Pages

Friday, July 08, 2005

War in the Taiwan Strait: Prospects and Possibilities

There's been quite a bit of discussion in the blogs lately, triggered by a hysterical article in the Washington Times from Bill Gertz. Asiapundit made the roundup here. One of the slew of largely identical red state sites added its two cents here. Much of this commentary has the laudable goal of countering what is essentially a bit of propaganda. Yet, in doing so, these pieces tend to go overboard with naive assumptions about the rationality of government actors in NE Asia, naive assumptions about what China is, and naive assumptions about the ability of the US to project power in the region. Essentially, this writing overestimates the power of the US, Japan, and especially Taiwan, and deeply underestimates the ability of the PRC to conduct a limited and successful war in the Taiwan Strait while suppressing public opinion at home, should any contrary opinion arise.

Let us first take up a couple of points.

In the event of a cross-strait conflict, would Taiwan's military fight. Maybe, and maybe not. The military rank and file are Taiwanese, but the officer class remains mainlander and therefore, in its heart, pro-China. I'd imagine there would be some outright defections if the Chinese actually moved, and there would be quite a lot of sabotage one way or another. The local military is riddled with PRC spies, and there has been a steady flow of retired military officers moving to China and selling local military secrets. When Chen Shui-bian became President, senior military leaders bluntly said that they would not defend the island if it declared independence.

A second problem is that the Taiwanese themselves do not want to fight China. A recent poll said about two-thirds of the young people would not fight if China came over.

A third problem is that the local armed forces are of questionable competence. Taiwan has been a pariah state for three decades now and the military has had almost no practice with foreign powers. Its tactical and technological ideas are often years out of date. The Taiwan military has four major branches, army, navy, air force, and logistics, and the last is extremely corrupt. My students, many of whom have served as conscripts in the military, often wryly joke that their job if attacked is to stand there and die.

How powerful is Taiwan? I think there are many people who consciously or subconsciously imagine that Taiwan is some kind of East Asian version of Israel. Don't.

Many pundits argue that China would be sufficiently deterred from attacking Taiwan because Japan and the US are more powerful than it, and defending Taiwan. That may be true on paper. But the US has conducted no joint large-scale exercises with the Taiwan on a regular basis. I do not know what the current level of military liaison between the two states is, but it is not very high, and certainly no tested skeleton or infrastructure exists for a wartime expansion. The same issue applies to the Japan. Again, Japan has conducted no large-scale exercises with Taiwan. This is further complicated by the fact that Japanese equipment is home grown in many cases, and not compatible with the US equipment used by the US and Taiwan. Again no formal infrastructure exists for cooperation between the two powers. In short, the US-Japan-Taiwan alliance is like the WWII ABDA alliance, one that looks great on paper, but whose mutual fighting qualities are likely to disintegrate under the pressure of serious warfare from a determined opponent. Jing asked these questions of the PLA:
What are the education levels of the officer corps? How effective is the PLA in retaining trained personnel that might otherwise head for the private sector? How quickly can decisions can be made and passed down the chain of command? How efficient is the general logistics department? How well can different combat units integrate their battlefield awareness? All of these are complicated questions that Gertz has not even addressed that are far more significant in the long term than simple hardware acquisitions.
I suggest that Jing ought to ask them of any three-way alliance of Taiwan, Japan, and the US. How long would it take to get moving? How would they talk to each other? Pentagon officials have suggested that it would take a week or two to organize a US response. China can get troops across in hours -- the Strait is only 100 kms wide. What would happen if China got troops across, in good organization, and supported by air power, and kept them there for a few days? Taiwan's largely mainlander officer corps may well defect to the other side en masse, effectively finishing any war.

Myrick at asiapundit assures us -- seriously -- that the goal of current Chinese leadership is to get rich. "In a couple of decades the WT article may make a fine basis for a Philip K Dick-style novel. Right now, it gravely misinterprets the goals of the Chinese leadership which is, simply put, to get rich." This is quite true, and yet, the goals of Chinese leadership do not end there. Annexing Taiwan is also an important goal, one that the leadership puts great stress on. It is interesting to note that China recently negotiated with Russia to let that nation have a piece of China long claimed as sacred national territories, but no flexibility is evident on Taiwan. This complete lack of flexibility should be an indication that the leadership is (1) actually dedicated to this goal, and not merely mouthing nationlist pap to feed the masses and (2) the leadership is not rational on this issue. Leaders of great nations are as susceptible to sentimentality as anyone else.

