Media views of Ma and Taiwan

Imagine this: Ma Ying-jeou criticized in the international English-language media.

I'm not kidding you.

Stephen Nelson in Asia Times has a nifty piece pointing out that Ma Ying-jeou is a man who has reimagined himself in the last two years:

Shortly after becoming KMT chairman in mid-2005, Ma told the Associated Press that - if he became president - he would do "everything in his power" to "re-unify" Taiwan with China.

He was strongly critical of efforts by President Chen Shui-bian to "suspend" the already dormant National Unification Council and the National Unification Guidelines - drawn up by the KMT - that laid out exactly how the Taiwan should go about "re-unifying" with China.

But even as outgoing KMT chairman Lien Chan was cozying up to Beijing, and promising "One China", Ma sensed that the ground in Taiwan was shifting.

It's so rare to read criticism of Ma in English that this piece should be treasured (UPDATE: does anyone actually know which AP piece he is referring to? The only ones I can find from that time all have Ma saying he won't unify until China is democratic).

Those of you with weak hearts should not read this interview with Ma in Newsweek, posted to Thirsty Ghosts. It's basically a farrago of nonsense from the Ma side. In it, Adams asks Ma two very good questions on the economy. In the first one, Ma starts backpedaling immediately:

NW: Is it realistic to think Taiwan can go back to old days of high-growth, or should people be more modest in their expectations?

Ma: Well, even the DPP government once reached six percent growth. I think we will be able at least to create a favorable situation, by changing the policy on direct flights, on tourism, and get people generally optimistic for the future. And that will help. So this year, the general forecast for our economic growth is 4% or something like this

Those of you with longer memories might recall that two weeks ago Ma was promising us 6% growth every year, along with a 30K per capita income and 3% unemployment. Suddenly he's "cautiously optimistic." The second good question Adams asked is about the truly severe problem Taiwan faces, rising income inequality. Ma detailed a couple of policies, and concluded:

And I think that can be done. Because the KMT, although it looks like a right-wing political party, has a lot of strength on the equitable distribution of wealth. So that will also be a very important part of our policy.

Sadly, the post-industrial economy driven by tourism, finance, and real estate that the KMT envisions is one in which income inequality is only going to worsen, as it has in the US since the Reagan Administration. We'll get a boost from the infrastructure expenditures, though it will be interesting to see if the Central Bank can hold down inflation, especially as the US dollar continues to fall over time.

This leads naturally to the next article of Adams', also in Newsweek, which points out that structural changes throughout Asia are driving political earthquakes. The first paragraph observes:

Voters in Asia are kicking out incumbents like never before. As maturing economies combine with the global slowdown to put a brake on the pace of development, Asians are electing pragmatic managers-in-chief who promise a return to the good old days of fast growth, job security and social mobility. The first came in South Korea last December, when former Hyundai chairman Lee Myung-bak won election as president vowing to serve as the pro-business CEO of a "Global Korea" and ending the reign of a string of populist liberals. On March 8 in Malaysia, an opposition coalition dealt the ruling party its worse loss in four decades by running on bread-and-butter issues and promising to end a stifling Malay affirmative-action system. Then on March 22, voters in Taiwan tossed out a quixotic nationalist who had undermined Taiwan's key economic advantage—access to mainland China—in favor of Ma Ying-jeou, who promises to improve economic ties with the mainland. In an exclusive interview with NEWSWEEK last week, Ma said he won because voters were tired of "pugnacious nationalism" and because the economic performance of outgoing President Chen Shui-bian had been "so poor, people just felt that enough is enough."

Let's remember: it was the DPP that legalized investment in China, not the KMT, and permitted over $150 billion of Taiwanese capital to move there. All countries around China place formal and informal limits on economic activities with China, though only the DPP gets abused for doing that. Further, the DPP vs KMT split on Taiwan's relationship to China was not a simple "open or not" dichotomy, though that is the line the international media and the KMT adhered to. The DPP was always open to direct flights and investment in China. It was a more complex debate over "what kind of relationship we will have with China."

Nevertheless, the article raises an important issue: changes in Taiwan's income and industrial base reflect changes happening throughout the region. All over Asia rising prices, stagnant real income, and slowing growth are a recipe for long-term instability. As they note in their last paragaph:

What the new leaders aren't asking is whether the old rates are still realistic. The richest economies typically can't grow faster than 3 percent for sustained periods without overheating. With average incomes now exceeding $15,000—not matching Japan but not poor either—South Korea and Taiwan may find that 5 percent is their new speed limit. With average incomes of only $6,150 and $3,400, respectively, Malaysia and Thailand will likely find it easier to hit 7 percent or more. But as Deans points out, the growing power of global markets means "new state leaders have fewer levers they can pull, [and] it's much harder to manage economies than it used to be." Particularly when voters expect past performance to predict future results.

A kind reader flipped me a link to this piece by a former Xinhua reporter, now a doctoral student in Singapore. Most of it is fairly typical establishment views of the situation. These see Ma's ability to move closer to China as constrained by Taiwan's divided society (note the underlying reading of Ma -- if it weren't for these constraints, Ma would indeed move closer to China). It also discusses some of the splits in the KMT. Sometimes it veers into the clinically insane:

With the KMT taking full control of both the legislative and administrative bodies, many observers have predicted a stronger civil society in Taiwanese politics.

Sorry, but when Ma attempts to put Taiwan into China's orbit permanently, the DPP will have to resort to street demonstrations again, putting us all the way back to the late 1980s and early 1990s. That is not an advance of civil society. I can't recall anyone saying we'd get a stronger civil society here as a result of putting the KMT in power.

Most of the time, though, the piece is quite balanced:

Whether or not Ma will succeed in his mainland policy equally depends on how Beijing responds and how the two sides interact in the short term. Now that the DPP is pushed to the political sideline, the ball is in China’s court. Beijing will have to take the initiative since there is no Chen Shui-bian to blame and no need to put pressure on the United States.

In the months ahead, it will be important to see how Beijing interprets the reality that the KMT, especially Ma's own position regarding Taiwan's identity, has moved significantly to the center. Also, it is important to see how Beijing views Ma's campaign rhetoric on the Olympics and Tibet and whether Ma continues such rhetoric after he takes office.

Most importantly, it will be crucial whether China changes its strategic priority regarding Taiwan from exclusively focusing on countering independence to some inclination of promoting unification. In the past few years, Beijing's dual strategy of forceful deterrence and charm offensive aimed at preventing Taiwan from moving further towards de jure independence.

Now that the imminent danger of Taiwan independence is gone, will China change its priority towards pushing for political conditions conducive for eventual unification? If so, it will be in direct contradiction to one of Ma's three-no policies: no unification, no independence, and no war. Any Chinese intention to use the economic bait to push for closer political ties is likely to be detected by the always-on-alert green camp in Taiwan, thus constantly putting Ma on the defensive.

We can only hope the Greens are so pro-active.

Finally, enjoy this very funny piece from the BBC on how the reporter went to observe a traditional aboriginal wedding ceremony that turned out to be a promotional event.

[Taiwan]