Monday, March 28, 2005
Updating....
I've added a few more pics to my justpix page, basically a page of stray pictures on Taiwan, and begun massively updating the site this week! Only a month late!
Sunday, March 27, 2005
Day Hiking: it's here!
Taiwanese enjoy hiking very much -- which is strange, because they hate walking -- and the mountains are criss-crossed by trails, especially near urban areas. If you are fortunate to live a few minutes away from a hill or peak, you can enjoy many a pleasant hour strolling through lush greenery while dodging motorcycles zooming past you.
We are lucky to live a few minutes walk from the Ta-Ken Scenic area, which is full of trails. Today we put together an hour to enjoy a hike up the Number 8 trail of the Ta-Ken Scenic area. Here are a few photos of the experience!
We are lucky to live a few minutes walk from the Ta-Ken Scenic area, which is full of trails. Today we put together an hour to enjoy a hike up the Number 8 trail of the Ta-Ken Scenic area. Here are a few photos of the experience!
Wednesday, March 23, 2005
Editorial In Taipei Times
The Taipei Times ran my editorial today, with very minor changes. Apparently their editorial staff has never heard the phrase 'declare the revolution' so they changed the all-important "the" to "a" but other than that, no serious changes.
Lots of fun coming up as a major workload producer finally ran out of steam today. More stuff to go up here!
Lots of fun coming up as a major workload producer finally ran out of steam today. More stuff to go up here!
Saturday, March 19, 2005
Chalmers Johnson on Anti War
Johnson has an article on the US, China and Taiwan at Anti-War.com which is utterly clueless about Taiwan, and worse, uncritically accepts China's claims, and defends its positions while attacking Taiwan for wanting freedom and independence. He also seems to accept the KMT's spin on Taiwan politics. Very sad.
Wow! Haven't posted here in a while!
Too busy sussing out the structure of Mark and doing translation work! Sorry! Won't be posting here for another week or so!
Wednesday, March 09, 2005
Book Review: Selden and So, eds., _War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century_.
This wonderful review appear on H-Asia:
H-ASIA
March 8, 2005
Book Review by William Sewell on Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So, eds., _War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century_. (orig. published on H-US-JAPAN)
----
Ed. note: This review appeared on H-US-JAPAN in February of this year, and was forwarded to H-ASIA by the editor, Professor Yone Sugita. For reasons unknown, but likely inattention will prove sufficient, the review was not cross post on H-ASIA. So it appears late; inconvenience is regretted, and the lead editor promises to try harder, really I do! FFC
*************************************************************************
From: Yone Sugita
Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So, eds. _War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century_. War and Peace Library Series. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. vi + 293
pp. Index. $80.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-7425-2390-X; $29.95 (paper), ISBN 0-7425-2391-8.
Reviewed for H-US-Japan by Bill Sewell, Department of History, Saint Mary's University
Modern States, Modern Terror
This timely volume will interest all who seek to apply the "lessons of history," as they are often called, to contemporary events. Growing out of a June 2001 conference entitled "Asia and the United States at War: The Twentieth Century Experience," held at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, some of the contributions to the collection were also obviously prodded by recent events in the United States, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Taken together, this book will contribute much to the debate over what many have called the "root causes" of September 11, at the same time reminding readers that American policy in the Far East is as problematic as it has been in the Middle East.
That said, not all of the papers here address American policy, for some consider actions taken on behalf of Asian regimes, particularly Japan. The result, however, is a volume focused on a tactic (terrorism), that usefully compares and contrasts the definitions, implementations, and implications of that tactic over the last century with regard to one region of the world. And even if individual articles will appeal to specialist niches, the volume as a whole focuses coherently on a central theme, making it perhaps a useful adjunct for seminar courses, at least for those who think that "root causes" matter.
American policy is focused upon by Mark Selden, "The United States and Japan in Twentieth-Century Asian Wars," Richard Falk, "State Terror versus Humanitarian Law," Bruce Cumings, "American Airpower and Nuclear Strategy in Northeast Asia since 1945," and Peter Dale Scott, "Drugs and Oil: The Deep Politics of U.S. Asian Wars." Selden's chapter is first, noting that while acts of Japanese state terrorism ceased with the Second World War, the incidence of American acts has increased. Defining "state terrorism as _systematic state violence against civilians in violation of international norms, state edicts, and precedents established by international courts designed to protect the rights of civilians_" (emphasis original, p. 21), Selden finds evidence for this growth most obviously in the changing role of airpower. For Selden, relatively bloodless bombing campaigns--from Americans' perspectives--qualify as instances of state terror because they target civilians en masse. Worse, this practice expanded in Korea and Vietnam, and threatened to do so again on the eve of the second Gulf War, when the essay was written. This expansion occurred because, while there was a rough parity of forces apparent in Europe during the Cold War to restrict American options, there was no such restraining balance in Asia. And now, in the wake of the Soviet collapse, Selden warns that there is little to contain the United States, unless international organizations can somehow come together.
