The Washington Post hosts an article this week detailing Pentagon planning to fight China. It's a glimpse of the war planning process and from that perspective is informative. However, despite its veneer of balance it has a subtle but powerful bias.... here are two quotes from the article:- Some critics doubt that China, which owns $1.6 trillion in U.S. debt and depends heavily on the American economy, would strike U.S. forces out of the blue.
“It is absolutely fraudulent,” said Jonathan D. Pollack, a senior fellow at Brookings. “What is the imaginable context or scenario for this attack?”
- “The old joke about the Office of Net Assessment is that it should be called the Office of Threat Inflation,” said Barry Posen, director of the MIT Security Studies Program. “They go well beyond exploring the worst cases. . . . They convince others to act as if the worst cases are inevitable.”
What's missing from the article? Read it carefully. See any quotes from civilians in support of Pentagon war planning directed at China, or warning of China's military build up or plans in Asia? Anyone who might consider the possibility of war with China as entirely rational (NBR's latest from Chris Hughes)? The article's balance is entirely faux.
If the possibility of war is "absolutely fraudulent" why are so many nations around China's borders bolstering their militaries?
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23 comments:
Weird to find myself defending an article in the Washington Post, but surely the difference is that the US is not "a nation around China's borders". It's hard to fault (e.g.) the Philippines, still less Taiwan, for perceiving a threat to their territory, peace and even sovereignty from China's military expansion. The elements in the US military and political class that want to boost US spending and presence in the Pacific, on the other hand, perceives a different kind of threat: that is, to their (global) hegemony from an emerging regional hegemon.
As for rationality, such planners are presumably rational given their aims. But one can question the rationality of those aims from a broader perspective -- of, say, the good of humanity as a whole.
From the narrower perspective shared by people reading this blog (i.e. with such aims as the continued freedom of Taiwanese people and peace in east Asia), there may be a case for continuing to shelter under the umbrella of the last imperial master in order to deter the next one... . But we should advocate that (if at all) with eyes wide open to the actual goals of the military planners in Washington.
To put it briefly: the US military may currently be useful to Taiwan, but don't assume that they are motivated by anything as noble as the preservation of Taiwanese democracy, or the good of people in east Asia.
The silver lining is that the topic is (ever so quietly) creeping into the mainstream media.
To put it briefly: the US military may currently be useful to Taiwan, but don't assume that they are motivated by anything as noble as the preservation of Taiwanese democracy, or the good of people in east Asia.
Sure, if there were some other solution than the US military, I'd grasp it. But there isn't....
This is the kind of planning the US needs to be doing. This is so not because we expect war with China, but because in the absence of certainty preparation for war with China is the best way to prevent war with China. Whenever I see talk of the US military changing its focus to fighting small wars (like Iraq and Afghanistan) because those are the kinds of wars we expect in the furture, I worry that we're being penny-wise and pound-foolish.
The primary goal of the US military should be to defend the US from foreign powers most capable of harming the US. The military might be needed for other purposes too, but it must never let those other purposes make it forget the primary goal.
Even if it doesn't always make sense to have overwhelming force to defeat a potential enemy like China - if all nations took such a course it would cause endless arms races - we still need to make clear to china that we're paying attention to them and won't be taken by surprise.
China will not start a war against the US, certainly.
I do see however the war planning being meant for a conflict between Japan and China (and the escalation thereof.) The US has a treaty based duty to side with (i.e. defend) Japan.
Nick, you overlook the fact that the US has benefited enormously from its influence within Asia, from imports of human capital, to trading in a favorable currency, to enjoying influence in developing solutions to a host of trade and economic problems. US "hegemony", and it is arguable whether a situation of hegemony really exists any longer, is not just of interest to the US for the sake of pride. It creates positive feedback for the US economy. Do you really think that we would be able to buy products at low prices from stores such as Best Buy and Wal Mart if, for example, open shipping were not possible in Asian waterways? And would American enterprises enjoy such deep penetration into Asian economies if it were not for US influence?
Your error is that you imagine that the US pursues influence in Asia for the sake of being number one. As a result, you overlook the concrete impact that allowing a power such as China to define Asian security matters might have on the US. To put it simply, the US does not need to be "a nation around China's borders" to perceive a very real threat.