From many years of reading and watching history I put very little faith in the ability of leaders to rationally manage events. Asia watchers especially should be the first to discount the idea that leadership will avoid war to get rich, or for some similar material goal. Prior to WWII Japan followed policies whose goals were to bring it into war with China, Russia, the US, and the UK, the four largest political entities on earth, all at the same time. The current US administration invaded Iraq for no good reason at all, and persists in its folly despite the fact that it has lost that war, and despite the fact that the US did the exact same thing in Vietnam within the memory of those now serving in the military and in the Administration.

A further problem with the "don't worry be rational" theory of non-conflict is that all four states possess domestic political pressures that may compel them to act in ways counter to rationality. A good example is the recent flap over the Diaoyutai, which saw pro-China lawmakers in the Taiwanese legislature demand that Taiwanese naval units be sent to show the flag in islands whose sovereignty is disputed with Japan. The anti-succession law in China is another example, as are the anti-Japanese riots. Even where leaders are committed to "rationality" their hands are tied by other factors. As the CCP has lost its legimacy based on Party orthodoxy, it has made use of a legitimacy based on nationalism and economic growth. Invoking nationalism is dangerous, for the population is likely to be as dissatisfied with Taiwan not taken as it might be with a war to take Taiwan.

Additionally, history watchers underestimate the ability of authoritarian states to take unpopular moves while suppressing dissent. Were China to move against Taiwan, a short war might be only a blip on the development radar. Europe does not support Taiwan or Taiwan independence, and has always been ready to sell the island out in exchange for favors from Beijing. Why would trade with Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South America cease if a war begins? Certainly shipping rates might rise -- but that can be compensated for by shipping out of north China and south China, far from the war zones. If all sides tacitly agree to contain the war to Taiwan and contiguous air and water space, as seems likely, then China's economic growth need not suffer severely. Does anyone really imagine that if there is a serious war the population of China will conduct mass protests against it? As long as the economy stays liquid and the government controls the news, there will be no trouble.

Again, the "argument from the growing economy" depends on constant economic growth. Should FDI slow, or the economy fail to grow, CCP leadership may well conclude that a war would become feasible as (1) the economy is tanking anyway and (2) the public needs a diversion from worsening economic conditions. And while many reassure themselves by saying that war will bring about economic devastation, few consider the possible economic consequences to the US. Can the US sustain any kind of war with China? We cannot even afford to pay for a conflict against insurgents in Iraq.

Indeed, since only Japan and America will be prosecuting a war against China over Taiwan, it seems quite likely the opposite would happen: that those two nations will find themselves isolated from world opinion, and fighting alone. Europe will almost certain support China in a serious conflict, the Bush Administration having driven a truck through our alliance systems. China is even now reaching out to the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, on one hand for energy, but on the other, to cultivate long-term diplomatic relationships that will pay off in a conflict with the US. Again, pundits overestimate the ability of the US to bring the world in on its side, and underestimate the diplomatic skills and position of the Chinese. Many nations are dependent on the Chinese economy as major markets, and will not want to see those markets lost in wartime. They will continue to deal with the Chinese even in the event of war, and even if it means risking US wrath.

As for the Nazi comparison, I'm sure the pundits are right: the CCP, with its state capitalism, its child, youth, and adult groups, its authoritarian oversight of society, its control of the press, the internet, and the publishing industry, its Army as a state-within-a-state, its widespread corruption, its promotion of the children of the powerful to high position, its sense of racial superiority that denies the findings of modern anthropology (for example...), its structure of Leninist, centralized control, its occupation of neighboring countries like Tibet, and covetous eyes on other nearby areas, its thought police and secret police -- is nothing like Nazi Germany. No doubt any resemblance between two Leninist, nationalist, centralized, state capitalist, parties running on cronyism, and controlling the public through false historical grievances and propaganda is purely coincidental.

It is true that Gertz's writing is overblown. But the response from pundits has not been very well thought out. It consists mainly of reassurances that God's in his heaven and all is right with the world. Well, folks, there are no gods, and the world is a very uncertain place where US power has become extremely impaired by our idiotic war in Iraq and the subsequent degradation of our military, massive public debts, and the appearance of the Euro as a viable alternative currency. Things are not what they were even 10 years ago. Each of the "don't worry be rational" arguments depends on the continuance of conditions like the US ability to wage war or continued economic growth in China, whose persistence is by no means assured.