In some ways, Falk's essay attempts to explain American justifications for the practices Selden describes, but in essence he describes mainly the quandary in which Americans find themselves. That is to say, despite technological superiority and a self-imposed global police role, the United States has also assumed a moral leadership role that leads many to question the means of achieving victory. That questioning, however, is never brought to a conclusion because the United States has never had to acknowledge comprehensively the sum total of American actions--the privilege of hegemonic status. Falk's prescription, then, related to Selden's call for greater organization, is for greater education in "the dark side of state terrorism" (p. 57). A good example of this education is provided by Cumings, whose essay on evolving American bombing strategies highlights the brutal nature of American conventional and nuclear tactics. Indeed, given the continuing security issues on the Korean peninsula that interest Cumings most, this perspective is perhaps one that needs bringing to popular attention most rapidly, for Cumings provides a more realistic rationale for current North Korean actions than simply labeling their leadership as mad.[1]
The three essays above focus upon destructive tactics, in effect assuming American actions as a given. Scott's essay seeks to explain why American administrations perceive the need to take these actions in the first place. Perhaps somewhat controversially, he concludes that oil and drugs constitute a "deep politics" that remain "factors in policy formation that are usually repressed rather than acknowledged" (p. 172). Although many will agree that the drive for foreign sources of oil has been central to postwar American decision making, Scott's charge of American complicity in preserving and expanding the global drug trade is more likely to be met with raised eyebrows. Granted, Scott, a former Canadian diplomat, is "not suggesting that anyone in the highest levels of U.S. government made a conscious decision to restore or expand the global [drug trade]" (p. 189), yet his allegations are, nevertheless, deep--involving even the banking industry. In a less provocative manner, it might be more prudent to recognize the correlations Scott notes and conclude simply that American policy makers have tended to be more willing to resort to shady or brutal methods to support whatever goals they have, rather than upset the American public by making extravagant military demands. Thus, the resulting "blowback" is one of the costs of waging war on the cheap. Moreover, as Scott admits that "the mechanics of the U.S. relationship to the drug trade remain mysterious" (p. 190), perhaps this perspective needs further study--not that it should be dismissed out of hand.
Supplementing Scott in this volume is Brian Daizen Victoria, "When God(s) and Buddhas Go to War." Exploring the roles of religious leaders in justifying acts of state aggression in a global context, Victoria's essay addresses the views of twentieth-century Americans. In keeping with his earlier work, Victoria finds ample evidence of support for aggressive actions, concluding by calling Christianity "the handmaiden of the state in providing moral and spiritual support and an ethical rationalization for U.S. wars" (p. 114).[2]
In contrast to these essays, two chapters focus upon protesting American policies: Marilyn Young, "Resisting State Terror: The Anti-Vietnam War Movement," and Lawrence S. Wittner, "Resisting Nuclear Terror: Japanese and American Antinuclear Movements since 1945." Together, they seek to demonstrate the impact protests had upon policy. This is difficult to gauge, but they are on the right track. While Young asserts that "in the face of the absolute military superiority of the United States, the international antiwar movement added a moral force untainted by state power or ideology" (p. 243), Wittner suggests that if one considers the strategy of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to be a kind of state terror, "then two of the largest and most effective antiterrorist organizations of the postwar era have been the Japanese and American antinuclear movements" (p. 251). These movements proved successful because, by stigmatizing an unpopular war and nuclear weapons, these two movements succeeded in making the moral points that Falk suggests some governmental agencies consider, only more successfully. The result of these endeavors has been that even if administrations now seek to insure broad popular support for their policies, there remains room for a popular check upon the executive, a theme that perhaps underlies all of the essays discussed so far. Notably, Victoria's essay ends on this kind of a note: "one of the chief challenges of the twenty-first century is for religious and non-religious alike to compete not so much in saving souls as putting in place systems, creeds, and practices that will no longer serve to foster 'the same old death-game'" (p. 115).
Balancing the discussion of the American context somewhat, Japanese experiences are addressed in the aforementioned article by Selden and in Utsumi Aiko, "Japanese Racism, War, and the POW Experience." While Selden provides an overview of some of more pertinent atrocities of the Sino-Japanese War, Utsumi's essay explores the differential treatment of POWs in Japan during the Second World War. Unsurprisingly, Allied POWs were accorded some status due to international agreements, though other POWs were not. This did not mean, however, that Allied POWs were treated well. Compelled to work for often doubtful pay, their conditions deteriorated towards the end of the war as shortages and other problems plagued Japanese society at large. As a result, overwork and food shortages incapacitated many. That said, Utsumi notes well the propaganda role these POWs played in Japan, initially dispelling any lingering views that foreigners might in any way be superior to Japanese and later providing scapegoats for rising Japanese frustrations.