Nick, you overlook the fact that the US has benefited enormously from its influence within Asia, from imports of human capital, to trading in a favorable currency, to enjoying influence in developing solutions to a host of trade and economic problems. US "hegemony", and it is arguable whether a situation of hegemony really exists any longer, is not just of interest to the US for the sake of pride. It creates positive feedback for the US economy. Do you really think that we would be able to buy products at low prices from stores such as Best Buy and Wal Mart if, for example, open shipping were not possible in Asian waterways? And would American enterprises enjoy such deep penetration into Asian economies if it were not for US influence?
Your error is that you imagine that the US pursues influence in Asia for the sake of being number one. As a result, you overlook the concrete impact that allowing a power such as China to define Asian security matters might have on the US. To put it simply, the US does not need to be "a nation around China's borders" to perceive a very real threat.
The real issue here is that many US policymakers believe American interests in Asia would be served under Chinese regional hegemony. After all, the things that you note that US hegemony gives to the US--Asian trade and cheap exports, continued funding of the US deficit, acceptance of US global leadership on issues outside East Asia--have been accepted and even encouraged by China for the last twenty to thirty years.
That track record is composed of three key milestones:
1) Chinese acceptance and encouragement of multilateral (read: US-led) intervention into the region after the 1997 Financial Crisis
2) Chinese accommodation to Western multinationals for its Year 2000 WTO entry
3) China's support of the US strategic shift after 9/11
Those three moves are what set the stage for today's strategic reality in Asia--a China which is seeking regional hegemony, and a US which is not necessarily opposed to it, but rather simply seeking to emplace tighter limits on that hegemony.
Once you realize that point, then a lot of things, including this WaPo article, make sense. The Office of Net Assessment is unnecessary, as under this worldview, money should be directed on constraining China into a regional hegemon, not towards building power projection capabilities.
There is a reason to the rhyme here, but whether the implied ends are what we'd like is an open question. Put another way, we can question the wisdom of this position as much as we'd like, of course, but ridiculing this article as being strategically incoherent misses the point.
I don't want to get into a long debate on Michael's comment pages, but briefly:
Tommy, hegemony is about control. In fact you accurately describe US mercantile imperialism. Of course it is supposed to pay. Why else spend as much as the rest of the world put together on 'defence'?
Approximately, US regional policy is to keep the Pacific a US pond. Would this seem reasonable to you if it were the other way round and China were in control of the Pacific? I suspect not, no matter how big the benefits to Chinese businesses and consumers.
Anonymous -- your comments about the accommodation between the US and China strike me as very perceptive. Three brief additions:
1) I think both US and Chinese elites are divided on the issue of whether primarily to work with or against the other. The accommodationists are in the ascendant on both sides at the moment.
2) The situation you describe is a reflection of a general US preference for a 'stable' situation with enough investor rights (above democracy, freedom, justice etc.). What might destabilise it in the medium-term is that the Chinese might decide they no longer need to put up with such things as the IMF's prescriptions for the region and the divine right of Western investors to repatriate their profits. That would be seen by US elites as 'destabilising' the situation.
An unpleasant alternative ending to the accommodation could come about through a military/territorial incident. There are a lot of potential flashpoints, as Michael documents on this blog.
3) A test of your theory is ongoing. Will an accommodation be reached in the South China Sea? One sign that it may is that the US has been making it clear that it is more interested in unimpeded shipping than in who owns what. (And that is also the main interest there of the Japanese, who still have the second most formidable navy in the Pacific, and for whom it is a vital interest: if those shipping lanes are closed, that would be the end of a great deal of Japanese industry.)
One sign that it may is that the US has been making it clear that it is more interested in unimpeded shipping than in who owns what.
The Emperor is sending up the CHOAM flag. He doesn't care who rules there.
Unfortunately, I think as China gains ascendancy it will become more intemperate and less willing to work out such compromises.
Michael
"That track record is composed of three key milestones:
1) Chinese acceptance and encouragement of multilateral (read: US-led) intervention into the region after the 1997 Financial Crisis
2) Chinese accommodation to Western multinationals for its Year 2000 WTO entry
3) China's support of the US strategic shift after 9/11"
Please...