UPDATE: Maddog blogs on this topic here, with a link to James Lilley's claim that all that Taiwanese investment in China will keep things safe. Maddog is suspicious, and so am I. MeiZhongTai nails Gertz here, and links to a good article from Arms Control Wonk here.

MeiZhongTai cites David Shambaugh, who is very pro-China on the Taiwan issue (at least from what I can recall) saying:

At present, an amphibious landing and full invasion of Taiwan remains far beyond PLA sealift and airlift capabilities. The conventional wisdom is that, in such landings, a 5:1 numerical advantage is needed (irrespective of terrain): thus the PLA would have to land approximately 1.25 million troops on Taiwan within the first few days of the invasion. This is, of course, impossible. At present, it is believed that the PLAN only has the sealift capability to transport one or two divisions and about 300 tanks at a time, far short of the numbers necessary to establish a beachhead on the heavily fortified western approaches of the island. It would take approximately 600 landing crafts nearly two weeks to transport twenty infantry divisions to Taiwan. (325)

This kind of "authoritative" discussion is exactly what I am talking about. People read the possibilities by projecting US logistical behavior and demands onto the siutation. But the US army is like eccentric old woman who, wherever she goes, takes her 38 suitcases with her. The idea that anyone would plan to invade Taiwan with 1.25 million men all at once is absurd. The 5:1 formula is not total national strength but forces at the point of attack. Since China can choose a number of landing spots, including developed port areas and seafront towns, it is hard to imagine that they would move against "heavily fortified western approaches." Shambaugh is simply constructing reassuring strawmen.

How many men would be necessary to establish a beachhead on Taiwan? Not as many as Shambaugh's strawman implies. Taiwan's military is currently at 300K men (falling to 265K under planned reductions), but 50K are stationed on the offshore islands, useless for the defense of Taiwan. The reserve is about 3.8 million. Since China would not throw troops over without control of the air, the actual situation would be one where PRC troops can move over even on small craft -- commandeered fishing craft -- to reinforce a beachhead, while movement toward the beachhead by Taiwan forces is interdicted by Chinese aircraft (helped by sleepers and sabotuers). Shambuagh writes as though the Chinese are really going to invade Taiwan by formula, with overwhelming force, like the Americans would. The Chinese can improvise. (from the
link below)

The PLA also adopted a new strategy during invasion of Hainan Island in April 16, 1950; while they continued to conscripted civilian ships to transport the troops, they modified 32 of them into motorized gunboats by shielding them with sandbags and arming them with light artillery. To gain an element of surprise, the cross strait operation was conducted at night, and it was also backed by artillery and air cover, which were lacking during Jinman.
Read up on the Hainan operation -- note that the Chinese conducted the operation despite the fact that total KMT forces on Hainan were 100,000, same as the attacking force. For some reason the Chinese felt a 5:1 superiority was unnecessary. And instead of dedicated sealift forces, they commandeered whatever civilian craft were around. In short, Shambaugh does not credit the Chinese with enough daring and imagination. Read here for more: Chinadefense.com review article of PLA amphibious capabilities.

16 comments:

  1. Quite an essay! I agree with a lot of it - but I think you've got one point wrong:
    "Europe will almost certain support China in a serious conflict"
    I don't know where you get that idea from! They wouldn't provide any military assistance, but that's a long way from supporting China. I'm also confident that they would impose sanctions on China - how much and for how long is debatable, but it would be enough (when combined with US sanctions) to do serious damage to the Chinese economy, which is probably as much of a deterrent as any military response.

    ReplyDelete
  2. I disagree. Europe has been conducting military exercises with China and France has a "special relationship" with China. No European nation recognizes Taiwan. Europe cannot even declare that human rights in China are a problem, and when Chen one a human rights award there a few years ago, he couldn't even get a visa to go there. His wife had to go. Europe kowtows to China almost totally -- the weapons embargo is the rare exception -- and I doubt there will be more than token complaints about a Chinese offensive in the Taiwan straits, especially if the Chinese go about handling the Europeans properly.

    ReplyDelete
  3. And if Chen won a human rights award in the States, you think he'd be allowed to go?

    All European links with China are predicated on it being a peaceful capitalist state. If they did something like invading Taiwan (on a different scale to Tiananmen - which did result in European action), then things would change *very* quickly.