Utusmi's discussion of Asian POWs will perhaps be enlightening to many readers. Theoretically "liberated" by the Imperial Japanese Army, South and Southeast Asian POWs were compelled to labor for the Imperial state,
often under adverse conditions. Chinese POWs, though, had it worse.While many were worked to death or killed before ever reaching internment camps in Japan, once there they were subjected to brutal conditions. A similar fate befell many Koreans, she notes, even if they were not technically POWs. Although the Asian POW portion of her article is not as well developed, it indicates generally what were likely the most common issues for these men.
Highlighting the racial profiling inherent in the Japanese expansion of the 1930s, Utsumi's analysis indicates one example of the stereotyping apparent in the prosecution of state-sponsored terror. This perspective is underlined in Ben Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance in East Timor, 1975-99: Comparative Reflections on Cambodia." Kiernan illustrates well how simplistic assessments in Washington helped enable Indonesian and Khmer soldiers to terrorize East Timor and Cambodia. That said, the two campaigns differed in that while the Khmer Rouge was revolutionary, Indonesians were bent on conquest. This resulted in different tactics, though both cases involved terrorism.
Another case study is provided in Diana Lary, "The Waters Covered the Earth: China's War-Induced Natural Disasters." However, unlike the chapters mentioned previously, this essay is about a desperate, self-inflicted form of terror. Retreating in the face of an unstoppable 1938 Japanese advance, the Nationalist Chinese forces resorted to opening the dikes on the Yellow River to slow the enemy. The strategy succeeded somewhat, but at the cost of more than 800,000 dead and six million made refugees. These resulted not only from flood and famine; as Lary notes, fear of the Japanese advance prevented many from seeking shelter in that direction.[3]
Moving from a discussion of the May 1938 flood to a discussion of floods, famines, and other war-related disasters in general, Lary stresses the useful point that contemporary plans to meet disasters today (disasterology--"surely a contender for economics as the original dismal science" [p. 166]) rarely take into consideration disasters occurring as part of war. This is perhaps most obvious today in discussions of Iraq,for the suffering of the Iraqi people in the wake of the first Gulf War appears to have provided a useful recruiting tool for those who would challenge American hegemony, and the situation today appears such that the suffering apparent in the wake of the second could well do the same. As Lary notes, "it is difficult to convey the long-term damage that accompanies such disasters, because the ramifications come in so many forms and affect so many aspects of life" (p. 165). The victims of state-implemented terrors--whether intentionally made victim or not--simply must be cared for, for at the least we risk contributing to the detriment of us all.
This book is one in the War and Peace Library series edited by Selden for Rowman and Littlefield. Obviously reflecting Selden's lifelong interest in the relevance of history for contemporary politics, it can be assumed that more projects are on the way.[4] Despite, or because of, the current intellectual climate, it is still cool to be a scholar engagee.[5]
Notes
[1]. This, of course, is not a new perspective for Cumings. There are many works of his that allude to this, but he has done so perhaps most popularly in _Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History_ (New York: Norton, 1997).
[2]. Though Victoria's earlier works focused on Japan, his successes there recommend that he turn his attention elsewhere. See his _Zen at War_ (New York: Weatherhill, 1997); and _Zen War Stories_ (London:
RoutledgeCurzon,2003).
[3]. Lary has written on this disaster elsewhere in "Drowned Earth: The Strategic Breaching of the Yellow River Dyke, 1938," _War in History_ 8, no. 2 (2001), pp. 191-207; and briefly in her "A Ravaged Place: The Devastation of the Xuzhou Region, 1938," in _Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China_, ed. Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001), pp. 98-116. The latter includes much on Japanese atrocities.
[4]. Selden perhaps first demonstrated this inclination in Mark Selden andEdward Friedman, eds., _America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations_ (New York: Pantheon, 1971) and in the various articles published in the _Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars_, now _Critical Asian Studies_.
[5]. Indeed, many of the contributors to this volume have written and spoken publicly much in this vein, perhaps most notably Bruce Cumings, Richard Falk, Lawrence Wittner, and Marilyn Young.
H-ASIA
March 8, 2005
Book Review by William Sewell on Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So, eds., _War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century_. (orig. published on H-US-JAPAN)
----
Ed. note: This review appeared on H-US-JAPAN in February of this year, and was forwarded to H-ASIA by the editor, Professor Yone Sugita. For reasons unknown, but likely inattention will prove sufficient, the review was not cross post on H-ASIA. So it appears late; inconvenience is regretted, and the lead editor promises to try harder, really I do! FFC
*************************************************************************
From: Yone Sugita
Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So, eds. _War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century_. War and Peace Library Series. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004. vi + 293
pp. Index. $80.00 (cloth), ISBN 0-7425-2390-X; $29.95 (paper), ISBN 0-7425-2391-8.
