving Beijing licking its wounds but refusing to accept the definitive loss of Taiwan.

For Taiwan’s status to be resolved, one or more of the following will probably have to change: (1) the nature of the regime in Beijing, (2) the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, or (3) the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. Such changes are only likely to occur over the longer term (more than five years). Moreover, even if one or more of those developments occurs, it is possible that Taiwan's status will remain unresolved. Combined with the two primary possibilities (peaceful irresolution or violent irresolution) that prevail in the near term, there are a total of ten distinct longer-term future situations with regard to Taiwan's status, which will be discussed in Chapter Two of this monograph.

The article makes an interesting point: A democratic China might be a good thing for all concerned, but a democratizing China might be a problem:

The emergence of a democratic China would undoubtedly transform the nature of U.S.-China relations. There is an extensive, though not unanimous, body of analysis that suggests that mature democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with each other. There is, however, likewise evidence that states undergoing the transition to democracy can be more war-prone than others. Thus, the relationship between the United States (or Taiwan) and a democratizing China could be highly unstable, and any democratic transition in a country the size of China is likely to be the work of many years, if not generations. If this transition period were successfully negotiated, however, and a democracy were to emerge on the mainland that was mature and stable enough for Taiwan to unify with the mainland voluntarily, relations between Washington and Beijing would likely be transformed as well. Although some tensions and suspicions between the two sides would continue, just as between any two countries, the chances of actual conflict between the United States and a democratic China would be much lower than they are today, particularly with the Taiwan issue also resolved.

Like many observers, RAND points to the possibility of a non-state solution to the Taiwan problem:

Absent a political transformation in mainland China, the best chance for a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status probably lies in an arrangement somewhere between formal independence and formal unification, a state that might be called "peaceful in-betweenness." Politicians and analysts in Taiwan and the United States have proposed a number of such formulas. One possibility would be an agreement to leave Taiwan's status unresolved for some period, with Beijing promising not to use force as long as Taiwan refrained from attempting to formalize its independence. Although this outcome would not be a true or final resolution of Taiwan’s status, the period in question could be very long or even unlimited, with the two sides agreeing to leave Taiwan’s status unresolved until they both come to an agreement on the issue.

The current Chinese regime, including the new "fourth generation" leaders, has so far shown no interest in such schemes, but it is not inconceivable that a future party leadership would be both willing and politically capable of accepting an arrangement with Taiwan if the costs to regime stability of continued cross-strait tensions began to outweigh the value of this specific play of the nationalism card.

The RAND reading is pretty good. It understands that the key problem in the Taiwan issue is not the attitude of the Taiwanese but the attitude of China -- specifically, of China's leadership. RAND concludes (my emphasis):

Perhaps even more fundamental than the observation that how the Taiwan issue is resolved will dramatically affect the nature of subsequent U.S.-China relations is the recognition that both how the Taiwan issue is resolved and the nature of subsequent U.S.-China relations will largely be determined by the orientation of China’s government. A pragmatic, self-confident Chinese government is both more likely to be able to come to some sort of peaceful accommodation with Taiwan and more likely to have amicable relations with the United States. An inflexible, nationalistic Chinese government, on the other hand, is both less apt to be able to resolve the Taiwan issue and likely to have an adversarial relationship with the United States.

Meanwhile, the actual conclusions of the RAND report are slanted 180 degrees in the pro-KMT China Post presentation of the RAND conclusions:

The continuing ruling of Taiwan by the pro-independence political force on the island will only escalate the tensions across the Taiwan Straits, but Taiwan will not accept unification with China in any forms in the near future even if the pro-unification comes to power.

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The China Post report, which is attributed to "China Post Staff" -- meaning that it is most probably a translation from the Chinese-language China Times, the sister paper of the China Post -- never mentions that RAND concentrates on the attitude of the Chinese government, and identifies it as the major factor in determining what the future might bring. Instead, the China Post opts for a hack on the pro-Taiwan parties. This is the dreck that is read every day by tens of thousands of Taiwanese. Scary, eh?

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