(1) "Sure, if you want to handle that stuff, go ahead, so long as you don't lay too much pressure on us to let the RMB float. We care about domestic matters and nothing else in a pinch."
(2)"Our accommodation of Western multinationals will, though our typical Chinese observance only in the breach, benefit our state-owned, party-pocket companies (give me your technology, boy, or kiss your market access, as-promised supply of infrastructure needs, or anything else out the window). We care about domestic matters and nothing else where world governance is concerned."
(3) "Thanks for the opportunity to murder Uyghers and couch it as support for 9/11. Domestic concerns trump all."
You made a valid point, Anonymous, in writing "The real issue here is that many US policymakers believe American interests in Asia would be served under Chinese regional hegemony."
But their thinking is mistaken, as all severely-ethically-compromised thinking is mistaken; realpolitik does matter and is well worth figuring into the calculus. But realpolitik often gets ahead of itself, reaches its conclusions too quickly, and ends up being la-la land-politik -- that self-congratulates, no less.
You believe in your stated examples courtesy of the blinkers realpolitik lays over your eyes. The American policy mavens you allude to suffer from the same blind self-deception.
p.s. There may come a time when "constraining" China into regional hegemonism makes sense, but only after CCP dictatorship has ended. And then the concept would be "accommodation," not constraint.
Unfortunately, I think as China gains ascendancy it will become more intemperate and less willing to work out such compromises.
Why not? Unimpeded shipping is even more critical to the Chinese economy than the US economy.
The true threat is indirect: Chinese control of the South China Sea means that US commitment to the region is limited to directly attacking Chinese onshore assets or offensively seeking to roll back a Chinese status quo. Neither is palatable to US policymakers, which means that US commitment to the region loses credibility. China would clearly and unmistakeably gain regional hegemony.
The real question is, though, whether that is such a bad thing. Germany has hegemony over Europe; US interests were not adversely affected at all.
"The real question is, though, whether that is such a bad thing. Germany has hegemony over Europe; US interests were not adversely affected at all."
1. Germany is a democracy.
2. Germany has economic but not military hegemony - or to put it another way, it doesn't have hegemony over Europe.
Germany, America, and pretty much every other modern democratic nation has a history since WWII of releasing former holdings or at least not making an issue of trying to re-take former holdings. Japan doesn't demand the return of Korea and Formosa. England doesn't demand the return of Ireland and India. Germany and Italy don't demmand the return of all their African former holdings.
And in those places where they have conflict it is peaceful. No one talks about Gibralter as a dangerous flashpoint for starting a war between Britain and Spain. Japan and Russia are in no danger of going to war over Sahkalin.
But threatens war and uses other military means to increase tension over Taiwan, the Senkakus, the South China Sea, and the regions China disputes with India.
That is why no one wants China to be a regional hegemon. They don't trust what China will do with that power.
Readin: The thing is that it's no better to be bombed or shot by a democracy than a dictatorship. The Vietnamese didn't vote for Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon, nor did Iraqis for Bush I or Bush II.
Minimally, what one wants from powerful nations outside their borders is that they obey international law, and, in particular, don't launch wars of aggression. It's obviously no praise to say that China's record is a lot better than America's... so far.
Despite what you say, I suspect that there are many who welcome the rise of China as a route to a more multipolar world. I think that's a bit too optimistic. One reason is that US and Chinese elites show signs of teaming up to carve things up for their mutual benefit, as Anonymous suggests.
Trust the hegemon you know. Be wary of wannabes.
The above arguably sums up the wisdom shared by statemen in countries too close to China for comfort.
And I'd bet that president Obama's wits when it comes to China were shaped as early as those happiest of childhood years he spent in Indonesia. No wonder then that his administration pursues a policy of renewed US presence in the Western Pacific and the Far-East.
As for theWaPo, give them a break. They do not enjoy the luxury of bias a blog owner does. As irksome as they read, they must stick to the journalist's ethos that prevail in US mainstream medias. The article did a good job and through dicing it you elicited a lively conversation.
