Foreign Affairs: Trouble in Taiwan (Apr 04)

I was poking around back issues of Foreign Affairs as I ate dinner tonight (homemade fajitas, cooked by your trusty writer to a state of less than perfection, and guaranteed to cause indigestion to even the most hardened expat stomach. You'll notice I didn't blog a picture). Anyway, to return to the weighty affairs of world, rather than the affairs of my burgeoning weight, this article, Trouble in Taiwan, seems to be available in its entirety on the websight.

Trouble in Taiwan is summarized in the opening paragraphs:

Although Wen and other senior Chinese officials have expressed appreciation for Bush's words and have moderated their reaction to Chen's proposals, the situation is by no means under control. Chen continues to downplay Bush's efforts to restrain him, claiming that he is advancing the democratic cause and strengthening Taiwan's ability to resist Chinese intimidation. These arguments have received a sympathetic hearing from some conservatives and liberals in the U.S. Congress, who were enraged by Bush's rebuke and argue that Washington has a moral obligation to endorse Chen's call for national plebiscites and a new constitution. Some critics even advocate ignoring China's concerns over Taiwan altogether, abandoning support for the "one China" policy (the view that Taiwan is a part of China), and endorsing Taiwan's right to self-determination, thus compelling Beijing to accept the reality of Taiwanese independence.

But these critics make three faulty assumptions: that Beijing would ultimately permit Taiwanese independence rather than confront the United States; that an expression of democratic self-determination is sufficient to establish territorial sovereignty and that democracy is incompatible with any political arrangement short of formal independence; and that it is immoral, as well as fundamentally contrary to U.S. interests, to oppose any manifestation of democracy in Taiwan. Once these assumptions are debunked, the prudence of maintaining the status quo becomes apparent.

There's some things in the article I would dearly like to know. For example:

Today, however, China's main objective is not to assert direct territorial rule over Taiwan but to avoid the island's permanent loss. Losing Taiwan against Beijing's will would deal a severe blow to Chinese prestige and self-confidence: Chinese leaders believe that their government would likely collapse in such a scenario.

How is the writer aware that Chinese leaders believe their government would collapse if Taiwan became independent. I don't dispute the possiblity, but I'd sure like to know where his information comes from.

The Chinese leadership would thus almost certainly fight to avoid the loss of Taiwan if it concluded that no other alternative existed, even if its chances of prevailing in such a conflict were low. Exactly how much blood and treasure China would be willing to expend over the issue is unclear, but it might be considerably more than the United States would be prepared to shoulder. Indeed, many Chinese believe that, in the final analysis, Taiwan matters far more to China than it does to the United States. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the Chinese government can be persuaded or coerced to alter its calculus regarding Taiwan, especially not by a U.S. government that appears to be supporting Taiwan's independence. This notion directly contradicts a key assumption held by critics of the status quo.

Again, I certainly believe that Chinese leaders would fight even if the chance of victory were low, but then I am an unreconstructed supporter of independence and hence somewhat biased on the issue of China's militancy. I'd love to know how he knows the mind of Chinese leadership.

And of course, here is a theme I've seen a lot around the foreign policy establishment lately.

Taipei, in particular, must develop a genuine ability to defend itself against possible Chinese attacks, including a rapid decapitation strike timed to occur before any U.S. assistance can arrive on the scene. There is considerable evidence that China is seeking to acquire the ability to launch just such a strike. Unfortunately, Taiwan is unable to credibly deter or deflect a Chinese attack (especially a rapid strike) at present, despite greatly increased levels of U.S. assistance. Indeed, it appears that many Taiwanese political and military leaders incorrectly believe that the island does not need to acquire such capabilities and can rely on the United States entirely.

Taiwan can't defend itself against a rapid strike. Does the foreign policy establishment really believe this (it's my conclusion) or are they just interested in pushing US weapons?

And here's something funky:

Furthermore, the U.S. government must not assume that Taiwan's citizens are uniformly committed to achieving full and permanent independence from China. Public opinion polls over the past decade have consistently shown that most Taiwanese people oppose any abrupt movement toward either independence or reunification. Moreover, a highly reputable recent study indicates that older Taiwanese citizens (who experienced the sometimes brutal rule of the Chinese nationalists) are more likely to view themselves as purely Taiwanese than their younger counterparts.

Isn't this the opposite of what most polls are saying? Think I have to email this fellow...


[Taiwan]