Reviewed for H-US-Japan by Bill Sewell, Department of History, Saint Mary's University
Modern States, Modern Terror
This timely volume will interest all who seek to apply the "lessons of history," as they are often called, to contemporary events. Growing out of a June 2001 conference entitled "Asia and the United States at War: The Twentieth Century Experience," held at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, some of the contributions to the collection were also obviously prodded by recent events in the United States, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Taken together, this book will contribute much to the debate over what many have called the "root causes" of September 11, at the same time reminding readers that American policy in the Far East is as problematic as it has been in the Middle East.
That said, not all of the papers here address American policy, for some consider actions taken on behalf of Asian regimes, particularly Japan. The result, however, is a volume focused on a tactic (terrorism), that usefully compares and contrasts the definitions, implementations, and implications of that tactic over the last century with regard to one region of the world. And even if individual articles will appeal to specialist niches, the volume as a whole focuses coherently on a central theme, making it perhaps a useful adjunct for seminar courses, at least for those who think that "root causes" matter.
American policy is focused upon by Mark Selden, "The United States and Japan in Twentieth-Century Asian Wars," Richard Falk, "State Terror versus Humanitarian Law," Bruce Cumings, "American Airpower and Nuclear Strategy in Northeast Asia since 1945," and Peter Dale Scott, "Drugs and Oil: The Deep Politics of U.S. Asian Wars." Selden's chapter is first, noting that while acts of Japanese state terrorism ceased with the Second World War, the incidence of American acts has increased. Defining "state terrorism as _systematic state violence against civilians in violation of international norms, state edicts, and precedents established by international courts designed to protect the rights of civilians_" (emphasis original, p. 21), Selden finds evidence for this growth most obviously in the changing role of airpower. For Selden, relatively bloodless bombing campaigns--from Americans' perspectives--qualify as instances of state terror because they target civilians en masse. Worse, this practice expanded in Korea and Vietnam, and threatened to do so again on the eve of the second Gulf War, when the essay was written. This expansion occurred because, while there was a rough parity of forces apparent in Europe during the Cold War to restrict American options, there was no such restraining balance in Asia. And now, in the wake of the Soviet collapse, Selden warns that there is little to contain the United States, unless international organizations can somehow come together.
In some ways, Falk's essay attempts to explain American justifications for the practices Selden describes, but in essence he describes mainly the quandary in which Americans find themselves. That is to say, despite technological superiority and a self-imposed global police role, the United States has also assumed a moral leadership role that leads many to question the means of achieving victory. That questioning, however, is never brought to a conclusion because the United States has never had to acknowledge comprehensively the sum total of American actions--the privilege of hegemonic status. Falk's prescription, then, related to Selden's call for greater organization, is for greater education in "the dark side of state terrorism" (p. 57). A good example of this education is provided by Cumings, whose essay on evolving American bombing strategies highlights the brutal nature of American conventional and nuclear tactics. Indeed, given the continuing security issues on the Korean peninsula that interest Cumings most, this perspective is perhaps one that needs bringing to popular attention most rapidly, for Cumings provides a more realistic rationale for current North Korean actions than simply labeling their leadership as mad.[1]
The three essays above focus upon destructive tactics, in effect assuming American actions as a given. Scott's essay seeks to explain why American administrations perceive the need to take these actions in the first place. Perhaps somewhat controversially, he concludes that oil and drugs constitute a "deep politics" that remain "factors in policy formation that are usually repressed rather than acknowledged" (p. 172). Although many will agree that the drive for foreign sources of oil has been central to postwar American decision making, Scott's charge of American complicity in preserving and expanding the global drug trade is more likely to be met with raised eyebrows. Granted, Scott, a former Canadian diplomat, is "not suggesting that anyone in the highest levels of U.S. government made a conscious decision to restore or expand the global [drug trade]" (p. 189), yet his allegations are, nevertheless, deep--involving even the banking industry. In a less provocative manner, it might be more prudent to recognize the correlations Scott notes and conclude simply that American policy makers have tended to be more willing to resort to shady or brutal methods to support whatever goals they have, rather than upset the American public by making extravagant military demands. Thus, the resulting "blowback" is one of the costs of waging war on the cheap. Moreover, as Scott admits that "the mechanics of the U.S. relationship to the drug trade remain mysterious" (p. 190), perhaps this perspective needs further study--not that it should be dismissed out of hand.
