Lately calls for ending US strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan have appeared in the media, as they do cyclically. I raked one by Etzioni over the coals a couple of weeks ago. Joseph Bosco has also been calling for the US to unambiguously declare it would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack (2010 for example).
Responding to the piece on Etzioni I wrote:
In the Senkakus the situation is crystal clear: we have an exact analogy for Taiwan, a foreign territory, Japan, backed by the US with strong and periodically renewed clarity. Everyone knows that the Senkakus are currently Japanese, that China wants to annex them, and that the US will defend them.I had forgotten of course, that Taiwan also offers a mirror to the Senkakus: the ROC holdings in the South China Sea.
Imagine if the US were to declare that it would defend Taiwan in case of Chinese attack. Because the ROC/Taiwan holds islands in the South China Sea, this may commit the US to defending them without -- as always -- declaring who is the proper claimant. These islands are claimed by several nations, not just the PRC and ROC, meaning that the US could find itself angering nations whose friendship it needs (just as Taiwan already is with these claims). And that's just the beginning...
...because what is happening in the Senkakus, the slow growth of tension via military and diplomatic moves, creating Japanese countermoves that Beijing can portray as "aggression", can just as easily happen in the South China Sea, if the US position becomes unambiguous, just as it is in the Senkakus. A well-defined policy invites testing of limits, a policy with no definition has no limits that can be tested.
In addition to creating incidents Beijing can use to construct an "aggressive Japan" narrative, tension generated by Beijing is used by Beijing to harm the relationship between the US and its allies -- in other words, one of Beijing's most important strategic goals is transferring tension from the Beijing-Washington relationship to the Washington-Taipei and Washington-Tokyo relationship.
Just tossing this idea out there. But by unambiguously promising to defend Taiwan, the US may simply involve itself even deeper in the South China Sea disputes in unwelcome, complicated, and unpredictable ways.
ADDED: I also wanted to point out that if the US guarantees to defend Taiwan against attack, it guarantees the South China Sea holdings, which are held by the ROC as Chinese claims. This would put the US in the very awkward position of fighting for Chinese claims over the South China Sea islands (against China!), or else rejecting those claims formally by refusing to defend them.
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Daily Links:
- BREAKING: Sean Lien declares his candidacy for Taipei mayor.
- Japan's maritime and security interests in the various territorial disputes.
- US stake in the cross-strait dialogue: not a bad review, but for some reason the writer imagines that there is a treaty that says the US thinks Taiwan is part of China.
- Taiwan and China to build water main to Kinmen
- Hear in Taiwan reflects on a billboard for beauty treatments
- Annette Lu asks Sean Lien and Ko Wen-je to explain their China ties. The Taipei mayor election will be fun this year.
- Yet another poll finding that majority support independence, reject annexation.
- Ben: Hilarity ensues on the intertubes as a statue of Sun Yat-sen is pulled down
- Smartphone industry takes year-end sales hit
- Awful Forbes piece from corporate-funded "pro-business" group wonders why the US funds Taiwan. No really, it's not an Onion piece.
- PHOTOS: Darren Melrose's series Diptych
- NOT TAIWAN: How did I never hear this gorgeous symphony by Erkki Melartin until this year?
- EVENT: LSE sent this around:
I am very pleased to announce two seminars that will be taking place during March 2014 as part of our series on “Taiwan and Hong Kong in Comparative Perspective”. Both deal with topics relating to identity and education.
Title: Schooling, History and the Construction of Identity in Hong Kong
Speaker: Paul Morris (Institute of Education)
Date: Wednesday 12 March, 6pm-8pm
Location: Room G.17, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, LSE
Title: Officially-Sanctioned Narratives of the War and Occupation in Hong Kong
Speaker: Edward Vickers (Kyushu University)
Date: Wednesday 19 March, 6pm-8pm
Location: Room G.17, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, LSE
[Taiwan] Don't miss the comments below! And check out my blog and its sidebars for events, links to previous posts and picture posts, and scores of links to other Taiwan blogs and forums!
And again, this is a very US-centric view. "Strategic ambiguity" is merely a means of milking the relationship with Taiwan and avoiding any kind of responsibility to the island. All the more reason for Taiwan to push for unification--at least Beijing is clear about it's position and its long-term commitments. If the US position remains "ambiguous" at best, then independence is off the table. In that case it's clearly in Taiwan's interest to negotiate the best possible deal it can get from Unification with the mainland.
ReplyDeleteI can't agree, because Taiwan has no way of (1) leaving if the agreement is not carried out and (2) ensuring that it is carried out. And we all know how real Beijing's promises are.
ReplyDeleteMichael
Taiwan is reflected in the unclaimed Spratley Islands. The recent change of control from the Philippines to a PRC invasion is indicative of the PRC intent for Taiwan. Actual control can be disputed because of claim jumping. But do international tribunal claims really work for the Taiwanese? It is far bigger than the Scarborough Atoll.
ReplyDelete