In the autumn of 2006, it looked a foregone conclusion that Ma would be the next president. President Chen Shui-bian was facing the huge "Red Shirt" anti-corruption protests and an unprecedented series of KMT initiated recall votes in the legislature. The corruption attacks were centered on his son in law's insider trading case, and allegations that he and the First Lady had misused the special presidential allowance fund. Earlier corruption scandals had contributed to a landslide KMT victory in the 2005 local executive elections. Following those elections, Ma's public satisfaction rate stood at 80% compared to only 10% for President Chen. The DPP's unpopularity was reflected in a mid 2006 party identification survey that gave the KMT a twenty percent lead over the DPP.I can't understand why anyone who follows Taiwan pays the slightest attention to opinion polls from the pro-KMT papers. It continually amazes me. Once a prominent pro-Taiwan activist contacted me looking for poll data to show an academic list that the polls are not trustworthy. Huh? You mean they didn't know? Since when does Ma have a satisfaction rating of 80%.....only on a pro-Blue survey. Bottom line: Ma was never that popular -- the polls were rigged or simply invented.
Also of note is the "landslide" 2005 victory of the KMT -- in which the party took back the county chief positions and continued its dominance at the local level, but also saw huge gains for the DPP (40% at the city council level). Lots of people saw only the raw scores, and missed the trends. Fell continues with some good analysis:
Ma had long benefited from his reputation as the model of clean governance in a party renowned for black gold politics. However, Ma's clean image was severely tarnished when he came under investigation and then was indicted for misusing his own mayoral special allowance. The fact that this charge is similar to the allegations the KMT has been making against Chen has made the party's anti-corruption appeal less convincing.After discussing Hsieh's problems, Fell then observes that the issues are:
Although the KMT remains one of the richest political parties in the world and has an advantage over the DPP in its media resources, it still struggles to match the DPP in controlling the political agenda. The recent campaigns to remove Chiang Kai-shek statues and rename the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall follow the pattern of the DPP setting the agenda and the KMT reacting to DPP initiatives.
Prior to the December 2006 mayoral election most observers had predicted voters would punish the DPP for the string of corruption scandals. In actual fact, the results served to reinvigorate the DPP. Though it lost in Taipei, with Frank Hsieh as its candidate, its vote share rose significantly compared to the 2002 election. Despite being behind in the polls, the DPP retained the position of Kaohsiung mayor, the island's second largest city. It also performed well in Kaohsiung and Taipei city council elections.
The DPP has come through the nomination process looking both more united and democratic than the KMT. Hsieh was nominated after winning a highly competitive DPP party primary. This process involved three televised debates and a national party member vote. After Hsieh won the primary, all three losing candidates publicly pledged their support for Hsieh's presidential bid. In contrast, the KMT did not hold a primary, as no politician was prepared to openly challenge Ma. Ma's main rival, Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, refused to join the primary. He argued that the ethnic structure of the KMT's membership meant that the resulting candidate would not be representative of the overall population. He also claimed that the KMT's political culture meant that a primary would be too divisive and could lead to the party splitting. Instead Wang appears to be pinning his hopes on Ma being disqualified from standing if he is found guilty of corruption.
One of Ma's main achievements while KMT party chairman in 2005-2006 was to bring in tougher anti-corruption nomination regulations. Under the new rules a politician indicted for corruption would be ineligible for nomination. Thus Ma's indictment on corruption charges put the party in a severe dilemma. First the KMT revised the regulations for Ma so that a conviction rather than an indictment is the new standard for blocking nomination. If Ma is found guilty in the first trial his supporters are also proposing a further revision that would stipulate that only after losing three trials should a candidate be disqualified. Such tinkering with regulations has undermined the KMT's clean government reputation and also threatens to divide the party. Wang Jin-pyng has warned that such revisions would be unacceptable and cause a party split. If Wang used this as a justification to stand as an independent he would have little chance of victory but might divide the KMT vote sufficiently to allow Hsieh to triumph.
The previous three presidential elections have focused on two main issue areas: (1) national identity (particularly the debate over Taiwan independence versus unification with China, and Chinese versus Taiwanese identity), and (2) political corruption. It looks likely that these two issues will once again be prominent in this campaign. However, as neither party can claim to be free of corruption, that issue may be less effective.
A disappointing aspect of recent Taiwanese elections is that alternative social or economic issues have often failed to get on the electoral agenda. At the height of the 2001-2002 recession, the KMT did give much stress to economic matters but its 2001 election setback led it to subsequently downplay the issue. Similarly, the DPP has become less enthusiastic over creating a welfare state, as it has found fulfilling such pledges a tricky business now that it is the ruling party. There is concern that the DPP will attempt to boost its election chances by holding a referendum on either a new constitution or KMT party assets (which many allege to have been illegally expropriated from their owners during the era of KMT rule). Nevertheless such projects stand little chance of gaining the necessary approval from the KMT-dominated legislature.
Therefore it looks likely that the DPP will fall back on identity appeals in the campaign. In 2006-7 the DPP and KMT appear to have become more polarized on identity than at any time since the early 1990s. In early 2006, Chen broke one of his inaugural pledges by scrapping the National Unification Guidelines and Council. While the KMT had largely steered clear of unification since the late 1990s, Ma reasserted that the KMT's goal is eventual unification. The KMT's party to party negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also revealed the growing divide between parties in Taiwan, as there had been a long-term consensus that such talks should wait until the PRC removed its military threat. Lastly in the realm of symbolic politics, the DPP campaign against Chiang Kai-shek represents an attempt to play the identity card. Similarly, the KMT's response of defending Chiang reveals its shift back to embracing this Chinese nationalist idol, a symbol that the KMT had largely avoided under Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s.