Supplementing Scott in this volume is Brian Daizen Victoria, "When God(s) and Buddhas Go to War." Exploring the roles of religious leaders in justifying acts of state aggression in a global context, Victoria's essay addresses the views of twentieth-century Americans. In keeping with his earlier work, Victoria finds ample evidence of support for aggressive actions, concluding by calling Christianity "the handmaiden of the state in providing moral and spiritual support and an ethical rationalization for U.S. wars" (p. 114).[2]
In contrast to these essays, two chapters focus upon protesting American policies: Marilyn Young, "Resisting State Terror: The Anti-Vietnam War Movement," and Lawrence S. Wittner, "Resisting Nuclear Terror: Japanese and American Antinuclear Movements since 1945." Together, they seek to demonstrate the impact protests had upon policy. This is difficult to gauge, but they are on the right track. While Young asserts that "in the face of the absolute military superiority of the United States, the international antiwar movement added a moral force untainted by state power or ideology" (p. 243), Wittner suggests that if one considers the strategy of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to be a kind of state terror, "then two of the largest and most effective antiterrorist organizations of the postwar era have been the Japanese and American antinuclear movements" (p. 251). These movements proved successful because, by stigmatizing an unpopular war and nuclear weapons, these two movements succeeded in making the moral points that Falk suggests some governmental agencies consider, only more successfully. The result of these endeavors has been that even if administrations now seek to insure broad popular support for their policies, there remains room for a popular check upon the executive, a theme that perhaps underlies all of the essays discussed so far. Notably, Victoria's essay ends on this kind of a note: "one of the chief challenges of the twenty-first century is for religious and non-religious alike to compete not so much in saving souls as putting in place systems, creeds, and practices that will no longer serve to foster 'the same old death-game'" (p. 115).
Balancing the discussion of the American context somewhat, Japanese experiences are addressed in the aforementioned article by Selden and in Utsumi Aiko, "Japanese Racism, War, and the POW Experience." While Selden provides an overview of some of more pertinent atrocities of the Sino-Japanese War, Utsumi's essay explores the differential treatment of POWs in Japan during the Second World War. Unsurprisingly, Allied POWs were accorded some status due to international agreements, though other POWs were not. This did not mean, however, that Allied POWs were treated well. Compelled to work for often doubtful pay, their conditions deteriorated towards the end of the war as shortages and other problems plagued Japanese society at large. As a result, overwork and food shortages incapacitated many. That said, Utsumi notes well the propaganda role these POWs played in Japan, initially dispelling any lingering views that foreigners might in any way be superior to Japanese and later providing scapegoats for rising Japanese frustrations.
Utusmi's discussion of Asian POWs will perhaps be enlightening to many readers. Theoretically "liberated" by the Imperial Japanese Army, South and Southeast Asian POWs were compelled to labor for the Imperial state,
often under adverse conditions. Chinese POWs, though, had it worse.While many were worked to death or killed before ever reaching internment camps in Japan, once there they were subjected to brutal conditions. A similar fate befell many Koreans, she notes, even if they were not technically POWs. Although the Asian POW portion of her article is not as well developed, it indicates generally what were likely the most common issues for these men.
Highlighting the racial profiling inherent in the Japanese expansion of the 1930s, Utsumi's analysis indicates one example of the stereotyping apparent in the prosecution of state-sponsored terror. This perspective is underlined in Ben Kiernan, "War, Genocide, and Resistance in East Timor, 1975-99: Comparative Reflections on Cambodia." Kiernan illustrates well how simplistic assessments in Washington helped enable Indonesian and Khmer soldiers to terrorize East Timor and Cambodia. That said, the two campaigns differed in that while the Khmer Rouge was revolutionary, Indonesians were bent on conquest. This resulted in different tactics, though both cases involved terrorism.
Another case study is provided in Diana Lary, "The Waters Covered the Earth: China's War-Induced Natural Disasters." However, unlike the chapters mentioned previously, this essay is about a desperate, self-inflicted form of terror. Retreating in the face of an unstoppable 1938 Japanese advance, the Nationalist Chinese forces resorted to opening the dikes on the Yellow River to slow the enemy. The strategy succeeded somewhat, but at the cost of more than 800,000 dead and six million made refugees. These resulted not only from flood and famine; as Lary notes, fear of the Japanese advance prevented many from seeking shelter in that direction.[3]
Moving from a discussion of the May 1938 flood to a discussion of floods, famines, and other war-related disasters in general, Lary stresses the useful point that contemporary plans to meet disasters today (disasterology--"surely a contender for economics as the original dismal science" [p. 166]) rarely take into consideration disasters occurring as part of war. This is perhaps most obvious today in discussions of Iraq,for the suffering of the Iraqi people in the wake of the first Gulf War appears to have provided a useful recruiting tool for those who would challenge American hegemony, and the situation today appears such that the suffering apparent in the wake of the second could well do the same. As Lary notes, "it is difficult to convey the long-term damage that accompanies such disasters, because the ramifications come in so many forms and affect so many aspects of life" (p. 165). The victims of state-implemented terrors--whether intentionally made victim or not--simply must be cared for, for at the least we risk contributing to the detriment of us all.