    ReplyDelete
  4. I sure hope China think I'm right :)

    ReplyDelete
  5. I agree with you regarding the strength of the mainland's desire to recapture Taiwan. But I disagree with a couple of your other assertions.

    1.) I disagree with your characterization that the mainland regime is irrational, at least in a game theory/realist sense. You might find their goal of cross-strait reunification completely distasteful, but if anything, they're being extremely rational about how they're going about to achieve reunification. They've always clearly signalled their intentions. They've never had a sudden change in policies. Yeah, a lot of their rhetoric is overblown, but I've yet to see any concrete action that could considered irrational.

    2.) I have no freakin' clue where this two year date came from. Originally, I considered any assertion that China would attack before 2008 to be ludicrous. But then after Lian Zhan's wildly successful mainland journey of love (which, no matter how much I personally Lian, I have to admit turned out better than expected,) and you'd think that anyone who has been paying attention to cross-strait relations knows that 1) Chen Shuibian is now effectively a lame-duck president who won't be able to rock the boat in the least and 2) the CCP will be perfectly content to sit on their hands and wait for Wang or Ma to be elected in 2008. Personally, I have to wonder about the motives of the Pentagon/Washington Times hawks who think that China is now going to attack Taiwan within two years. Are they scared that the LY won't approve the purchase of US$18 billion worth of second-hand US weapons that even the US admits would help Taiwan defend an invasion for at most an extra two or three days?

    3) Additionally, history watchers underestimate the ability of authoritarian states to take unpopular moves while suppressing dissent. I cannot imagine a possible scenario where a mainland Chinese person would dissent with the government over their decision to attack Taiwan.

    4.) A good example is the recent flap over the Diaoyutai, which saw pro-China lawmakers in the Taiwanese legislature demand that Taiwanese naval units be sent to show the flag in islands whose sovereignty is disputed with Japan. Kim Jong-Il ranting about how he'd turn Tokyo into nuclear ash is irrational (though, I'd disagree with even that.) Wang Jin-ping getting on a naval carrier and giving a half-assed speech about protecting ROC sovereignty is zuo xiu.

    ReplyDelete
  6. I agree with Wayne's third point. Well educated people in Kunming talk about the coming invasion of Taiwan, about how evil the Taiwanese government is. Less well educated Chinese also talk about the coming war with Japan.
    Can't think there would be a big need to control the public's opinion over a war (more than has already been done).

    ReplyDelete
  7. Initial reactions:

    1. You forgot the quote from the US officers who visited here: "We came expecting Israel, we found Panama."

    And the Taiwanese couldn't complain because Panama is a diplomatic ally!

    2. Europe will not support Taiwan with the exception of legislative resolutions and economic sanctions that would be useless.

    Also Europe has a fixation on international law (which would make any invasion technically legal, right?)

    ReplyDelete
  8. http://nihowdy.blogspot.com/2005/03/invasion-taiwan-countdown-1239-days.html

    The links leads to someone who predicts a pre-Olympic surprise invastion.

    ReplyDelete
  9. http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/TDRFAJAN2004ARCHIVES.html#TDRNSA01JAN04A

    Excellent discussion of invading Taiwan looking back in the German invasion of Norway.

    ReplyDelete
  10. WAYNE: Yeah, a lot of their rhetoric is overblown, but I've yet to see any concrete action that could considered irrational.

    MICHAEL: Hi Wayne! I'm afraid you've confused rationality of means with rationality of ends. Sure, the Chinese might be rational tacticians (although I can think of many Chinese stupidities re their advance on Taiwan), but capturing Taiwan cannot bring them any benefit that they cannot access through normal trade relations.

    What I was really getting at, though, was that the definition of "rational" used in this discussion by 'experts' is something like "managing peaceful relations to keep economic growth going." By that token, the Chinese are certainly irrational, though you or I might see them as very rational.

    WAYNE: 2) the CCP will be perfectly content to sit on their hands and wait for Wang or Ma to be elected in 2008. Personally, I have to wonder about the motives of the Pentagon/Washington Times hawks who think that China is now going to attack Taiwan within two years.

    MICHAEL: The longer Taiwan sits outside of Chinese hands, the stronger its position becomes. I have no quarrel with the "next two years" time frame. What if Ma doesn't get elected, and instead we get Su or Hsieh? Ma has zero base outside of northern Taiwan. And Wang is a Taiwanese. I am not as sanguine as most people on the next two years. The weirdness is that time makes Taiwan more independent, but it makes China relatively more powerful. When do those trends come to a head?