Fell then raises the important issue of the legislative elections:
Another important variable for the upcoming presidential election will be the result of the January 2008 legislative election. After seven years of unsatisfactory divided government, it is likely that the winning party in the legislative election will receive a significant boost to its presidential campaign. As Taiwan will be using a new single member district two-vote electoral system for the first time, the results are hard to predict. Most analysts argue that the system will favor large parties, particularly the KMT. It is likely that the KMT will win in the north and the DPP in the south of the island. The election will be decided by who can win the central constituencies and the main parties' ability to avoid rebel and allied party candidates dividing their votes.Actually, the legislative election is eminently predictable and the KMT will win it. Because of gerrymandering, the pan-Blues have an all but insurmountable 11 seat advantage over the DPP. It will be years before the DPP wrests the legislature out of the KMT's grip.
Fell goes on to argue that the intra-party hostility is just a matter of personality issues:
It is likely that the new legislative election system will favor more moderate candidates and thus lead to less antagonistic party politics. Much of the inter-party hostility is rooted in the mutual hatred of Lien Chan, James Soong, Chen Shui-bian, and Lee Teng-hui. The fact that all four are fading from the political scene should also serve to reduce tensions.
Guess again: it's because the KMT's power is slowly being eroded, and the two sides have mutually opposed goals. It's not a matter of personalities but a structural feature that is systemic in nature. Fell then says that Hsieh and Ma are moderates, and argues Hsieh won't be "provocative" like the Big Bad Chen Shui-bian, whom we all know is the Root of all Evil.
On national identity and cross-Strait relations both Hsieh and Ma are moderate pragmatists. Under either we could expect to see calmer cross-Strait relations and closer economic integration, though Ma would go further than Hsieh in lifting economic restrictions. As Hsieh would be less likely to take the kind of provocative actions that have been a feature of the Chen Shui-bian presidency, cross-Strait tensions would be significantly reduced. However, it is unlikely that he would be prepared to make the kind of compromises that the PRC demands.
"It is unlikely that [Hsieh] would be prepared to make the kind of compromises that the PRC demands." No kidding. And whatever do you think it is that "provokes" the PRC?
[Taiwan] [KMT] [Ma Ying-jeou] [Frank Hsieh] [media]
I have always maintained that the closer polling gets, the less shiny Ma will appear. His image as Mr. Clean, sexy hero of young women was always an invented one. He has never been popular among any but the hard-core, pro-China bloc and civil servants.
ReplyDeleteIn 1999, the DPP had only Chen who could run and win against a myriad of strong Pan-Blue candidates. The Brookings Institute may have figured that by 1996 Ma was a shoe-in, but even then it was obvious the KMT had no one but him who could credibly run. And now the DPP have so many candidates they have to have a major nomination.
I seriously doubt if the Chinese KMT can ever win again - at least in my lifetime.
Good catch Michael, thanks. I sent him my Google map ;)
ReplyDeleteDamn, Scott! You're more optimistic than I am!
ReplyDeleteIn fact, the things you've pointed out must be obvious across the Strait too. So what will they do when Ma flames out?
Michae
His image as Mr. Clean, sexy hero of young women was always an invented one.
ReplyDeleteTrue. It was never really the young women who found him appealing, but the 40 somethings. Maybe mid-late 30s, tops. The soccer moms of the 1990s?
He has never been popular among any but the hard-core, pro-China bloc and civil servants.
Not true. But he is certainly losing his lustre. I think a big part of it is his tendency where he feels he must call a press conference to address every single issue facing Taiwan society out there, not matter how trivial, or no matter how little he actually knows about the issue.
He also couldn't have chosen a more unappealing running mate. A proven loser. He had his clock cleaned in 2000, along with Lien Chan.
Ma will have to run the campaign of his life, and let's face it, he is anything but a dynamic orator.
The DPP, its faults notwithstanding, is by far the more politically savvy party.
And now the DPP have so many candidates they have to have a major nomination.
ReplyDeleteThat's an exaggeration. Like the KMT, it was always a two-man race, between Hsieh and Su. The others didn't stand a ghost of a chance.
So what will they do when Ma flames out?
ReplyDeleteIf Ma loses, it will depend on:
a) how many seats the KMT has in the legislative
b) who picks up the pieces
If the KMT gains more seats that it expects to win, it may decide it has enough of a "mandate" to continue on with its bad old ways and not reform itself into a party that really does what's best for Taiwan. If, however, it is disappointed with the legislative results, a presidential loss would probably cause some introspection.
However by far the most important thing would be who takes over. As there is so much expectation over Ma, he would eventually have to skulk off. If someone with the courage to change the KMT into a real pro-Taiwan party got enough influence, there might be change. But again, if a traditionalist took charge little would change.
Even when a political party loses several elections (to form the government) in a row, some members can still refuse to accept they lost because of their policies or attitude. The hard right-wingers in the Conservative Party (UK) are an excellent example. They've lost the last three general elections, yet some members insist that hard right-wing policies will win the day - if only they're screamed even louder than in 1997, 2001 and 2005!
So basically it would depend whether a realist or someone with their head up their backsides took over.