This book is one in the War and Peace Library series edited by Selden for Rowman and Littlefield. Obviously reflecting Selden's lifelong interest in the relevance of history for contemporary politics, it can be assumed that more projects are on the way.[4] Despite, or because of, the current intellectual climate, it is still cool to be a scholar engagee.[5]
Notes
[1]. This, of course, is not a new perspective for Cumings. There are many works of his that allude to this, but he has done so perhaps most popularly in _Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History_ (New York: Norton, 1997).
[2]. Though Victoria's earlier works focused on Japan, his successes there recommend that he turn his attention elsewhere. See his _Zen at War_ (New York: Weatherhill, 1997); and _Zen War Stories_ (London:
RoutledgeCurzon,2003).
[3]. Lary has written on this disaster elsewhere in "Drowned Earth: The Strategic Breaching of the Yellow River Dyke, 1938," _War in History_ 8, no. 2 (2001), pp. 191-207; and briefly in her "A Ravaged Place: The Devastation of the Xuzhou Region, 1938," in _Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China_, ed. Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001), pp. 98-116. The latter includes much on Japanese atrocities.
[4]. Selden perhaps first demonstrated this inclination in Mark Selden andEdward Friedman, eds., _America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations_ (New York: Pantheon, 1971) and in the various articles published in the _Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars_, now _Critical Asian Studies_.
[5]. Indeed, many of the contributors to this volume have written and spoken publicly much in this vein, perhaps most notably Bruce Cumings, Richard Falk, Lawrence Wittner, and Marilyn Young.
Tuesday, March 08, 2005
A few days more...
Swamped here....things should clear up next week. Got a backlog of writing to do!
Saturday, March 05, 2005
As Bush Burns the US, the China Threat Grows
China to 'boost' military spending
Hu Warns Against IndependenceWith Bush rapidly grinding down US power and influence in the world, here in Taiwan we face an increasingly uncertain future. China's formal double digit defense spending growth masks much greater real military spending growth, and its swelling hegemonic drive in Asia that can only portend bad news for the Beautiful Island. Should you come here to teach English? Sure. By the time Bush is through with the US, we won't have enough power to frighten a Haitian crime gang, let alone the PRC military. There shouldn't be much of a fight. At the moment, between the sleepwalking Taiwanese populace, the weakness of the DPP, the venality of the pro-Chinese mainlander cliques -- which, I hasten to add, do not include all mainlanders -- and the accelerating decline of the US, Taiwan's future as an independent political entity has never looked so grim.
Overheard on the Net: From a Poster at Internet Infidels
One of Darth Bush's military advisors, who is losing faith in Bush:
"Any attack made by the Iraqi insurgents against us would be a useless gesture, no matter what primitive tactics they use against us. Our military machine is supreme!"
Darth Bush:
"Don't be too proud of our military machine. The ability to bomb a country into oblivion is nothing compared the power of God to wipe these brown skinned terrorists from the face of the Earth."
Darth Bush's Advisor:
"Don't try to frighten us with your religious ways, Bush. Your sad devotion to that ancient religion has not helped you conjure up the supposed Weapons of Mass Destruction, or given you clairvoyance enough to find Osama Bin Laden."
Darth Bush:
"I find your lack of faith... disturbing".
Thursday, March 03, 2005
More great letters
Wow,
Stumbled onto your website when I googled Taiwanese breakfast and for the pass two day have been going through each page completely transported back to Taiwan by the wonderful and plentiful pictures. Thanks, for all of your hard work putting this site together. I lived in Taiwan 91-93 while on a mission for my church. I have often looked for a site with such everyday 'real life' pictures , but all to often I ended up at some tourist type site with some pictures but nothing I related to or could even relate to. Your pictures are awesome, perfect.
I especially enjoyed the pictures of the food, night markets, neighborhoods pictures, and all the others. It felt like I was back in Taiwan, I miss it dearly. I got to go back soon, till then you site will do the trick,
thanks again.
****************
That's what the website's for, man!
Stumbled onto your website when I googled Taiwanese breakfast and for the pass two day have been going through each page completely transported back to Taiwan by the wonderful and plentiful pictures. Thanks, for all of your hard work putting this site together. I lived in Taiwan 91-93 while on a mission for my church. I have often looked for a site with such everyday 'real life' pictures , but all to often I ended up at some tourist type site with some pictures but nothing I related to or could even relate to. Your pictures are awesome, perfect.
