Too often, frustrated people in Taiwan interpret a US policy statement as being animated by a desire to curry favor with Beijing. The truth is that US policy decisions are often more complex than would be the case if the sole objective were to please mainland China. It is more accurate to acknowledge the balancing act as being pro-Taiwan, but not anti-China.
Returning to the question of a national referendum in Taiwan in this context, let's consider what US officials are likely discussing as Taiwan conducts its own debate regarding the wisdom of holding a referendum next year. One can imagine categorizing referendums in Taiwan in three ways from the US perspective.
Category 1 is a referendum on a topic that relates to good governance, increasing efficiency and resolving a contentious public debate that the legislature is unable to resolve (eg, Taiwan should build a fourth nuclear power plant). A second-order benefit of a referendum in Category 1 is that the collective experience resulting from conducting the referendum in and of itself would help strengthen Taiwan's democracy.
Category 2 is a referendum that most clearly addresses the question of independence and/or sovereignty (eg, an actual referendum on whether Taiwan should declare its independence).
And finally, Category 3 would be a referendum that is highly symbolic in nature (has no consequential impact on governance and policy), and touches obliquely on questions of Taiwan's status or sovereignty.
From the US perspective, a referendum in Category 1 is quite easy to support despite pressure that might come from Beijing. In such a case, the US could comfortably support a referendum in the spirit of being pro-Taiwan (but not anti-China), and being pro-democracy (without being pro-independence).
A referendum in Category 2 is quite easy to oppose despite the deep desire among many in Taiwan to see such questions addressed in a direct fashion. The US would oppose a referendum in Category 2 on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with its non-support for Taiwan's independence.
It is Category 3 that will spark the most internal debate in Washington and whose wording will become the Rorschach test for Asia-policy experts in the US trying to manage a set of competing interests. Ultimately, Washington would likely discourage this type of referendum as well because the cost-benefit analysis for the US tilts in the negative direction.
Thus far, the proposal on the table in Taiwan rests firmly in Category 3. Holding a referendum on whether or not to seek membership in the UN under the name "Taiwan" (rather than "Republic of China") will be problematic for Washington. It is a topic that seems highly symbolic (no matter the results of the vote, there is no chance Taiwan will be admitted to the UN under any name as long as China holds a veto) and certainly touches on Taiwan's status (by virtue of specifying that the application should be made under the name "Taiwan").
Shriver is a former deputy assistant sec of state for East Asia and a longtime supporter of the island.
[Taiwan]
I resent the very pronunciation of the referendum in question as being purely symbolic. That's a huge (and very convenient for some) cop-out.
ReplyDeleteSurely, you can say that it remains a purely symbolic for the very fact that China holds veto
power at the UN, but to leave it at that is tantamount to accepting that state of
affairs.
How can it be acceptable that the nations of the world are satisfied to cooperate with a one-party authoritarian regime in keeping the citizens of a multi-party democratic nation with full civil rights from entering the UN?
Is it symbolic simply because it cannot bring about any sort of change in any kind of direct fashion? Don't forget that this kind of referendum has the potential of bringing about a very significant change of mind not only inside Taiwan, but also (and not
less importantly) in how the rest of the world sees Taiwan. One important change that the referendum can bring about is in changing how the rest of the world sees the aspirations of the Taiwanese people.
Of course, that's also the very reasons why it has the potential of angering not only Beijing, but also the USA and the pro-China parties in Taiwan.
--scott