There are three interesting new articles on the tensions in the South China Sea in the Guardian:
Vietnam/China:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/06/protests-vietnam-china-bullying-grows
US/China:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/06/china-us-south-china-sea
Philippines/China:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/06/us-helps-philippines-improve-military
@Jerome Besson "As for theWaPo, give them a break. They do not enjoy the luxury of bias a blog owner does."
Clearly you've never read anything the WaPo has written on illegal immigration.
" The thing is that it's no better to be bombed or shot by a democracy than a dictatorship. The Vietnamese didn't vote for Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon, nor did Iraqis for Bush I or Bush II."
Be serious here, Nick; don't equate things that aren't equivalent. There's no Cold War-proxy element in the South China Sea. So cancel your Vietnam example.
And no larger country has invaded a tiny one, so cancel your First Gulf War example (which was not at all a war of aggression and did pay heed to notions of international law [which the Vietnam War, wrong though I personally think it was, also did not violate]).
As for the second Gulf War, why conflate a cabal-inspired war prosecuted half for dumb ideological reasons and the other half for oil with a nationalistic island-sea grab -- unless your point is that both were/are wrong?
Our honor as thinking persons rides on not excusing ill behavior through use of the "you, too" fallacy -- and it especially rides on not trying out that fallacy where it so obviously doesn't make sense.
Vin: Just a brief reply, because I don't think it would be polite of me to go into (e.g) the legality of various US military interventions here (but I'm happy to do so in some suitable venue) --
My point was just intended as a corrective to the view I took to be suggested by Readin, which is that democracies are better in their foreign policy than other countries. US behaviour over the last century or so is a spectacular counter-example, in my opinion.
I wasn't trying to make any argument about moral equivalence; just the very practical one that it doesn't usually make that much difference if one's overlord is a democracy back home or a dictatorship. Colonies, client states, invaded countries etc. do not get to vote for the elite in the hegemon.
Friends of Taiwan need to bear that in mind, I think, to avoid having unduly rosy assumptions about the way Taiwan figures in the aims of the EU, Japan, and, of course, the US.
Being the regional peacekeeper means having to make difficult choices. The Pax Romana involved a lot of head-breaking by the Romans. The relative peace after the peace of the Cold War required hard decisions - do we help the Bosnians and Kosovars? Do we rollback the invasion of Kuwait? Do we help the Chechnyans? Do we get involved in Rwanda (could we?) How many WMD does Saddam have and is he developing more, and if so should we act? How should we react to Libya's revolution?
We could debate all day each of those cases, but in none of those cases did the US act to annex land, nor was there any naked aggression to take resources (if we invaded Iraq for oil, why are we still paying for the oil?)
As for illegal vs legal - that's simple.
Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Gulf War, Gulf War II - War Powers Act followed. For those cases where there plenty of time to prepare and hostilities were expected, Congressional authorization was given but no Declaration of War.
Libya and Kosovo - Plenty of time to prepare but no Congressional approval and/or War Powers Act violated - clearly illegal.
@nick "The thing is that it's no better to be bombed or shot by a democracy than a dictatorship."
It's also no better to be shot by a local government than be a foreign government.
Nick:
Still gotta ask you to please show your powers of discrimination in all of this discussion. It's worthwhile to question how peaceable the US is. (And of course there are instances of the US militarily flouting international law [including the bombing of Cambodia during the Vietnam War].) But to use the example of the most powerful hegemon in world history as somehow representative of democracies in general isn't logical. The US is foremost a hegemon, whereas all other democracies are foremost democracies. (Sure the UK and Australia get hegemonette-style hard-ons once in a blue moon, but really...). Readin is right that contemporary democracies don't duke it out with other democracies over territory. But China threatens to duke it out with any and all -- democracies and dictatorships alike. A huge difference. And I think you're easily smart enough to get that -- and to have already thought of it yourself. So I think you're obfuscating here.
Why?
And I don't think anyone in Taiwan or any supporter of Taiwan has "unduly rosy assumptions about the way Taiwan figures in the aims of the EU, Japan, and, of course, the US." I think they know well and worry in this regard, because the last thing they would want is to be under Chinese control.
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