I especially enjoyed the pictures of the food, night markets, neighborhoods pictures, and all the others. It felt like I was back in Taiwan, I miss it dearly. I got to go back soon, till then you site will do the trick,
thanks again.
****************
That's what the website's for, man!
Sunday, February 27, 2005
Humor Department: Don't Politicize 2-28!
The Taipei Times weighed in with a comical story entitled "Don't Politicize 2-28, Mainlanders Say." They left off the unspoken corollary, which should read something like "...but let us keep our priviliged positions in the military, the government, and society at large that we earned as a result of the political killings."
The article itself was a wonderful bit of unanalyzed political propaganda. The "news item" was actually a poll conducted by the Mainlander Association in the Taipei area (~30% mainlander). It's about as representative as conducting a poll about Castro only in Dade County:
The article itself was a wonderful bit of unanalyzed political propaganda. The "news item" was actually a poll conducted by the Mainlander Association in the Taipei area (~30% mainlander). It's about as representative as conducting a poll about Castro only in Dade County:
To better understand the connection between the 228 Incident and ethnic relations, the Mainlander Association released yesterday the results of a telephone survey the group conducted last month, making 1,000 random phone calls in Taipei City and Taipei County residents.
Even more comical were the results that attributed tensions between the 'ethnic groups' to 'political maneuvering.'
While split over whether talking about the 228 incident helps ethnic relations, the survey showed that more than 80 percent of the respondents agreed that tensions between ethnic groups are a result of political maneuvering. Further, over 50 percent think that ethnic tension is a serious problem in Taiwan.
It's true that jailing one's opponents, suppressing their culture, murdering tens of thousands of people, and sending hundreds of thousands of others into exile is a 'political maneuver.'
In addition, more than 40 percent said that, as an ethnic group, Mainlanders are losing their political influence.
It's interesting that over half said that wasn't the case, also my own impression. From boardrooms to university departments, cliques of mainlanders continue to run Taiwan.
Chief executive director of the association, Huang Luo-fei (黃洛斐), said that characterizing the 228 Incident as a conflict between victims and perpetrators paints Mainlanders as those who are guilty of the massacre.
This is a great bit of doubletalk. If a political massacre isn't an event between perps and their victims, what is?
"In talking about the 228 Incident, it is crucial to focus on the individuals who were involved in the tragedy." Huang said.
I agree! Let's focus on the individuals -- all 100,000 who were killed over the years, and their murderers, many of whom are still at large, unpunished, in positions of privilege.
"Accusing an ethnic group of a historical crime is not the solution to ethnic conflict," Huang added.Mainlanders are not an "ethnic group" but rather a group of disparate cultural backgrounds united by their allegiance to the former ruling party, the KMT, and their own interests, which the KMT furthered. They are a political construction, not an ethnicity, and they were purpose-built as a minority ruling class. Until mainlanders stop thinking of each other as a class with shared interests diametrically opposed to the locals, the "ethnic conflict" -- actually class-based political struggle -- will continue. Bluntly put, this conflict will cease anytime mainlanders give their primary allegiance to Taiwan and not each other.
In other words, mainlanders grousing about "ethnic conflict" are really mainlanders anxious about the rising Taiwanese consciousness and its threat to their hands on the levers of society.
A great letter
My Taiwan website generates 4-8 emails a day, and many are like this:
Thanks!
Michael
Dear trusty author,
I couldn't help it. I just had to stop my tour to congratulate you on
your great website. Everything there is just great: from the tips you give
to foreigners to the amazing pictures and accompanying captions. I must
say you are both an excellent writer and a great photographer.
Congratulations!!!I've spent the last two hours visiting every link of
your web site and I'm not sure if I'll be able to sleep before I can get to
the very end of it. I do love Taiwan, I know lots of other web sites
containing pictures and information on this country, but none compares to yours in
terms of quality. By the way, "trusty author" is how you call yourself in one of the
captions: "Your trusty author in Neihu in younger, thinner days. The views over
the city from the mountains nearby are breathtaking." Now I will resume my tour ...
Best wishes to you and your BEAUTIFUL family!
Thanks!
Michael
Our new dog!!!!
We got a new dog today! A fully housebroken and beautiful golden retriever.
If we get any more animals we'll have to apply for government permit to operate as a Zoo!
Michael
If we get any more animals we'll have to apply for government permit to operate as a Zoo!
Michael
Thursday, February 24, 2005
A-bian's Contract on the PFP
"You should have stuck to your original contract. Or your second plan. Or your third. You should, in fact, have stuck to something. Anything. Your total self-interest didn't make you strong. It made you a rag in the wind, anybody's to pick up." -- The Vor GameNews today reports that Chen Shui-bian, our energetic President, has signed a contract with James Soong, the head of the "opposition" People First Party (PFP). Lots of people are already complaining; after all, didn't we elect A-bian in part to keep that fox Soong out of the henhouse?