    WAYNE: I cannot imagine a possible scenario where a mainland Chinese person would dissent with the government over their decision to attack Taiwan.

    MICHAEL: Me neither, but they may well get bummed if the economy tanks because of a war, or many Chinese are killed. In other words, the war can have many negative political effects that will require suppression.

    Michael

    ReplyDelete
  11. Mr. Turton
    I must say you are very naive to think that Europe would support China in a Taiwan-China military conflict. This is completely absurd. The US has rattled the alliance system but as for a truck being driven through...wellvthat is just silly. Blair and Bush are still chums are their alliance is in perfect shape.
    Perhaps the French are cozy with the Chinese but when it comes down to War I think things would change. Nato would be in a sure predicament. The US has way more pull than you give it credit for.
    You have a fools logic concerning the economic aspects. China relies greatly on the US market. Look at the trade surplus. The loss of the american market coupled with the loss of it's other major trading partner Japan would throw the world into an economic mess. The current global trade system would be completely thrown into disarray and China would be in deep trouble.
    As for China being able to still trade...Another foolish statement. Japan and the US would have China sealed up rather well on the high seas and likely would not be doing much trading. They would also not likely be receiving much oil. More than half of China's oil imports come from the middle east! How are they going to secure this source? How could they get oil to China from the middle east even with the taps still open (which they likely would not be) Furthermore China does not even maintain strategic reserves of 30 days. They would be on the ropes in terms of oil rather quickly.
    A long term war between the US, Japan and China would likely not be a localised conflict isolated amongst those 3 countries. I would find it hard to believe cirumstances would not force others to become involved.
    The truth about a war over Taiwan and winnability for the Chinese is a quick attack that paralyses Taiwanese response before US/Japanese help arrives. Most analysts figure Taiwan has enough power to hold the fort for about 4 days. After that all bets are off. With this kmowledge the US is shifting resources closer to the conflict area by shifting greater US resources to Guam and Hawaii (including more advanced aircraft, and another aircraft carrier) Japan has also shifted 2 dozen F-15j's to Okinawa strengthening its position there. Future shifts are likely as well as China expands its own military strength. I would further suspect increased cooperation between the Japanese, US, and Taiwanese and further unifying of abilities. For example a number of retired Japanese military recently came here for high level consultations and the the US has decided to place permanent military representatives here in Taipei.
    While the true ability of this to take place may be in question at least the desire does show increased seriousness about the situation.
    Michael u must not forget the internal Chinese situation. If there is increased inequality within China, increased demands for social programs and need for support for an aging population is China really going to be strong enough to pursue a war. If it is a long war are Chinese families really going to be willing to lose their ONLY son, as their economy takes a nosedive and sit back and enjoy it.
    I think the deck is stacked against China in any conflict with Japan and the US. It is naive to think otherwise.
    Moreover China does not have to risk it's new power over a conflict with Taiwan. It can sit back and let the Taiwanese businessmen drag Taiwan over to China.
    Geeeez we didn't even touch on the importance of Taiwanese chip/high tech production in terms of global supply and what this would mean for the global economy if it was disrupted!
    It's great to sit back and be an armchair pundit. Living in Taiwan doesn't make us all experts though. There are innumerable things for anyone contemplating this issue to think about. It's not nearly as simple as you or I think.

    ReplyDelete
  12. I have no quarrel with the "next two years" time frame. What if Ma doesn't get elected, and instead we get Su or Hsieh?

    I just don't see there being a terribly huge advantage to attacking early. Taiwan isn't going to drift much further away from China by 2009 than in 2007. I'm no military expert, but I'd think that even if they decide to attack within a year, it'd still take them long enough to move all their troops into position that there wouldn't be much of a surprise factor going on and we could send a couple of aircraft carriers out there. I certainly don't see the US being any less entangled in Iraq in 2009 than in 2007.

    On the other hand, there's quite a huge potential gain from not attacking early, namely that they won't quite possibly won't have to attack at all. Furthermore, while I don't doubt the entire PRC population's willingness to support attacks against Taiwan, it would be a hundred times sweeter to them if Taiwan were to go back peacefully, even under some sort of quasi-federation type scenario.

