The big complaint of US-China/Taiwan watchers and players since Chen's election has been that too often his words and actions seem entirely predicated on domestic Taiwan political issues and concerns.
Almost never did Chen show appreciation, in the sense of concern and consideration, of the Bush Administration's larger strategic approach to China and world affairs, nor how events on Taiwan could run afoul of US concerns...that was the constant refrain, sometimes on the record, more often "on background" over the past six or seven years.
In that sense, Hsieh today, and en-route, is already seen as a major improvement on Chen, observers concede. But substantive concerns have not been alleviated, on the basis of what we're hearing.
We see no evidence that despite his good humor and eloquence, Hsieh has been able to resolve the two fundamental Administration concerns about the DPP's pursuit of "Taiwan identity" and "international space".
First, we don't hear any sense that the Administration accepts the DPP argument that it's the people of Taiwan who are demanding the active diplomatic pursuit of international space, including the current campaign for UN membership under the name "Taiwan";
Second, we don't hear any sense that the Administration thinks that it's necessary to have referendums or votes trying to define or pin-down the "identity" and "space" issues now, or for Chen's successor, which ever party he may represent.
What we DO hear is the very clear sense that the Bush Administration still considers these topics, AS pursued by the DPP, to be inherently provocative and therefore risky to peace in the Taiwan Strait, given the stated views and implicit threats of the PRC over the past 30 years.
Note how Chris has carefully chosen the words to describe this situation. The Bush Administration does not accept any of Taipei's positions. It does not agree that Taipei needs to have referendums, or work on identity or Taiwan's shrinking international space. The Administration thinks that pursuit of international space will trigger a war in the Taiwan Strait. Whatever you may say about the questionable idea that China could be "provoked" by Taiwan -- being provoked is a policy choice for China -- the fact remains that the Bush Administration accepts that rubric of "Taiwan provokes Beijing" as the framework for understanding US-Taiwan-China relations.
That means that Taipei's most urgent foreign policy priority must be to repair its relations with the United States. There is an enormous reservoir goodwill for Taiwan in Congress, in many policy circles, and potentially, among any supporter of liberal democracy in the US, if not the world. This can be leveraged, but Taipei has not shown that it has any clue what has happened to it, nor that it has any clue about how to conduct itself in relation to the US. China has successfully maneuvered the US into accepting its view of US-Taiwan-China relations, and Taipei does not appear to understand that, nor understand how to combat it.
There's always a temptation to compare Taiwan facing China with Czechoslovakia facing Germany just prior to Munich. But there is another, a probably more apt, comparison, and that is with the situation of Poland between the wars. Poland pursued a foreign policy that alienated both Soviet Russia and Germany at a time when it needed the friendship of one power to balance the other. That stupidity cost it half a century under Communist rule. Let's hope that history doesn't repeat itself.
[Taiwan] [US] [China]
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