Before we get too upset at our President for signing a contract with that Peron-wannabe Soong and his faction of corrupt, power-hungry, Taiwan-hating mainlanders, let's recall that there are three major parties involved here, the DPP, the KMT, and the PFP. The DPP needs a deal to get a majority in the legislature, and while the KMT is for sale like any political party, the DPP cannot afford the price. On the other hand, the PFP is solely interested in power, and thus, belongs to anyone willing to bargain.
But what exactly did A-bian give up? He promised not to declare independence, stage any referendums, change the name of the country, and so on. Raise your hand if you really believed any of this was going to happen in the second term of a man whose country has hundreds of missiles pointed at it, whose senior military officers are apparently sympathetic to Taiwan's enemies, whose capital is essentially a territory of rival political party formally committed to the eradication of an independent Taiwan, whose major western ally, the US, is now a power clearly in decline (and which supports his political rival Soong), who gets no support at all from Europe eager to sell weapons to China, and who rules with a razor-thin majority atop a completely divided legislature. Yes, all those things were really going to happen in the next four years. I'll bet you also believe that the 2004 Florida vote count was kosher too.
No, essentially, A-bian is promised that he wouldn't do things he wasn't going to do anyway, in order to get cooperation from the PFP on some urgent political needs. No doubt this will last about as long as the triumvirate of Marc Antony, Octavian, and Marcus Lepidus, as two sides fundamentally opposed to each other stick it out exactly as long as interests are served. Fifteen minutes?
Once the smoke clears and tempers cool, A-bian's political acumen will once again be revealed. By signing a deal with the PFP, he has put another spike into the wedge between the KMT and the PFP. Loyal KMT cadres already hate Soong for selling out the KMT, and now here's another reason to hate him: a deal with Darth Vader himself, Chen Shui-bian. What is the real cost to A-bian? "Ink on a page" as one of my favorite TV shows once put it. Should an unlooked-for miracle occur and the opportunity for independence arise, does anyone really think that this contract will constrain Chen?
And let's not overestimate the real effects of this. Taiwanese political parties are notorious for their inability to impose discipline. The figures at the top can do what they like, but the bottom will crawl along as before: locally focused, gloriously corrupt, and contemptuous of the center as only Taiwan can be. Can the PFP really muster the kind of party discipline needed to make this deal go? Inquiring minds register doubt. Really, looking at what goes on in the legislature, I do not even know why Beijing would want this crazy island; they ought to be paying Taiwan to stay away.
So relax, and enjoy what promises to be an entertaining 15 minute partnership.
What should Taiwan do?
Marc Plumb wrote an informative letter to the Taipei Times on the EU drive to resume selling weapons to China.
Even as we speak Japan is haltingly drawing closer to Taiwan, and this trend needs to be encouraged. Americans are apt to view the natural counterweight to China as Japan, but the reality is that China's main rival in Asia in the long-term is India. The region along the Himal, from Kashmir on one end to the tiny Himalayan states on the other, is one of the most explosive, though least remarked on, tinderboxes on earth. Taiwan, as I recommended many years ago, needs to be reaching out to India and developing it as a counterweight. This may sound like a bizarre recommendation but in dollar terms India's economy is only about twice the size of Taiwan's, and it is much less developed in many ways.
Perhaps, though, there is just no more time for a strategy like this. Time to bristle with missiles, folks.
For Taiwan, the upcoming trouble the US will have with Iran may push the Chinese navy to make a move to blockade Taiwan, not only to challenge those who support independence, but also to give the US more to deal with since China (and Russia) have partnered with Iranian oil interests. North Korea may complicate matters as well. Taiwan may end up having to fend for itself.Between the suicidal violence of US policy, and the venal hypocrisy of the EU, Taiwan doesn't have much of a choice. With US power steadily eroding on its way to an (increasingly probable?) Argentina-style meltdown, what is the proper stance for Taiwan?
Even as we speak Japan is haltingly drawing closer to Taiwan, and this trend needs to be encouraged. Americans are apt to view the natural counterweight to China as Japan, but the reality is that China's main rival in Asia in the long-term is India. The region along the Himal, from Kashmir on one end to the tiny Himalayan states on the other, is one of the most explosive, though least remarked on, tinderboxes on earth. Taiwan, as I recommended many years ago, needs to be reaching out to India and developing it as a counterweight. This may sound like a bizarre recommendation but in dollar terms India's economy is only about twice the size of Taiwan's, and it is much less developed in many ways.
Perhaps, though, there is just no more time for a strategy like this. Time to bristle with missiles, folks.
A Morning Guffaw
A friend of mine sent me this hilarious blog entry about an important find in a used book store in Taichung.
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