    Even more, I'm guessing that the CCP is catching on that using carrots with Taiwan is a thousand times more effective than using sticks and that leading up to the 2008 election, the CCP is going to keep throwing carrots at Taiwan, that even if the pan-greens were to win, they'd be constrained by domestic pressure to pursue a policy of reconciliation (or at the very least, separatist policies like a new constitution are politically dead in the water.) I mean, that's where half the DPP is already right now, with Chen Shuibian dropping hints that he wants to do a Hu-Chen summit in DC in a bid to save his relevance and the Guotaiban in Beijing laughing at the suggestion like some night-market vendor playing hardball with a foreign tourist.

    I'm not as much of an ethnic determinist as you are. Yeah, Wang is an ethnic Taiwanese. That doesn't preclude him from pursuing some sort of reconciliation with the mainland. I don't see him as being another Li Denghui-esque TIer incognito, though certainly my mind isn't made up on that, since few people saw Li Denghui as that in the early 90s either. Indeed, I don't have a grasp on what any of the potential candidates (Wang/Ma/Su/Xie) truly feel Taiwan's position should be, simply because as far as I know they've stuck to their party line. I'm willing to listen to anything beyond cheap stereotypes of "He's ethnically Taiwanese, so he's a proud defender of the motherland" or "He's ethnically mainland, so he's a Red Book-waving surrender-monkey"

    ReplyDelete
  13. I just don't see there being a terribly huge advantage to attacking early. Taiwan isn't going to drift much further away from China by 2009 than in 2007.

    Maybe...but Jiang has said he wants to see annexation occur in his lifetime.

    that there wouldn't be much of a surprise factor going on

    None whatsoever. They'd have to gain air supremacy over the Taiwan Strait, which would take a day or two.

    and we could send a couple of aircraft carriers out there. I certainly don't see the US being any less entangled in Iraq in 2009 than in 2007.

    A couple of aircraft carriers are so much dog meat.


    On the other hand, there's quite a huge potential gain from not attacking early, namely that they won't quite possibly won't have to attack at all.

    That's a very good point.

    Even more, I'm guessing that the CCP is catching on that using carrots with Taiwan is a thousand times more effective than using sticks and that leading up to the 2008 election, the CCP is going to keep throwing carrots at Taiwan,

    Yeah, I noticed that too. Their policy has definitely become more sophisticated. They've moderated the rhetoric, and they've also done some clever things, like make foreigners residing in Taiwan get a visa in HKK before entering China, thus cutting down on the ability of Taiwan to HQ businesses with significant China manufacturing capacity. I've been thinking for years they could bring Taiwan in if only they knew how to sweet talk'em right.

    I'm willing to listen to anything beyond cheap stereotypes of "He's ethnically Taiwanese, so he's a proud defender of the motherland" or "He's ethnically mainland, so he's a Red Book-waving surrender-monkey"

    I'm glad I didn't say that, then, eh? I'm happy to respond to anything, except insulting strawman reconstructions of my posts.

    Whatever Wang's position is, the fact that he is Taiwanese may compel a different attitude in outsiders. I saw some of his campaign posters today up in Hsinchu, which I'll be posting in a moment, and they emphasized his distance from Taiwan independence. I don't know how to read that -- is it real, re-assurance, or LTH-type sneakiness? Or what?

    Michael

    ReplyDelete
  14. I must say you are very naive to think that Europe would support China

    By "support" I mean that Europe would not take an adversarial position. Just as the US supported Franco in the Spanish War by not opposing him.

    If it is a long war are Chinese families really going to be willing to lose their ONLY son, as their economy takes a nosedive and sit back and enjoy it.

    Obviously not, but the issue is not whether they are going to be willing but whether dissent can be suppressed. I think probably.

    ReplyDelete
  15. As for China being able to still trade...Another foolish statement. Japan and the US would have China sealed up rather well on the high seas and likely would not be doing much trading. They would also not likely be receiving much oil. More than half of China's oil imports come from the middle east! How are they going to secure this source? How could they get oil to China from the middle east even with the taps still open (which they likely would not be) Furthermore China does not even maintain strategic reserves of 30 days. They would be on the ropes in terms of oil rather quickly.
    A long term war between the US, Japan and China would likely not be a localised conflict isolated amongst those 3 countries. I would find it hard to believe cirumstances would not force others to become involved.


    Why would anyone choose a generalized war over a localized one? What would happen to Japan's oil supplies in a prolonged war with China? No, I suspect there will be a tacit agreement among the powers that the war would be as confined as possible because the alternative would be international chaos. And who else would get dragged in? And how?

    Michael

    ReplyDelete

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.